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ABSTRACT

Proceedings from two conferences of a society of specialists in the philosophy of education comprise this document. Fourteen papers are included from the 1989 conference program. They are: (1) "George S. Counts: Dare Educators Inspire World Vision?" (C. A. Ryan); (2) "Political Activities of George S. Counts and John L. Childs" (L. J. Dennis); (3) "Recollection" (P. A. Schilpp); (4) "The Failure of Reconstructionism" (D. G. Smith); (5) "The Legacy of Counts: Contemporary Motivational Theory in Education and the Power of the Status Quo" (R. Brosio); (6) "Zen Buddhism: A Religious Paradigm of Pedagogy" (D. Schultz); (7) "Makers of Meaning: Students as Active Participants" (J. S. Kelly); (8) "Making History, Making Lives, and Making Connections" (S. Schroeder); (9) "Neurophilosophy of Sensorial Epistemology: An Update on G. H. Mead's Second Stage of the Act" (G. W. Stickel); (10) "Conversation for Diversity: A Case for Critical Hermeneutics" (M. Abascal-Hildebrand); (11) "Democratic Character and Democratic Education: A Cognitive and Rational Reappraisal" (M. Gross); and three papers on education and institutional democracy by B. F. Radebaugh, R. P. Craig, and A. Brown. Twelve papers from the 1990 conference are presented. These include: "Ahead to the Past: Adventures in Pragmatic Justification" (J. A. Popp); "Comments" (H. S. Brody); "The Semiotics of Habit: A View of Charles Sanders Peirce's Categories in Learning" (G. W. Stickel); and "Classics and Beyond" (D. B. Owen). Other authors include Richard H. Owens, Jack S. Kelly, Ronald M. Swartz, Lawrence J. Dennis, Robert P. Craig, Edward G. Rozycki, and Alexander Makedon. The presidential address, "Doing Dewey Again and Again," was delivered by Ronald M. Swartz. (KM)

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PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE

OF THE

MIDWEST PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY

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David B. Annis
Ball State University

Associate Editor

Michael A. Oliker
Loyola University of Chicago

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PREFACE

The 1989 and 1990 meetings of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society were held at Loyola University of Chicago. The Society expresses its deep appreciation to Walter P. Krolikowski for local arrangements, to the School of Education, Dean Robert E. Roemer, and to the University for generously hosting the meetings.

The Society also expresses its appreciation to the Program Committees for 1989 and 1990 for refereeing the papers submitted for presentation and for organizing the programs.

David B. Annis
Muncie, Indiana
May, 1991

MIDWEST PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY
1989 Annual Meeting

Friday, November 10

12:00-1:00 p.m. REGISTRATION

1:00-2:15 p.m. FIRST GENERAL SESSION

Welcome: Barbara K. Townsend, Associate Dean, School of Education, Loyola University of Chicago

A Centennial Retrospective of George S. Counts and John L. Childs

"George S. Counts, Philosopher-Ideologist: A Retrospective Commentary," Gerald L. Gutek, Loyola University of Chicago

"George S. Counts: Dare Educators Inspire World Vision?," Carole Ann Ryan, Illinois College

"Political Activities of George S. Counts and John L. Childs," Lawrence J. Dennis, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale

2:30-3:15 p.m. FIRST CONCURRENT SESSION

1) Presiding: David B. Owen, Iowa State University

"Quotation, Foot-Noting, and Plagiarism," Peter J. Goldstone, Temple University

2) Presiding: George Kizer, Iowa State University

"The Failure of Reconstructionism," Don G. Smith, Nazareth College (New York)

3:30-4:15 p.m. SECOND CONCURRENT SESSION

1) Presiding: David B. Annis, Ball State University

"The Legacy of Counts: Contemporary Motivational Theory in Education and the Power of the Status Quo," Richard Brosio, Ball State University

2) Presiding: Ronald R. Morgan, Loyola University of Chicago

"Construct Validity, Context Specificity, and Testing for Critical Thinking," Charles V. Blatz, University of Toledo

4:30-5:15 p.m. THIRD CONCURRENT SESSION

1) Presiding: Richard C. Pipan, Oakland University

"Zen Buddhism: A Religious Paradigm of Pedagogy," Dayvid Schultz, University of Illinois at Chicago and Chicago City Day School

2) Presiding: Thomas I. Stark, Harold Washington College, City Colleges of Chicago

"Makers of Meaning: Students as Active Participants," James S. Kelly, Miami University (Ohio)

5:30-6:00 p.m. **BUSINESS MEETING**
Presiding: Ronald M. Swartz, Oakland University

President of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society

6:00-6:30 p.m. **WINE AND CHEESE RECEPTION**

Saturday, November 11

9:00-9:45 a.m. **FOURTH CONCURRENT SESSION**
1) Presiding: Alexander Makedon, Chicago State University
"Making History, Making Lives, and Making Connections," Steven Schroeder, University of Northern Iowa

2) Presiding: Philip L. Smith, Ohio State University
"Neurophilosophy of Sensorial Epistemology: An Update on G. H. Mead's Second Stage of the Act," George W. Stickel, Northwestern College

10:00-10:45 a.m. **FIFTH CONCURRENT SESSION**
1) Presiding: Donald Vandenberg, University of Queensland (Australia)
"Conversation For Diversity: A Case For Critical Hermeneutics," Mary Abascal-Hildebrand, University of Toledo

2) Presiding: Thomas Wren, Loyola University of Chicago
"Democratic Personality and Democratic Education: A Critical View," Michael Gross, University of Chicago

11:00 a.m.-12:30 p.m. **SECOND GENERAL SESSION**
Education and Institutional Democracy
"Introduction," Byron F. Radebaugh, Northern Illinois University
"Democratizing Health Care Facilities," Robert P. Craig, University of Houston
"What Education Can Learn From Industry," Irving Bluestone, Wayne State University
"Education and the Family," Leonard Kaplan, Wayne State University
Respondent: Arthur Brown, Wayne State University

GEORGE S. COUNTS: DARE EDUCATORS INSPIRE WORLD VISION?

by
Carole Ann Ryan
Illinois College, Jacksonville, Illinois

INTRODUCTION

The media's quotidian illustrations of the world's crash course of national interest are verified by scholorly studies. Education is called to respond to the anguished cries of contemporary civilization. From the early 1900's until his death in 1974 George S. Counts offered educators, within and beyond his civilizatioal philosophy, the insight and motivation to guide education, its processes and principales, to a soluble response for the evolvng interdependent world reality. If such testimony had appeared only in his writings of the second half of the twentieth century, it culd be acknowledged simply as a logical correspondence with contemporry concerns. While it is true that these later writings focused more directly on the global dimensions of the prospects for mankind the whole concept had been well developed in his publication of 1952, Education and American Civilization. Counts verified that he prefered this book as the most comprehensive expression of his ideas.[1] However, his awareness of the significance of a world prospective, so well developed in the aforementioned book and ursued in ensuing writings, was already appropriately evident in his earlier writings, beginning with his 1924 textbook, co-authored with J Crosby Chapman, Principles of Education.

QUARTER CENTURY COMPARISON

In the 1952 work, which looked to the past and to the futre in the middle of the twentieth century, Counts found that the curent proposals for educational reform were inadequate. Mid-century educationists were still dealing with either the surface or the mechanics of the problem, largely ignoring the basic problem of all educational thought: "...the problem of the relation of educaion to the nature and fortunes of our civilization in its historical and world setting."[2] Near the close of the first quarter of the century Counts and Chapman have already called for a restatemet of educational philosophy, emphasizing the fact that there can be no final formulation. "There is particular need today for varied formulations of a philosophy of education--formulations which,in the light of educational and psychological research, take into accunt the development of science, the revolution in industry, the rise of democracy, and the integration if the people of the world."[3] The general view of education in this early textbook defined it as a social process, an economical method of assisting the individual to cope with the ever-increasing complexities of the world. The earth man was inhabiting, even at this time, had been greatly reduce in size due to travel and communication. The immediate rivalries of two minor states had turned into a global war, illustrating how the industrial and cultural society of the twentieth century had aready knitted the whole of mankind together in intimate association.4 "Almost within the span of a generation the whole world had been crowded into a single parish."5

Although there is a disparity in the number of pages bearing a world title, two in Principles of Education versus twenty in Education and American Civilization, the impact of world implications in the close relationship between civilization an schools cannot be disregarded throughout either work. In the Chapter, "Education for a World Community" of his later book, Counts declared: "Yet the fact remains that the supreme task of the resent and the coming generation in all countries, surpassing in its urgency any domestic issue, is the development of the institutions, the outlook, the morality, and the defenses of world community." He felt that dedication to the building of a world community must foster a sustained sense of urgency and responsibility. Political realities, such as the reduction of the earth to the dimension of a neighborhood, the creation of a condition of world wide interdependence, and the widening of the sweep of war to the point of embracing the entire planet should serve as stimuli.7 Counts realized the responsibility of the United States. Such a poweful and advanced industrial state could not remain neutral on the reat world issues unless all citizens could somehow transport themseves to some other planet. "That a world order of some kind will emerge in the proximate future has already been decided by the facts of technology, provided mankind survives. The only living option before the peoples of the earth is the character of that order."8 He ascertained that Americans had difficulty seeing the world as it was and as it was becoming, especially the significance of the poverty of approximately two-thirds of the people of the earth and the rivalry and hostility between the Soviet Union and the United States. Conflicts generated from such trends"...may in time set the wold aflame. The stakes involve the whole future of mankind."9 The magnitude of such urgency to build a world community may be abent from the earlier text but the message of responsibility is clear in the problem section "How May Educators Advance the Civic life? "We already recognize the immorality of the man who places the welfare of his family above the good of the community; but little imaginaion is required to see that it is just as immoral to subordinate the interests of mankind to those of race or nation."10

A WORLD AT WAR

Although Count's textbook with Chapman in the first part of the twenties had a definite world perspective, much of his work in that period was reconstruction of the theory of education, in respose to an industrial civilization. In 1932, three papers which Count had presented at professional meetings were combined to produce his most contrversial book, Dare the School Build a New Social Order? In this Publication, he repeated the four major tasks of American education which he had stated at the session of the National Council of Education: "...to create a tradition which has roots in Amrican soil, which is in harmony with the spirit of the age, which recognizes the facts of industrialism, and which will appeal to the most profound impulses of our people."11 However, his book included a fifth task, "...and takes into account the emergence of a world society."12 He went on to note:

> *In the remainder of the argument I confine attention entirely to the domestic situation. I do this, not because I regard the question of international relations unimportant, but rather because of limitations of space. All I can say hre is that any proper conception of the world society must accpt the principle of the moral equality of races and nations.13*

Count's philosophy of a world awareness in education was till more fully defined in his 1934 volume for the American Historical Association's Commission on the Social Studies in the Schools, for which he was Director of Research. Education is regarded from the opening pages of this study as an act of statesmanship, for as educators molded the minds of the coming generation they share in shaping the future of the nation and even of world society.1 The recognition of world relations had become increasingly signifiant to any philosophy of education as the United States moved out into the world and became and integral part of a social and economic coplex that embraced most of the globe. The growth of transportation and communication, of foreign commerce, of cultural contacts with ther countries, of political commitments beyond the national border had drawn the nation into a great world complex.15 The negatie aspect of the trend toward world integration was the actuality of the institution of war. On the positive side was the potentiality of a trend toward world organization. "How can the human mind span the globe and hold in careful balance all that takes place on the five continents and the islands of the sea?"16 Technology had bound the nations together only less tightly than it had united the inhabitants of a single country. Economic interests were interating the world and curbing the forces of competition in the internaional no less than in the domestic field.

> *The great purpose of the public school therefore should be to prepare the coming generation to participate actively and courageously in building a democratic industrial society that will cooperate with other nations in the exchange of goods, in the cultivation of the arts, in the advancement of knowldge and thought, and in maintaining the peace of the world. A less catholic purpose would be certain, sooner or later,to lead the country to disaster.17*

In his 1938 study of the propects for American democracy, Counts illustrated the dependence of free institutions on popular enlightenment via a humble New England farmer. William Mannin's 1798 manuscript, entitled The Key of Libberty, endeavored to offer the means to a successful free government. Manning, a farmer, had not had six months schooling and had never traveled fifty miles from where he was born. Yet, in his promotion of an organizaton of laborers, able to disseminate the knowledge necessary for a freeman by its own series of publications, his vision extended beyond he bounderies of nations. Counts quoted him:

> *'And I have often had it impressed on my mind that in one such way as this Society might be organized throughout the world as well as government, & by sotial corraspondance mutual consestions all differences might be settled, as that wars might be bannished from the Earth.'*[18]

In view of pending war at the time of this publication, devote to the task of civic education, Counts implored citizens to acknowledge the international situation of the contemporary world; imbalace of natural resources; extreme nationalism; a technologically boud planet; and instability of institutions and organizations within and among nations.[19] In the spirit of William Manning, Counts proposed that the public school provide knowledge defined by eight specific points. Seven of these eight areas include a world dimension: the world map of resources and population; world history; the relations of nations; world economic order; soial ideas, philosophies and programs of the world; world propaganda, and democracy in the world.[20]

One year later Counts opened The Schools can Teach Demoracy with this dark prospect: "For us in America the present is an age of reckoning."[21] He felt that the League of Nations was symboic of the moral tragedy of this whole epoch. In any program for the defense and advance of democracy, the public school would have to play an important role even though it had never before faced sqarely the problem of education for democracy.[22] What was needed now was the teaching of patriotism in its most enlightened and human form in order to create a generation eager to serve community, nation and mankind in times of peace.[23]

Although the role of education is not addressed in America, Russia and the Communist Party in the Postwar World, it is significant to highlight its directive, due to the important rapport with world events and Counts's world perspective. Counts and John L. Childs based this book on three deep convictions:

> *...first, that the present global war can and must conlude in a just and lasting peace; second, that the United Nations constitute the most promising, indeed the only available agency for laying the foundation for such a peace; and third, that within the United Nations,the most crucial and impotant of the many problems faced is*

> *that of the sincere, vigorous, and enduring collaboration between the United States and the Soviet Union.*[24]

Characteristics which would be basic for a permanent peace woud have to include provisions for equal treatment and opprotunity of all the races and peoples of the earth, Asians and Africans no less. The principle of the cultural pluralism would have to be recognize in political agreements. They would thus be compatible with diversity of cultural, economic, and political institutions in the dometic life of the cooperating nations.[25] Counts and Childs warned the United States that she would have to make profound readjustments in her historical policy with regard to the rest of the world in general and the Soviet Union in particular. One readjustment would inolve abandoning the notion of avoiding entangling alliances bacause peace cannot accompany a disregard of world-wide interdependence--ecnomic, political, military, and cultural. Also, the United States would have to abandon the notion that the rest of the world could be organized in terms of her interests.[26] The perfecting of the modes of transportation and communication had contracted the earth to the dimensions of a small neighborhood and Counts and Childs held the conviction that if a lasting peace could be attained in this gobal neighborhood, it would be by the instrumentality of the United Nations.[27]

Reflecting the ensuing Cold War, Counts wrote in 1945 that Americans must realize, as they had never before, that they did not inhabit the earth alone. In Education and the Promise of America, Counts again alerted Americans to the fact that for the first time in their history a powerful rival for the affection of the common man had appeared in the world.[28] Such a time called for greatness and a great education which must be based on the obvious fundamental truth that education is always a function of some particular civilization at some particular time in history. The first responsibility for education in the present age was to formulate on the foundation of fact a conception of American civilization in its historical and world setting.[29]

TOWARD A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Count's 1951 article, "Education for a World Society" intoduced the program of education which was repeated and more fully devloped the following year in Education and American Civilization. The one short paragraph devoted to the study of Russia is developed into an independent category covering four pages of the chapter "Education for a World Community."

Writing in the early sixties, Count's essay, "The Redirecion of Public Education: A Frontier of the Sixties," repeated, expaned, and updated many of his ideas. He also added valuable impetus to his educational philosophy of world awareness. He felt the enactment of the National Defense Education Act by the Congress of the Unitd States revealed a naive level of understanding of stark realites. He stated that all the additional emphasis on science and matematics would be able to do in the present struggle for the world would be to give us time to save ourselves. The real challenge was in the realm of understanding and moral values.30

> *All of the races of peoples and nations, all of the laguages and cultures and social systems, with their accumulated ears, hatreds, ignorances, and prejudices formed during the long period of migration and conquest, are crowded together in this tiny earthly neighborhood. Whether they can learn to live together on this vastly shruken planet before they all go down in final catastrophe is the supreme question confroting mankind. Here without doubt is a basic challenge education.31*

These poignant lines served to introduce Counts' review of five inescapable realities confronting the post-modern age. First of all, geographic isolation was obsolete. Second, American oppression of dark-skinned peoples, who constitute two-thirds of the human race, could result in the loss of freedom in the world. Third, due o technical advances man now had power over the forces of nature human life and death, and the human mind. Fourth, science and technology had created a system of national and world relationhips so complex and dynamic it might be beyond the power of human cntrol. Finally, the power structure of the world had shifted from the base on which it had rested for several centuries to the Soviet Union and to the United States.32 Included in endorsement of this 1962 publication was the following commment by Adlai L. Stevenson:

> *"The shape of this great challenge has seldom been drawn with such clarity and force as in this essay by Dr. George S. Counts, who has devoted a most distinguished life to education. May all Americans who want to do something for their country read his thoughts, and ponder them, and act on them."33*

CONCLUSION

This paper has had to limit its scope to Counts's directive for a world awareness in education. However, his writings contain a prescription for what could constitute an educational program or a world community and means by which teachers may become more efective world educators. In this anniversary year it is fitting to review, recognize and renew our response to the challenge of contemporary society and of George S. Counts's legacy of world vision.

FOOTNOTES

1 John Paul Eddy, "George S. Counts After 50 Years of College Teaching," Phi Delta Kappan (June 1967), p. 507.

2 George S. Counts, Education and American Civilization

(New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1952), p. 30.

3 J. Crosby Chapman and George S. Counts, Principle of Education (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1924) pp. xi-xii.

4 Ibid., pp. 29-30.

5 Ibid., p. 288.

6 Counts, Education and American Civilization, p.413

7 Ibid., p. 415.

8 Ibid., p. 417.

9 Ibid., pp. 421-422.

10 Chapman and Counts, Principales of Education, p 289.

11 George S. Counts, "Theses' and Report of a Discussion," NEA Proceedings 70 (1932), p. 250.

12 George S. Counts, Dare the School Build a New Social Order? (New York: John Day Company, 1932; reprint ad., Carbondale, IL: Southern Illionis University Press 1978), p. 36.

13 Ibid.

14 George S. Counts, et al. The Social Foundations of Education (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934), p. 4.

15 Ibid., p. 457.

16 Ibid., p. 516.

17 Ibid., p. 544.

18 The Key of Libberty, p. 66, quoted in George S. Counts, The Prospects of American Democracy (New York: John Day Company, 1938), pp. 180-181.

19 Counts, The Prospects of American Democracy, pp. 210-211.

20 Ibid. pp. 330-337.

21 George S. Counts, The Schools Can Teach Democracy (New York The John Day Company, 1939), p. 5.

22 Ibid., p. 14.

23 Ibid., p. 22.

24 George S. Counts and John L. Childs, America, Russia, and the Communist Party in the Postwar World (New York: The John Day Company, 1943), p. 76.

25 Ibid., pp. 76-77.

26 Ibid., p. 80.

27 Ibid., pp. 12-16.

28 George S. counts, Education and the Promise of America (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1945, pp. 12-13.

29 Ibid., pp. 23, 26.

30 George S. Counts, "The Redirection of Public Educaton: A Frontier of the Sixties." In Redirection of Pubic Education, Francis T. Villeman, ed. (Toledo: College of Education. University of Toledo, 1962), p. 16.

31 Ibid., p. 17.

32 Ibid., pp. 16-20.

33 Ibid., p. 6.

Political Activities of George S. Counts and John L. Childs

by
Lawrence J. Dennis
Southern Illinois University

This year marks, as you know, the centennial of the births of both John L. Childs and George S. Counts. In fact, Counts died fifteen years ago to this very day. Childs lived on until 1985. Their careers not only ran parallel, but they also became close colleagues. They were educated in midwestern, rural America, whose values they carried with them throughout their lives; both had intense foreign experience and interests (in Counts's case, his Russian studies continued until the end of his life, whereas Childs' China attachment dimmed in his mature years); both taught at Teachers College over the same period; both returned to the midwest for their last professional assignment; both died in Illinois; and both, maybe in part due to the external similarities, spear-headed the left-wing of the Teachers College progressives. It was perhaps not surprising that both felt it necessary to become actively involved in politics. Counts, airing an idea that I find increasingly profound and increasingly true, asserted that all educational problems are at heart political problems. He therefore saw politics as an extension of his own writing and speaking. Childs, much less a polemicist than Counts, seems to have "fallen in" to the political scene, but there is no doubt that he enjoyed it--not perhaps with the relish of Counts, but certainly with an equal, if not stronger, sense of obligation.

Let me give you very brief biographical sketches which I have no doubt bear on what they did, and which might help you put their work in context. Childs was born in Eau Claire and went to the town's public schools. He attended the University of Wisconsin and graduated in 1911 with a degree in Journalism. Upon graduation, he worked for the university branch of the YMCA. At that time, he believed rather enthusiastically in fairly main-stream Methodism, and his religious convictions were sufficiently strong to take him to China in 1916 as a missionary. He worked there until 1927, saving an eighteen-month break to take his masters degree in Religious Education at Union Theological Seminary and Teachers College. In China he quickly came to believe that his first responsibility was not to the religious conversion of the young Chinese, but to their social welfare. As a result, he became very active in promoting self-help for the Chinese, leading them, he hoped, to more democratic social and political arrangements. Incidentally, it may be no coincidence that Dewey was also in China in 1919 and 1920. He wrote Reconstruction in Philosophy in the far east, and he stayed with the Childses while he was in Peking.

Childs' conversion, and I can use no better word, to pragmatism was not completed until the conclusion of his doctoral program, also in Religious Education, again jointly at Teachers College and Union. His principal professor was Harrison "Sunny" Elliott, but he drew very close to William Heard Kilpatrick. Incidentally, Elliott was one of the original members of Kilpatrick's famed "Discussion Group." Childs was not; Counts was. Childs had Dewey for three classes, and clearly Dewey was the dominant intellectual influence on him, although he remained personally close to Kilpatrick. Childs's published dissertation, Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism, already shows him moving slightly to the left of Dewey. For, although he stated that the experimentalists' basic educational aim is "to develop individuals who can intelligently manage their own affairs, at times 'alone', more usually in shared or joint enterprise,"[1] he also stated that education must develop individuals "who through critical experimental procedures come to possess the resources needed to carry on this responsible work of social reconstruction."[2]

Childs was, by then, a trained philosopher; Counts was not. Counts was probably the first trained educational sociologist, at least the first graduating from the University of Chicago. Although his experiences in Russia and his indignation at the social misery wrought by the Depression had made George Counts the principal spokesman for social reconstructionism, he, like Childs, had long prepared for this role. He took four classes with Albion Small while a doctoral student at the University of Chicago. Small in turn was strongly influenced by the work of his teacher, Lester Frank Ward, who as early as 1895 had stated that educators "shall not rate themselves as leaders of children, but as makers of society. Sociology knows no means for the amelioration or reform of society more radical than those of which teachers hold the leverage."[3] And a year later that education "must assume some of the responsibilities for the eradication of social problems."[4] Counts's three important books of the 1920s, during which time he was still in his empirical period, all deal with themes of social import. In the last of these, the Senior High School Curriculum, Counts urged the schools "to make positive contributions toward the regeneration of the individual [and] the reconstruction of society."[5] In the following decade no one did more to bring this about.

Now to their political activities. In the interests of time, today I will limit myself to only their union activities. Childs started, like many professors who feel the need to share the responsibilities of membership in the academy, as a campus gadfly. Unlike most of us who get involved in campus politics, faculty at Columbia could find themselves in the pages, not of a paper like ours in Carbondale (Southern Illinoisan), but of the New York Times. There's a certain notoriety in that, isn't there? And thus it was with with Childs, when, in 1935, he joined the Columbia chapter of Local 5 of the AFT. That summer he was already publicly urging teachers to join the labor movement, and to take sides on social and economic questions. The following year he represented the Chapter in the delegate assembly for Local 5. This was doubtless as a result of his chairing of an in-house committee which investigated the firing of some dining hall workers at Teachers College. In fact, the sort of thing that some of us here have or might have done--but Childs did so in New York. In this instance, Dean William F. Russell was, and always remained, adamantly opposed to unionization, thus disagreeing with Childs. However, beyond the rights or wrongs of collective bargaining, and Childs' committee found the workers had been seriously wronged, the debate at TC was whether an institution that preached democracy even had a choice not to practice it as well. The incident was commented upon in the pages of the Nation, the New Republic, New York World Telegram, School and Society, and mentioned in the New York Times. The union issue continued to divide the Columbia faculty; the following summer (1937) Russell spoke out at a public meeting against unionization for teachers followed a week later by Childs who roundly rebutted Russell's position.

But as favorable as he was to the principles of collective bargaining for teachers at all levels, Childs had long been wary of the growing domination of Local 5 by Stalinists. In April 1938 he was nominated for the presidency of the College Local, now newly named as Local 537, but declined. In fact his membership had lapsed at the end of the previous December. Ominously, he had found that "every crucial issue was discussed on the basis of political sects which stemmed from Russia's tragic divisions. I was puzzled by the trend of meetings sponsored by the Union. The favored interests of the Stalinist group would always emerge in frequently wholly irrelevant resolutions. Soon I and others were filled with grave doubts on union trends."[6]

Now the union leadership turned on Childs and not only did it disavow any Stalinist taint but attacked Childs' personal commitment to the union cause which, in fact, never wavered. Counts, allied with Childs throughout the dining hall workers dispute and the leadership fiasco (which was quite a notorious affair), decided to remain within union ranks, but the withdrawal of the one and the continued membership of the other were reported in all the leading newspapers of the country. Counts himself decided to run for presidency of Local 537, which Childs had declined to do, but he was defeated. He was by now thoroughly disillusioned by the Soviet system, not that he had ever been completely taken in by it. He had come to love the people during his three trips to Russia, and had developed some close friendships. His last visit to Russia came in 1936 and one of those friends, Albert Petrovich Pinkevich, saw him off at the railway station in Moscow. He never heard from him again. He had been liquidated in the first big Stalinist purge. Any lingering reservations Counts might have had were swept aside, and he was fierce in his efforts to loosen the control of the Stalinists (who did not, in fact, have majority control but did control the procedures). So he went to the national convention of the AFT in August 1939 determined to win the presidency. He himself thought his chances to be pretty dismal, when, literally on the eve of the ballot, the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact was announced. This unholy alliance between fascism and communism shocked everyone, and brought home to all the absolute untrustworthiness of the Stalinists. Counts won the election easily, and an investigation of the locals got underway immediately. By May 1941 those offending locals had been expelled from the AFT. Counts wrote to Childs, "It has been a bitter fight, but I think it was necessary. We must do whatever we can to root out of American democracy every vestige of the totalitarian pattern, whether it is on the so-called right or on the so-called left."[7] Counts served a total of three terms as national president of the AFT, and the first year gave over 100 speeches across the country while still attending to his duties at TC. But as things heated up in Europe, he began to direct his work toward issues of war and peace. He stepped down in 1942 but continued to serve as one of the vice presidents of the AFT.

Counts and Childs (chair), among others, were appointed to the AFT's Commission on Education and the Postwar World. Under its auspices they produced their slim volume, *America, Russia, and the Communist Party in the Postwar World*. It was highly praised, and even now seems very forward looking. They called for accommodation with Russia, the end of an isolationist attitude, an understanding of communism, and the assumption of a global perspective largely through support for a United Nations. It was published serially in the *New York Post*. Again under the auspices of the AFT, Childs and Counts authored a short pamphlet in which they spoke out against compulsory military service because it reinforces "a horse-and-buggy military policy in an atomic and missile age."[8] They write, "The simple conception of national defense is narrow and traditional military terms can only serve to lull us into a false sense of security. The safety of our country--and of democracy throughout the world--demands a sweeping and comprehensive defense, on many fronts. It calls,... above all, for an educational system that will give our children an abiding belief in democracy and the willingness and ability to defend it." And, they add perceptively, "physically, morally, and intellectually."[9]

I think we can only mourn the absence of such rhetoric in the current calls for educational reform (although still small cries can be heard in the land that sing in a nearly related key). Theirs was a broad vision cast to the corners of the planet. Dr. Ryan has noted the interest of Counts in global issues; Childs was similarly committed.

I had hoped, and indeed promised by my title, that I would discuss Childs' and Counts's political activities, and I've only dealt, and that very briefly, with some of their union activities. Well, time is not kind to those of us anxious to share our work with others, but, like all teachers, I do have an eye to the clock, and thus will save until another time a discussion of Childs' and Counts's contribution to the work of the American Labor Party and the New York Liberal Party. I would like to say, however, that all the leading New York reconstructionists, and to Counts and Childs should be added Harold Rugg and George Axtelle, and with caution even John Dewey himself, believed that their commitment required *action*, and be involved in "socially useful work."[10] That, of necessity, involved entering the political foray, getting one's fingers dirty, and showing us by their example that the ivory tower is no excuse for disengagement.

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[1] John L. Childs, *Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1931), p. 93.

[2] Ibid., p. 89.

[3] Quoted in Herbert M. Kliebard, *Struggle for the American Curriculum, 1893-1958* (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987), 62.

[4] Quoted in Charles D. Jay, *Doctoral Program of George S. Counts at the University of Chicago 1913-1916* (Unpublished dissertation, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, 1982), p. 312.

[5] Quoted in Kliebard, p. 185.

[6] *Guild Teacher* 4 (18 January 1939) 9, p. 1.

[7] George S. Counts to John L. Childs, 19 June 1941.

[8] *To Provide for the Common Defense* (Chicago: AFT, 1948), p. 8.

[9] Ibid., p. 10.

[10] *Justice*, 15 June 1944, p. 6.

RECOLLECTION

by

Paul Arthur Schilpp, Professor Emeritus
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale

When I was a very young man in my early thirties, in the first days of my career at the College of the Pacific in Stockton, California, I became interested in the work of John Dewey. Later, by the time I was 42, I had selected that great and original American philosopher as the subject of my first volume in the *Library of Living Philosophers*.[1] This was in 1938/39.

As part of my early explorations on Dewey, I had come upon the work also of George Counts and John Childs. Although it was George whom in time, I came to know best, it was with Childs that I first had correspondence, inviting him to write on "The Educational Philosophy of John Dewey" for my *Dewey*-Volume.

Counts' name had become firmly implanted in my mind with his tract of 1932--*Dare the School Build a New Social Order?* I was only 35 at the time, and to me he seemed an "older man," distinguished and respected, although only 8 years my senior. The 52-page book was soon making a stir in educational circles. I, myself, was a political dreamer who headed the regional office of the Norman Thomas Socialist Party. I was enthralled to find the words of this prominent educator who encouraged teachers to take on the *challenge of building a better society*. Few people, during the throes of the Depression in the 1930's, were contemplating the link between education and a better real world. But George Counts dared to say:

> We can view a world order rushing rapidly toward collapse with no more concern than the outcome of a horse race; we can see injustice, crime and misery in their most terrible forms all about us and, if we are not directly affected, register the emotions of a scientist studying rats in a laboratory....In my opinion this is a confession of complete moral and spiritual bankruptcy.

The man who wrote these words was more than an ivory tower professor within the confines of Columbia University. He was a man who dared to travel intrepidly into Russia several times long before most tourists would set foot there. He rode in a Model T over rough roads and uncharted paths. He was never taken in by the political theory of Communism, although some yellow journalists from William Randolph Hearst's newspapers tried to smear him. Actually, of course, he fought Communist infiltration within the American Federation of Teachers.

Counts also ventured into Japan long years before there was popular airfare and extensive tourism there. He wanted to see for himself what American educators might learn from the Japanese.[3] Throughout his long career it remained his ambition to see education and learning related to a better world order, a more equitable society.

> There is the...fallacy that education is primarily intellectualistic in its processes and goals. Quite as important is that ideal factor in culture which gives meaning, direction, and significance to life. I refer to the element of faith or purpose which lifts man out of himself and above the level of his

> more narrow personal interests. Here, in my judgment, is one of the great lacks in our schools and in our intellectual class today. We are able to contemplate the universe and find that all is vanity. Nothing really stirs us, unless it be that the bath water is cold, the toast burnt, or the elevator not running; or that perchance we miss the first section of a revolving door. Possibly this is the fundamental reason why we are so fearful of molding the child.

His views were strong as ever when Professor Counts and I came together, along with Professor Childs, also, all as emeriti from our major institutions to Distinguished Retirement Professorships at Southern Illinois University in Carbondale. Both of them I saw from time to time in the free-spirited Unitarian Church on Sundays. It was on the occasion of Counts' 80th birthday that one of my colleagues, Dr. John Hayward, wrote a delightful poem that, in conclusion, I would now like to share with you.

WHY GEORGE COUNTS - - -

Some Poesy for his 80th Birthday

May the Muses of all poesy by which my spirit mounts
Now light my fuse to sing the praise of George Sylvester Counts.

Some men in weight and character are measured by the ounce.
But we must shout in megatons of hefty Georgie Counts.

From Kansas farm to woodland traps ranged forth this eager quester.
"And then I met that girl," says he. Behold, a new Sylvester.

Aloha, then, to Lois whose better, best, and bester
Conferred an academic life on country boy Sylvester.

Our Hero's verbal prowess and endurance none can trounce.
You have to call in Lois if you want to silence Counts.

On Russian roads in Model T he drove with joyful jounce,
This troika, vodka, balalaika, swingin' Russki, Counts.

Then Willie Randolph Hearst on this Russian trip did pounce
And loosed a swarm of calumnies 'gainst George Sovietski Counts.

But with these puny fleabites, our hero did not fester:
"The remedy is planet-wide," says Gorgeous George Sylvester.

"Take vodka, cherry brandy, and applejack for bounce.
Far better than an H-bomb!" prescribes old Dr. Counts.

"Old men and distant travelers may lie," he would announce.
But even lies enhance the wit of sly Sylvester Counts.

The groves and gardens of Japan for him are sacred grounts.
A Shinto streak enshrines itself in Nature-loving Counts.

For him all books are berries to be eaten by the pounds.
And everything that thus goes in comes out as purely Counds'.

If his teaming brain should fail some proverb to pronounce,
A wrinkled slip from pocket fetched will speak the word for Counts.

Says he, "It takes more years than mine, 'ere Gabriel's trumpet sounts,
To pay for sins in former lives when no one called me Counts."

O blessed sins enjoyed and kept by their inspired investor!
How else could we at this late date make merry with Sylvester?

LONG MAY THE FIRES OF JOY AND TRUTH STILL BURN UPON HIS FORGE!
WE CRY ALOUD OUR FOND SALUTE TO OUR BELOVED GEORGE!

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2. George S. Counts, *Dare the School Build a New Social Order?* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978). p. 19-20. Originally published in 1932.

3. In fact, Counts only made one trip to Japan. That was in 1946 when he served as a member of the Education Commission to Japan, whose purpose was to advise General MacArthur on the restructuring of Japanese education.

4. Counts, p. 19.

5. John F. Hayward, typescript, 7 December, 1969.

The Failure of Reconstructionism

by
Don G. Smith, Ph.D.
Nazareth College of Rochester, N.Y.

In the 1930's George Counts and some other progressivist educators advanced the idea of schools as agents of social reconstruction. Public schools, they said, should become institutions of social change, among their objectives being justice, social and economic equality, and cultural pluralism. As we prepare to enter the 1990's it is clear that the reconstructionist agenda has made little if any progress. Now, on the one hundred year anniversary of the birth of George Counts it is appropriate that we review the reasons for the failure of reconstructionism, and that we understand why the philosophy has no foreseeable chance of altering American society in any fundamental way. In essence, we can attribute the failure of reconstuctionism to the power configuration of America's focal institutions which ensures the maintainance of the status quo, and to certain problems in the foundation of reconstructionism itself which hinder its efforts to effect fundamental change.

According to Bertran Morris, we differentiate societies by the way their institutions interact to form particular patterns and configurations.[1] The priorities of a culture mark its cultural focus. The cultural focus is that institution or set of institutions that give people's activities direction and meaning. Though all social institutions have their own spheres of influence, a strong case can be made for the dominance of the economic institution of capitalism. Reknown historian Charles A. Beard argues convincingly that the American constitution is indeed an economic document. Pulitzer prize winning historian Richard Hofstadter ably demonstrates how American religious institutions overtly transmit capitalist values in their interpretation of the Judaeo-Christian faith. Historians, sociologists, and social critics such as Michael Parenti, C. Wright Mills, and Noam Chomsky meticulously document the power of America's economic institutions over lesser institutions such as the mass media, the military, the political system, the family, and the schools.[2]

The United States is a capitalist democracy. To the founding fathers "freedom" largely meant the ability of capitalist entrepreneurs to generate profits without governmental restraints. Social critic Benjamin Ginsburg argues that Western governments have always used market mechanisms to regulate popular opinion and promote state power.[3]

In other words, the American economic elite maintain the status quo by controlling "the marketplace of ideas." The economic elite control the range of what is thinkable by controlling the mass media. Noam Chomsky documents the existence of what he calls "the propaganda model": "the media serve the interests of the state and corporate power, which are closely interlinked, framing their reporting and analysis in a manner supportive of established privilege and limiting debate and discussion accordingly."[4] Political parties, television stations, and major newspapers do debate the issues of the day, but all within the accepted parameters of what Chomsky calls "the bounds of thinkable thought."[5] We can all tinker with aspects of the system, but substantially to alter the system itself lies outside the established parameters circumscribing what most Americans perceive as reality. The average person is unable to give serious consideration to suppressed ideas that never become part of the climate of opinion. As Parenti concludes, "almost all the social institutions and material resources existing in this society are controlled by non-elected, self-selected, self-perpetuating groups of business people who are accountable to no one but themselves."[6]

Because capitalist interests control the access to ideas, Madison Avenue drives consumers to want far more than they need, a state of affairs necessary for capitalist market expansion. Rather than demanding the knowledge and information needed for social, political, and economic freedom, Americans have settled for what Jeffrey Schrank calls "pseudo-choice," a state of affairs in which people mistake the freedom to choose among a wide array of consumer products for real freedom.[7]

Parenti summarizes the effects of this control by the economic elite:

> ...the history of the great "affluence" in the United States since World War II is of people becoming increasingly entrapped in a high-production, high consumption, high-profit system. Millions of Americans live under starvation conditions; millions are desperate for work; millions are afflicted by one or another socioeconomic pathology. Millions live in dilapidated, ill-heated and hazardous domiciles. Millions who identify themselves as middle class live in overpriced, poorly constructed, heavily mortgaged homes or high-rent apartments that consume a large part of their incomes while providing living quarters that are far from satisfactory. Millions are immobilized by inadequate public transportation facilities and have no access to decent recreational areas. At the same time, our rivers are turned into open sewers by the countless tons of raw industrial waste dumped into them, our bodies damaged by environmental pollutants, our forests and wildlife destroyed, our roadsides uglied by commercial enterprise, and our cities are showing serious signs of decay and bankruptcy.[8]

While it may not be readily apparent, America's ingrained anti-intellectualism also makes it simple for the status quo to perpetuate itself. Richard Hofstadter copiously documents the distrust of intellect inherent particularly in America's economic, religious, political, and educational institutions.[9] If people have little inclination to ponder important ideas that question the status quo, and if the focal institutions discourage people from doing so, then the power elite is relatively free to perpetuate itself. Unfortunately, a new product can interest Americans in ways that an idea cannot.

Of course, reconstructionists are aware of these and other problems. In fact their philosophy is dedicated to the eradication of such problems. Reconstructionists often appear, however, to under-estimate the degree to which the power elite exercise their control over public schooling, the very institution that reconstructionists feel can build a new social order. Today, few would challenge the conclusion that common schools were formed with the primary purpose of producing docile workers for corporate America.[10] Since their founding, public schools have functioned as agents of social control, not as agents of social change. The business community continues to dominate school boards and to produce reform documents whenever certain changes are needed to keep their capitalist ventures economically competitive.[11] Rather than function as agents of social change, public schools promote a hidden agenda of economic conservatism through the cultural transmission of the traditional curriculum.[12] This curriculum, incidently, is disliked both by educational conservatives such as Adler and Hutchins and by such educational liberals as Dewey and Brameld. In summary, reconstructionists are doomed to failure because the school is not, and under present conditions can never be, a focal institution. Beyond these social realities, however, reconstructionists are also doomed to fail because of their relativistic foundation and because of their reliance upon the role of the teacher.

Most reconstructionists agree that no one ideology or set of values should dominate the school curriculum. Instead, in a world of pluralism, all values should be accorded representation. In a world of diversity students are to respect the worth of all cultural values. Unfortunately, this current of relativism popularized in America by the Pragmatists is antithetical to producing the sort of commitment required for the building of an ideal society. If all values are relative, then values such as justice and equality must be relative. Given the current state of affairs, some gain and some lose. Likewise, if society is reconstructed, some will gain and some will lose. In a pluralistic world in which all values are relative, it is hard to get excited about social change. In a world of relativism, the only impetus for reconstruction is the enhancement of one's own relative position. High-minded ideals must eventually give way to self-interest, and, regardless of the rhetoric, reconstructionism then degenerates into a power struggle between the have's and have-not's, each with an equal right to its socio-political enhancement at the cost of the other. The more pluralistic the process, the more difficult it will be to engender in the people a common purpose.

Reconstructionists realize that if they are to succeed, much depends upon the role of the teacher. Yet, the American teaching corps is a product of the very public school system that must be reformed if reconstructionist teachers are to be produced. American teachers are produced by the same school system that discourages critical thinking and which replicates existing inequalities of wealth, power, and opportunity. American teachers are no more intelligent or intellectual than any cross section of the general population.[13] They have read few of the great books and have critically considered few of the great ideas upon which our society is reputedly based. For instance, in their study of certain Utah school systems, Bullough, Goldstein, and Holt found that "the teachers' own senses of democracy were vague."[14] Therefore, it should not be surprising that their students suffer likewise. To understand fully the concept of democracy, one must read and consider the works of John Locke, of John Stuart Mill, and of our founding fathers. Yet those works go largely unread and unconsidered, as do the works of Karl Marx and the intellectuals of the Left. Great ideas such as equality, freedom, and democracy become unchallenged slogans manufactured by the power elite for mass consumption, unwitting and well socialized public school teachers being primary agents in the process. Thus far, teachers have been part of the problem, and nothing on the horizon provides hope for change.

So, dare the schools build a new social order? Dare what they will, they cannot. Ivan Illich is probably correct in concluding that schools are constitutionally incapable of promoting social change, but because they serve such a vital function for the power elite, it is unlikey that they will be abolished as Illich recommends. In fairness to reconstructionsism, no other educational philosophy has a better chance of bringing about change. Other than socialization of the masses, no coherent philosophy underlies what goes on in American public education. Instead, public schools are moved by whatever social, political, or economic conditions arise to endanger the profit margin of the power elite. These concerns are usually addressed by adding some new course to the already over-crowded curriculum or by announcing some new program that must be adopted for America's economic security.

The best to be hoped for is that a few educators of the Adler and Hutchins mold will persuade some teachers to begin reading about and discussing important ideas, and that as a result a few people will begin to understand more clearly our existing conditions and their causes. These few people would then be able to evaluate critically the constant barrage of advertising that they have largely passively assimilated. These few might then seek out other ideas in addition to those promoted by the media and the schools. Finally armed with the liberal arts and freed by the liberal studies, some might be able to seek, to consider, and to balance ideas. That much is possible to a small degree. Anyone familiar with the American power structure and its lock upon ideas knows that any more is largely wishful thinking.

Notes

1. Bertran Morris, *Philosophical Aspects of Culture* (Antioch Press, 1961).

2. See Michael Parenti, *Democracy for the Few* (St. Martin's, 1980), C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (Oxford University Press, 1956), and Noam Chomsky, *Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies* (South End Press, 1989).

3. Benjamin Ginsberg, *The Captive Public* (Basic Books, 1986).

4. Chomsky, *Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies*, 10-12.

5. Chomsky, *Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies*, 59.

6. Parenti, *Democracy for the Few*, 35.

7. Jeffrey Shrank, *Snap, Crackle, and Popular Taste: The Illusion of Free Choice in America* (Dell, 1977).

8. Parenti, *Democracy for the Few*, 32.

9. Richard Hofstadter, *Anti-intellectualism in American Life* (Vintage Books, 1962)

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11. For a study of the control of public schooling by business see Raymond Callahan, *Education and the Cult of Efficiency* (University of Chicago Press, 1962) and Joel Spring, *American Education: An Introduction to the*

Social and Political Aspects, fourth edition (Longman, 1989), chapters 1, 6, and 7.

12. Edward J. Power, *Philosophy of Education* (Prentice-Hall, 1962), 180-188.

13. Hofstadter, *Anti-intellectualism in American Life*, 318. See also "Help! Teacher Can't Teach," in *Time* (Vol 115, #24, June 16, 1980). Studies abound documenting the poor preparation of our teacher. For example, see Francis Griffith, "Teachers are Part of the Problem," in *American Education* (October, 1983).

14.. Robert V. Bullough, Jr., Stanley L. Goldstein, and Ladd Holt, *Human Interests in the Curriculum* (Teacher's College Press, 1984), 122.

The Legacy of Counts: Contemporary Motivational Theory in Education, and the Power of the Status Quo

Richard A. Brosio
Teachers College
Ball State University

INTRODUCTION

George Counts, "like hell he does." A quantifier wrote "like hell he does" after Counts' name on the library book's title page. The graffitist turned Counts' surname into a verb, and then criticized him for not being a number cruncher. I do not sympathize with the graffitist in his/her attempt to deride Counts for not being a positivist; however, I am convinced that George Counts did not accurately count the allies and "foot soldiers" he had when he issued his call to arms in Dare the School Build a New Social Order? (1932). Furthermore, many of the contemporary, motivational, educational theorists suffer from the same problem when they fail to evaluate accurately the power of those who are opposed to their ideas and proposals. While it would be unfair and inaccurate to blame Counts for the work being done by motivational theorists in education today, I am convinced that they and Counts can be linked easily - and that their common flaws are apparent. Many of the contemporary motivationalists acknowledge their debt to Counts, and his original call to arms. My intent is to analyze this motivational tradition, within the context of what I consider to be a more sober - and realistic - appraisal of what is to be done, within a status quo which is characterized by democratic and capitalist imperatives.[1]

(1)

The great tradition in philosophy which has allowed an analysis, and criticism, of the descriptive "is", in the name of the normative "ought", has been effectively used by contemporary educational theorists who belong to various leftist perspectives. The tension between "is" and "ought" is always a fragile one, because although speaking in terms of the normative "ought" provides the possibility for moving beyond any status quo and/or its legitimacy, the theoretical analysis and critique must be related accurately to the lived experiences of the particular historical period which is being studied. My concern is that some important theoretical work in education-schooling has come close to losing touch with the grim reality of the contemporary status quo. Admittedly, the relationships between lived reality and normative critique are not simplistic, nor either-or; in fact, the complex relations are dialectically interactive - however, the fragility of the connection can still be broken.

It appears that the basic goal of these motivational theorists is to promote the possibilities for human agency, so that educators, students, parents, et al. can act collectively in order to improve schools, education, and the larger society. These theorists have labored tirelessly to combat the supposed deterministic tendencies, and realities, in Marx's work. More specifically, the emphasis upon the possibilities for human agency has occurred as part of an energetic reaction to Bowles and Gintis' landmark book, *Schooling in Capitalist America* (1976). It is ironic that the heated celebration of human agency by the left should have occurred during a period of reactionary triumph. Evidence compels us to admit that the period since 1976 has featured few opportunities for progressive democratic achievement - especially in the United States. The theorists of possibility, agency, and hope have been surrounded by quite pessimistic social, political, economic, judicial, and educational realities throughout the West, which has followed U.S. neo-conservativism and reaction.

Nicholas Burbules has written, "Seizing on the notion of resistance, many radical scholars in education are arguing that the failure of reproduction theories are not only theoretical and explanatory, but also ideological and motivational . . . [in other words] they . . . alienated and discouraged the very people who can change schools . . ."[2] The apparent concern for the weakening of educators' motivation - if deterministic Marxists are correct in their interpretation of what *cannot* be done - is at bottom a fear that there will be little work to do in the educational community, or site. George Wood makes this point very clearly, ". . . they [Bowles and Gintis] have built a mechanistic analysis which ignores the actual internal workings of schools. In doing so they give radical educators little to do but gather in study groups and await the . . . collapse of capitalism . . ."[3] Henry Giroux has said that "Teachers at all levels of schooling represent a potentially powerful force for social change."[4] It does not seem plausible to contend that the majority of educators - especially K-12 public school teachers - suffer from low motivation primarily because *Schooling in Capitalist America* is viewed as being reductive and deterministic. Radical educational theorists who have made exaggerated claims for teachers' roles, for motivational reasons, have carried on important work for themselves; however, it is difficult to see much evidence of their work having an important impact beyond the circles of persons who read, and can understand, their publications. It may not be a wise tactic for these theorists to make motivational and/or ideological claims in order to win short term gains, at the expense of a more sober, realistic, empirical, and believable thesis.

Speaking of revisionist educational historians, Marxist reproductionists, and "de-schoolers", Wood tells us that these analyses ". . . have been translated into a political strategy disavowing the roles many progressive educators envision for themselves . . . [they] argue that there is neither a role for schools or in schools bringing about social change."[5] I do not believe that Wood's self-proclaimed cynical opponents have ever claimed that good teachers make no difference in the lives of their students. What many persons, who are criticized by Wood, said is that the educational system in the United States represented a substitute for real equity, and that the internal working of the school system hardly allowed equitable outcomes for students. The scholars who are disliked by contemporary motivational theorists are those who have argued that empirical evidence does not allow us to believe that American schools were, or are, springboards for radical change.

When theorists like Wood, Giroux, et al. tell us that we must eschew reductionist and reproductive models, they also rightly suggest looking inside of the "black box" which is far more complex than non-educational specialists and orthodox Marxists believe the school to be. However, it is not clear whether close-up studies of schools - or within the "black box" - will provide empirical evidence that good things are happening which contradict the analyses of those scholars who are criticized by the motivationalists. There is a good deal of evidence that schools do serve basically as reproductive institutions. One could agree with motivational theorists that the reproductive process is more subtle and complex than Bowles and Gintis described it in 1976, but still reach pessimistic conclusions because of the grim evidence published by non-radical scholars like John Goodlad, in A Place Called School (1984). The fact that the institutional school, in an advanced, capitalist, democratic society is answerable to both capitalist and popular imperatives, or pressures, does not necessarily make it a springboard for the reform of itself, let alone the host society. The relative autonomy, which the school does in fact enjoy, allows for more modest claims than have been made by the theorists being analyzed herein. I continue to believe that more persons can be better educated to understand the issues, and seek to promote the empowerment of all citizens, but the plans for accomplishing such improvement must be based upon sound theoretical insights.

Closely related to a motivational, ideological interpretation of possibility for counterhegemony or oppositional activities is the abandonment of the Marxist paradigm or problematic. Peter McLaren believes that a choice must be made between being Marxists and revolutionaries. This assertion necessitates what McLaren really means by the term revolutionary, during this historical period and status quo. McLaren charges that Marxism and its concept are able only to interpret the world, but not to transform it. The implication is that his, and other motivational theorists', work allow correct interpretation, and transformation. This is not an exercise in diffidence. For McLaren, ". . . it matters less that any test for the "truth" of an idea is incontrovertible than it matters whether or not the idea can be linked to a praxis of emancipation."[6] McLaren thinks that "class reductionism" is afflicted with despair ". . . and contribute[s] to a tendency among radical educational theorists to eschew a logic of possibility."[7] Landon Beyer and George Wood demote the proletariat, or working-class, to a "particular social group". Marx, of course, saw the proletariat as the potential universal "everyperson". But, for Beyer and Wood, this privileging of the proletariat ". . . generates a theory of moral decision making [called] 'social moral relativism'."[8] One could conclude, through hindsight, that Marx's nineteenth century belief and anticipation of the proletariat's eventual emancipatory role was inaccurate, and still disagree with Beyer and Wood that there is no rank order of radical revolutionary potential among oppositional groups within this society. Many, or perhaps even most, oppositional groups pose little threat to capitalist hegemony during the late twentieth century; moreover, some of these groups simply want to be included within the one-dimensional status quo. Marx's working-class proletariat has posed the greatest threat to capital since the late nineteenth century.[9] Daniel Liston has said that Giroux's call for an abandonment of the Marxist problematic and tradition has been "too hasty". According to Liston, "While Giroux states correctly that classical Marxists relied on the category of class, it is incorrect that they devalued the importance of political and ideological forces."[10] The work of Antonio Gramsci and Georg Lukacs are examples of Liston's claim. While it has been important and correct to have focused upon the problem of agency versus determinism within the Marxist tradition - including the role of groups with emancipatory potential - this is not the same as misunderstanding, or misrepresenting, what the tradition is about in order to tactically exaggerate the potential for reconstruction and radical change from the springboard of democratically empowered teachers, students, and various oppressed oppositional groups. Over ten years of taking Schooling in Capitalist America to the woodshed has allowed the motivational theorists to serve up a 1980s version of George Counts' ideas - and perhaps, ultimately, Dewey's.

(2)

It is clear that the motivational educational theorists of the 1980s have important things in common with Reconstructionists such as Counts; however, there are differences as well. With regard to the attempt at "reconstruction" in the past, it is obvious that it did not succeed. It did not work when Counts sounded the alarm during the Great Depression when capitalism may have reached its nadir. It is difficult to understand why the motivational theorists are optimistic, when earlier failures are considered, and when the present strength of capitalist hegemony is soberly assessed. If one looks at Reconstructionism as focusing primarily upon education ". . . [and] an ongoing attempt to develop curriculum that was critical of the injustices of American society . . ."[11] instead of social activism, it is still not obvious that schools in the United States have succeeded in the more modest goal of having taught students an understanding of the issues which allow critical citizenship. I realize that the Reconstructionists have not been in charge since Counts dared the school, but that is the point: radical educators have never been in charge of American schools. Sometimes contemporary motivationalists write as if they were in control of a unified party - or even an army. For example, Wood has written, "Giroux has located himself as a modern compatriot of Gramsci."[12] Wood has also written, "Giroux proposes that teacher education counter . . . technocratic reality . . ."[13] One wonders where the cadre is which will implement this proposal. Finally, this language which makes an educational theorist seem like a field marshall, ". . . he [Giroux] has reclaimed the schools as a legitimate arena for radical struggle for transforming society."[14] As we know, Counts said this about power during the 1930s, "Ruling classes never surrender their privileges voluntarily."[15] Counts continues, "When property is threatened, constitutional guarantees are [unfortunately] but scraps of paper."[16] Contemporary calls for transformative oppositional behavior must be balanced by a remembering of history, which includes the brutal record of the reactionary right and fascism.

With reference to Counts' suggestion that ". . . a society in crisis might . . . turn to its teachers for guidance . . ."[17], one can only smile gently at such well-intentioned optimism. Teachers have not succeeded at serving as "wellsprings for change", most of them have never even tried, because they do not believe that their jobs includes, nor permits, such a role. In addition, many teachers are quite conservative, and status quo oriented. Michael B. Katz has written, "If we allow ourselves an illusory optimism, we are sure to suffer the disenchantment followed by the failure of reform . . ."[18] Speaking specifically of Counts' Dare the School Build a New Social Order?, Katz calls it ". . . an example of the type of passionate manifesto which . . . engenders unrealistic expectations, and, in the end despair."[19] Counts himself was ambivalent concerning what teachers, students, and schools could accomplish. Sometimes he exaggerates, whereas on other occasions he realizes the need for a mass movement, of which the school is only a part. I believe that similar ambivalence exists in the writings of the motivational theorists whom we have been discussing.

However, there are valuable lessons to be learned from Counts, as well as the motivational theorists, which can serve as a guide to what schools can do realistically. Urban tells us that Counts, ". . . thought that the unique power the school possessed was its ability to formulate an idea of a democratic society, to communicate that ideal to students, and to encourage them to use the ideal as a standard for their own and other societies."[20] This is different from arguing that teachers and students can lead the way. Claiming that the schools can formulate a democratic ideal is not different from what Dewey taught us. Furthermore, in a society which is at least formally committed to democratic principles, teachers may have a "democratic bias" without needing to be extraordinarily brave. Many teachers do, in fact, laud the advantages of democracy, and fair play, even without reading educational theory.

When one studies the tradition consisting of: education for democratic empowerment; emphasis on heuristics; accent upon the individual student; recognition of various learning styles; awareness of racial, ethnic, and gender differences; attention to social class realities; etc. it is possible to construct a concrete, explicit model for what should occur in our public schools. The wonderful model of the Dewey School, as described by Mayhew and Edwards, has still not been translated into public policy. My point is that we, in America, have not come very far beyond Dewey's philosophy in terms of education for democratic empowerment. Dewey's educational philosophy and pedagogy were not able to be implemented because his idea of a democratic community, which his educational thought presupposed, was not a reality.[21] It still is not.

Teaching and learning for democratic citizen empowerment will require resolute adults who are in the struggle for the duration; furthermore, it has to be realized that they must develop strength which is superior to the awesome power of capital, and capitalist hegemony. This is not a job just for school kids, and a few brave educators. Counts wrote in the early 1930s that this nation was the scene of an "irreconcilable" conflict between democracy and capitalism. He warned that unless political democracy could establish a complementary democratic foundation, it would not survive.[22] The contemporary crisis is still the failure of authentic democracy to be realized; moreover, the basic cause is the absence of a democratically controlled economy.

1. See, Martin Carnoy and Henry Levin, *Schooling and Work in the Democratic State* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1985), *passim*.

2. Nicholas C. Burbules, "Review Article - *Education Under Siege*," *Educational Theory* 36, 3 (Summer 1986): 302.

3. George H. Wood, "Beyond Radical Educational Cynicism," *Educational Theory* 32, 2 (Spring 1982): 62.

4. Henry A. Giroux, "Schooling and the Culture of Positivism: Notes on the Death of History," *Educational Theory* 35, 3 (Summer 1985): 283.

5. Wood, "Beyond Cynicism," 56.

6. Peter L. McLaren, "Ideology, Science, and the Politics of Marxian Orthodoxy: A Response to Michael Dale," *Educational Theory* 37, 3 (Summer 1987): 321.

7. Ibid., 319.

8. Landon E. Beyer and George H. Wood, "Critical Inquiry and Moral Action in Education," Educational Theory 36, 1 (Winter 1986): 4.

9. See, E.J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire 1875-1914 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987), especially chapter 4, "The Politics of Democracy."

10. Daniel Liston, "Marxism and Schooling: A Failed or Limited Tradition? A Response to Henry Giroux," Educational Theory 35, 3 (Summer 1985): 310.

11. Henry A. Giroux, "Citizenship, Public Philosophy, and the Struggle for Democracy," Educational Theory 37, 1 (Spring 1987): 107.

12. Wood, "Beyond Cynicism," 66.

13. Ibid., 68.

14. Ibid., 69.

15. George S. Counts, Dare the School Build a New Social Order? (New York: The John Day Company, 1932), 51.

16. Ibid., 52.

17. George H. Wood, "Schooling in a Democracy: Transformation or Reproduction?" Educational Theory 34, 3 (Summer 1984): 221.

18. Michael B. Katz, "Reflections on the Purpose of Educational Reform," Educational Theory 30, 2 (Spring 1980): 86-7.

19. Ibid., 87.

20. George S. Counts, Dare the School Build a New Social Order? With a New Preface by Wayne J. Urban (Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978) x. The quote is from Urban's Preface.

21. Richard A. Brosio, The Relationship of Dewey's Pedagogy to His Concept of Community (Ann Arbor, MI: The University Michigan Social Foundations of Education Monograph Series, No. 4 yellow, Malloy Lithoprinting, 1972), pp. 106, 147-8.

22. Counts, Dare the School, 45.

Zen Buddhism: A Religious Paradigm as Pedagogy

Dayvid Schultz

Chicago City Day School &
University of Illinois at Chicago

One: expressions

The late afternoon sun floods brightly through the south bank of windows. It penetrates the stillness; desks, books and walls blaze back colors that fill the classroom. Dust, captured for a moment in the sharp light, pirouettes and is gone. Sparrows play games outside and I hear the call of children gathered under the building eaves.

Kids have filled this space today, adding their shapes to the light and colors and dust.

"Mr. Schultz, why can't we bring skateboards to school?"

"Mr. Schultz, why can't we feed the world?"

"Mr. Schultz, what is the way?"

The space will again fill up the kids; books speaking, colors laughing, dust swirling to its own enlightenment. A right environment for this moment, a place not holding back. Space, as well as time, is relative, expanding to proportions beyond what we anticipate. Alfred Schutz talked about this. Ordinary life expands to interpret life's phenomena, to make sense of being. This kids' space too, is not to be taken for granted, not to be measured lightly.

A knock at my door settles me back in the decorated concrete box.

"Can I come in?"

"Sure, if you want to grade papers with me."

"Same here, it's a wonder I get anything done."

She took in the classroom, then just relaxed in a chair. That familiarity of a job at hand forces us into safe, worn roles. We complain, we console, we plot comedies towards a brief release. Finally she picks up one of the social studies tests piled on my desk and reads for a minute.

"It's just plain stupid to let the kids believe that there're right answers on these tests when we both know that these answers can be relative, bought with the right amount of influence, the right clout. We push them into believing in a balanced ecology, but continue eating holes in the ozone, in the earth, in every resource that counts for their future. Are we lying to them, or just being chumps ourselves?"

"I seem to remember something in the curriculum guides about critical thinking and anaylsis. It's supposed to lead to moral action and a rational, just society. What, you don't dream anymore?"

She seemed to sense my mood, "So what are we doing here?"

- - - -

An afternoon sun floods brightly through the south bank of windows. It penetrates the stillness of the temple, tatami mats blaze back a coolness that fills the air. Sparrows play games outside and I hear the call of children gathering under the eaves of the meditation hall.

My old teacher sits quietly at one end, a solid figure in black, like a cat posed in the stillness of motion. I kneel in front of him and bow three times, in respect for his teaching shared between us. He accepts my being here, my jumbled mind, my wordy questions wholeheartedly, and uncritically, as a parent accepts a newborn child. It's more than acceptance actually, I have his total attention - unhurried, open - it's startling. So often we lean on pillars constructed of another's self image, on their rendition of our own problems and doubts, a comfortable fix for our own self image. Yet with this teacher I move right through him to my own reflection. He is a person not to be taken for granted, not to be measured lightly.

A temple bell tolls deeply outside, calling students to evening Zazen, sitting meditation. Legs folded under for balance, back straight and relaxed, Zazen is the practice of letting go of thoughts, the stream of self that separates us from immediate, direct experience. These ego attachments lull us to sleep. The bell tolls again, its deep resonance giving way to a deeper waking quietness. As I begin to sit I remember the opening lines of Seng Tsan's poem of Zazen:

The Great Way is not difficult
for those who do not pick and choose.

When pref'rences are cast aside
the Way stands clear and undisguised.

But even slight distinctions made
set earth and heaven far apart.

(Kapleau, pp 184-185)

Incense drifts slowly towards the rafters as I gently ease my mind towards a stillness, softening the boundaries between self and environment. It is the temple bell that sits here silent. A 6th grade teacher that tolls, calling his students to practice.

...If all thought-objects disappear,
the thinking subject drops away.

For things are things because of mind,
as mind is mind because of things.

These two are merely relative,
and both at source are Emptiness.

The bell tolls again, and I quickly unfold. Today I need to talk also, to give form to my feelings and doubts as a 6th grade teacher, a buddhist, submerged in the western world of concepts. My teacher leads me through winding temple halls to an inner courtyard screened by pine shrubs and open to the evening sky. A low table is set with stoneware, a full pitcher, and bowls of vegetable stew that smelled of roasted chiles. The old man is talkative now, even encouraging, "Tell me what's eating you."

I stopped eating and replied, "If this world is objective, science is possible."

"Yes."

"But the world cries from fright. Choices are passed on, people cringe from decision or try to read the blueprint in the dark. There is a yearning for direction, a desire for order. What causes this desire? Could it be a reaction to a deeper understanding that this is all subjective, reality is what we make it? And people want to work on this reality together. The more of us that think the same reality will insure the more of us surviving - a herd world - that offers hope to its believers."

"Do you believe that?"

"I think Jurgen Habermas and his Frankfurt group had the right idea. Start with the individual, the psychoanalytic view and move towards a group consciousness. A gestalt."

"And if the group gets it wrong?"

"Habermas talks about that. Syntax analysis, behavior and symbolic manipulation are all susceptible to distortion (Habermas). That's why Freud used dreams as a measure of communicative distortion. Dreams are a window to the conflict between a self, intent on order and structure, and the unperceived abyss of reality dominated by subjective existence. Is there a significant difference between dreams and what we perceive as reality? We distort this dream to fit an objective gestalt, a grounding in human culture. The Frankfurt people thought this was a wonderful starting point because it enabled human culture to evolve."

"In what ways?" he asked.

"Through what they and many, including Mahayana buddhists, describe as critical self-reflection. On the one hand, if you start with a process of interaction between a self in action and the objects of that action, then the end product of that interaction is open to deductive explanation. Such interpretation, in its "self", is not reflective or moral. That in fact has been the basis of distortion, of self-destructive individuals and societies in history. But another face of that same interpretative process is critical self-reflection and evolution. Human culture has learned what is good and what is evil, there is a consensus of values in all lasting cultures that mediates self-interest with dynamic communal interest. Logical instincts may compel us to self-surviving behaviors, but cultural instincts compel us to imagine a world rich in meaning and understanding. Marxist science attempted to explain and generalize these evolutionary values as an inevitable ideology of social progress. Enlightened millions moved to act. This belief ignores however, the roots that subjective reality plays in interpretation. The price of becoming rational is to lose touch with the world as it is. This holds no matter how you perceive the world - as a monster or a saint. I guess that's the continuum. The difference between a monster and saint is the degree of dominance of the self in relation to the community at large. Rationality then makes a poor measurement of human values as it is a function of the self dominating reality. The purely rational man could easily be - no, is by nature, a monster."

He stopped me, "How is rationality a function of the monster? Are you intent on saying that rationality is equated with logic? Or with ideology? Are saints not rational?"

"A saint is someone who does not cry out in the terror of the night! A true saint follows no blueprint, but is compelled to act morally out of compassion for what is, not for what he/she wants there to be. History interprets the actions of the saints falsely, as metaphyisical, divine will channeled through a human tool. This is a rational explanation for an irrational act. For the saint reality dominates over self, and the consequences scare the rest of us. Monsters we can understand, they are essentially rational or logical, self-serving in behavior. Their meaning structures are unipolar. Ideologies fall into this same trap, their meaning structures are at worst uniconceptual. By definition an ideology stands inside or outside something else, and usually in opposition to something else. Oppressive ideologies enslave people, emanicipatory ideologies free people. But both follow a rational blueprint, an 'ought' that shapes the 'is'."

"Is there an 'ought'?"

"Yes! Even the saint infers values from a human perspective. If not from a rational set of structures or ideals, then from direct human experience. In Miyamoto Musashi's "A Book of Five Rings" the samurai-philosopher argued that in reality there is no separation between the cutting sword and victim, no break between life and death. For Musashi, reality is pure, dualities dissolved into the void. But human experience teaches us that there is blood and pain and mourning wives and fatherless children (Aitken, p.17-26). Values exist, not in an idealized absolute state, but as phenomenon that give rise to human emotion and action. Rationality then is the structure we give to these phenomenon that shape our experience. Language and symbols, behavior and institutions are all filtered reality, half hidden understandings.

This hiding away of understanding, though, is challenged by the saint who responses directly to the demands of life with compassion - that is to say with no separation between his own experience and that of all beings. And it is this critial self-"reflection" informed by compassion that unfolds the wisdom of the world."

My teacher rose and began to collect the dishes. Taking the empty pitcher and a bowl I started to follow him. The temple kitchen was clean and simple, framed with large ash beams from which pots, herbs and dried chiles hung. I felt at ease here, doing the dishes. Each bowl had a different texture, a different weight and glaze. Washing a bowl became a singular event, taking all my attention. When I finished I couldn't help but smile self-consciously, "For some reason that felt good."

He silently finished pouring boiling water into a white porcelain tea pot. Placing the pot and two cups on a tray, I followed him back out to the courtyard. We sat quietly for a minute as steam escaped from the pot into cool, still evening air.

"In the Japanese Chanoyu tea ceremony," he began, "the guest and host are asked to let go of the self and experience the making of tea for what it is."

"An aesthetic experience?", I offered.

"Ryku, a Tea master of the 16th century, explained it to his disciples this way -

> Tea is nought but this:
> First you heat the water
> Then you make the Tea
> Then you drink it properly.
> That's all you need to know.
>
> (Sen)

These tea masters realized that conceptual interpretation of experience both clouds the experience, and makes it abstract. But their interpretation was not in their minds, but in their hands, their movements. They expressed relationships metaphorically, but also silently, as both a unity and transformation. Each act leaves both the actor and that acted upon with a shared identity that offers meaning to a perceived existential world. So the activities of life have meaning in themselves; the making of tea is just that. With no veneer of aesthetic conceptions interpreting the experience, the making of tea stands out sharply as action informed by reality. The tea master and the tea making cease being percieved as two, but as an expression of the rootedness of everyday life, non-dualistic, and concrete."

"This action then, is born by reality with no interpretation?" I asked, "Is it the saint acting, compelled by moral experience?"

"It is the artist becoming the tool."

"Of whom?"

"Of the experience itself. Does free will exist?"

"Subjectively of course." I hesitated, "Then are you saying that to conceive of ourselves as autonomous human beings is to step out of the stream of reality, yet it is that humanness, self awareness, that is also the key to returning?"

"It is the key to transforming our solitude into meaning, not only for ourselves, but in reality itself."

"Our purpose?"

"Interesting question," he shot back. "Purpose always speaks to a greater whole. Let us just say for the moment it is our nature to create meaning out of experience. Inquiry that deepens our understanding, propping up the structure built from reality."

"But what you're implying is that self-aware, critical inquiry is necessary as a test of reality and that too, is susceptible to distortion. So is it possible to truly know anything?"

My teacher sat back, pausing for a moment, "Hogen, a chinese Zen monk, lived alone in a small temple in the country.

One day four traveling monks appeared and asked if they might make a fire in his yard to warm themselves. While they were building the fire, Hogan heard them arguing about subjectivity and objectivity. He joined then and said: There is a big stone. Do you consider it to be inside or outside your mind?

One of the monks replied: From the Buddhistic viewpoint everything is an objectification of mind, so I would say that the stone is inside my mind.

Your head must feel very heavy, observed Hogen, if you are carrying around a stone like that in your mind" (Reps).

I anticipated the connection and tried to explain rapidly, "So everyday life is the absolute expression of the non-dualistic void. The goal of buddhism then is to rid ourselves of the heavy stones we carry by ridding ourself of the carrying head, and in the process become fully awakened to a world alive in action and choice-making.

Maybe the Frankfurt groups and the Japanese Tea masters were pushing at the same model, that critical inquiry is always rooted in a questioning of a given description of reality, in reconciling experiences, not generalizations, and in recognizing the moral nature of the human experience."

He laughed with me then, his gentle way of accepting my overdone arguments. I laughed back, "And maybe I'm trying too hard to make everything fit. Ambiguity has its place too."

- - - -

The morning hung dark and gray, rain clouds against the highrise apartments surrounding the school. Florescent lighting glares brightly against the desk tops, stripping the room of dimension and color. Sparrows play games outside and I hear the children gathered under the eaves of the building doors.

The kids will soon fill up this space, adding their shapes and questions to the light and colors.

"Mr. Schultz, why can't we feed the world?"

I settle down into the day then, "Let's try to imagine a world in which we did."

Two: Impressions

The 2500 year old Mahayana Zen Buddhist tradition has successfully provided much of humanity with spiritual meaning as well as a pragmatic philosophy grounded in the demands of daily life. As a religious system, Zen Buddhism is a response to the perceived paradox of life and death, good and evil, meaning and disillusion. Its practical value in constructing and deconstructing meaning leads to an emancipation of spirit, a "wide-awakeness". Cooking and cleaning, friendship and aging, learning and teaching, the labors of life are seen as wholistic, central, the ends and means to fulfillment.

What could be the pedagogical and curricular implications of such a system on western educational thought? How has this religious paradigm functioned as pedagogy?

First, an analysis of the basic propositions of buddhistic faith may reveal imperatives that value some modes of description and thought over others. The Heart of Perfect Wisdom Sutra is widely considered to express the core of the buddhistic paradigm:

> Form here is only emptiness
> emptiness only form.
> Form is no other than emptiness,
> emptiness no other than form.
>
> Feelings, thought, and choice
> consciousness itself,
> are all the same as this.

(Kapleau, p180)

Form and emptiness here represent the dualistic perception of phenomena central to conceptual thinking. Under this system we live in the world of form, of sense perception preinterpreted to what Alfred Schutz describes as "the common-sense world of daily life" (Schutz, p 7). It is a world that has and will exist beyond our own existence, organized by the interplay of intersubjective sense perceptions and social choice. It is a concrete world in as much as our rationality is dependent on form consistancy and predictability. And it is a world described in conceptual opposites: self and other, life and death, good and evil.

It was against this backdrop of philosophic tradition that Siddhartha Gautama percieved human suffering as a paradox of dualistic objectiveness, a profound sense of separation through attachments to rational and emotional constructions. Through the direct experience of meditation he came to realize the subjective grounding of perception. Without the human context of intersubjective meaning objective existence loses its permanence and "form deconstructs into emptiness, emptiness deconstructs into form" in an endless process of dynamic change.

Yet even this model is dualistic by nature. The sutra's text "form is only emptiness, emptiness only form" is an expression of a counterconceptual paradox of undifferentiated "emptiness and form" dissolved utterly. This non-dualistic entirety, called Buddha-nature, is uncovered through the cessation of conceptual thought from which dualisms arise. Writing in 920 C.E., Huang-Po, a Chinese monk, describes this underlying state:

> Our original Buddha-nature is, in highest truth, devoid of any atom of objectivity. It is void, omnipresent, silent, pure; it is glorious and mysterious peaceful joy - and that is all. Enter deeply into it by awakening to it yourself. That which is before you is it, in all its fullness, utterly complete. There is naught beside.
>
> (Blofeld)

It is here worth remembering Miyamoto Musashi's story of the sword and the victim. Reality is pure, dualities dissolved into the void. But human experience teaches us that choice-making creates "mourning wives and fatherless children." Values, as experience, exist, not in an idealized absolute state, but as phenomenon that give rise to human emotion and action. Yet without these attachments to the ego-self, what response is possible? In "The Mind of Clover", Roshi Robert Aitken summarizes a first response to human suffering:

> ...if you can see that all phenomena are transparent, ephemeral, and indeed altogether void, then the thrush will sing in your heart, and you can show compassion to the prostitute. Experiencing emptiness is also experiencing peace, and the potential of peace is its unfolding as harmony among all people, animals, plants and things. The [buddhistic] precepts formulate this harmony, showing how the absence of killing and stealing is the very condition of mercy and charity. This is the Middle Way of Mahayana Buddhism. It is unself-conscious...and unselfish...
>
> (Aitken pp. 10-11).

This state of peaceful mind is not passive, however, but rather fully engaged in the immediate world - the world of ordinary living, of distress and suffering. Schutz's phenomenology of multiple realities parallels this view as he describes the state of wide awakeness as piercing the subjective perception of the working self in a "plane of consciousness of highest tension originating in an attitude of full attention to life and its requirements" (Schutz, p.213). It is seeing things not settled, not predefined, but demanding choice. This reflective posturing is possible only after living in the "vivid present" (p216), and precipitates moral action. For buddhists, reflection is non-conceptual, an intuitive response of compassion for things as they are. All action, of the monster or the saint, precedes from the buddha-nature shared by us all. To cease immoral action is to lessen its burden on all beings, to promote compassion shakes us all to attention.

The pedagogy of buddhism has traditionally begun as an unencumbered response to a dynamic daily life and a profound belief in the potential of children and teachers to cut through curtains of deception, to change their circumstances by seeing through them (Kubose).

It is an awareness that neither history nor labels pose insurmountable obstacles to awakening to the concrete possibility of change. It is an awareness of profound autonomy, each of us being the wondrous expression of the whole, capable of great good and great evil. Finally, it is a belief in our abilities to uncover just ways of living together in balance and in pursuit of common ends.

Maxine Greene, in her essay "Wide-Awakeness and the Moral Life" speaks powerfully towards this awareness of "moral directedness" as the realization of autonomy and "attentiveness to others and to the circumstances of everyday life" (p. 51). As teachers, our job is not to proscribe ideologic or institutional moral structures or perceptions, but to awaken, as the saint, the sense of a shared reality. Greene argues that wide-awake teachers must:

> orient themselves to the concrete, the relevant, and the questionable. They must commit themselves to each person's potential for overcoming helplessness and submergence, for looking through his or her own eyes...(p. 51).

This orientation is a useful counterpoint to the exponential increase of objectified information science and technology is precipitating. In a world in which ambiguity is becoming the nature of knowledge, Seng Tsan deconstructs our separation from experience:

> ...If all thought-objects disappear,
> the thinking subject drops away.
>
> For things are things because of mind,
> as mind is mind because of things.
>
> These two are merely relative,
> and both at source are Emptiness.
>
> (Kapleau)

For the teacher then, knowledge is the child wide-awake in response to the demands and responsibilities of her environment and whose action
shapes that environment's meaning. Maxine Greene also concludes that teachers too, must be seen as knowledge creating beings in a morally ambiguous world if kids are to respond:

> the young are most likely to be stirred to learn when they are challenged by teachers who themselves are learning, who are breaking with what they have too easily taken for granted, who are creating their own moral lives (p. 51).

The Mahayana Buddhist tradition is one response to the sense of helplessness, of anthropocentric ambiguity, of lost purpose. It locates the teacher and student alike in a world of direct experience, in which action is communal and healing, and in which the smallest task, accomplished in aware, wide-awakeness is

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MAKERS OF MEANING*

J. S. Kelly
Department of Philosophy
Miami University

> The quest for certainty by means of exact possession in mind of immutable reality is exchanged for search for security by means of active control of the changing course of events. Intelligence in operation, another name for method, becomes the thing most worth winning.
>
> *John Dewey*

Let me begin with some (what I take to be) truths, reflection upon which sets the context for this essay. As undergraduate (philosophy) teachers we recognize our main, or certainly crucial task as expanding our student's abilities to engage in sustained and rigorous thinking. For without such reasoning abilities they are ill equipped as learners-in-the-large-sense, they become candidates for the fallacies of tradition or *non-directed* revolutionaries. As learners-in-the-large-sense they will *seek* to learn and experience new ideas, customs, and ways of dealing with the world. To focus on critical reasoning skills is not to deny, of course, our role in helping our students attain what E. D. Hirsch labels 'cultural literacy'.[1] But at the beginning undergraduate level, if not before, it is important for our students to develop a method for making use of and evaluating the background beliefs which constitute the core content of one who is culturally literate. E. M. Adams correctly sees that, "[t]he fundamental function of philosophy in higher education is twofold: (1) to help elevate the level of awareness and appreciation among students and within the larger community of the philosophical problems in our culture...and (2) to train students and others in disciplined and responsible ways of thinking about these problems so that hopefully the individuals involved and in time the larger society will achieve a coherent and valid intellectual vision of [persons] and the world and a healthy culture that will be life-supporting for both individuals and society."[2] In this paper I will concentrate on (2) and a cooperative learning strategy for empowering students to enable them to *critically* assess problems stemming from the culture. A basic claim I shall pursue is that students must be encouraged to take more responsibility for *their* education and that this active learning goes hand-in-glove with critical assessment. Let us, then, reflect on a difficulty we all, to one degree or another, face.

All too often, unfortunately, our students are not able to engage in, nor (more importantly) do they recognize the need or point of the method of critical assessment we seek to impart. Typically they seek certainty and expect to learn ***TRUTHS*** from authorities who dispense ***FACTS***.[3] Or, as is too often the case, truth is not their aim; rather they are much more instrumentally inclined and seek "whatever is needed" to enable them to, e.g., pass an exam or obtain a degree. That, or they see teachers as merely playing "semantic games". Holding aside likely hypotheses as to the causal factors involved in this lack of critical assessment and the expectancy of being "handed" what is "required", let us concentrate on what positive moves we can make at this point in the student's intellectual development.

To accomplish our goals as teachers we must, I propose, help students become *agents* by enabling them to develop the requisite (process) skills, as opposed to remaining passive recipients of knowledge (content). We must also remember our mission, that in the overall curriculum our goal is not to merely increase the number of philosophy (or ...) majors but to facilitate the development of a transferable skill while exposing students to new content. As Hirsch claims, "[f]acts and skills are inseparable. There is no insurmountable reason why those who advocate the teaching of higher order skills and those who advocate the teaching of common traditional content should not join forces."[4] In the following I focus on critical thinking skills and the need to empower students; on method, not content, and both motivate and suggest a cooperative learning model for classroom use, a model that helps students to become active learners.

I. *Goals, Content, and Process*

While we want our students to become aware of the subject matter we teach, we want more than mere acquaintance. Students need (and want[5]) to be challenged by the material to which we expose them. But to both challenge and to be challenged requires that our students actively and critically engage the material, in whatever form it is presented. Thus we seek to impart content to self-motivated, creative and critical reasoners who express a need to know. Though many bemoan the (alleged) fact that these are not the students who fill our classrooms, this cultural phenomenon can be overcome, in part, by a change in *our* basic orientation toward teaching (more of this below). It is our goal, I shall take it, not only to focus on course content, but also to facilitate students in their: (i) critical skills, (ii) self-motivation, (iii) creativity, (iv) desire to know, and (v) sense of accomplishment.

To accomplish these goals (and others to be addressed below), I will motivate one model of an interactive, or cooperative, student-focused teaching-learning technique. Discussion techniques of the sort I shall suggest have received considerable attention and the research done confirms my own experience. To wit: "Research into interactive processes supports a number of important outcomes: students become active rather than passive participants in the learning process; students retain the information longer; various interactive techniques are democratic processes and give students experience in cooperating and collaborating with others [the lack of which is a major complaint of graduates according to *The Harvard Assessment Seminars*[6]]; problem-solving and critical thinking skills are best served in discussion contexts; students can reality-test their ideas within a microcosm of society; students develop feelings of psychological ownership of or identification with a [school] class; some students learn better in a group situation than they do individually; self-esteem is enhanced by class participation; students are given the opportunity to clarify their values and beliefs; student motivation for future learning is increased; student attitudes are more likely to change in a more open classroom environment; and the instructor is able to receive informal feedback about the progress and attitudes of the students throughout the semester."[7] Throughout what follows I shall suggest how these good-making features are enhanced by the model I propose as well as refer to research data relevant to these claims.

Our particular brand of critical reasoning rightly aims at shaking students from their desire for metaphysical certainty-from-authority while helping them make decisions in the face of uncertainty. But once they are shorn of their need for certainty we must pay careful attention to the next stage in their thinking process - the predictable: "Maybe that's *your* opinion." What we want is for them to see the role of reason in allowing for progress. They will not, however, embrace the view that critical assessment makes for progress just because we say they should; when we damp their quest for certainty we give up the title of authority dispensing certainty. A *title,* I argue, we need to seriously consider abandoning. This may well call (as I can testify) for some (psychological) adjustment on our part, as Bolton and Boyer note: "When the teacher is psychologically big, students have a tendency to lean heavily upon him [or her]. They expect him [or her] to solve many problems, to see that all goes well, to take care of them. This can easily result in apathy, lack of initiative, and dependence. Another, less apparent consequence, is hidden resentment and frustration in those who are psychologically small. Believing they must carefully nurture the good will of the "big" leader they do not feel free to be themselves. They feel they must defer to him [or her] and, in a sense, deny their own individuality. Thus, even when the teacher is doing a good job of taking care of his [or her] students, considerable resentment may be building. Stated in psychological terms, conditions producing inappropriate dependency usually produce hidden frustration and hostility....The solution...is for the teacher to reduce his [or her] psychological size."[8]

So to accomplish our goal we must help students become agents - *makers of meaning*. My suggestion here is that the typical lecture format (with its excessive focus on imparting information) is, and given our student's past educational experiences, is expected to be content-from-authority centered thereby reinforcing their passiveness, which frustrates our attempts. This, I believe, results from a culture-generated focus on an objectivist model of knowing where what dominates is the notion that imparting knowledge is accomplished by passing on empirically verifiable propositions about phenomena. As a result the world studied is not the world lived in - the world lived in is a world of experiences. Although philosophers and those in the humanities are most likely to be aware of this in the abstract, we too are caught up in the dominant cultural mode.[9] To overcome this in the classroom I propose a *structured* discussion format which aids the development of agency, enhances critical thinking and social skills and empowers the students by placing more of the responsibility for learning on them. As I view it, learning is a social activity, the model to be proposed enhances the activity. Before turning to the details of my proposal, however, I need to say a bit more about my assumed goal.

A maker of meaning is an active agent who does not merely memorize or become acquainted with predigested conclusions, but rather engages the world so as to offer a *critical* and *creative* assessment which opens new avenues of conversation and thereby fosters deeper understanding. It is the critical component of the learning process that provides the structure needed to anchor what students create out of their own imaginations and background beliefs. For without this skill imagination often runs wild and background beliefs remain unchallenged or, if they are challenged, it is often unproductive. Here again I come back to Hirsch, who points to the active mind of the learner (in this case a reader) who is

> ...not only a decoder of what is written down but also a supplier of much essential information that is not written down. The reader's mind is constantly inferring meanings that are not directly stated by the words of a text but are nonetheless part of its essential content. The explicit meanings of a piece of writing are the tip of an iceberg of meaning; the larger part lies below the surface of the text and is composed of the reader's own relevant knowledge.[10]

Thus Hirsch focuses on early education and the need for specific content making up the relevant background knowledge. Now there is much debate on just what this content should amount to and one may argue that even at the early grades educators should pay more attention to teaching (or encouraging) critical thinking than Hirsch ***seems*** to advocate. For my purposes, however, I restrict attention to the college student who has attained, given adequate past educational experience, (some degree of) cultural literacy. Our task, then, is not to merely acquaint our students with factual information, e.g., that Plato was the author of the myth of the cave, but rather to allow our students to understand the myth and its point for them and society. As active learners they need to make the myth meaningful from their particular take on things. They need to realize, for instance, that the prisoner in the cave has no views ***imposed*** on him - the prisoner discovers truths. The ideal goal is approached when by critically evaluating their initial understanding students become able to anticipate other points of view, thereby expanding their fund of background information and increasing their understanding. Although content and process cannot be separated, under-emphasis on the latter can diminish the value of the former. But as teachers we face difficulties.

It has been argued that students suffer from episodic consciousness - "an inability to grasp the continuity of ideas displayed in philosophical thinking and argument, and embodied in philosophical writing."[11] To some extent this is certainly correct and to that extent students have a tendency to view each class as a self-contained unit - they fail to carry ideas over from one meeting to another. Here I have no wish to debate the extent to which this is true (it varies from group to group) or to analyze its cause - be it television or other aspects of our culture that help instill the expectation of self-contained episodes. Nor, of course, is is sufficient to merely complain. Rather I want to propose that our task as philosophy teachers - indeed as teachers - is to recognize and assist in the developmental aspect of our student's thinking. Failure to recognize the developmental process and our role in it - to think we can teach a skill and meet our mission by uttering profundities - helps set up the problems we and they encounter. Our task is that of guide, our tyros: anyone with an inclination to reason - an inclination it is our charge to help instill and develop. Indeed, as Mary Lynn Crow points out, the teacher needs to examine his or her own views on the teaching activity and thus shift his/her attention from what and how the teacher is teaching to what and how the student is learning, for awareness of the latter can alter the former. Crow writes:

> In the main, a person's values, beliefs, and philosophy can easily be ascertained by the way he or she teaches. The instructional strategies and techniques that are adopted by a teacher bespeak his attitudes about himself, his students, and their respective roles in the teaching-learning process. They bespeak his belief about how people learn and therefore about the proper techniques one utilizes to help learning occur.[12]

In what follows I will make suggestions relevant to enabling us to shift the focus onto the student as learner. My earlier characterization of students as passive ***recipients*** of knowledge may have been somewhat optimistic; for the student ***what*** we teach (the given) will have a better chance of being successfully received (taken) if the student-as-person recognizes that he or she is responsible for actively seeking the skills and information required for making informed decisions that matter to him or her. The difficult task in this shift of focus is to neither dilute content nor diminish intellectual challenge.

The thesis I shall float, then, is that at least at the introductory undergraduate level the (bloody but unbowed) lecture-focused course only serves to reinforce the very difficulty about which we complain, for it tends to assume the *empty bottle* picture of education - our students, on this picture, are the bottles and we funnel in knowledge for their consumption and enlightenment. We may enjoy the comfort and control of such a format and our students no doubt expect it, but it reinforces their passivity - a mistake Socrates did not make. Nor is it wise to mount a defense of the typical lecture course by reflecting upon our own student days and the great lecturers we so much enjoyed and from whom we learned so much, for we are a strange and minority group.[13] Much the same can be said of many of our successful students. As Kant would remind us, we need focus our major efforts on the great middle, the rest are often beyond our reach or can do well with minimum interference.

Content is not what should monopolize our attention at this level; we have acquired and thus have, in addition to important content, a special *method* that is ours to teach. It is this method as opposed to vast amounts of content that is crucial at this level. But I do not, obviously, advocate abandoning our concern with content; instead I urge that we not put misplaced emphasis on (or faith in) the lecture format which focuses excessively on content. Even in those courses where critical thinking is the content, that is, the skill is the content, we all too often fail our students by offering wonderfully erudite lectures or barren text book examples and exercises.[14] And too often in all courses we wonder how so many of our students fail to extend the point of the lecture or reading to new, but related material. Thus the view that students suffer from episodic consciousness, an ailment we must face.

Consider a simple analogy. Should a student wish to learn the game of tennis, the tennis instructor does not *merely* lecture and require that several books or articles be read or movies watched. The would-be tennis player is directed to practice, be it her grip, her backhand or whatever. Likewise for learning our special and transferable skill - the students must become *active*, they must recognize they are *agents* - makers of meaning. Here reading or even reading combined with short exercises is (typically) not enough to develop our skill, for our skill requires a certain level and amount of metathinking *and the recognition of the point and need for critical reasoning*. First develop the skills, then play tennis. The role of the instructor is to guide the student through the frustrating period of "paralysis through analysis". So too for us; first foster the development of their critical thinking skills, then offer the classics, the *New York Review of Books*, the business decisions, etc. Or much better yet, develop the former by way of the latter. The question, of course, is how best to do it.

My suggestion is to have them do it. With our guidance, of course, but with the focus on their active participation - replace the passive with the active. Floating about many campuses is the increased emphasis on critical thinking (not a univocal term across disciplines[15]); but one course in critical thinking or (worse yet) the typical[16] informal logic course is not sufficient. It can be very helpful, but to conclude that the average student develops the skill we so want them to exercise simply because they have taken informal logic is, of course, naive. *In addition* to the one-course-in-critical-thinking approach to improving the curriculum, let me suggest a cooperative learning strategy for many if not most introductory courses. (What constitutes an introductory course will obviously vary from institution to institution.) Briefly consider, then, three general tasks we face and how an alternative classroom approach better aids in the development of active learners - this alternative is quite dynamic, even within the context of a particular course. First, three tasks that face us when the developmental nature of student learning is considered, then, in the next section, how the structured discussion format I propose aids in satisfying these tasks.

1. One task is to allow students to see that although the human condition is one of uncertainty, such uncertainty is nothing to bemoan - it's just the way it is. Convincing them their desire for (metaphysical) certainty-from-authority is to be replaced with reasoning that may have a less than certain foundation (or coherence) is no easy task, especially since we do not want them to throw out the baby with the bath water. We want, that is, to avoid the naive relativism or subjectivism that takes us to nihilism (here we must fight dominant cultural trends), while instilling them with reasoning abilities that allow for cogent decision making. Too often, as hinted at in the above, students suffer from the ***1-800-syndrome*** - they want to drop their quarter (or tuition), dial the appropriate 800-number (take the right course) and learn (be told) ***THE TRUTH*** (or "whatever it takes"). We must shake them of this habit. But, unfortunately, upon their encounter with uncertainty their initial response is all too often of the form: "So-called authorities disagree, there's no certainty, no proof - any opinion is as good as any other."[17] Taking away their search for certainty-from-authority takes us to a second task.

2. Now we must demonstrate reason at work and since we are offering a skill, a process, we must encourage their active participation. Merely lecturing to them, having them read what we take to be paradigm examples of philosophical argumentation is (usually) not sufficient. They have yet to develop the requisite skills to understand and follow what we say or they read and, more importantly, they do not see the need or point - "There's no *proof*, it's all just opinion." We must show them that mere opinions are cheap (everyone has one), and offer them skills that meet their newly forming needs. Thus our task is to spark their recognition of the need for critical reasoning and provide them, in an unfussy way, with skills which aid them in making wise decisions about what to believe and do. The next task follows closely.

3. Our third task is to show that progress occurred without certainty - progress by the elimination of poor reasoning. By developing criteria for acceptable reasoning, by pointing to pseudoreasons, we are able to discuss with them why certain reasoning is faced with a burden of plausibility. One small, but worthwhile, suggestion here to help change the focus away from the quest for certainty is that we motivate replacing the notion of "burden of proof" with that of "burden of plausibility" (I come back to this below). For once they realize that reasonable people can reasonably disagree, students quickly turn to an investigation of the proffered reasons. Our individual talents come into play here, so I will not burden you with my particular techniques for indicating to the student that progress has occurred in the face of uncertainty, except to point out that I think it needs to be continuously reinforced. Here, finally, I introduce my addendum to the lecture format, a model that greatly aids, I suggest, in accomplishing our tasks.

II. *Structured Student Discussions*

At this point I am hopeful that there is not radical disagreement with what has been said thus far. In fact when I have presented these ideas to philosophers and educators their general agreement is only dampened by the lack of a plausible strategy for use in the classroom. The idea of student discussions is hardly new, but the pitfalls are obvious. There is the difficulty of getting participation in the discussion, of making the students aware of progress (of making progress) toward course objectives, and of avoiding "bull sessions". Most of us seek and are disappointed when we do not generate useful classroom discussions, and when, on those rare occasions, we find students engaged in academic discussions we are often disappointed in the discussion's lack of fruitfulness due to its unstructured, willy-nilly methodology. As a substitute to the lecture-*focused* course, I provide a ten-page detailed (and *structured*) discussion *worksheet*. It is this worksheet that is key to this particular student discussion model and that separates this cooperative learning strategy from most other interactive learning techniques. Here is that worksheet, which at this point in development, remains the same for all readings:[18]

DISCUSSION WORKSHEET

NAME ____________________

AUTHOR & TITLE OF READING ____

Please complete the worksheet *before class* in a color of ink or pencil *different* from what you will use in class. [Be sure to carefully read "On Discussion" for valuable guidelines.] You may use additional sheets. You may frequently want to add to and modify what you have written during class. Please hand this worksheet in at the end of discussion.

PHASE I --READ THE ARTICLE--WHAT THE AUTHOR SAID.

1. *DEFINITIONS*. List key new terms and concepts. Define those you don't already know. Circle those that you think need clarification or discussion. (*Don't* use class time to define terms that are clear to all.)

[↓ 20 Spaces]

2. *STATE THE AUTHOR'S GENERAL POINT IN YOUR OWN WORDS*.

[↓ Remainder of page 1]

3. [Page 2] *IDENTIFY MAJOR THEMES AND KEY POINTS*. Make special note of those which appear central to the author's argument and those which are relevant to course themes. This is usually best done by a *point outline*. NOTE AND CIRCLE questions and points you think most need discussion. AVOID EVALUATION HERE--your goal is to make sure you really understand what the author is trying to say. Feel free to "scratch out" and otherwise modify as you go. DO NOT MAKE YOUR NOTES SEPARATELY AND THEN OUTLINE THEM--your time can be spent more constructively on the rest of the worksheet. You should fill in and finish this section **as** you read and finish the article.

While you are reading, ideas for later sections, especially applications and integrations, will occur to you; jot these down in a preliminary form (in the margin, perhaps) wherever you think they will best fit into the discussion. DO NOT include the ideas which are YOURS in this section which is your listing of the AUTHOR'S ideas. [over]

[↓ Remainder of page 2 to page 3]
[↓ 25 Spaces]

[Page 3] As soon as you finish the article re-read your list of definitions and circle or star those which you would like to have clarified during discussion. Re-read your point outline and circle or star the points which you think it most profitable to discuss, either because you don't fully understand them or because they seem essential to Phase II.

4. ***AUTHOR'S ARGUMENT***. Decide what the author's main conclusions were. These may or may not be any of the specific points you noted in §§2 -3 above, so consider this ***carefully***. Then ***summarize*** the author's central argument--the support for the main claims. What are the premises and assumptions, the evidence, the connections, the conclusions, and the implications that the author used? [See handout on Arguments and Signal Words.] ***Write the summary as if you were the author***. That is, state the points specifically and directly, and do not use, e.g., "She says..." or "it's about...". These constructions will usually cause you to miss the author's point. E.g.: "This article is about sexual differences..." should be replaced with, "Men are inferior to woman with regard to..." or whatever. Note that personal opinions about the reading are ***not*** appropriate at this stage. The reason is simple--namely, once personal opinions are stated, what the author ***actually said*** tends to get obscured; and what the author ***said*** (wrote) is what we're after here. Getting straight on this latter is often a task by itself; once we have that straight we'll be in a better position to evaluate it critically. And remember: ***MERE OPINIONS ARE CHEAP, EVERYONE HAS ONE***.

[↓ Remainder of page 3 all of page 4]

[Page 5] PHASE II--MY SUMMARY AND EVALUATION OF THE READING

As soon as you finish Phase I of the worksheet, start Phase II:

Scan your outline and jot down in a preliminary form ***your ideas*** and the author's points which apply to each section. Then ***stop*** and decide whether you have placed each idea under the appropriate section.

IN CLASS DISCUSSION. You will have to keep track of time. There will usually not be time enough to discuss everything, so you will need to formally or informally allocate time so that the discussion includes the most important topics and those most in need of clarification. The keys to getting the most out of discussion are to ***state what you don't understand*** and to ***ask for clarification***. Stating what you think you ***do*** understand often actually inhibits progress unless someone else has already asked for a clarification or stated a different interpretation.

5. ***APPLICATIONS***. Suppose that the author's argument is cogent. What important positive and negative consequences would this have regarding other of your beliefs? for society? for values?

[↓ Remainder of page 5]

[Page 6] 6. ***ADEQUACY OF PRESENTATION: INTERNAL CONSISTENCY***. How adequate is the argument when considered on its own? Does the argument "make sense" (is it logical and self-consistent)? Is the evidence/reasoning adequate?

[↓ 20 Spaces]

7. *CONTEXTUAL EVALUATION*. How adequate is the article when compared to what else you know? Do you know of other relevant data and, if so, do they tend to support or refute the author's claims? Are the pertinent alternative hypotheses and approaches clearly stated and adequately excluded?

[↓ Remainder of page 6]

[Page 7] 8. *PLAUSIBILITY/STRENGTH OF EVIDENCE*. After considering the author's argument and doing your contextual evaluation, how well established do you consider the author's main claims? Briefly list the main claims and explain *why* you evaluate *each* as: very solid, solid, plausible, suggestive, improbable, or very improbable. In doing this determine where the burden of plausibility lies. That is, if you can, provide contrary reasons that shift the burden of plausibility onto the author(s). [E.g., suppose the author claims certain accidents are not due to a fault in the car but that the hundreds of accidents are due to driver error.] On the other hand, suppose you agree that, e.g., certain fertilizers are harmful to humans and other animals, but the *author's* reasons are very weak. Thus you may agree with an author's main point, but disagree with the reasons given for thinking it correct. In such a case one might attempt to supply plausible reasons, for without them the burden of plausibility is on one who wishes to hold such a claim (think of law courts). In short, evaluate the plausibility of the author's claims by giving reasons for *agreeing or not*. [Use the rest and the back of this sheet.]

[↓ Remainder of page 7 all of page 8]

[Page 9] 9. *IMPORTANCE AND INTEGRATIONS*. How important is this reading (taking into account the preceding points)? To which of the themes and other important points from the course materials does this reading relate. How? How important has it been in your understanding of the course themes? Of other readings?

[↓ 20 Spaces]

REWORKING: Students have frequently commented that some of their best Phase II ideas occur to them between the time they finish initial preparation and the actual discussion--that is to be expected. These can, of course, be added to the sheet.

PHASE III--SUMMARIZE AND EVALUATE YOUR DISCUSSION GROUP.

Please fill out this phase at the *end of class*.

10. *SUMMARIZE* the main points of agreement and difference among your group's members in the evaluation of the article.

[↓ Remainder of page 9]

[Page 10] 11. *EVALUATE* the performance of the group as a whole and the roles played by each group member. This is a crucial step because it gives you and the instructor a check on the degree to which the discussion is working correctly.

A. Overall Reactions:

	LOTS	SOME	NONE
I learned	____	____	____
I Participated	____	____	____
I enjoyed	____	____	____

B. Group Dynamics

	YES	?	NO
Completed all steps satisfactorily	___	___	___
Everyone participated	___	___	___
Leadership functions were distributed	___	___	___
There was overall focus on resolving uncertainties and comparing insights	___	___	___

C. Roles: Check (√) your own--circle those you observed in others.

Positive Roles

Initiating
Asking for information
Gave information
Asked for reactions
Gave reactions
Restated points
Gave/Asked for examples
Asked for summary
Summarized discussion

Gatekeeping
Timekeeping
Encouraging
Tension Release
Useful Pause

Dysfunctional Roles

Sidetrack to Own Area
Interrupted Others
Monopolize Discussion
Put-Down
Irrelevant Stories
Apologizing
Withdrawal
Premature Evaluation
Failure to Listen

D. *Parting Thoughts*: Summarize *your* views on your discussion group today, on the impact of this discussion on your view of the article.

[↓ Remainder of page 10]

Based on W. F. Hill, *Learning Through Discussion* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publication, 1977), and W. J. McKeachie, *Teaching Tips* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Co., 1986). An earlier version of this form was created by C. E. Nelson and associates at Indiana university, the present version has been much revised and altered by J. S. Kelly, Department of Philosophy, Miami University, Ohio.

> This worksheet is accompanied by *On Discussion - A Guide*, a ten-page set of directions and/or suggestions for using the worksheet.[19] The Guide addresses the discussion sequence, student roles in the discussion (in detail), and amplifies the directions for all three phases of the worksheet (good discussions do not just happen). After introducing the students to the concept of the discussion format (during the first class)[20] and setting the first problem/issue, I assign a reading and their task is to fill out the worksheet at home *as-they-read*. This latter emphasis is important, for critical thinking involves critical reading - the worksheet serves as reading guide by focusing their attention and helps to avoid the "spinning of wheels" - with the result that students become actively involved in the task of "nonlinear" reading, of searching for a claim and its backing. On the designated class meeting (Monday, say, of a MWF schedule) the class is divided into discussion groups of 5-6 each and the students follow the structured discussion format, with part of the discussion worksheet to be filled in and modified during their class discussion and in consultation with other classmates (group membership is changed each discussion session to avoid the formation of cliques and to simulate the real world and the fact that, as in any community, one must learn to "deal with" a variety of personalities and learning styles).[21]

At the end of the class the worksheet is handed in. On the following class meeting we all engage in a lively discussion of the reading and, more importantly, on the activity of the discussion groups - for it is this activity that initially commands the students' attention and accounts for "paralysis through analysis". Since we should seek to make students active learners, it is best to let them know what we are up to that they may take an active role in their education - it helps to emphasize to them that it is *their* education and we seek their input regarding the appropriateness of the worksheets. And since it is often opportune to make changes based on student suggestions, the students become part of a dynamic process. In addition each worksheet has an evaluation section built into it that we might monitor and discuss difficulties as they occur (this is much more useful for all than is the end-of-course evaluation alone). For instance, early on in the term one student complained on the worksheet that many of the other members of his group seemed unprepared and that the discussion wandered and was of little benefit. My written response was a question: "As a member of the group what did you do to generate useful discussion?" As later conversation confirmed, this student recognized he had been a bit passive. By combining the *weekly* discussion format with our structured input and guidance, students are quickly eased into seeking out the most plausible line of reasoning for a position. Here we begin to move students from the quest for certainty as they now seek reasons for their and other's claims. Again, our individual teaching talents come into play.

What strikes me as most useful about the structured discussions is the development of the student's metathinking, for they have questions not only about the content of the reading but also about their own processes of reasoning - and that is exactly the aim of the discussion worksheet. It is here that the teacher is able to introduce some tools that aid in the development of the student's critical assessment, tools that the students have asked for because *they see the need*. We arrive, then at task two: enabling students to see the need for critical reasoning in order to make informed decisions despite uncertainty. For in their group discussions they begin the process of thinking critically, of building skills and of seeking the tools that are of help to them (no doubt peer pressure plays a positive role here). And all this is for the (their) purpose of critically discussing the content of the reading assigned - they are becoming active learners. Teacher handouts or discussions introducing critical thinking concepts and heuristics are thus welcomed by the student. Student discussions have even been successful in my absence (e.g., while at a conference) - *learning should not be contingent upon our presence* (another point of intersection with ***The Harvard Assessment Seminars***).

Once they overcome their initial paralysis through analysis, and it happens rather quickly, a typical student response might be: "We can all rationalize - so who has the better reasons? Like, it's all just a word game." What I *think* is: *At least it's a game you are now playing,* what I say is: "Let's investigate how your discussions actually went." And then we are off and running, the search for criteria has begun - and they are searching. Very rarely is there a group in which a "good" point has not emerged; this serves as fodder for discussion - *metathinking*! By seeking tools that will enable them to better understand the readings and engage in critical discussions in their groups (which itself furthers understanding), group members begin thinking about their own thinking processes. (Although my emphasis here has not been on content, we must remember that it is the *content* that is serving as grist for our critical mill.)

We now move to the third task: to show progress occurred without certainty - progress by the elimination of poor reasoning. Since we have already begun to develop criteria for acceptable reasoning, we are able to discuss why certain reasoning is faced with a burden of plausibility. Again, this notion of the burden of plausibility is built into the structure of the worksheet. The group discussions help them realize that reasonable people can reasonably disagree, thus they turn to an investigation of the proffered reasons, for it is the reasons that are the focus of the discussion and that enable them to make progress in understanding. And for us this is progress, for it is the exercising of the very skill we hope to impart - and they do it. Again, I think this notion of progress needs to be continuously reinforced with examples, drawn if possible from their discussions. Moreover there is a bonus that I discovered with this structured discussion format. The increase in critical thinking skills via group discussion aids the development of social skills, e.g., empathic understanding, the role of compromise and reasoned disagreement. Critically listening to one another becomes important to them and provides for a vibrant mixture of levels of interaction, for by identifying a position with a member of some group, someone who has an identity, a continuity through time, the position itself begins to have a continuity.[22] Whereas Morgan may never have thought: "What would a Marxist say in response to me?", he may think about what Amy will say. This critical attitude, this bringing of others into one's thinking is exactly the skill we want and the discussion format promotes its development. Take the troublesome abortion issue. Sarah and Beth may be on opposite sides of the issue, but once they recognize there is some plausibility to the reasoning on both sides they are less likely to be dogmatic. They may each retain their beliefs, but they will begin to feel uncomfortable in enforcing them on others - compromise may be rational. With our guidance students begin to realize there can be progress and commitment in full awareness of uncertainty.

To further remove unclarities and to ease the doubts some may have, I now turn to pedagogical worries.

III. *Pedagogical Worries—Further Suggestions*

> What is the use of studying philosophy if all that it does is to enable you to talk with some plausibility about some abstruse questions of logic, etc., and if it does not improve your thinking about the important questions of everyday life...?
>
> *Ludwig Wittgenstein*

As with any suggested teaching technique, there are prima facie doubts facing this model's implementation in individual settings; there may also be more serious questions aimed at the value of the technique. By addressing the worries that have been raised by others or anticipated by myself, I shall further articulate my proposal in order to soften such worries. No doubt there are particular difficulties I have failed to consider, still it is hoped that the dynamic nature of the method here suggested will allow a successful fit with the majority of course structures and goals. Moreover, there are many variations on this model (no boil in the bag solutions here) that can help accomplish the same goal - to make students active learners.

Course Structure. One may worry that their particular institutional structures do not allow sufficient opportunity for the discussion format here espoused. This may be true in some situations, though only those that involve tutorial teaching come quickly to mind (though, of course, variables such as room layout may be prohibitive). Large lectures involving (graduate) student assistants strike me as particularly apt candidates for this method since there can be lectures on Monday, Wednesday, Friday, with structured group discussions on Tuesday and/or Thursday (or some such). My own experience suggests that this structure would be most beneficial for all concerned (assistants may profitably function as either facilitators or group members). Classes that meet once a week also benefit from this heuristic since, as many know, three hours can be a very long time. In this latter setting I have found that students both enjoy and benefit from an hour of student discussion followed by a break, followed by further discussion and/or the introduction to the next problem or reading(s). As should be clear from the above, the method here proposed does not dismiss lecture, it merely makes it an adjunct to the total learning experience (instead of being the total learning experience). For the more traditional Monday-Wednesday-Friday or Tuesday-Thursday schedule, it is helpful to assign the worksheet over the longer period of time (e.g., have the in-class discussion on a Monday or Tuesday, respectively).

Workload--Type and Amount. In my experience students are always overworked - just ask them. However, what I gather from my students, though mixed, tends to support the claim that it *initially* seems like more work because one is required to do something - write and think - every week: "It's not just reading and memorizing." But again, once the "paralysis through analysis" phase has passed and they become accustomed to the schedule and structure, students tend to find themselves "involved" and reading material not assigned, even some of the suggested reading. Their efforts receive immediate reward since unclarities and misinterpretations arise within the group and given that each member identifies with the group, each student feels he or she is making progress (in understanding) - they no longer feel they are merely spinning wheels. (Of course there are those who drop out.) As Hilary Putnam and others have pointed out,[23] our present experiences take on meaning when we assimilate them to prototypes or schemata formed from past experiences. How much more efficient, then, is the process of learning when the labor is divided and schemata "shared". Thus, to use Hirsch's metaphor, the bringing of the "iceberg of meaning" to the surface is enhanced by communal effort. By, so to speak, "borrowing a schema", we stop the spinning wheels and this, among other factors, tends to alleviate worries about loss of content (see below). How such a program works with texts (e.g., Plato's ***Republic***) may require that the worksheet (or course) be modified from what is suggested here. As I mentioned above, this approach is dynamic and should accommodate most introductory class material (I have also used it, in modified form, in an advanced history class).

Students are not the only ones who are overworked and many faculty members have expressed their worry that such an approach will require too much "retooling". Certainly for some of us it may require arduous change, but I find such worries somewhat dramatic. Acting as facilitators of skill rather than purveyors of truth (content) may be initially threatening, but given that our role in the college or university is not merely lecturing and distributing reading lists, it is a change worth serious consideration. Nor is the change that demanding for once the basic worksheet is set, class preparation is not burdensome; again one need not worry about that wonderfully erudite lecture or about "tricks" for generating discussion - as in any class, of course, it helps to have interesting material (content). Moreover, as I have structured my classes there is at least one hour (per class) per week "free". In fact my role as guide tends to relieve me of some of the pressures which result from feeling that I must "fill them with truths" (it is better to participate in the search with them). This combined with the intrinsic satisfaction of seeing students actively engage issues, challenge one another (and me) with argument, and respond positively to better arguments has instilled a new sense of vigor in my teaching while allowing me more time for my own thinking and reading. Teaching the introductory course need not be dreaded, it can be enjoyable and beneficial for all. Sounds a bit grandiose, I admit, but I have found it somewhat amazing how much we can accomplish with a bit of "hands-on" thinking and doing.

Grading. My conceits about grading practices are not changed by this approach - it is very much an individual decision. My own preference is not to grade the worksheets - it is more important to have the students become involved in the search for meaning and understanding than to have them (directly) aiming at a grade - *a correct* answer. Rather, I "require" that 80% of the worksheets be turned in on time (at the end of class discussion), otherwise grades are subject to being lowered. Corresponding to the content on which the worksheets focus, I structure short papers, gradually building from explication of an argument, criticism of an argument, to formulation of an argument - I do not require "term" papers, that strikes me as too content oriented.

Group Interaction. As I mentioned, accompanying the worksheet is a discussion about roles in group discussion, including both dysfunctional and positive roles. These are discussed as the course proceeds. Some of the dysfunctional roles to be on the watch for include: showing off, dominating, monologues (not listening), silence, sidetracking, being unprepared.... Fruitful roles to be encouraged include: initiating, asking for/giving information, asking for/giving reactions, restating (other's claims), comparing ideas, clarifying, synthesizing, summarizing, encouraging, tension-relieving.... Two essential roles are (i) gatekeeping: verbal traffic management, and (ii) timekeeping: keeping track of the time allotted for discussion. Discussion and implementation of roles such as these combined with a recognition of the place of reason, helps limit dogmatism (compromise may be rational) and promotes the development of social skills - critical reasoning occurs in a context, a context from which textbook exercises too often pull away (we are wise to remember Wittgenstein's challenging aphorism).

Things Are Fine. Many classes tend to flourish from the outset -lively discussions are generated, students are interested, exams are well done as are papers. In such cases why try something new? Probably one should not. Still, one must be sure that discussion is not limited, say, to ten out of thirty. That can make a class seem very active; it may be, or it may be only those ten. But if upon reflection one is satisfied with one's classes, I agree - don't change. Nor will adopting this model cure all ills - there are no panaceas.

Content. Perhaps the most often expressed worry concerning the model here championed is that not everything one wants to cover can be covered - content will be sacrificed. This truly is an empirical issue and although my sample is hardly adequate, nonetheless I may (in philosophic fashion) be able to ease some worries. There is also the data mentioned in footnote #7, which indicates that students involved in group discussion cooperative learning suffer from no loss in content as compared to traditional teacher-centered methods. Moreover, as McKeachie concludes, "[a] large number of studies have compared the effectiveness of lectures with other teaching methods....[The results of which show] that when measures of knowledge are used, the lecture proves to be as efficient as other methods. Alternatively, in those experiments involving measures of retention of information after the end of a course, measures of transfer of knowledge to new situations, or measures of problem solving, thinking, or attitude change, or motivation for future learning, the results tend to show differences favoring discussion methods over lecture."[24]

Now for the more philosophic massaging. For this fear of loss of content to be poignant it must be established that the lecture model *is* successful in imparting content - that it seems not to be is what generated the search for an alternative. After all, that a great deal of content is assigned or lectured on does not automatically translate into content gained by the student. What we may run into here is a conflict of goals. My preference, motivated in the above, is not mere exposure, but engagement and the exercising and development of a transferable skill. Changing the focus so that content is grist for the critical mill, allows content to be "picked-up" along the way. By learning to follow a line of argument students are not wasting time attempting to memorize (memorize what?) and the discussions, as mentioned above, enable them to become active learners who feel a sense of accomplishment due to increased understanding. We must provide the tools and motivate their use that our students continue to read and engage issues outside the classroom - we cannot "pour in" the content, especially philosophical content.

With regard to performance on papers and essay exams, I have noticed no loss of content, but have noticed more sensitivity to argument ("mere opinions are cheap..."). And again, there is the evidence just adumbrated of the advantages of the discussion model. Moreover discussions begun in class carry over to the student union, library, etc. - learning is not distinct from social activity. Those students who are or become philosophy majors will not suffer, for that their first philosophy course did not "cover", say, positivism or existentialism will not set them back - their learning philosophy is not contingent on our lecturing (though they more than others may benefit from it). By generating and sustaining their interest, supplying necessary tools and recommended reading, these students receive proper guidance - they become active learners (not followers). With either kind of student, loss of content need not be a threat with the discussion model.

Conclusion

My claim, then, is that the structured discussion format speeds the recognition of agency (getting beliefs on one's own, avoidance of the 1-800-syndrome), instills interest by participation, promotes development of a transferable skill, aids development of social skills, and (it seems) increases retention of issues discussed - ***CONTENT*** is not lost in the ***PROCESS***. Finally let me emphasize that I am not advocating the total abandonment of the erudite lecture/discussion format. Reading Kant, for instance, is tough and we need to set a framework for understanding. My point is that the lectures and the readings are usually not sufficient for enabling students to become ***makers of meaning***.

Notes

*Earlier versions of this paper have been presented to The Warren Steinkraus Lectures on Human Ideals, State University of New York, Oswego, (April 1988); to the faculty and students at the California State University, Chico (May 1988); to the Faculty Forum, Elmhurst College, (May 1988); to the American Association of Philosophy Teachers, in conjunction with the American Philosophical Association, Chicago (April 1989). Worksheets based on this paper have also been presented to both the 7th and 8th International Workshop/Conference On Teaching Philosophy, Hampshire College, Amherst (August 1988) and Indiana University, Bloomington (August 1990). I am grateful to all who participated in discussion and from whom I have learned a great deal.

1. *Cultural Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1987).

2. "Philosophical Education as Cultural Criticism," *Teaching Philosophy,* 3: 1, (1980), p. 2.

3. For an excellent discussion of the developmental aspect of student learning see W. G. Perry, *Forms of Intellectual and Ethical Development In the College Years* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1970).

4. Hirsch, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

5. See R. J. Light, *The Harvard Assessment Seminars* (First Report, 1990).

6. "[S]tudents overwhelmingly report one additional benefit of small group work. They point out that *the process of working in a group,* in a supervised setting, teaches them crucial skills. The skills they learn include how to move a group forward, how to disagree without being destructive or stifling new ideas, and how to include all members in a discussion. Few students, if any, have these skills when they arrive at college. Fewer still ever get formal training in them. Yet alumni from 35 liberal arts colleges report overwhelmingly that the best thing colleges could do for students in coming years would be to train them how to engage in group efforts productively..." Ibid, pp. 70-71.

7. Mary Lynn Crow, "Teaching as an Interactive Process," in K. E. Eble (ed.) *New Directions for Teaching and Learning - Improving Teaching Styles,* 1 (1980), pp. 43-44. Like results have been documented in W. J. McKeachie, *Teaching Tips* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Co., 1986); J. A. Olmstead, *Small Group Instruction: Theory and Practice* (Alexandria, Va.: Human Resources Research Organization, 1974); and N. R. F. Maier and L. A. Maier, "An Experimental Test of the Effects of "Developmental" vs. "Free" Discussion on the Quality of Group Discussions," *Journal of Applied Psychology,* 41 (1957).

8. "One-Way and Two-Way Communication Processes in the Classroom," *Teaching-Learning Monograph Series,* 1 (1970), p. 5.

9. See Parker Palmer, "A New View of Knowledge," address given to the *American Association of Higher Education,* Chicago (March 1987), and J. S. Kelly, "Community, Individualism, and Epistemic Encounters," delivered to the *Midwest Philosophy of Education Society,* Chicago (November 1990), where it is argued that what dominates in our culture is an objectivist mode of knowing where the paradigm of successful explanation is that of manipulation and control, resulting in an educational system that is a more or less value-neutral institution within which individuals pursue their private goals, free for the most part from any sense of public good or the goals and constraints of moral tradition and community.

10. Hirsch, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-34.

11. Michael Goldman, "Episodic Consciousness," *Teaching Philosophy,* 6: 2, (April 1983), p. 127.

12. Crow, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

13. My own experience at both the undergraduate and graduate levels was that a great deal of learning took place outside the classroom in (often heated) discussions. We must remember that it is a low percentage of students who go into academics, and lower still into philosophy.

14. Nonetheless where critical thinking is the content, certain formal procedures are good adjunct exercises. But they need to be motivated by showing their role in the total skill development (cf. "Why do I have to practice against the wall? I want to *play* tennis").

15. Exciting questions are raised, for example, by Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, and Tarule, *Women's Ways of Knowing* (New York: Basic Books, 1986). For present purposes I adopt the notion captured by R. Ennis, "A Conception of Critical Thinking--With Some Curriculum Suggestions," *Newsletter on Teaching Philosophy,* (Summer 1987).

16. This, of course, is my "fudge" word, but by 'typical' I mean those courses that *focus* on syllogisms, truth-tables, venn diagrams, etc. My sense is that this focus is changing; see, for example, B. Moore, and R. Parker, *Critical Thinking,* (Palo Alto: Mayfield Publishing, 1989), and V. Barry and J. Rudinow, *Invitation to Critical Thinking* (San Francisco: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1990). Still, I am not claiming that truth-tables, etc., have no place in the curriculum.

17. Here I lean on Perry, *op. cit.*

18. One needed emendation I am in the process of developing, is inclusion of a section that will reflect students' emotional reactions to articles, movies, etc., so as to allow such reactions to themselves be put under critical assessment. The theoretical backing for this alteration is to be found in my paper, "Emotions and Reality - Bridging the Subjective/Objective Gap," presented at the *48th Annual Mountain - Plains Philosophy Conference,* Central State University, Edmond, OK (September 1990), and to the *Society for Realist/Anti-realist Discussion,* at the Central Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association, Chicago (April 1991).

19. Anyone interested in obtaining a copy of this guide please feel free to contact me.

20. An advantage here is that the first day of class is not wasted and students *begin* to demarcate philosophy from other disciplines.

21. Thus I am hesitant about the group competition model suggested by K. Ramsland, "Teaching Critical Reasoning Through Group Competition," *Teaching Philosophy,* 9: 4, (December 1986), pp. 319-326, for it calls for group membership to remain constant and for group competition. I worry that competition may improperly alter the focus from a more intrinsically (as well as extrinsically) desirable goal. Thus I agree with E. Glassman that "participative discussion in which all persons contribute facts, ideas notions, theories, thinking, and creativity," is more likely to be successful where there is cooperation rather than competition. See Glassman, "The Teacher as Leader," in K. Eble *op. cit.*, p. 36. See also D. B. Haines, and W. J. McKeachie, "Cooperative vs. Competitive Discussion Methods in Teaching Introductory Psychology," *Journal of Educational Psychology,* 58 (1967), where it is concluded that cooperative discussion methods encourage more effective work and better morale than competitive methods.

22. Goldman (1983), *op. cit.*, suggests this outcome as a desideratum.

23. Putnam, "The Meaning of Meaning," in *Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2: Mind, Language and Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 227-248. See also David Rumelhart, "Schemata: The Building Blocks of Cognition," in R. Spiro, B. Bruce, & W. Brewer (Eds.) *Theoretical Issues In Reading Comprehension* (Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1980), pp. 33-58; and M. Crawford and R. Chaffin, "The Reader's Construction of Meaning: Cognitive Research on Gender and Comprehension," in E. Flynn & P. Schweickart (Eds.) *Gender and Reading* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 3-30.

24. McKeachie, *Teaching Tips, op. cit.*, p. 69.

MAKING HISTORY, MAKING LIVES, AND MAKING CONNECTIONS

Steven Schroeder
Department of Philosophy and Religion
University of Northern Iowa
Cedar Falls, IA 50614-0501

I

In *Making History*,[1] Richard Flacks describes a separation between "making history" and "making lives" that permeates contemporary American behavior. In general, he argues, American society is structured in such a way as to drive a wedge between "ordinary" activities in which *lives* are made and "extraordinary" activities in which *history* is made. Because most people are almost exclusively concerned with the "ordinary" activity of making lives, they see themselves as disconnected from the "extraordinary" activity of making history. In this paper, I will outline a philosophy of education in which the distinction is taken as a *tension*.

That the distinction has "making" on both sides is more than a fortuitous coincidence: ***making*** is central to the pedagogical process. More to the point, the pedagogical process, by which I mean the single process that encompasses "teaching" and "learning," *is* making, and it is simultaneously making lives and making history.

To make a life or a history, one must make connections. One of the fundamental tasks for philosophy of education is to clarify how such connections are made. I am convinced that they are not simply "given," that where they are taken as given one is certain to find a process by which the making of lives is defined entirely in terms of *reproducing* connections: making is redefined as *re*making. This is likely to produce an educational process that is indistinguishable from "socialization,"[2] and it is likely to produce a disconnectedness like the one Flacks describes. Even this disconnectedness is a product of making connections: the world is held together as a series of discrete spheres, and one's life is the product that results from "proper" distinction of those spheres. "Proper" distinction of those spheres is imposed from outside, making one's life an essentially passive outcome of history. History is isolated from the realm of ordinary activity, and education (particularly to the extent that it involves learning "history") becomes an entirely passive process of absorption.

As Flacks implies, "disconnectedness" represents the mystification of connections: the process by which connections are made is rendered inaccessible to conscious intervention. The result is an inability to make connections and an uncritical acceptance of connections made elsewhere--whether rational or not. It is an assumption that connections are *always* made elsewhere and are therefore *always* experienced as arbitrary. It is also a fundamental failure of education, a failure that I propose to address here in the form of a constructivist philosophy of education that builds on Flacks' argument.

II

"Making history" brings a number of things to mind. We often use the phrase (or some variant of it) to describe the occurrence of an event that we judge to be of particular importance. If someone makes an important discovery or does something significant for the first time, s/he is "making history." In this sense, the phrase shifts our attention from the "ordinary" to the "extraordinary," from the common to the singular. It brings to mind "big names," not the names of common folk. Flacks, for example, quotes George Konrad: "History takes no note when a woman feeds her family."[3]

But we might also play on the subtle ambiguity in our use of "history" to generate a number of additional variations. For example, we might use the phrase to refer to the art and/or science of the historian. This banks on the possibility of understanding "history" as a narrative account of events and thus understanding *making* history as the construction of such an account. This use of the phrase might well suggest a different focus. It has often been the case that historians "make" their histories in such a way as to focus our attention on "big names" rather than "common folk," on the "extraordinary" rather than the "ordinary." but it does not necessarily *have* to be the case. Certainly, there are (by definition) more common than "uncommon" folk. If history is our life together as well as an account of that life, then it is made mostly by common folk, with only intermittent contributions from those labelled "uncommon." This suggests an additional variation. Making history is a social process, something in which cultures engage, not only through historians but also through other story tellers.[4] Interestingly enough, this cultural process, although it reinforces the tendency to focus on the uncommon, also contributes to the construction of the common. We might very well think first of particular persons and particular events when we think of making history, but the cultural process of making history is just as concerned with *connections* among persons and events. More than anything else, it is concerned with stories or narratives that connect persons and events in particular ways. These stories determine what we hold in common, what we take to be "ordinary," and what we take to be "extraordinary." We might want to ask what a history that *did* take note when a woman feeds her family would look like.

In contemporary culture, particularly in the context of schools, these "stories" are likely to take the form of "curricula" or "canons."[5] The passion with which the canon has been debated in institutions of "higher education" of late and the ferocity with which the "purity" of the canon has been defended in the West from the beginning of the Christian era (and still is by authors like Allen Bloom[6]) suggests that there is at least a subconscious awareness of this. It would probably be more correct to say "partially conscious." What marks much of the debate is *consciousness* of the stories combined with *unconsciousness* of the processes by which they are produced or of the fact that they are produced. This combination results in a confusion of story or "system" with reality.[7] The debate and the defense are also evident in campaigns for curricular reform at the elementary and secondary level, and, as early childhood education is increasingly subsumed under elementary education, they creep nearer and nearer the beginning of human life.

III

In its most general sense, the word "canon" denotes a measuring device or a standard. In Biblical studies in the Christian tradition, it is often used to refer to the body of texts taken as "Scriptural" by the Christian community. That sounds simple enough, but it masks a complicated process by which a living community struggles to come to agreement regarding which stories are to be included and which excluded in its self-definition. There is a great deal at stake here: the process of formation of a canon largely determines who is and who isn't part of the community. It determines which stories and texts are to be considered orthodox and which heterodox.[8] The term is also applied outside Biblical studies to designate a formal or informal body of authoritative texts in non-religious communities. "Canons" of Western literature describe bodies of texts by which Western culture defines itself. To look at a "canon" is to look at a self-portrait of a community or a culture. Since the term is applied to bodies of texts, it is all too easy to forget that it refers to a *rule*, not a *list*. In looking at bodies of texts identified as "canons," it is important to look for the rule by which the body is constituted. It is important to see what is included as well as what is excluded and, in both instances, to attend to "why" and "how."

A number of years ago, Richard McKeon described this process in the West in terms of an interaction between "Greek" books and "Christian" books.[9] "Greek literature and culture, as we know them," he wrote, "are the result of three stages of production, preservation, and organization. The classics of Greek literature owe their origin to Hellenic authors, their form and interpretation to Hellenistic editors, librarians, and historians, and their adaptation to uses in other cultures to Roman rhetoricians and philosophers. Greek literature did not present itself in one guise or perspective for adjustment to the books of the Old and New Testaments. The early Councils of the church formed canons of the authentic books of Scripture, of the beliefs or doctrines set forth in them, and of the orthodox and heretical interpretations of those doctrines. The Roman Church sought in Greek literature doctrines that might lead to heresy or might reinforce orthodoxy. The Jews in framing their canon...sought in Greek literature philological methods of establishing texts and critical methods of interpreting them. The Muslims sought sciences and scientific laws that were in accord or disaccord with the law of the Koran. The Greek Church departed from the institutionalized canons of Latin popes and

Councils to form a canon of literature. Greek literature in these various guises--as philosophy, criticism, science, or letters--was adapted over the centuries to the institutionalized canons of the Roman Church, and the evolution of judgments to accept or prohibit books followed the altering forms taken on by books and interpretations of books. The history of ideas finds its materials in surviving books and constructs the history of freedom of thought and expression, of innovation and conservation, from the production, preservation, and use of books, and from the doctrines, interpretations, sciences, and literary forms found in them."[10] The concept of "surviving books" is of particular importance. The process McKeon described is a process of selection, shaped largely by the encounter of Christendom with Greek culture.

It is a truism that history is written by the winners. But the process of selection by which canons *and* histories are formed is a more complex process of assimilation in which the "survival" of texts depends on their reinterpretation in new contexts. If by "winners" we mean people in power, it is accurate to say that winners not only select which texts survive but also largely determine how those texts are understood and used. This selection process, of course, tends to reinforce the understanding of those in power as "winners" and of those out of power as "losers." At its most extreme, it renders those out of power invisible.

McKeon hinted at this when he pointed out that "the freedom of writers to write, the freedom of readers to read, and the freedom of critics or judges or censors to select criteria which establish communities united by common opinions, beliefs, or institutions supplement and delimit each other."[11] He saw both canon and history as resulting from an interaction of "freedom" and "constraint": "Athens, from the age of Pericles to the death of Alexander the Great, provided the freedom in which the works which laid the foundations of culture and art in the West were produced. Athenians were free and Athens was the school of Greece, as Pericles proclaimed, yet poets, artists, and philosophers, including Pericles' master, Anaxagoras, were imprisoned, exiled, or put to death. Only a small portion of the books of that period has survived. Greek literature and culture as we know them were formed and structured in the Hellenistic period, when scholars, librarians, and historians edited books, organized them in catalogues of arts and sciences, and traced the sequences of schools and the development of men of letters. Only fragments and later reports of Hellenistic works of scholarship have survived. Scholars were free to shape or neglect, interpret or suppress the works of earlier writers. Our knowledge of Hellenistic learning is mediated by works written during the Roman republic and empire which adapt them to the preservation and development of the values and institutions of another culture."[12] As an example of the selection process involved in the formation of canons and histories, McKeon points out that the Alexandrian librarians "who edited Homer and Hesiod, Aeschylus and Sophocles made canons of Plato's authentic works...[but] did not edit Democritus, who was a voluminous writer, praised for the beauty of his style and the subtlety of his dialectic, and author of one of the earliest treatises on Homer, fragments of which survive. They did not edit Pythagoras, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, or any of the Sophists. The treatises of Aristotle were edited in the first century B.C. in Rome by Andronicus of Rhodes, tenth head of the Lyceum. They seem to have been little known at the time, although his dialogues were widely read and admired. Only fragments of his dialogues survive today, but his treatises have come to us much as Andronicus organized them. Plato's 'Lecture on the Good' has not survived despite its wide renown, but his dialogues have come to us much as they were edited in Alexandria."[13]

McKeon looks at two canons from the early Church, one contained in the *Pseudo-Clementine Apostolic Constitutions*, the other in the *Pseudo-Gelasian Decretals*. One of the little ironies he notes is that "authoritative compilations of canons tend themselves to be spurious, pseudo-works attributed to apostles, companions of apostles, or earlier popes or theologians with authority to speak for the apostles."[14] The contemporary equivalent of this spurious character is the tendency of the New Right to pass off its curricular pronouncements as recoveries of a purer, more "normal" time.[15]

IV

The "history of philosophy" is an important example of the submersion of the *process* by which a canon or curriculum is constructed and the resultant confusion of the *product* with reality. In a recent article in *Hypatia*, Mary Ellen Waithe[16] explored the "canon" typically employed in teaching history of philosophy and offered some correctives. She writes: "Accounts of the two millennia history of our discipline are astonishingly incomplete and incorrect. Those accounts typically omit any mention of contributions made to philosophy by women. The histories I am referring to include those multi-volume series created in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as well as the standard English-language anthologies and introductory texts which are the mainstays of philosophy libraries and curricula. Through them, philosophy is effectively, but not explicitly, portrayed as an essentially male exercise."[17] In this comment, Waithe does an admirable job of capturing the connection between "making history" and constructing canons. The "standard" histories by which philosophy is typically taught constitute a canon of sorts. What is *excluded* from that canon is as important as what is *included*. Excluding women from the canon renders them invisible. In this case, since there are no women in the canon, the community defined by that canon becomes closed to women.

But there are and have been women philosophers. Waithe continues with a number of important examples: "Hypatia of Alexandria and Hildegard of Bingen were considered by their contemporaries to be philosophers, but later historians refer to Hypatia as a 'mathematician/ astronomer," and to Hildegard as a 'theologian/ medical theorist.' Yet what Hypatia and Hildegard wrote fit descriptions of philosophy in their respective eras. We must remind ourselves that the definition of the discipline philosophy has undergone significant metamorphosis over the millennia. If we accept descriptions of philosophy in use at particular periods, we find woman-authored works fitting those descriptions...with the possible exception of those centuries appropriately referred to as 'the dark ages,' there is an unbroken history of women philosophers from ancient times until the present day. It is understandable that our students and our colleagues believe that women did not make substantial contributions to philosophy. The opinion that for two millennia there were no women philosophers has achieved the status of received (and unspoken) doctrine in our profession."[18] This is a concrete example of what McKeon meant when he attributed great significance to the scholars who "make history." If we want to study the philosophy of Democritus, we have to work from fragments and second hand reports. This is not because Democritus did not write much; it is because the scholars who made history chose not to include much of what he wrote. By the same token, if we want to study most of the women who have contributed to philosophy over the past two millennia, we have to work from fragments and second hand reports. This is not because women have not contributed to philosophy; it is because the scholars who made history chose not to include their contributions.

Waithe rightly emphasizes the importance of understanding the process of exclusion. She points out that Marsilio Ficino, writing in the 15th century, was the first to suggest that Diotima (the woman who was Socrates' teacher) was a fictitious character. She insists that "we will need to know both as a general phenomenon, and with respect to specific philosophers, how women's biographies and texts came to be excluded from the histories of philosophy. This is particularly true respecting philosophers such as Hypatia, Hildegard, Conway, Cavendish, and Cockburn. These and numerous other philosophers were well known among their contemporaries and/or immediate successors in philosophic and wider intellectual circles. Their philosophic *corpus* is substantially larger than mere fragments or scattered pamphlets and correspondence. How did it all get misplaced? If we do not find out, it will most certainly happen again. These materials are part of our rich heritage. Finding them or identifying their philosophical significance creates something of a moral obligation to preserve them. Ideas and theories are preserved by critically examining them, utilizing them, comparing them, and improving upon them without destroying the content or denying the authorship of the original."[19]

Making history is a kind of cultural remembering and, like all remembering, it involves *reconstructing* the past. Both

Waithe and McKeon imply that such reconstruction is always related to the present and how we understand or construct it.

V

This brings us to another aspect of making history. To connect the reconstruction of history with the construction of the present is to imply a kind of "present-mindedness," to use a term employed by William Dray in a lecture delivered at the University of Northern Iowa last year.[20] Dray began his lecture by referring to the understanding of history developed by John Dewey in his *Logic*. Dewey was inclined, like McKeon, toward a "presentist" view: historical accounts "are clearly relative to the time and place at which they are produced in the sense that they can only be inferred from documents and artifacts that happen then and there to be available." This calls to mind McKeon's concept of "surviving texts." Dewey also wrote that "the conceptual material employed in writing history is that of the period in which a history is written...As culture changes, the conceptions that are dominant in a culture change. Of necessity new standpoints for viewing, appraising and ordering data arise." Historical accounts are shaped by the questions they are intended to address. Particular times and places have particular questions which historians address as they make histories.

Dray's lecture was an extended critique of Dewey, insisting that we not study history "for the sake of changes this may produce in something else." I bring it to your attention because it cautions against reading the present *into* the past. That is a sure way to avoid the task of *listening* that is central to education. When Waithe recounts a list of women who engaged in philosophy but who are not included in histories of philosophy, when McKeon speaks of reconstructing Democritus from fragments because the scholars who made history didn't attend to Democritus in the same way they attended to Plato, they are not encouraging us to read the past in terms of the present. They are encouraging us to *listen* to the past, to voices that have intentionally or unintentionally been suppressed. This is "present-minded" to the extent that it will enlarge the universe of discourse, to the extent that it will broaden the circle of our conversation. It will *transform* the present. Waithe suggests that we read philosophy as a symposium in which women and men have been engaged from the beginning rather than a "course" to which women may be "added and stirred." I suggest a similar approach to history. We look at the past because it contains voices which, like ours, are engaged in a conversation. That conversation implies a connectedness among people, places, and events that requires some work on our part. That work is "making history," and it is a work in which we are *presently* engaged.

VI

To say that we are presently engaged in making history is ambiguous at best because of the difficulty of identifying "we." In fact, as suggested earlier, canons and curricula are largely responsible for that definition. In the West, the "we" of a white male is a different reality than the "we" of a woman or a person of color.[21] The process of making history has, in the West, most often been simultaneously a process of making ordinary people--particularly women and people of color--invisible.[22] It is, to a large extent, a process of marginalization. That is a paradox that lies at the heart of the educational process today, particularly in the West. I say this because education has become virtually synonymous with schooling and schooling has become virtually synonymous with social control.[23] Although, as I've already mentioned, some conservative curriculum reformers have adopted social control as an explicit goal, it is not necessary that it be *explicit* in order to function. In fact, as Waithe implied in her description of the "canon" of philosophy, *implicit* mechanisms of control may be more effective than explicit ones because they are more difficult to see. What is "implicit" may come to be taken as "natural" or given.

A less formal but more chilling example than the history of philosophy comes from a fifth grade classroom in Iowa.[24] The teacher was a woman, very "professional" in appearance and style. She was teaching a class of approximately twenty students about housing. To do this, she used a segment of a nationally broadcast television program designed primarily for elementary school children. The program began with the construction of a "Western" style house being built by male carpenters. Teacher and students were quiet as they watched and listened. Then there was a sequence in which a traditional Japanese dwelling was constructed, this time by one man. The narrator described the process seriously and with respect; teacher and students listened and watched in rapt attention. Finally came a sequence in which African women constructed a dwelling using mud. The narrator's tone changed (he was no longer serious); the teacher and the students laughed throughout this segment.

The example is chilling because it is at once so blatant and so unconscious. The teacher undoubtedly selected the program at least partly as a result of her school's written commitment to diversity of education, to a "global" understanding; after all, the program included people from European-American, Oriental, and African cultures. It included those people in a construction of history or world. But the construction valued male labor while it devalued the labor of women. It also accorded equal value to Oriental and European-American culture while devaluing African culture. The professional conducting this class had apparently internalized a system of values that renders women valueless. Her choice of program and her manner of presentation together were a construction of history that was simultaneously a marginalization of personal life--at least for the females in the classroom. In this case, the problem was exacerbated by the fact that the class did not include any minority children and that the tiny population of minority children in the "metropolitan area" are physically (and, apparently, psychologically) separated from this school.[25] White males in this classroom can put on blinders and begin to grow secure in their central position. White females are marginalized but presented with the option (in the example of their teacher) of retaining some status by identifying with males.[26]

A less straightforward but equally important example is the growing tendency to measure school success in vocational terms, particularly in terms of adjustment and competition. A driving force of school reform nationwide has been the conviction that the United States cannot remain "competitive" if its children are not equipped to enter the job force. As a motivation for school reform, this betrays the conviction that schools are factories for production of workers. Students are raw material to be transformed into laborers. Growing corporate involvement in school programs reflects this conviction.

In the realm of higher education, the same sort of vocationalism--including corporate involvement--is rampant. But, even apart from vocationalism, it is not difficult to make the case that universities are factories whose product is the elite of an existing social structure. Universities produce those who make history. More precisely, only the "best" universities and graduate schools produce those who make history. There is evidence that this circle also needs to be more tightly drawn. In one sense, complaints of critics like Bloom seem motivated by the fact that it is increasingly "elite" business schools--not traditional graduate schools--that produce history makers. The corporation is in a position to remake the world in its image.

VII

What troubles me about that is not the image of education as a process by which the world is remade but the image of the corporation as agent, with students as patients and teachers as tools. Teaching is increasingly a matter of technique, and technique is most often borrowed from the mass media. "Curricular materials" are increasingly intended to be "teacher proof." This is a recipe for alienated students, alienated teachers, and an alienating society.

My family and I moved from Chicago to Iowa a little more than a year ago. If William Bennett is to be believed, that means we moved from the "worst" school system in the nation to one of the "best." But the experience led me to rethink the categories and reinterpret Bennett's data. I suspect that, on one level at least, the high dropout rate in Chicago is a *positive* sign. Where schools are primarily concerned with social control and the production of laborers adjusted to life in an unjust society--as they are in Iowa as surely as in Chicago, dropping out may be a *better* action than staying in.

VIII

Paulo Freire suggested some time ago that the task of the educator committed to liberation consists of both denunciation and annunciation. More recently, Henry Giroux has restated that as an obligation to complement critique with "possibility thinking."[27] Though the form of my argument has been negative, I would suggest that it includes "possibility thinking" as well. I am convinced that distorted systems must be confronted with denunciation or critique before they can be transformed. But the transformation is at least partly to be located in recognition of distortion.

At the beginning of this paper, I mentioned the importance of making connections. In fact, I would go so far as to say that making connections is the heart of both philosophy and education. However, as I also mentioned at the beginning of the paper, the education that isolates life from history is itself a process of making connections: it is a way of making history. This highlights what I take to be essential for liberative education. It is most important, first, to be aware that connections are *made*; next, to be aware of *processes* by which they are made; and, finally, to act on the processes in a transformative way.

This is why I call the philosophy of education developed here "constructivist." Education, like philosophy, is a process of construction--not a process of transmission. It is more properly envisioned as a conversation than as a lecture. I am aware that to claim a "constructivist" orientation in education is to invoke Piaget, while to claim it in philosophy is to invoke Kant. I am more comfortable with the first invocation than the second, but I am willing to live with the second if I can insist that Kant be read *through* Piagetian and Marxist lenses.

In response to the contemporary perception of education as a process by which laborers are produced to fuel the economy of corporate capitalism, both Marx and Piaget would insist that education is itself labor. Piaget captured this in the title of a study he did for UNESCO: "to understand is to invent."[28] Marx captured it in his eleventh thesis on Feuerbach: "up to now, the philosophers have only interpreted the world; the point, however, is to change it." Both recognized that to know the world is to change it, or, more precisely, to *make* it. Both recognized that students do not learn if they are constrained to be products of a teacher's labor or a corporate system's priorities. They would agree with Freire that there is no sharp distinction between "teacher" and "student," because both are engaged in the transformation or construction of world. If either becomes a passive product, there is little hope that knowledge will come to life in their relationship.

I am convinced that the construction of knowledge is in large part simultaneously a construction and a deconstruction of "world" and "self." I think this is what some feminist writers[29] mean by *renaming* the world. Renaming is profoundly personal and profoundly political. It is, in fact, a process by which the personal and the political are reconnected.

Peggy McIntosh, in her description of interactive phases of curricular revision,[30] eloquently relates how the "traditional" curriculum of androcentric education is inherently disconnected from women students, who cannot find themselves in it. They cannot find themselves in it because it has no place for them. To a lesser degree, I think the same can be said for male students. I say this because the curriculum is depersonalizing. Its effect--whether this is its purpose or not--is to isolate the personal from the social and the political, to separate "making history" from "making lives." By placing Man at the center, it distorts both women and men. The humanity of the oppressor, the elite produced by this system, is diminished in the process. Both Spender and Schaef have written convincingly about the "tunnel vision" of males in an androcentric society. The only corrective for such tunnel vision is, to borrow Mary Daly's term, "polycentric" vision.

As Piaget was aware, this makes decentration central to learning. I interpret that to mean that we must actively challenge systems, particularly systems that are taken as reality. Since we are not aware of the systems we confuse with reality, we need one another if this challenge is to be possible. Confronted with a system that standardizes and depersonalizes, we can and must take every opportunity to bring the system itself into confrontation with other systems. This is an argument for pluralism that tends toward polycentrism.

It is also an argument for constructivism, because it insists that *no* structure or system is total and that *all* systems are therefore under construction.

NOTES

[1] Richard Flacks. *Making History.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.

[2] As Henry Giroux points out in *Schooling and the Struggle for Public Life: Critical Pedagogy in the Modern Age* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), this is explicitly acknowledged in much "New Right" literature on school reform. He cites Edward A. Wynne's identification of "social control" (in "The Great Tradition in Education: Transmitting Moral Values," *Educational Leadership*, December 1986/January 1987, pp.8-9) as a *desirable* goal of school reform.

[3] Flacks, p.1. See George Konrad. *Anti-politics.* New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1984.

[4] Cf. Giroux, *Schooling and the Struggle for Public Life* and Dale Spender. *Man Made Language.* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985 (second edition).

[5] In the context of popular culture, they are increasingly likely to take the form of programming decisions.

[6] *The Closing of the American Mind.* NY: Simon & Schuster, 1987.

[7] Spender, *Man Made Language.* See also Anne Wilson Schaef. *Women's Reality.* Minneapolis, Winston, 1985.

[8] In this sense, it might be more accurate to think of the canon or the curriculum as a "meta-narrative," a community's narrative account of which narratives are to be included and which excluded.

[9] Richard McKeon, "Canonic Books and Prohibited Books: Orthodoxy and Heresy in Religion and Culture," *Critical Inquiry* 2/4 (Summer 1976): 781-806.

[10] Ibid., pp.781,782

[11] Ibid., p.782

[12] Ibid., p.783

[13] Ibid., p.784

[14] Ibid., p.787

[15] Giroux treats this in some detail.

[16] Mary Ellen Waithe, "On Not Teaching the History of Philosophy," *Hypatia* 4/1 (Spring 1989): 132-138.

[17] Ibid., p.132

[18] Ibid., pp.132,133

[19] Ibid., p.136

[20] "Present-mindedness: Boon or Bane of Historiography?" reprinted in *On History and Philosophers of History*. Brill, 1989.

[21] And it is important to be suspicious of all attempts to include the "we" of oppressed people in the "we" of white males. Cf. Spender, *Man Made Language*.

[22] Perhaps the most spectacular example of this is the history of colonialism in Africa, the Americas, and Asia. Cf. Juan Luis Segundo, Leonardo Boff, Gustavo Gutierrez, Enrique Dussel.

[23] This, of course, is not a new observation. Ivan Illich said as much in *Deschooling Society*, as did Paul Goodman in *Compulsory Miseducation*. I should make it clear, though, that when I say schooling has become virtually synonymous with social control, I intend to suggest that this is the standard by which schools tend to be judged. Where schools are perceived to be "failing," it is most often because they are not exercising effective social control. I am convinced that this is why inner city schools are perceived as failing while suburban and small town schools generally aren't. The people who "make history" are more concerned about controlling inner city youth than suburban and small town youth. Obviously, this concern has racist and classist undertones.

[24] As reported by Margaret Riehl.

[25] Recent studies describing Chicago as "hypersegregated" come to mind here. I am struck by the extent to which the so-called "heartland" is hypersegregated. My suspicion is that current studies label hypersegregation a city problem when they should identify it as a nationwide problem in a society that pays lip service to pluralism while practicing provincialism. Labelling problems as belonging to someone else is a long-standing tradition in our culture. As Steve Goodman sang, "It's not hard to get along with somebody else's troubles."

[26] It would also be possible to comment on choice of medium (television) and the fact that a discussion of housing did not include any attention to homelessness. The choice of medium

tends to reinforce television as an arbiter of value. Lack of attention to homelessness may confirm disengagement from social problems.

[27] Paulo Freire. *Pedagogy of the Oppressed.* NY: Herder and Herder, 1972. Henry Giroux. *Schooling and the Struggle for Public Life.*

[28] New York: Viking, 1974 (originally published in 1948).

[29] Including Spender, Adrienne Rich, and Mary Daly

[30] "Interactive Phases of Curricular Re-Vision: A Feminist Perspective," Working Paper No. 124, Wellesley College Center for Research on Women, 1983.

THE NEUROPHILOSOPHY OF A SENSORIAL EPISTEMOLOGY: A THEORY OF PERCEPTION FROM G.H. MEAD'S SECOND STAGE OF THE ACT AND

by
George W. Stickel
Northwestern College
Orange City, Iowa 51041

John Dewey wrote of George Herbert Mead, " . . . his mind was full of the problem which has always occupied him, the problem of the individual mind and consciousness in relation to the world and society . . . "[1] The problem of consciousness, the problem of the development of the individual mind, and the problem of the individual mind in relation to the environment (the world and society) is still with us, as will be seen.

Patricia Smith Churchland has written about our so-called misunderstandings about consciousness and articulates the need for further study.[2] Additionally, she has written a monumental work, *Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind/Brain*, relating philosophy to neuroscience and calls for a Galilean combination of a theory which would provide the mathematics as well as the simplicity of understanding the individual mind. Mead's quest is very much alive, for she writes:

> What is now needed are theories of brain function that will begin to pull the data together, to pose new questions, and to compete for epistemological space. . . . The cardinal background principle for the theorist is that there are no homunculi. There is no little person in the brain who "sees" an inner television screen, "hears" an inner voice, "reads" the topographical maps, weighs reasons, decides actions, and so forth. . . . Crudely, what we have to do is explain the cleverness not in terms of an equally clever homunculus, and so on in infinite regress, but in terms of suitably orchestrated throngs of stupid things. In one's own case, of course, it seems quite shocking that one's cleverness should be the outcome of well-orchestrated stupidity. The sobering reminder here is that so far as neuronal organization is concerned, there appears to be no rationale for giving a system conscious access to all--or even very many--of brain's states and processes. . . .
>
> What is available by way of theory? . . . The fast answer is that a lot of very creative and intelligent work is going on in a number of places, but it is uneven, and it is difficult to determine how seminal most of it is. . . . Most generally, I was trying to see if anywhere there was a kind of "Galilean combination": the right sort of simplification, unification, and above all, *mathematization*--not necessarily a fully developed theory, but something whose explanatory beginnings promised the possibility of real theoretical growth.[3] (Emphasis is hers.)

On another dimension, the artifical intelligence studies bespeak of the same problem that filled Mead's mind. For example, the studies by the parallel distributed processing (PDP) group, simulates details of what happens simplistically on a neuronal level, within the cognitive processes. But in order to provide the simulation, an abbreviated concept of the environment is used and simulation of the external influence through observation is limited.

Finally, within neural studies, the tracks of the sensory inputs are still being traced, with little understanding of the sensorial part within the whole--the Galilean combination of the mind which Chruchland seeks.

George Herbert Mead's quest has not yet been reached and much work is still needed. That work falls both within the neuro- and cognitive science fields as well as within the study of philosophy and philosophy of education. While Mead's questions are still with us, a question to be addressed is exactly what is that interface between the individual learner and the environment? As the senses play a major role in that interface, the question becomes: What is observation and how does it fit into the scheme of learning--the development of the mind.

To answer that question--or rather to begin to answer that question--this essay will draw heavily upon the work of Mead, briefly upon C. S. Peirce, and upon selected neuroscience studies. Mead was chosen, because he ties the individual nicely to the environment within the learning process and delineates the process of learning within the social context, which seems to make a great deal of sense. Additionally, Mead is closely tied to the theory of learning and Dewey's impact on the schools.[4] Peirce was chosen because he likewise ties the individual to the environment--in fact the individual and the environment are inseparable and cannot be comprehended in any reductionistic sense. Also, Peirce has a more comprehensive picture of what happens within the thought process with his semiotic studies and his work provides a mathematical comprehension which is needed for neurostudies as well as artifical intelligence studies. A selective look at neurostudies is appropriate because the pragmatic philosophy, at least in its early history, was never far away from the cutting edge of the various sciences.

To begin to answer the question of observation, it will be elucidative to examine Mead's second stage of the act. Assumptions will be made, however, about the general role and development of Mead's stages within the act (which are the stages within his process of learning, of knowing, of developing socially). Briefly, his stages are 1) the impulse, 2) perception (which is observation), 3) manipulation, and 4) consummation.[5] It will also be assumed that Mead's act is central within the learning process or the process of social development. In brief, those assumptions specify that the individual operates on some habitual level until pricked by an impulse which establishes a problematic relationship or a maladjustment between the individual and the environment. The impulse provokes the individual to drink in the surroundings--to observe the situation--then to manipulate these perceptions, and finally to physically act toward them in such a way so as to readjust the maladjustment or problematic situation. When this happens, the individual learns or emerges, as Mead calls it.[6]

Mead writes of this second stage:

> Perception is a relation between a highly developed physiological organism and an object, or an environment in which selection emphasizes certain elements. This relation involves a duration and a process. The process is that of action through media which affect the sense organs of the biological individual. The process takes time, and the effect produced upon the organism is later than the disturbance of the medium and still later than the influence of the object upon the medium. The customary interpretation of this statement identifies the perception with the effect within the organism, regarding these bodily effects as significant of the things that have mediately affected them, justifying this significance by the fact that any object or event such as an organism is significant of the rest of nature and therefore of the particualr objects which are involved in the process of perception; the selection of this particular object being due to the sensitiveness of the organism to the relation, one relatum of which is found in the nervous excitement within the organism.[7]

There are several key components within this passage. First, there is an internalization of the external environment, which is not to say a reductionism, but rather a continuity between the individual and the environment. The continuity is crucial to the pragmatists and is foundational to Peirce, in particular. In fact, Peirce saw this continuity as the mind reflecting the universe with the same set of mathematical and scientific rules applying to both. There was for Peirce an isomorphism between the mind and the universe.[8] This is particularly important for tying observation to a mathematical and semiotic understanding of the whole, but will be saved for another time.

After the impulse has stimulated the organism an attitude is formed that suggests some relationship between the stimulus and the individual, that is, a relationship between the object and the individual. Additionally, there is a passage of time which is a process. During this passage of time, the organism drinks in the situation with the sense organs. This is not a time of analysis of the situation but a sensing of the problem as one might gaze at a work of art. There is no attempt to compare lines and colors but only a forming of an impression or an imprint on the mind. Elsewhere, Mead refers to this perception as the aesthetic image.[9]

Mead writes of the object: "The object in perception is a distant object. It invites us to action with reference to it, and that action leads to results which generally accomplish the act as a biological undertaking."[10] To experience the object, that is, to gain knowledge requires some question, problem, or impulse which yields refelctive thought and a subsequent action resolving the problem or question. Mead clarifies:

> The immediate perception is simply there and not an object of awareness or knowledge except as some question as to conduct or agreement with the perception of others arises to lead us to reflect upon.[11]

The object becomes significant within the mind because a sign is formed which allows for interpretation, according to Peirce. The sign is a representamen within the brain (CP 2.274, 2.444n, 5.313, and 8.343; see note 8 for interpretation of Peirce references). That is, there is some mathematical/neuronal representation of the external within the context of the situation. This internalization is called forth by the impulse, creating an attitude of relation.

According to Mead, there are two different attitudes that the individual may have toward the perceptual objects. The first, Mead calls an *attitude of immediate experience* which is a picture of the whole field of perception. (The contemplation of that whole field follows after the perception and cannot take place during the perception.) The second attitude, that of *reflective analysis* is the attitude which resolves particular physical objects from one another within the field.[12] This second attitude is not the manipulation of the perception, but rather a recognition of component parts. It is this attitude which calls up some past (recognition, fear, joy, etc.).

An example might assist in our understanding of this concept. We purchased a computer when our youngest daughter turned two. A friend gave us a program of pre-school games that he had written. Before he gave me the program, he typed on the colorful introductory screen, "This program was created especially for . . ." inserting the names of our daughters. The screen contained no pictures, only letter symbols which had no meaning to our youngest daughter. It was almost nine months later that our daughter began to realize that a discrete word existed upon a page of text. She certainly could not read that computer screen when we were given the program. But she was told that a particular colorful screen meant her name. She would subsequently recognize the screen and call out her name--a physical act--each time she saw that screen. The effect of the object, the screen, with continued verification taught her that, indeed, her name was on that screen. She would point to the yellow letters for her name, but certainly could not distinguish between her name and the names of her sisters. The appearance of the screen was the impulse. The visual discernment of a screen with yellow print is a portion of the attitude of refective analysis in the perception stage. It preceeded the act of this two-year old calling out her name, i.e., she recognized (cognitively) the yellow print from the purple. It is a perception which she processes (Mead calls the processsing of perception "manipulation") and then acts upon as she says: "There is Tabitha!"

The attitudes lead us to the final point in discussing Mead's perception. The perception is not the distant object, but rather, the perception is within the individual; the perception is what the individual sensed and records in some fashion within the brain. Thus Mead can write: "To everyone the world that is there is in varying degrees different from that which is there for every other, because of each one's location and perspective."[13] Again, he suggests:

> These physical things are all of distance experiences. That is, they are placed in a space, and to be so placed they are ordered from center O of a system of coordinates. The forms in which they appear are optical perspectives, and perception realizes them in terms of the experience of the manipulatory area, in which they are subject to the test of contact, for their perceptual reality; but they remain in that area visual objects.[14]

Thus, it is that two different people can come to different conclusions having viewed the same thing. Their percpetions are different for a variety of reasons. In one case, an individual might be color blind. The color blindness does not change the physical object, Mead argues, but rather, it changes the perception.[15]

While two different people can come to different opinions, it must be understood that the attitudes that the individual calls forth in the perception of the situation are social attitudes. Mead writes of these social attitudes:

> The characters of a perceptual world are dependent upon the susceptibilities and attitudes of the individuals who make up human society. . . . [the individual organism] has become a self by responding to himself in the attitudes of other selves. This involves the assumption of the community attitudes where all speak with one voice in the organization of social conduct. The whole process of thinking is the inner conversation going on between this generalized other and the individual. The perspective of the individual is, therefore, that of the social act--an act which is inclusive of the act of the individual but extends beyond it. The individual in assuming the attitude of the others assumes attitudes that are adjusted to his own particular response.[16]

The attitudes and the signs (within the brain) of the objects perceived are always social for both Mead and Peirce. Indeed, these social attitudes are complex. The mechanism of the attitude, for Mead, begins with Whitehead as Mead analyzes:

> This mechanism is that of the sense organs and the central nervous system of which they are essential parts. The stuff of the percept are the sensa, which are the immediate deliverances of the sense organs with their apparatus. That which besides the firm association of certain of these sensa is "conveyed" by these sensa comes in large degree from recollection and memory.[17]

That is, the attitude of refelctive analysis depends upon past experiences which are always social. But Mead was not satisfied with Whitehead's limited description of the mechanism. As the individual senses the totality of the situation, there are perceptual objects which are selected out of the environment which are appropriate to the solving of the problem or rectifying the maladjustment. So, Mead offers:

> The perceptual object is primarily the organization of the immediate environment with reference to the organism. Perception here has no other significance than that of the sense apparatus in its adjustment to the environment, in its function in selection of the stimulation needed for the reaction of the organism through its relation to the central nervous system, and in its calling-out of the appropriate response.[18]

What this stage is doing is to select out of the total situation those items which are, or may be, appropriate to the solving of the problematic situation. Mead's third stage, manipulation, is where the individual reflectively thinks through the situation and analyzes the perceptual objects. This stage of perception merely prepares the brain for the manipulation.

There are two things happening here of importance to us. First, there are several sensa--i.e., several messages coming from the sense organs at the same time. Again, referring to Mead:

> The problem is to discover the principle of this type of organization. There seem to be different acts. There are the sight of the object and the response involved in moving toward it. There is also the attitude of readiness to handle the object, and perhaps a series of such successive acts in its manipulation; and for each one of the acts there may be elements in the object which act as specific stimuli. . . . the ease with which the earlier step in the complex act goes off may be an indication that this step is an organized part of a disposition or nervous structure, in which each step leads up to the next involving a susceptibility to the proper stimulus to set this step free. I take it that it is this sort of attitude which passes under the name of "feeling of familiarity."[19]

The first thing, then, that is happening is that the visual and tactile senses call forth different organizational structures and call them forth simultaneously.

The second thing that is happening is that the individual is calling forth these organizations as a social being. The attitudes are always social, for Mead. The "feeling of familiarity" is a learned structure from past social acts, i.e., as each act is completed (all four stages of the act), the individual has emerged as a different being--one who has learned in the process of the act. The basic organization of that learning is the internalization of the social other or the generalized other mentioned above.

Concerning this organization, Mead suggests:

> In the organism I have spoken of these as attitudes or co-ordinations which in the higher centers of the central nervous system are the organizations of different responses that in their temporal succession will accomplish the act which a perception stands for, at least as a possibility. . . . It is this sort of mapping of his environment that goes on in the experience of the baby as it advances from reaching to creeping and from creeping to walking. . . . We have traveled so far from infancy that it is with difficulty that we can get behind the *tabula rasa* doctrine of perception and regard percepts as more than sensa associated together with varying degrees of permanence. The difficulty is enhanced by the fact that we act so much in a field of a fifth dimension of the social symbol, the field of language, leaving action so largely to trained automatisms.[20]

To summarize the perception stage of Mead, then: First it organizes the environment for the individual in such a way so that the individual can respond appropriately toward the maladjustment. Second, the organization includes several component parts driven by the input from the various senses. Third, the organization reflects the social attitudes of the society in which the individual has developed. Finally, the organization is so effective that it functions apart from a consciousness of its organization.

A NEUROSCIENCE RESPONSE

Time does not permit a detailed analysis of the neuroscience literature on the subject, so let me share four brief points and a suggestion based upon Mead.

First, the human senses are highly developed for what humans are designed to do. Churchland delineates what humans can and cannot sense. Concerning human senses she writes:

> The classical distinction into "five senses" is notoriously inept, since there are receptors not only for taste, smell, sound, sight, and touch but for a miscellany of other things as well. There are proprioceptors for detecting changes in position of the head, kinesthetic receptors in the muscles and the tendons to detect stretch, receptors for visceral distension and for lung stretch, and receptors in the carotid arteries to detect levels of oxygen in the arterial blood. Besides being incomplete, the classical taxonomy is imperspicuous. For example, the category "touch" rakes together diverse perceptions, including light touch, erotic sensations, light and deep pressure, vibration, a variety of temperature sensations, and a wide assortment of painful sensations.[21]

Churchland continues that there are several things we cannot sense, including ultraviolet light like the bees, or infrared as the snakes can, nor do we possess gyroscopic strain guages like flies or ferromagnets for orienting ourselves to the earth's magnetic field like pigeons. She concludes:

> The world as perceived by humans is not the world as perceived by any organism. Rather, it is that narrow dimension of the world evolution has permitted our specialized receptors to detect. . . . and there is a correlation between the complexity of behavioral repertoire and specialization of central nervous tissue, on the one hand, and specialization of receptors and development of complex sense organs, on the other.[22]

There appears to be a relationship between the complexity of our sense receptors, central organization, and behavior. Perhaps Mead was wise in delineating perception as a separate stage in the act.

Second, the organization of the sensual data received by the brain anticipates specific responses in the individual. For example, skilled typists anticipate upcoming keystrokes. Two cogitive scientists, Rumelhart and McClelland, working within artifical intelligence offer:

> Consider the word vacuum. In this word, the v, a, and c, are all typed with the left hand, leaving the right hand nothing to do until it is time to type the first u. However, a high speed film of a good typist shows that the right hand moves up to anticipate the typing of the u, even as the left hand is just beginning to type the v. By the time the c is typed the right index finger is in position over the u and ready to strike it.[23]

Other studies have shown how the person anticipates the meaning of a word even though a letter is blocked or missing.[24] Conclusions from such studies reinforce the notion in Mead's perception stage that the organization of the sense data in the brain yields an anticipation or an attitude which enables the organism to respond appropriately as in the typing of the u or in the correct guessing of the masked word.

Third, from the studies of D.N. Perkins on the creativity of the human mind, it appears that there are innumerable organized structures of acts which the brain can call forth immediately. Perkins adds:

> Contemporary psychology calls such repeated units and patterns schemata. A schemata is a mental structure that allows a person to perceive or act effectively by anticipating the organization of what the person apprehends or does, so the person needn't function as much from scratch.[25]

The schemata could be a phrase such as "Hi, how are you?" or the movement of a smoker reaching for a match while reading a magazine. The organization of the brain anticipates actions and prepares the body for specific action.

Fourth, many senses and perceptions are happening simultaneously. This is the thesis of Rumelhart and McClelland and their research groups. They argue that the processing of information occurs simultaneously and on parallel tracks which enables the brain to come to conclusions much faster than would be expected by linear thinking.[26] Churchland quotes McClelland from an unpublished work as she analyzes this line of research which is called "parallel distributed processing":

> If current estimates of the number of synapes in the brain are anywhere near correct, it would take even the fastest of today's computers something between several years and several centuries to simulate the processing that can take place within the human brain in one second.[27]

In conclusion, it seems to me that Mead's perception stage has a simplicity and unification of details which make it a viable option for a partial theory of the mind/brain. Its mathematization remains to be seen and is for another paper. Further, I would suggest that the organization of the sensa, in the attitudes Mead discusses, is social in nature. That is, I would anticipate that the mapping of the data within the brain from the receptors follows some social mapping, whose nature is unknown. From Perkins's study, the schemata appear to be consistent with the social nature of Mead's self. Likewise, Howard Gardner, in his research on the human intelligences, relies heavily upon the social or cultural input in the development of those intelligences.[28]

Therefore, I would offer that in understanding the social development of the self, from Mead's writings, one can find the key to understanding the mapping within the brain. Further, the social mappping within the brain, the social mapping of the schemata--Mead's attitudes of perception--are perhaps the key to reflective thought--Mead's third stage of the act of learning.

ENDNOTES

[1] John Dewey, "George Herbert Mead," *Journal of Philosophy* 28 (1931): 311.

[2] P. S. Churchland, "Consciousness: The Transmutation of a Concept," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, 1983.

[3] P. S. Churchland, *Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind/Brain*, Cambridge, The MIT Press, 1986, 146, 406-7.

[4] Mr. and Mrs. George Herbert Mead edited Dewey's *The School and Society*. See also, Lawrence J. Dennis and George W. Stickel, "Mead and Dewey: Thematic Connections on Educational Topics," *Educational Theory* 31 (Summer/Fall 1981), 319-331.

[5] George Herbert Mead, *The Philosophy of the Act*, ed. Charles W. Morris (Chicago: The Universtiy of Chicago Press, 1938), 3-25.

[6] George Herbert Mead, *The Philosophy of the Present*, ed. Arthur E. Murphy (La Salle, Illinois: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1932), 69.

[7] Mead, *The Act*, 8.

[8] Richard Tursman, *Peirce's Theory of Scientific Discovery* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 102-3; *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, ed. C. Hartshorne, P. Weiss, and A. Burks (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935, 1958). Volumes and paragraph numbers appear as CP 6.169, read as volume 6, paragraph 169. For isomorphic discussions see CP 6.169, 7.463, 7.466, and 7.565.

[9] "Student notes for Mead's Philosophy of Education, 1911," The George Herbert Mead Papers, box VIII, Folder IX, The University of Chicago Library, pp. 63, 82-3.

[10] Mead, *The Act*, 12.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid, 13-14.

[13] Ibid, 64.

[14] Mead, *Present*, 120.

[15] Mead, *The Act*, 11.

[16] Ibid, 140,152-3.

[17] Mead, *The Act*, 126.

[18] Ibid., 16.

[19] Ibid., 129.

[20] Ibid., 134-5.

[21] Churchland, 46.

[22] Ibid., 47.

[23] David E. Rumelhart and James L. McClelland, *Parallel Distributed Processing vol. 1: Foundations* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1987), 14.

[24] Ibid., 4-9.

[25] D.N. Perkins, *The Mind's Best Work* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,1981), 172-3.

[26] Rumelhart and McClelland, *Vol. 1 and Vol. 2 Psychological and Biological Models* (Same press and year).

[27] Churchland, 460.

[28] Howard Gardner, *Frames of Mind* (New York: Basic Books Inc. Publishers, 1985).

Conversation for Diversity and Democratic Education: Critical Hermeneutics as a Way Out of Relativism

Mary Abascal-Hildebrand
The University of Toledo
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Introduction

Relativism creates misunderstandings about diversity in social and intellectual life, especially about multiple forms of diversity. This leads to misdirecting efforts to create the conditions for democratic life in schools and society. The primary problem is that relativism makes it difficult to question the conditions of our lives, to think that we might be wrong about views we hold, or imagine that there might be competing claims. Moreover, because of the complexity relativism leads us to believe that creating community and promoting diversity are exclusive of one another rather than overlapping one another through the basic features of language.

This complexity overwhelms us and in retreating from it we find a false sense of safety in relativism from having to create a language that examines thinking, appeals to some overarching framework, and points out competing claims. We fail to understand the way we use language; Bellah[1] points out that we need a more moral language to come to terms with out taken-for-granted assumptions.

Bowers proposes that a sociology of knowledge framework Bowers[2] can enable us to understand how to use our language to understand that we construct knowledge in a social context and use language to illuminate our beliefs. Combining critical theory and hermeneutics offers a unique view from philosophy that examines language-use because these viewpoints approach understanding conversation as the vehicle for creating the meanings that support community life, as well as promote diversity. Critical theory and hermeneutics combine in a particular way to explain that these processes are overlapping processes, not mutually exclusive processes. This combination is referred to here as a critical-interpretive approach and is seen as what can enable us to engage in critical forms of conversation as the means for creating just forms of social life.

Relativism Dominates Social and Intellectual Life

Relativism dominates much of our intellectual and social life and, in turn, masks its domination. As such, it guides much of the thinking in education and surrounding social issues, such as how to appreciate and celebrate the many forms of diversity, as well as how to create simultaneously a sense of community in daily life. Bernstein writes about the pervasiveness of relativism and that

> The problem (of relativism) is not just an intellectual one,nor is it restricted to parochial disputes about the

> meaning and scope of rationality. At issue are some of the most perplexing questions concerning human beings: what we are,what we know, what norms ought to bind us,what are the grounds for hope. The malaise penetrates our everyday, social, and political experiences[3] .

Fundamentally, relativism prevents invoking language, itself, to criticize entrenched modes of thinking or to interpret more consciously. Accordingly, relativism discourages asking questions and engaging in critical and interpretive forms of conversation that promote diversity and meaning, as well as a sense of belonging through understanding others' lifeworlds. This is because relativism holds that any view about educational, social, and political life is right and that there is no need to engage in criticism about how to learn, live, and work together. As such, relativism makes it easier to deny that questioning and interpreting can illuminate forms of knowledge needed for changing the conditions of our lives. This has major implications for promoting democratic life in schools and society because it casts doubt on the need for open debate.

The Rush to Relativism and the Possibility of Criticism

However, combining critique and interpretation can promote a particular form of conversation and criticism for promoting diversity and democratic life. There are two parts to this combination in conversation: one, we need to understand the benefits of a critical theory of language. Habermas[4] writes there are four conditions needed for the ideal conversation: each person needs to be able to understand the other, each needs to be able to believe the other is truthful, each needs to be able to believe the other is sincere about what is said, and each needs to be able to believe that what is said is appropriate to the context.

Even if all four claims are not met, as long as persons can participate more equally, the act of striving to meet the claims creates the kind of communicative competence needed to engage in conversations. Two, communicative competence must also promote interpreting histories and traditions through conversation as ways to respect diversity in social relations. In other words, to be communicatively competent we must learn to critique the human condition at the same time that we learn about interpretion in conversation.

Engaging in such communicative competence[5] , based on the "possibility of criticism,"[6] promotes forming arguments in open debate, respecting diverse views, and examining understandings about needed change. Criticism can open the process for suriving the rush to relativism. Bernstein explains that in order to survive today's rapid shifts in thinking (such as in social, political, and educational thinking), there is a "rush to embrace various forms of relativism" because it holds "there are no hard 'facts of the matter'. . . almost 'anything goes' "[7] . It seems as if relativism provides a refuge from these rapid shifts.

However, there is a false sense of safety because there is no overarching framework for recognizing or arguing about competing claims. Alexander[8] explains more about what contributes to this false sense of safety as he writes that relativism not only claims that all views are equally true, it creates simultaneously the belief that that there is no possibility that views can be wrong. Bernstein[9] exposes a central contradiction in relativism: as it contends that all views are equally true, it also contends that actually none is true, making all false.

We limit ourselves and contribute to this contradiction by accepting the contention that competing claims are not subject to standards against which we can evaluate them. Relativism makes it difficult to connect claims and standards because we ignore the historical conditions that give rise to them. Bernstein explains that relativism limits reasoning about and understanding "our historical context and our own social practices."[10]

The implications of these limits are twofold and interdependent: first, differing views are less subject to critical evaluation; and, second, we are unable to engage in critical forms of conversation for moving beyond our histories. Then we simply fail in developing ourselves and our society with the kind of historical consciousness that would enable us to question and interpret outmoded ideas.

As a result, relativism restricts us in changing social and intellectual relationships to more just forms for promoting diversity and community. When we are unable to examine shared meanings a sense of belonging eludes us. We experience a sense of alienation and hopelessness about being able to move beyond outmoded ways of thinking and relating. This affects our ability to reason about diverse claims and meaning systems, and form relationships with those persons whose arguments and views contrast with ours.

Reason, History and Criticism as Knowledge

Without language that is both critical and interpretive it is difficult to reason together and recreate our society in ways that promote unity and community, while also illuminating and celebrating the traditions and histories that give rise to views about diversity. Gadamer's work focuses on reason through language as a way to question and get beyond extremes, such as thinking that there is a right and wrong that never changes or that it is not possible to be wrong. Indeed, language can expose the limitations of opposites such as absolutism and relativism. Reason formed through critical and interpretive language can help take on "an entirely different notion of knowledge and truth." [11]

This notion of knowledge holds that reason is historical while at the same time situated within each moment as we live it; that is, our living tradition.[12] We can reason more about what we do when we understand how our history is implicated in all that we do.

As persons, our knowledge and reason emerge within our history even as we live it, we are "not detached from a being that is becoming, but determined by it and determinitive of it." [13]

Further, when we believe in the possibility of being mistaken we can strike down the relativistic assumption that all views are equally true, and instead use language consciously to emphasize its dynamic, social, historical construction--not as something that lies outside of us but as something we create within us while we live it with one another, always in some form of community. This notion of knowledge can help us view our histories and traditions through a critical understanding of how we can change both the way we live our lives and the forms of community in which our lives are embedded. In order to be able to change we have to come to terms with the way we seem to be caught between feeling certain of the need for change and the fear of what might be required of us if we were to change.

Further, the possibility of criticism encourages believing that change is not an all-or-nothing phenomenon. Change does not require giving up our histories, instead it promotes recreating from among those histories new interpretations of particular historical features that more justly speak to the possibilities for living and working together. Thus, we can see that we can make the changes we desire, that change is not just something that happens to us.

Arguing competing claims can help us to view change, such as the change needed for educational reform, as negotiated commitments we can make consciously and scrutinize continuously because what we know changes in relation to the questions we ask. The possibility of criticism also encourages understanding that people resist change because they believe either that knowledge is absolute or that knowledge is relative. Believing in the possibility of criticism creates understanding that knowledge is neither absolute nor relative. This view of criticism and knowledge through reason promotes persons engaging in conversations that are more likely to explain and influence change. Also, this view of criticism can promote knowing which understandings of diversity and community support one another and then discarding beliefs and practices that alienate and interfere with desireable intellectual and social relations that thinkers such as Bellah, et al[14] describe as habits of the heart.

The process of change is complex because its parts overlap at many levels, and extend in many directions. Such complexity promotes anxiety and limits understanding. The anxiety makes it difficult to acknowledge and argue the complex, hermeneutic (part-to-whole) phenomena inherent in overlapping processes. Therefore, this anxiety keeps us from moving beyond absolutism and relativism. But more conscious use of conversation can illuminate the necessary, overlapping processes for creating meaning and community through understanding others' life worlds. Such conversation helps us with this anxiety because it fuses new horizons of understanding about social relations.[15]

Criticism and Democracy

Relativism promotes asymetrical power relations. When persons cannot find ways to argue competing claims and to interpret what others claim, those who take more dominant positions are able to constrain the participation of those who do not. Accordingly, conscious use of conversation and awareness about these overlapping processes are especially important in pointing out the causes of asymetrical relations and in promoting diversity through democracy.

This awareness about conversation can help us understand the dilemma we create by acting in ways that close off possibilities for using language critically and interpretively, particularly when we close off those possibilities based on myths about diverse ways of knowing, creating meaning, and expressing. One of the primary aims of democratic education should be to teach persons to see through social myths, argue competing claims, uncover the errors of leaders, and correct problems justly.

Relativism limits democratic life because it makes it more difficult to use language to recognize mistakes in thinking and to avoid them. Relativism masks the socially-constructed, historically-dynamic nature of knowledge that forms through language because it makes it difficult to understand that knowledge "changes in response to criticism." [16] Notions of knowledge, conversation, and democratic life become meaningless when we are caught up in relativism.[17] How are we caught in relativism?

Views from Anthropology and Philosophy

Many anthropologists warn about relativism because limited experience in anthropology can promote vulgarized uses of anthropology.[18] Kleinfeld writes that relativism promotes patronizing, superficial approaches to education that rely on romanticized, albeit colorful, renditions of cultures. As a result, we do not use language consciously to examine ideas based on different intellectual and cultural viewpoints in ways that create meaning and make it possible to discard outmoded viewpoints, or to acknowledge appropriateness. Thus, even with our best intentions as educators, often we are unaware of how our limited views collect, unexamined, into tangled webs of assumptions.[19] These assumptions promote distance between persons, and create dilemmas in social and intellectual life. But they can be uncovered through critical and interpretive conversations about diversity.

An example from Weisner, Gallimore, and Jordan[20] illustrates how relativism limits cultural understanding and is implicated in misdirecting our educational efforts. Researchers were reexamining the effect of Native Hawaiian sibling caretaking, known as sib care. Earlier research failed to show educational gains in reading among Native Hawaiian children, given a variety of particular educational changes. Subsequently, the researchers decided to change to cooperative learning and peer-assisted activities, along with instituting a new reading curriculum, because of the long-understood Native Hawaiian phenomenon of sib-care wherein children are taught to depend on one another for help and interaction rather than focusing on their parents.

They reported subsequent success and based the success on the cooperative learning. In later research, they decided to inquire about the understandings held by the parents of the Native Hawaiian children concerning sib-care. That research showed that not only did the parents inteviewed report that they did not promote the notion of sib care among their children, but they did not see much merit in the concept, itself. The researchers may have mistaken the influence of the cooperative learning strategy for at least two other reasons.

By assuming that the cultural phenomenon of sib-care was the basis for the success, they limited their understandings and the potential for their research findings. One, the researchers had ignored what might be more accurate reasons for the success of the cooperative learning, such as its being more interesting. Two, they might have ignored the appropriateness of the new reading curriculum. Critical conversation uncovered their earlier errors.

This instance of relativism does not appear to have been harmful to these students, but it illustrates the problems in making decisions based on understandings about culture without examining these understandings to find out whether they are outmoded or inappropriate. With our best intentions to respect culture and diversity, we fall prey to believing that culture is the only contributor to others' responses and needs. The harm is that these unexamined views encapsulate us in inappropriate assumptions and we limit others' possibilities when we are not open to the possibility of criticism.

The following example from Kleinfeld's work with Native Alaskans illustrates relativistic thinking that did bring harm. She writes about the educational dilemmas we create because of relativism despite our best intentions to respect cultures. She illustrates, how "overly individualized treatment gives Native American students no sense of meaningful standards toward which to direct their efforts". . .

> "'After class, an Indian girl came up to the teacher and told her that she had been sick and had missed the last test. 'What should I study for it?' she asked.
> 'Don't worry,' the teacher replied, 'I'll make up a special test for you and you'll do well on it.' 'But I don't know what to study,' the girl persisted. 'Don't worry,' repeated the teacher,'I'll make it special for you. You'll do well' ." [21]

This illustrates how we find it difficult to interpret what is alien to us. When Bernstein refers to the rush to embrace various forms of relativism, he also refers to our attempts to understand "alien societies" as he contends "the entire range of human and social sciences" has been affected by relativism. He argues that we retreat into forms of relativism because of "uncertainty...in our intellectual and cultural life," explaining "we have witnessed the playing out of bold attempts to secure foundations and the elaborations of new methods that promise genuine knowledge, followed by a questioning that reveals cracks and crevices in what had been taken to be solid and secure." [22]

Thus, he illustrates how these shifts promote relativism and yield unrelated, fragmented understandings. Instead of surviving the shifts, we are engulfed by them and we cannot get beyond the inevitable misunderstandings that develop when we try to understand. Misunderstandings encourage encapsulation and limit possibilities for using language to understand diversity and create community.

Relativism in the Writing Lab

The following case illustrates how relativism limits our potential for using language to understand understanding, itself, and the inevitable misunderstandings. Being unable to account for how people misunderstand makes it more difficult for educators and students to create new, more appropriate solutions to educational and societal dilemmas. Delpit's case[23] shows how relativism limits understanding, relationships, and participation in educational communities and how it promotes misunderstandings that go unexamined.

The case, set in Philadelphia, concerns the dilemmas that some black teachers encountered in a student writing project. These difficulties illustrate how relativism establishes itself from well-meaning, though patronizing, views and thus limits opportunities for both students and teachers. She describes the disappointment some black teachers reported about the project leaders' assumptions concerning black students' writing fluency and skills.

The project leaders contended that the black children lacked fluency because they often wrote much less than and in ways different from other students. Some of the black teachers claimed the leaders developed a "white curriculum," first concentrating on fluency before promoting the teaching of writing skills to black children. However, some of the black teachers claimed there are several ways in which many black children are fluent and creative with clever word games, rap songs, and chants.

They contended that the the leaders' beliefs would lead them to apply the curriculum in such a way as to hold the students in fluency activities, waiting for success in the teachers' terms, thereby excluding the children from ever being able to work directly on the writing skills they needed. (Delpit defines skills broadly as what are useful to communicate in standard literary forms--she does not suggest that skills are learned with workbooks and spirit masters.) Many of these teachers stopped participating in the project, believing that it did not support their beliefs about black students' fluency or learning needs.

Delpit proposes that the project leaders "hear only silence...see only immobile pencils"[24] when they think about black students' writing and she argues this stance is repressive and oppressive. She points out, on the other hand, that these teachers both hear the children's voices and believe that success will come as they appropriate mainstream oral and written forms.[25] The teachers and leaders had not create discursive processes among themselves that might have helped them to see through these dilemmas. Delpit contends that understanding is limited unless we have a language for arguing about our differing perspectives and uncovering the rightness or the wrongness in our views.

Delpit's example also illustrates another contradiction in relativism. The basic intent in relativism, particularly cultural relativism, is to build mutual respect and opportunities for participation in society through education about peoples and cultures.[26] This example also points out that both the teachers' and students' opportunities for participation were actually limited by the project leaders' interpretations (meanings) because their interpretations overlap their best intentions to address what they thought was a deficit based on culture (understanding others' life worlds). In the earlier examples the teacher and the Native American student also experienced limitations. And the Native Hawaiian children might have been further misrepresented by unexamined assumptions and good intentions about their culture.

The overlapping both hinders and helps serious questioning about the ways particular language-use can create knowledge and meaning. It hinders serious questioning because of its complexity. The complexity requires careful language-use to understand the diverse ways in which persons learn, how social and political events can be understood, what might be a more just society, and how to build it. However, the complexity helps questioning because acknowledging this overlapping can build faith in being able to use language to illuminate complex phenomena such as diversity and individualism and, at the same time, create meaningful understanding and community within diversity.

Individualism and Community as Contradictions

Relativism promotes pristine, entrenched forms of individualism, such as competition and accountability, that contradict acknowledging reponsibility for creating communities. There is the need to understand the difference between accountability and responsibility and apply this to our thinking about how accountability promotes competition and isolation, and how responsibility promotes communication through cooperation and commitment. Understanding this difference can aid us in encouraging new forms of communication and commitment among teachers and students based on responsibility formed in communication, rather than on accountability generated in individualism and competitition.

Individualism is an example of a deep cultural code woven from taken-for-granted beliefs. Many Americans have chosen not to open themselves to the liminality required to examine problems and make changes or to try to unravel the contradictions they create. The limits of individualism illustrate the conflicts individualism creates in promoting the common good in communities. While many Americans among Bellah's research subjects view community, and their relationships with others, as what create meaning in their lives, most of these persons also say they believe in individualism and the myth of individualism: that those who work hard can get ahead.

The assumption in individualism is that those who do not get ahead, fail because of some fault of their own, and not also because of problems contributed by the society. The writing project leaders assumed that black children did not write well or sufficiently because they lacked fluency, rather than understanding that they may have different forms of fluency. They were unaware that the problems students have with writing may be created partly by their views about the students' potential for writing. The leaders assumed a more technical view of writing curriculum by separating teaching fluency from teaching writing.

The leaders and the teachers did not engage one another in conversations where they might have created a language for talking together. They might have discovered that their views of curriculum and of black students' potential actually serve to limit students' opportunities, making it difficult for them to appreciate their own forms of fluency and to develop mainstream forms. Engaging in conversation might have uncovered the false assumption that the students' failures were their own fault.

Bellah, et al. write that Americans have not sought to create a moral language for understanding that there are events which cannot be explained by "individual choice and will"[27] . They explain

> ..there is no way to discuss or evaluate the relative merits of values and lifestyles in the culture of individualism, a generalized tolerance, dependent on strict adherance to procedural rules, is the best that can be expected. But tolerance, despite its virtues, is hardly adequate to deal with the conflict and interdependence among different groups in a complex society.[28]

He contends that without a language for understanding, we relieve ourselves from confronting the deep, obscured cultural codes that support individualism. In not seeking a more moral form of language-use, we shield ourselves from revealing the stark reality of moral inequalities in U.S. education and society.[29] Then we do not have to deal "with embedded inequalities of power, privilege, and esteem"[30] or acknowledge that there are many ways to understand change, diversity, and commitment.

Diversity Takes Multiple Forms

Typically, creating meaning within diversity is viewed within a cultural context and consists usually of shallow attempts to explain external features of cultures. That is, diversity is usually described as racial, ethnic, or cultural in nature in ways that draw on superficial features such as food, dress, customs, art forms, etc, rather than also on other forms of diversity--such as the diverse ways we think, know, create meaning, and express what we know. Certainly attempts to explain culture without also examining how we think artificially illustrates culture since ways of knowing, creating meaning, and expressing have deep cultural bases because they draw from experience.

While its overlapping parts may appear incommensurable, the task of engaging in critical conversation is aimed at understanding the overlapping processes of creating community and promoting multiple forms of diversity as it examines social systems and illuminates competing claims. Such conversation creates a particular kind of communicative competence oriented in the common good because it illuminates practical choices for educational and social change such as can be found within a sociology of knowledge.

A Sociology of Knowledge Examines Social Reality

Bowers describes how a sociology of knowledge framework, can help illuminate commonalities and shared experiences. He offers that failures of projects created in a sociology of knowledge framework have occured largely because persons who launch them fail to account for all aspects of the framework. Adding to Bowers, projects fail particularly to use forms of language-use that can uncover beliefs and errors in thinking.

A sociology of knowledge framework can explain sharing social reality and negotiating that reality through communication. It promotes understanding how the unique idea of self "serves as the set of interpretational rules for making sense of everyday life"[31] It helps to explain why persons see aspects of social life as inevitable, thus taking them for granted. Also, this framework illuminates knowledge as socially constructed,[32] and persons as being able to understand themselves in relation to what they choose to know. This framework describes the individual as related to society through the communicative process. Thus, incorporating this framework in everyday school life can enable us to illuminate more competently the social nature of learning[33] and thus expose the influences of individualism and relativism.

Also, this framework can help explain the way people form obligations and communities. Generally, social scientists think of obligation as something that exists externally. However, a sociology of knowledge framework can explain how we create a sense of obligation among ourselves, not only because we believe we must, but also because we participate together in a shared lifeworld, such as the lifeworld of education. We interpret our shared experience and the obligation we feel for one another through the language we use to describe the obligation.

Further, when such a framework accounts for a criticial interpretation of language, the interpretive process can promote true conversation about shared experience and extend a sense of mutual obligation and commitment. This kind of commitment can make it possible to change the contexts which promote relativism. Thus, change and reform take on a whole new potential. Critiquing and interpreting underlying tensions, and examining problems and possible solutions, can illuminate the exit from the yellow brick road that leads to relativism. Just as Oz could not do for Dorothy what she hoped, relativism in educational and social life cannot encourage true conversations, or create the sort of meaning needed for us to understand democratically culture, obligation, commitment, and change in a diverse society.

Since it can illuminate complex overlapping processes, a critical-interpretive sociology of knowledge framework can help to change the nature of beliefs about diversity, meaning, obligation, and change. It can explain how the process of socialization through language forms the basic learning process. Additionally, this framework illustrates the complex and unconscious nature of socialization and "puts a renewed emphasis on understanding our beliefs and the language systems that both transmit and sustain these beliefs."[34]

The benefit of a critical-hermeneutic sociology of knowledge perspective, in otherwords one that is oriented in a philosophical view of change and tradition, is that it enables an interpretive critical consciousness about language-use for creating meaning. Becoming more aware that overlapping processes create obligation through creating meaning can change our relationships to more democratic forms. This awareness about the power of meaning and obligation can challenge both educators and students in universities and schools to promote more just circumstances for educational practice and democratic participation.

Looking again at Delpit's work, the teachers who withdrew from participating with the writing project leaders likely did so because they believed that the leaders were not interested in promoting participation by engaging them dialogically about the students' abilities. The teachers assumed they knew all they needed to know about writing. The leaders assumed they knew all they needed to about black students' fluency. These unexamined assumptions influenced both groups to close off opportunities for critique, for finding new ways to communicate more competently with one another, and for creating new forms of knowledge about writing, about students, and about one another.

Communicative Competence through Critical Hermeneutics

Bowers acknowledges that there are those who may think that communicative competence is too abstract to be appropriate in public education.[35] However, he contends such a goal can help in understanding how communicative dynamics reinforce taken-for-granted beliefs, and how making these beliefs explicit can promote critical reflection and awareness. This awareness is particularly important in education contexts because of the inherent purpose of education to challenge assumptions and promote social change through democratic education. Some may see the project of communicative competence as too simplistic for the broad social change needed. However, Bowers counters, "Understanding how the patterns of the everyday world are shared and sustained through communication, while appearing banal to the more apocalyptically-minded, can lead to changing the dynamics of the socialization process."[36]

Because the abstractness in critical hermeneutic language-use requires a particular orientation to the world, the abstractness can actually provide a more moral guide away from relativism[37] because its abstraction supports questions as the basis for engaging in conversation. Calling our social relationships into question makes it more likely we can create more ethical relationships.

When we base our conversations on communicative competence between persons we can provide ourselves with opportunities for more moral equal participation in educational and social life. Then we can find new ways to challenge and defend arguments, form agreements, understand more deeply, participate together, and commit to each other. And when we engage in interpretive, hermeneutic processes through more democratic communication, we can fuse what we already know into new horizons and new forms of community. That is, we use our humanity to create even loftier forms of human relationships.

Habermas[38] writes we cannot have interpretation without critique; both are needed. This means we cannot interpret the overlapping processes for creating meaning unless we are able to call into question social influences such as absolutism and relativism that constrain us in our efforts to create meaning while engaging in social criticism. Still, there are those who orient their social criticism through a critique perspective only. They do not seek out interpretation as a way to create meaning. Engaging only in critique limits us in learning how we create meaning and we fail to understand how interpretation can lead us to understand better.

Thus, we cannot have critique without interpretation because, as Greenfield[39] writes, "we need praxis, not simply critique." He explains that in both schools and society we need praxis to act on what we believe is just not only for the sake of justice, but because engaging in such ethical action, itself, can change fundamentally the lives of all those who participate. Critique alone will not serve us in our efforts to create more practical, ethical solutions because critique overlooks the potential in creating meaning. While critique makes it possible for us to reveal current conditions and uncover problems, awareness and use of hermeneutic (interpretive) processes in conversation, can promote commitment among people as they create meaning together. This communicative commitment gives new grounds for hope that persons who interpret together are more likely to uncover more ethical solutions to problems they discover in critique.

Ricoeur defines hermeneutics as "the theory of the operations of understanding."[40] Therefore, hermeneutics offers a means by which we can use everyday language in our conversation to interpret our social text--what is said and what is experienced so we can understand our relationships and commitments better. The interpretive process makes possible a more thorough search among alternative solutions. Efforts for more practical solutions to the problem of relationships and commitments, such as those among teachers and students or persons in society generally, can take on more praxis forms of community.

We can imagine that if the writing project leaders and teachers had questioned their assumptions and reexamined their beliefs about black students' writing, they might have better understood what each believed was meaningful in black students' experience. Their critique and interpretation might have enabled them to work more closely together to develop new views about curriculum for engaging students in writing. Moreover, their conversation might have enlarged their horizons about possible new forms of relationships among themselves and their students.

Conversation for Moving Beyond Relativism

Conversation that has the potential for moving beyond relativism is what Bernstein describes as "a true conversation--which is not to be confused with the idle chatter or a violent babble of competing voices--(it) is an extended and open dialogue which presupposes---agreements and...relevance."[41] This means true conversations are drawn from cultural and societal experience and then go beyond experience so outmoded ideas can be illuminated and discarded, as Habermas[42] writes, through the force of the better argument. Gadamer[43] explains that the bouyancy (give-and-take) in conversation opens biases in experience in forming arguments, bringing forth new interpretations, and uncovering errors.

While it is necessary to account for our experience to get beyond relativism, it is also necessary to go beyond grounding teaching and learning only in teachers' or students' experience. Limiting teaching and learning to experience only makes it more difficult for us to understand how we internalize our thinking into deep cultural codes and take them for granted.[44] Bowers writes that insights from the more contemporary work in cultural linguistics, phenomenology, and the sociology of knowledge explain that grounding learning only in experience usually results in reinforcing taken-for-granted beliefs.

Thus, a more ethical form of conversation can sow the seeds for change.[45] Teachers and students may be able to make substantive changes in educational and social life in both universities and schools and in society if they are aware that the conditions for teaching and learning are the same conditions required for critical conversation, for creating meaning, and for forming communities of committed citizens. These conditions include opportunities to question, to uncover assumptions, to challenge outmoded views--in short, to create the possibility of criticism through critical conversation.

In creating these conditions we can take a whole new view of theory and practice so we can promote educational and social life around what is actually needed for commitment and community, and for change and reform in both education and in society. Then we can move educational and social change and reform away from a more piecemeal, technical, hierarchical treatment form toward a renewal of praxis and communicative ethics.

Conclusion: Conversation as Seeds for Change

Common understandings created in conversation can support interdependent personal and cultural identity while creating community. Conversation enables us to bridge our self and the uniqueness of others expressed in diversity with the community we form as we engage with one another through the self. This conversational form of participation can focus us on how we, though we are individuals, express that individuality in commitments with others; this view of language expands the meaning of community. As such, we can change the nature of experience for the individual as we create new forms of group relations. This more ethical form of change relies on building common understandings and democratic participation as the basis for group relations, rather than on forms of competition and aggression for maintaining groups.

What is important about this process for building common understandings from a critique and interpretation of deep cultural codes is that it engages us in the possibility of criticism. It encourages us to challenge relativistic stances that promote distance so we can examine closely the way we use language to understand and create meaning from among diverse views. Besides questioning the merit of taken-for-granted assumptions, we can understand others based on more concretized, personal relationships and on the belief that others are more like ourselves than they are different.

The value for education practice is that this form of relationship builds interdependence for teachers and learners as they engage in conversation together. This creates a circle of interpretation that emphasizes new ways they can understand the interdependence of individual and community life in schools and society. Interdependence forms as students examine the conditions of their lives together and create meaning for being together. Isolation and competition diminish. Self-reflection and participation increase. A sense of belonging forms as meaning is created and becomes the basis for obligation and commitment. Community arises out of shared meanings and commitments created in relationships, particularly those based on mutual belonging, obligation, agreement, interdependence, and responsibility.

Bernstein writes that locating relationships through more ethical forms of conversation, can create the praxis desired because in "a dialogue based on mutual understanding, respect a willingness to listen and risk one's opinions and prejudices, (and) a mutual seeking of the correctness of what is said, we will have defined a powerful regulative ideal that can orient our practical and political lives."[46]

Using language consciously to create such forms of conversation among teachers and students becomes a guide for practical, ethical life in a diverse society. Gadamer writes that the relationship between practical life and cultural diversity is bound up in understanding and interpretation since "Understanding and interpretation are related...in a specific way....because all the creations of human culture, including the nonlinguistic ones, seek to be understood in this way...as everything that is intellegible must be accessible to understanding and to interpretation."[47]

Bernstein does warn it is not possible to organize all social and political life around conversation, given the fragile conditions needed for genuine conversations. However, through critical-interpretive conversation, we can engage in ways that create an awareness about the overlapping processes for creating meaning and obligation and for promoting multiple forms of diversity. Bowers writes we can teach in schools in ways that can enable us to create a more just, democratic, diverse society by orienting our conversations and our relationships with others around the significance of seeking understanding through risking our taken-for-granted notions in the give-and-take in conversation.

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Democratic Character and Democratic Education: A Cognitive and Rational Reappraisal

Michael Gross
The University of Haifa (Israel)

INTRODUCTION

Democratic education and democratic character are evocative if not exhilarating concepts, inspiring a portrait of political man capable of molding his world in exalted images of freedom and self-realization. They lie at the core of much of what is classical and contemporary political philosophy and, in many cases, constitute the explicit aim of normative democratic theory. However strongly intuitive, our images of the ideal citizen are partly illusory and in the sections below I will discuss the cognitive and rational constraints that political psychology imposes upon our considered opinion of democratic character and, ultimately, upon the normative directions open to political theory.

Finding fault with the traditional images of democratic character is not a new undertaking. Over the past thirty or more years, economic theories of democracy have taken issue with the cognitive and rational pre-suppositions of traditional liberal democratic theory. Whereas traditional theory, exemplified for instance by J.S. Mill or Dewey, emphasized an image of political man who was cognitively complex, capable of assimilating large amounts of information and rationally inclined to eschew self-interest in favor of the common good, economic democratic theory questioned this perception. Instead it offered a image of an apathetic political actor, incapable of all but the most rudimentary grasp of his political environment and rationally inclined to act in his own self interest. As a practical matter this meant that information was seldom sought, relatively simple schemata were used to cognize the political environment and the rational obstacles to political participation were often not overcome.

This dichotomy immediately causes us to focus upon the relationship between normative theory and political psychology. Simply because political actors do, in many ways, conform to the economic conception of human nature does not entail that this should dictate the normative direction of political theory. Psychological propensities can be changed. However, in many other cases, these same psychological traits act to constrain normative prescriptions often in the same way that physical limitations (what can be done) can limit the range of moral obligation (what ought to be done). The direction taken in this paper will be to argue that the psychological assumptions at the core of our conception of democratic character are faulty. Moreover, this is not a fault that can be rectified. Rather, they are of nature that demands a change in normative democratic theory and particularly that of democratic educational theory.

These psychological assumptions are not peculiar to a single school of democratic thought. As will be argued below, economic and self-interested theories of democracy often fall back upon a conception of moral agency and democratic character that is strikingly similar to that of developmental and participatory democratic theorists. All of these conceptions share two basic traits that permeate their understanding of democratic character. First, they all stipulate generalized moral limits that constrain public policy and make the cognitive leap that these limits are largely recognizable by the general polity. This is the assumption of moral insight. Second, there is a foray into rationality with the assumption that it is rational for political actors to act collectively once they recognize that these moral limits have been breached. In short, the fundamental characteristic of democratic character is a propensity to undertake political action particularly when public policy transgresses certain moral limits. It has been the direction of nearly every major school of normative democratic theory to ultimately root political stability not in structural or institutional devices but in political virtue or democratic character.

This is true even of economic democratic theory which while recognizing certain cognitive and rational limitations to political behavior, with respect to voting for example, did not apply their cognitive and rational critique to the moral aspects of democratic character as it was understood by traditional democratic theory. Instead, they very often adopted the perspective that members of the polity, while often inclined to be apathetic and uncooperative were, nonetheless, morally astute and potentially capable of exercising moral control over public policy. In short, there is a glaring inconsistency as economic democratic theory very often fell back on the very qualities of democratic character that they were trying to debunk through cognitive and rational critique.

In the sections below I will analyze the concept of democratic character with respect to these psychological traits and then introduce a series of cognitive and rational reservations as they affect this idea of democratic character. Finally, some tentative directions for normative political and educational theory will be offered.

DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND DEMOCRATIC CHARACTER

There has always been a pronounced tendency to imbue democratic character with a conception of enlightened moral and political consciousness. Among democratic precursors, e.g contractarians such as Locke, governments were understood to be established when individuals surrendered their executive power to a ruling elite ("legislators") charged with the protection of, in Locke's words, "life, liberty and estate." Emphasizing the metaphor of a revokable trust, Locke envisioned a system, unlike Hobbes for example, in which the citizen could under certain circumstances revoke the trust. Revocation was justified when these legislators violated their fiduciary obligation to protect the natural rights of the citizenry (Locke, 1963, II:222).

Locke was keenly aware of the arbitrary nature of this stipulation and suggested that citizens would only be moved to rebellion when the abuse of natural rights became egregious (II: 223). What is at issue here is the ability of the citizenry to recognize and then act upon instances of abuse. Locke's stipulation of moral insight and collective action, though hardly peculiar to democracies, marks the beginning of a tradition that was to typify subsequent conceptions of ideal democratic character. On the one hand, citizens must be sufficiently morally perspicacious to recognize instances of political injustice, i.e. instances in which the principles of natural law which govern the trust have been violated. On the other, citizens are understood to be rationally inclined to organize and revolt if, in fact, their interests have been violated by the trustees or ruling elite. Although the reality and legitimacy of these traits might seem to be self evident, they are, in fact, extremely problematic.

These cognitive and rational faculties become more pronounced with the evolution of democratic theory in America. In the theories of early "protectionist" thinkers such as Madison and James Mill there evolved not only a complex system of representation, both popular and paternal, but an endorsement of the image that the ultimate check lay in citizen virtue (Wills, 1982, p. xxi;

Hamilton, et.al., 1982, #57; Mill, J., 1978, p.73). Acceptance of the underlying legitimacy of these faculties was even more pronounced among adherents of the participatory or developmental school of democratic thought. Beginning with John Stuart Mill (1950) and continuing through the 20th century theorists such as John Dewey (1927, 1929, 1935, 1939), Bachrach (1967, 1975), Pateman (1970), Rawls (1971), Gutmann (1987) and others saw in the practice of democracy not only a procedural means to protect individual rights but an intrinsically important educative and pedagogic component as well. Not only did active participation in the democratic process make one a better citizen, one better able to understand the issues at hand and, as a consequence, better able to understand and protect one's own interest, but participation was also essential to human development and moral progress. Democracy created an atmosphere most conducive to human development and betterment, within which "human potentialities could flourish" (Dewey, 1939). As a result, emphasis came to be placed upon the democratic community with particular attention paid to generating and sustaining, through education, the twin ideals of moral insight and political participation.

As political theory developed, however, this character soon became suspect. Schumpeter (1950), Berelson (1952, 1954), Downs (1957), Verba and Almond (1963), all emphasized the procedural rather than the developmental aspects of the democratic process, a process which not only did not depend upon widespread participation and enlightened consciousness but in many cases actually suffered because of it. Axelrod (1973) and his followers characterized the typical citizen as a cognitive miser incapable of assimilating extensive and complex information about his political environment choosing instead to make decisions based on simple schemata and stereotypes. Political actors, in turn, were viewed as eminently rational and therefore disinclined to participate when it was not cost effective. Not only was this evident in voting patterns but rational considerations worked in such a way to hamper groups of individuals seeking to act collectively even when the failure to act produced sub-optimal outcomes (Olson 1971).

In light of these cognitive and rational constraints democratic theory moved away from advocating perpetual participation and chose to focus instead upon competition among elites for political power as the substance of democratic practice. This did not require widespread voter participation and implied in effect an acquiescence to policy in the interelectoral period. While it was understood that during this time bureaucratic dynamics kept the lid on abuse, ultimate control and responsibility was still understood to lie with what are now viewed as cognitively simple and political unsophisticated individuals. This is the paradox of contemporary economic democratic theory.

Berelson, et.al., (1954), for example, understood the following traits to be typical of developmental or participatory democracy:

> 1. Interest, discussion and motivation - the democratic citizen is expected to be interested and to participate in political affairs.
>
> 2. Knowledge - the democratic citizen is expected to be well informed about political affairs.
>
> 3. Principle - The democratic citizen is supposed to cast his vote on the basis of principle, in reference to standards not only of his own interest but of the common good as well.
>
> 4. Rationality - the democratic citizen is expected to exercise rational judgment in coming to his voting decision.

While contemporary political scientists (e.g. Berelson, 1952, 1954; Verba and Almond, 1963) have, on the basis of extensive attitudinal studies, labeled these traits as mythical they nevertheless have relied upon the trait of principled moral thinking ("principle") while constructing a theory of democratic stability. The retention of this moral element in democratic character is especially pronounced in Verba and Almond.

Once it appeared to researchers that these traits were in no way sufficiently dispersed in the general population to satisfy even the minimal conditions required by classical democratic theory, researchers were confronted with a dilemma: why is it that democracy is so stable without what was thought to be the requisite number of individuals typifying the necessary personality? Or, more simply, how can there be democracy without democratic character?

The answer for many such theorists lay in a conception of political man who was both assertive and submissive. During times of relative stability it was incumbent upon the concerned citizen to restrain his participation in the system. During good times, indeed, most of the time there was no necessity for citizens to be interested and knowledgeable participants. In fact, it was viewed as dangerous and destabilizing. All that was required of the polity during these times was (1) an understanding of the rules of the game that eschewed violence and prohibited the radicalization of one's primary group's interest, (2) interpersonal trust and a respect for law and order and (3) a "body of moderately and discontinuously interested citizens within and across social classes whose approval or at least acquiescence in political policies must be secured" (Berelson, 1952, p. 317, emphasis added).

The last point cited is most telling. Verba and Almond make the point even more emphatically in their theory of potentiality:

> A citizen within the civic culture has a reserve of influence. He is not constantly involved in politics . . . but he does have the potential to act if there is a need. This reserve of influence- influence potential that is inactive and uncommitted to the political system- was best illustrated by the data on the ability to create political structures in time of need [see below]. The citizen is not a constant political actor. He is rarely active in political groups. But he thinks that he can mobilize his ordinary social environment for political use. He is not the active citizen: he is the potentially active citizen. (Verba and Almond, 1963, p. 481.)

Verba and Almond maintain that the potential for participation is sufficient to control elite behavior:

> The power of elites must be held in check. The citizen's opposite role, as an active and influential enforcer of the responsiveness of elites is maintained by his strong commitment to the norm of active citizenship, as well as by his perception that he can be an influential citizen. This may be in part a myth, for it involves a set of norms of participation and perceptions of ability to influence that are not quite matched by actual political behavior. Yet the very fact that the citizens hold to this myth- that they see themselves as influential and obligated to take an active role- creates a potentiality of citizen influence and activity (ibid).

The core of this argument centers upon the assertion that all citizens must potentially embody an ideal democratic character which can then be drawn upon to check elite abuse or unjust policy. The demand is a rather excessive one: all members of the polity are understood by these researchers to be of sufficient moral caliber, to command sufficient knowledge, and to adequately understand the dynamics of political activity in order to be able to act when the times and conditions demand it. The extreme reliance upon moral insight is revealed in the data referred to in the above citations.

These data refer to what Verba and Almond term "subjective competence" and correspond to the competence that individuals feel they have in influencing government policy and elite behavior. Specifically, individuals were asked whether they "can do something about an unjust local or national regulation." As expected, most individuals thought that they could. 77% thought that they could effectively oppose a local regulation and 75% thought they could oppose a national regulation that was "unjust and harmful" (p.185, also Milbrath, 1981). These results are not surprising as they indicate the widespread socialization of democratic maxims with respect to efficacious citizen control over an aberrant elite. The vast majority also held to the collective action mystique as well, i.e., that "one can cooperate with one's fellow citizen as a means of influencing the government" (p.196). This latter point will be examined below.

What is surprising is that Verba and Almond fall back on subjective competence to shore up their theory of democracy. They take these results to signify a well of popular moral acumen ready to be tapped in times of elite abuse, and an ability to not only exercise critical and autonomous moral judgment, but the ability to do so "discontinuously" as the conditions warrant. They view subjective competence as sufficient to check elite power. In effect they rely upon the same ideal of democratic character that they have tried to debunk in the first place. Is this concept of a democratic personality justified or can it too be subjected to cognitive and rational criticism?

DEMOCRATIC CHARACTER: A RATIONAL AND COGNITIVE REAPPRAISAL

Why are these two competencies, moral insight and collective action, so difficult so sustain? Some of the answers to this question can be found in an analysis of two diverse schools of thought: cognitive, developmental moral psychology and rational choice theory.

Cognitive Constraints on Democratic Character

Considerations of cognitive developmental approaches to moral psychology will be directed at the psychological assumption referred to as "moral insight" or "principle". Moral insight can be understood in terms of autonomous or critical moral judgment and entails the ability to judge a set of social and moral rules from a perspective independent of these rules. These meta-rules need not be absolute but must be universalizable and form the foundation of a reasoning process which subjects social and moral rules to review. The emphasis therefore is not so much upon the substance of the principles utilized in autonomous moral reasoning, but the structure of this type of reasoning. Autonomous moral judgment need not be linked to a specific normative system such as utilitarianism or Kantian deontological rationality but to a process of abstracting from and thinking about social norms. This conception echoes a cognitive-developmental view of autonomy as a psychological faculty for universalization rather than as a philosophical principle (Lind, 1985) and is consistent with a constructivist (e.g. Rawls, 1980) approach to the generation of moral principles. It makes no claim as to the ultimate veracity of these first principles. In the theories previously cited a number of first principles were thought to be utilized by ideal citizens including natural law (Locke), utilitarianism (Mill, Bentham), or Kantian fairness (Rawls).

Moral autonomy or what many developmentalists refer to as "principled moral reasoning" is a cognitive faculty that can be often understood to derive from one's level of moral and logical development. This emphasis on development is not accidental. Democratic theory beginning with J.S. Mill and continuing through Dewey to the present has often been termed developmental because of the emphasis upon the role that participation plays in fostering moral, logical and political development. Inherent in this idea is the assumption that individuals develop along a continuum beginning with a relatively unsophisticated conception of their moral, political and natural environment and develop by way of age and experience to more mature adults. Education is often understood to play a part in this process while the norms which fire a philosophy of education often being the endpoints of these developmental processes.

This scenario is especially pronounced when viewing moral development. Drawing from Piaget, Kohlberg (1985) and his followers, for example, sought to demonstrate the validity of a typology of moral development that gradually saw the individual move from judgments based on self-interest (stages 1, 2) to those based on group and civic interest (stages 3, 4) and ultimately to judgments that derived from abstract, universal moral principles (stages 5, 6). Kohlberg also took the step of viewing the endpoint of this development with its emphasis on abstract and universal ethical reasoning as normatively significant and an aim of democratic education; a position parallel to that of Dewey and Mill.

For its part, democratic theory incorporates a vision of an ideal citizen endowed with a level of moral insight that is representative of only the highest stages of moral development. Post-conventional moral reasoners are inclined to be liberal while lower stage thinkers tend to be more conservative (Thornton, 1983; Weinreich-Haste, 1981, 1983, 1984, 1985). Higher stage thinkers are inclined to participate, be politically active and protest when necessary (Haan, 1968, 1975; Weinreich-Haste, ibid.; Candee, 1974; Kohlberg, 1984; Thornton, 1983), withstand dogmatism (Lind, et.al., 1985) and resist imposed authority such as that simulated in the Milgram (1974) experiments (Kohlberg, 1984).

Conceptually, these correlations between principled thinking and democratic ideals occur as a result of the post-conventional individual's capacity to recognize the moral limits of public policy. Cognitively, social or political injustice comes to the fore when accepted legal and social norms or the actions of duly constituted political authority conflict with considered moral principles. In that moral principles, for principled thinkers, are self-generated there is an accompanying sense of personal responsibility and accountability that often lead toward the fulfillment of these principles both in thought and action. These two cognitive attributes, the ability to recognize injustice and the concomitant recognition of the duty and responsibility to see one's principles through, combine to define for the principled thinker the notion of political duty and obligation. The capabilities of the principled moral agent stand in stark contrast to those limited moral-political capabilities and insights of conventional thinkers.

Do such individuals exist? Clearly they existed in the minds of several generations of democratic theorists. Moreover, the evidence compiled by moral psychologists over the past thirty years offers convincing evidence that some individuals do reason and act in this manner and exhibit many of the traits that are associated with ideal democratic character (Kohlberg, 1984; Haan, 1968, 1975; Lind, et.al., 1985). However, is it reasonable to argue that these individuals can serve as a normative ideal for democratic and educational theory or that democratic stability is secured by the widespread political participation of such individuals? To do so would require that moral development can be encouraged across the broad spectrum of the polity to the extent that large numbers of individual can attain a level of moral autonomy and principled moral thinking. Fulfilling this requirement turns on a bald psychological problem: can moral development be fostered at the extensive levels that seem to be required by the theories of democracy surveyed in the previous section.

The Moral Limits of Political Development

Kohlberg's own conclusions are most telling:

> our finding that the modal stage of American adults is now stage 4 means that the majority still do not embrace the moral principles which underlie their political system (1981, p. 237).

With these remarks Kohlberg posed a dilemma that neither he nor a generation of cognitive developmentalists have been able to solve. On one hand, however, this might look rather like a challenge, a challenge to moral psychologists to devise adequate means to raise the level of moral perspicacity. On the other hand, if the level of moral development manifest across a broad segment of the society cannot be appreciably affected by educational or psychological intervention then the dilemma is pronounced: How is a political theory that depends upon morally and politically sophisticated individuals to be sustained?

There is little argument that the actual dispersion of principled moral thinkers within a given society is meager. Estimates of principled moral thinkers within the general population range from 5% to 13% (Kohlberg, 1984, p. 458; Murphy and Gilligan, 1980). The balance of the body politic, those who are understood to be "conventional" moral thinkers lack the cognitive ability to perceive political injustice. This derives from conventional reasoner's inability to assume a "prior to society perspective" whereby they can cognitively disassociate moral principles from the "law and order" principles promulgated by politically authorized elites. By virtue of their authoritative standing elites and elite policy are, with very few exceptions, conceptually beyond conventional moral criticism (Kohlberg, 1984, p. 175).

With this in mind one is left to pursue two options. First, one can empirically examine the efficacy of intervention techniques such as moral dialogue and participatory experiences to stimulate moral development. The literature in this field is vast, but not entirely convincing. Second, one can abandon the attempt to raise moral consciousness beyond the level that Kohlberg deems the modal stage and seek to root the ideal democratic character in conventional morality. This view is a more of a philosophical undertaking than empirical analysis and constitutes an approach recently explored by Guttmann in *Democratic Education* and, more generally, is the subject of Rawls' inquiry into moral psychology.

Intervention and Stimulation Techniques

Broadly speaking one can distinguish two areas of educational intervention that are relevant to the concerns of democratic theory. First, classroom intervention and moral dialogue, and second democratic participatory experiments such as those exemplified by Kohlberg's just communities.

There is be no doubt that these avenues of moral stimulation can raise individual levels of moral reasoning. The results of these experiments have been reviewed in a number of places (Kohlberg and Blatt, 1975; Lockwood, 1978;

Kohlberg, 1975, 1985,1985a; Mosher, 1980; Berkowitz and Oser, 1985) and by and large demonstrate changes in moral development that surpass, though in many cases barely surpass, the 1/3 of a stage change that is generally regarded as the threshold of significant progress (Higgens, 1980). In addition, researchers who have taken issue with Kohlberg's measurement techniques have demonstrated that even when stage change was not apparent other avenues of development such as social awareness, moral sensitization and conflict solving ability have nonetheless opened up (Oser and Schlafli, 1985).

In spite of these successes several difficulties arise. First, one must be wary about drawing the conclusion that these experiments attest to the efficacy of adult participation within democratic society. Many, if not most, of these experiments draw from a subject population of adolescents or individuals (such as those in the prisons) whose initial level of moral reasoning was relatively low (Higgens, 1980). Adult moral development is more problematic as it isn't clear which factors, if any, affect stage change in adults. Kohlberg singles out "post-educational moral experiences" but emphasizes not democratic participation but more general life experiences such as "sustained responsibility for the welfare of others and the experience of irreversible moral choice" (Kohlberg and Higgens, 1985 p. 492). What is curious about this approach is that while these latter experiences are ubiquitous in adulthood the vast majority of adults still fail to achieve principled moral thinking.

Second, aside from the general problem of adult development, several difficulties arise relative to intervention techniques even when they are practiced within a receptive population. While both intervention techniques and experiential participation settings are efficacious, the marginal returns diminish rapidly after initial exposure. In "just communities," for example, change was most pronounced after the first year (Higgens, 1980, p.104). In and of itself this is not a serious criticism. On the contrary, it points to the relative effectiveness of short term programs. However, declining efficacy is also a function of the initial stage of moral reasoning. Individuals who reason at relatively low stages prior to intervention are most positively affected (Higgens, 1980, p. 93). In many research settings, prisons for example, those who entered the experiment barely reasoning at levels of conventional morality made the most progress (Kohlberg, 1985, p.85; Feldman, 1980). In other words while intervention techniques facilitate and even accelerate development to the modal stage, they do not seem to effectively stimulate developmental leaps into principled moral reasoning.

Finally, one must point to the tenuous relationship between moral judgment and action as ultimately the ideal citizen must not only be capable of making the appropriate moral judgment but also inclined to act on his judgment. The problem of action, not one of Kohlberg's initial concerns, was appended to the developmentalist agenda rather late and too has spawned extensive literature (Blasi, 1980). Generally, it has supported the conclusion that the ability to translate judgment into action relies primarily upon the strength of one's moral character. However, much of this theorizing took little notice of existing schools of decision theory and ignore the fact that political action is most often collective action and in these cases principled thinkers are no more resistant to the dilemmas of utility maximizing behavior than conventional reasoners (see below).

In short, one must interpret much of the developmental approach rather cautiously. Educationally propelled intervention techniques are limited in their range of applicability and capacity to produce stage change in general and principled moral thinking in particular. However, it might then be argued that principled thinking in and off itself may not be indicative of the capability to cooperate and undertake political participation or, more generally, be a significant element of a well balanced democratic character. It may not be important then that adults cannot move past conventional morality or that moral development cannot significantly raise the upper level of moral development. Perhaps it is enough that the level of civic virtue (stage 4) be sustained through adolescent intervention and that cooperative and altruistic traits that are not measurable by stage development be fostered through the widespread exercise of democratic practice. In other words, perhaps it is sufficient for normative theory to be able to root the ideal democratic character in the higher levels of conventional or civil morality. Democratic education might then be geared toward the good citizen rather than the principled moral thinker.

Consistent with the move away from emphasizing stage development or promoting principled thinking as the goal of education were collective experimental approaches in the form of the "just community." Just communities (Kohlberg,1985a; Mosher, 1980) emphasized collective participation within a self governing group regulated by democratic rules and procedures. Initially the focus of these communities was upon individual moral development but later shifted to the "development of the group and its moral atmosphere" (Kohlberg, 1985a, p. 74). The thrust of the experiments was to produce a collectively altruistic, cooperative and mutually respectful and supportive community.

With this in mind many of the difficulties of individual intervention techniques cited above might be sidestepped if it could be shown that the "moral atmosphere" resulting from the just communities in particular and a civil society of stage 4 conventional thinkers in general was consistent with democratic norms. The nature of this moral atmosphere, however, has been the subject of much debate. While practitioners of the just community have viewed it as enlightened, invigorating, and "characterized by a respect and caring for persons in which students can experience the roles necessary for full participation in a democracy" (Wasserman, 1980, p.278) detractors have viewed it as paternalistic and oppressive of dissident viewpoints (Feldman, 1980).

Regardless of how one sides in this debate one must take pause when exponents of the just community concluded that the highest collective norm is that of "group norm enforcement" and exemplified by situations in which "collective norms are upheld through the expected reporting of the deviant to the group, the highest state being when most group members report deviant behavior" (Reimer and Powers, 1980, p. 308-9). Statements of this sort immediately lead to the kinds of concerns that have always distressed democratic theorists who saw one of the major difficulties of democracy to be majoritarian tyranny and the deleterious effects of widespread equality. In many cases, these fears can be traced to philosophical underpinnings that emphasize broad based equality over extensive libertarian concerns. The ease with which many developmentalist theories incorporate, for example, Rawls' principles of Kantian constructivism often leads them to ignore the warnings of Tocqueville and Madison.

The Morality of Association

Can the morality of association at the level of civil society be the morality of an ideal society? Is a society of stage 4 thinkers sufficient to drive a normative theory of democracy that incorporates as its ideal a citizenry of morally perspicacious and politically active individuals who will police public policy and guarantee political security for the polity at large? The practical difficulties of the just community not withstanding, this issue also turns on a philosophical argument.

In her recent book, Gutmann (1987) develops a provocative conception of democratic character utilizing, among other things, many of Kohlberg's theories cited earlier. Her objective is to develop a pluralism that is not relativistic or value neutral. This is accomplished by subjecting any proposed educational policy or norm to two principles: the principle of non-repression and the principle of non-discrimination. The first principle stipulates that restrictions of rational deliberation cannot be tolerated and the second demands that no educable citizens be excluded from an adequate education (p. 95). These two principles are fundamental and logically cannot be violated without violating the essence of democracy itself. They are therefore used to control majoritarian decisions and act as a constraint on the practice of democracy. Understanding these principles and using them to guide one's political activity is the hallmark of a democratic character.

What makes Gutmann's theory unique and especially enticing is the fact that she attempts to introduce a fair measure of particularism without falling back on what is termed the state of families, i.e., a state in which education is solely determined by family or small group interests. As long as the two principles are not violated, communities are free to teach parochial values. However, the arm of these two principles is quite long. It mandates that community agendas be established in a democratic way and that value systems which are inherently undemocratic because they might limit rational deliberation be restricted. This effectively excludes equal time for, for example, theories of creationism which are seen to lend scientific, i.e. universal, validity to parochial ideals.

On the face of it this argument, representative perhaps of true pluralism, is attractive as it structures democratic education to allow for a kind of constrained conventionality. Particular, parochial values which derive from conventional associational roles can be the norms of education provided that the two principles are not violated in doing so. In short, the ideal democratic citizen would not be a cosmopolitan citizen void of parochial affiliations rather the opposite: an individual possibly imbued with an intense particular identity yet cognizant of the abstract, universal principles that underlie and constrain democratic society. Such an organic personality is desirable because it satisfies not only the condition of critical moral judgment necessary to a liberal conception of democratic character but appears to derive directly from conventional modes of association.

It might be asked however, whether this notion of character is really different from the traditional and morally articulate version sketched above. It demands recognition of the normative superiority of the two abstract principles that underlie democratic society. By demanding that citizens "recognize the common interests among citizens and the related commitment to reconsider our individual interest in light of understanding the interests of others" (p. 77) there is the implicit understanding that significant weight, if not equal weight be given to the interests of others. Altruism is particularly strong in this conception of democratic character and while the scope of these "others" (i.e. the range of altruistic feeling) is not specified it is understood to extend at least to the territorial boundaries of the democratic state if not to the entire world community.

What is of particular interest in Guttmann's argument is the claim that the ability to reason altruistically and adequately cognize and utilize these principles is not necessarily a function of principled moral thinking. This argument, if sustained, would undercut many of the objections raised against the claims of developmental psychology and the idealized concept of democratic character discussed above. In fact, Guttmann accepts the substance of many of these objections and argues instead that the requisite moral character can be derived from conventional or associational morality. Such a community of individuals reasoning in a way consistent with the higher levels of conventional morality would go a long way to realizing the ideal that she envisions.

Can the morality of association do this? The term, "associational morality" is drawn from Rawls (1971) and denotes the "moral standards appropriate to the individual's role in various associations to which he belongs" (p. 467). However, as Rawls' develops this concept (in a way parallel to Kohlberg's typology) it is clear the morality of association is always relative to the bounds of the association in question springing largely from "ties of friendship and fellow feeling for others, and one's concern for the approbation of the wider society" (p. 473). It is difficult to see how the morality of association of this sort can generate the requisite principles of democratic education. In spite of the shortcomings of Kohlberg's theories cited above, he has convincingly demonstrated that principled morality is distinct from conventional morality with regard to autonomous moral reasoning.

Part of the problem in Guttmann's argument stems perhaps from a confusion that is generated when Rawls' theory of a sense of justice is superimposed upon Kohlberg six-part typology. Rawls indicates that his "morality of association" encompasses Kohlberg's stage 3, 4 and 5. Clearly this represents Rawls' anti-utilitarian bias as his conception of the "morality of principle" is reserved only for Kohlberg's stage 6 (Kantian rationality). But Kohlberg later jettisoned stage 6 as empirically undemonstrable and only stage 5 (utilitarianism and contractarianism) now characterizes principled morality. It is stage 5 which draws in the two abstract principles necessary for Guttmann's argument. Putting aside the stage distinction it is still clear that these two principles are abstract principles that necessitate the cognitive ability to judge democratic policy from a perspective that is independent of that policy. Moral autonomy, however construed, is still a necessary element of democratic character as Guttmann understands it. It cannot be derived solely from a morality of association.

Morality of association does spawn the cooperative virtues. But it does so an many levels, only a very small percentage of which can engender moral principles that satisfy Guttmann's criteria or the general demands of extensive altruism and moral autonomy that characterize idealized conceptions of democratic character. Figure 1 depicts the range or focus of moral concern as it varies with moral development. The stages follow Kohlberg's general descriptive typology but the subclassifications within stages, which, while perhaps consistent with Kohlberg's substages (Lind, 1985), exemplify the range of motivating moral principles that bring individuals beyond self interested behavior. They are drawn from the attempts by rational choice theorists to explicate the motivations necessary to precipitate cooperative behavior (Elster, 1989; Mansbridge, 1990). The focus of moral concern represents the extrapolation of these motivations at various stages of development.

The motivating principles delineated deserve further explanation. Consequentialism or utilitarianism signifies utility maximizing behavior. At the levels of egotistical behavior it is only individual welfare that one seeks to enhance. While it might seem obvious that self-interested behavior is antithetical to cooperative undertakings it has been the virtue of rational choice theory to emphasize the dilemma that self-interested, outcome oriented behavior poses for collective action. In spite of the fact that the outcomes of collective ventures are often to the benefit of all participants it is usually individually irrational to participate. This is the essence of the prisoner's dilemma and derives from the fact that collective action usually provides a collective good (see below), one that is indivisible and available to all regardless of participation. However, if the good is available regardless of participation and the efficacy of any single actor's contribution is low then no

Figure 1

MORAL MOTIVATIONS

	FOCUS OF MORAL CONCERN			
STAGE/ORIENTATION: Motivation	**SELF**	**SMALL GROUP**	**SOCIETY**	**ABSTRACT INDIVIDUAL**
STAGE 2/EGOISM 1. Consequentialism: utilitarianism	Maximize self interest			
STAGE 3/LIMITED ALTRUISM				
1. Consequentialism: utilitarianism		Maximize interests of small group		
2. Nonconsequentialism: fairness	------->	Treat members of the group fairly		
3.Nonconsequentialism: normative obedience (duty)		Adhere to group norms		
STAGE 4/ SOCIAL ALTRUISM				
1. Consequentialism: utilitarianism			Maximize interests of society: the "common good"	
2. Nonconsequentialism: fairness	---------------------------->		Treat members of society fairly	
3. Nonconsequentialism: normative obedience (duty)			Adhere to social norms and law and order.	
STAGE 5/ABSTRACT UNIVERSALISM				
1. Consequentialism: utilitarianism				maximize interests of abstract individual: average utilitarianism
2.Autonomous Nonconsequentialism: Kantian fairness	-->			treat others as ends: universal moral duty

individual has any incentive to bear the cost of participation. Collective action then fails and all are worse off.

The dilemma, usually referred to as a "prisoner's dilemma," is practically solved in a number of ways, most of which assume that the scope of moral concern can be broadened and various cooperative motivations substituted for self interested behavior (Hardin, 1982; Sen, 1974; Elster, 1989). It is for this reason that the empirical studies of developmental moral psychology are so crucial. Effectively they dictate the range of motivations possible. Altruism, for example, is but one motivation which may encourage cooperation. Formally, altruism represents a utility function that is "self and other regarding" (Elster, 1989), i.e, it sums the expected utility of the individual actor and, at the same time, the benefit which a specified group of others will receive from collective action. In some cases, this additional gain will offset the cost of cooperating (Marwell, 1982). The ultimate utility calculation, however, depends not only upon the weight attached to the welfare of others but their numerical strength as well. As exemplified in figure 1 the size of this population of significant "others" increases across the range of moral development.

By contrast the principles of fairness and duty are non-consequentialist in that they motivate individuals to act in concert without regard to cost. Individuals who are fair will act if enough members of some specific, but morally significant, group are also contributing (Elster, 1989). As in the case of altruism, the "significant group" is defined relative to moral development and, as exemplified in figure 1, can vary from the parochial moral community to that of humanity at large. However, in contrast to altruists who base their decision on the welfare, but not necessarily the actions, of others fairness minded individuals will join in out of a sense of fair play and desire to "pitch in" only if enough members of these significant groups are already acting. Fairness captures a sense of community obligation to act irrespective of personal cost to the extent that even the object of participation, the collective good itself, might be placed in jeopardy. Elster (1989) argues, for example, that without constraints many more able bodied men would have, out of a sense of fairness and to the ultimate detriment of the war effort, chosen combat during WWII over relatively safe but absolutely essential stateside assignments.

Duty is also a non-consequentialist motivating principle that makes no reference to cost but, unlike fairness tends to motivate regardless of the actions of others. Duty bound individuals act out of adherence to particular norms (or the normative dictates of legitimate authority) and, because the actions of others are irrelevant, they are often among the first to act. Typical examples in our time can be found in blind adherence to religious norms without regard to personal cost, a form of behavior often resulting in a particularly insidious type of fanaticism. While "duty" is often thought to be philosophically enlightened and principled such is the case only if the norms followed are universal, i.e.. apply across the broad spectrum of humanity. However, if the scope of these norms is bounded by a parochial moral community, as they most often are, then the resulting judgments and actions might be far from moral. As in the cooperative virtues or motivating principles previously discussed, duty can function as a motivating principle only within the context of a significant moral community whose norms or leaders dictate such duty. All of these motivating principles, therefore, depend upon a specified range of others whose welfare is weighed (altruism) whose actions are considered (fairness), or whose norms or leaders are authoritatively followed (duty). But who are these others and who constitutes the focus of one's moral concern?

I would argue that this range of others varies with development and that one can see a changing conception of altruism, duty or fairness as one moves along the developmental continuum. For pre-conventional egotistical moral agents (stage 2) there are no "others." Slowly this evolves into a conception of a limited moral community bounded by one's family, friends and associational ties. At this stage altruistic individuals, for example, will weigh the welfare of others within the boundaries of their group or association when contemplating action. Even at the highest levels of conventional reasoning, this community is bounded by what is legally recognized as civil society. It is, however, still particularistic, very often subject to the range of the majority political or cultural group. Or, more importantly, it is restricted by law and authority itself for at this level, the "law and order stage," moral principles and the principles of law are coterminous. At this stage a kind of popular procedural positivism prevails which is resistant to moral criticism as individuals are socialized to the principles of dominant political culture. While they are capable of undertaking civil disobedience, for example, they must understand such acts to "foster the maintenance of the social system" (Linn, 1987) to the extent that a government policy actually threatens the integrity of civil society and not merely violates principles of justice. Lacking the structure of principled moral reasoning, however, they are unable to utilize these principles to oversee the democratic process itself and thereby constrain deviant and unjust public policy when effected by legitimate authorized elites in way that appears to be procedurally correct and in the national interest.

Under these circumstances the welfare of individuals or groups of individuals who are not legally part of civil society is not weighed by conventional moral reasoners. At these levels of moral and political cognition the interests of others beyond one's moral community are easily discounted or disregarded. It is this cognitive phenomenon that makes the wholesale discrimination of entire minority groups possible. Individual acts of discrimination can be challenged under the law, but when a group is placed outside the pale of legal protection and recognition, then their welfare can be readily discounted by those in the community at large. Wholesale persecution of an entire minority group be it displacement and incarceration or deportation and extermination as befell the Japanese-Americans in the United States or the Jews in Germany can be morally palatable and consistent with these virtues. Once groups are beyond the pale of civil society conventional morality can longer safeguard their welfare or political security.

Such attitudes, though morally abhorrent are perfectly commensurate with conventional political and moral cognition and the morality of association. This phenomenon constitutes not a localized political issue related to, for example, xenophobia but a universal political problem that derives from the very nature of moral and political cognition. The morality of association can engender certain moral and cooperative virtues, but they are bounded by a particular moral community. Parochial groups are just as likely to exhibit these virtues when practicing beneficence as when practicing malevolence. Associational morality cannot reach to the principles that underlie democratic society.

Only at the principled levels of moral cognition is the community grasped in its abstract form and the welfare of all individuals weighed in a way that is non-discriminatory. However, as long as that moral community is not coterminous with humanity at large the democratic character that Guttmann and so many other liberal democratic theorists desire will not be realizable to any great extent in practice.

Rational Constraints on Democratic Character

In spite of this generally pessimistic conclusion no one could argue that at least some portions of the electorate do not reach principled moral thinking, perhaps in numbers sufficient to drive democratic society. Putting aside the question of sufficiency and the possibility of elitism that a small cohort of ideal citizens might lead to, there is an significant behavioral constraint that affects the ability of principled actors to act on their judgments, particularly as these actions, being political in nature, can often only be undertaken in concert with others. This behavioral constraint is rational in nature and derives from the dilemma that collective action often poses for political actor. Because of the structure of collective action problems in which non-cooperation is the dominant strategy there is no reason to assume that principled actors are any more resistant to this logic than less developed moral thinkers. In fact, I would argue that while principled thinkers are just as prone to the dilemma they lack the social psychological mechanism to affect its solution.

Collective action problems derive from the fact that most goods sought through political action are collective (or public) goods:

> A collective good is one which provides indivisible benefits; i.e., as soon as it exists, everyone will be able to benefit from it regardless of whether he himself has paid for it and regardless of how many others are also benefiting from it. For example, provision of national defense is a boon to every citizen; even if one citizen paid for it solely out of his own pocket, all the others would gain from it. Where citizens are numerous, each man finds it advantageous to refuse to pay for such benefits. Instead he assumes that the other men will bear the costs and he will still benefit. But in a free market, everyone makes the same assumption, so no one bears any of the costs and none of the benefits are forthcoming (Downs, 1957, p. 170).

These collective action problems are pervasive and affect the spheres of moral and political action as well because the moral goods or benefits that are sought by collective moral action in the political environment are also public goods. The ideal citizen might strive for a more just distribution of resources or the amelioration of political injustice through the overthrow of an unjust regime. In either case the good sought is a public good because its benefits are available to anyone regardless of his participation or contribution. However, because a single individual's participation rarely affects the provision of a public good, rational, outcome oriented individuals will find that the cost of participation exceeds any expected benefit. Regardless of what others do, such an individual will always do better by not cooperating or participating in political activity. Under these circumstances, however, collective action fails and the outcomes reached are sub-optimal. This paradox holds in spite of the fact that individuals recognize that everyone will be better off if the collective good is provided. Political action by principled moral agents is also subject to this logic and therefore often prone to failure.

Although collective action problems can sometimes be solved rationally, that is by the introduction of incentives that raise the benefits of cooperation to the extent that they outweigh the costs of participation (Olson, 1971), these dilemmas are most often solved by appeals to extrarational, moral motivations (e.g. Hardin, 1982). In fact, these are the same motivating principles that emerge at various stages of cognitive and associational development. Because they are cooperative virtues, each of the principles outlined above - altruism, fairness or duty - can serve to fire collective, political action.

However, given these solutions the groups most likely to succeed in collective action are not necessarily principled moral thinkers but what Olson has termed "intermediate groups." These groups are usually small in size or bounded in scope and exhibit certain group or associational dynamics and interdependencies that can make participation rational. In particular, they often work in one or more of the following ways. First, these groups are sufficiently organized to allow leaders to exercise sanctions or to offer incentives. Under these circumstances an individual may first find it irrational to cooperate with others but will do so because he is faced with sanctions (i.e. additional costs if he remains inactive) or offered incentives (i.e. additional benefits if he cooperates).

Second, such groups might allow an individual to notice the effect of his action. In other words, it is important to the contributing individual that his contribution make a difference. If he can see a real marginal benefit or the chance that his contribution will significantly affect the provision of the collective good he may carry the cost of contribution. Political entrepreneurs can sometimes rally support in this manner by manipulating information to cause individuals to believe that "over some range of contributions by others, their own marginal evaluations of what their contributions will buy exceed their cost" (Frohlich, et.al., 1975, p. 329).

Third, if the group is sufficiently close-knit some individuals may contribute even if their own marginal benefits are small because benefits accrue not only to oneself but to a large number of significant other individuals as well. These are the effects of altruism discussed earlier. Even if the net benefit of one's contribution is small an individual motivated by altruism (i.e utilitarianism) may act if the benefit that accrues to all those whose utility he weighs exceeds the cost of his contribution. By this reasoning even a relatively low expectation of personal influence can be multiplied by altruistic tendencies to induce collective action (Marwell, 1982).

Finally, small groups may motivate individuals to act even when it is not cost effective to do so. These are non-consequentialist motivations that have been characterized in terms of fairness or duty. Individuals motivated by fairness will contribute, often to the detriment of optimality, when others in their group contribute. They do so because it is the fair thing to do. Others may act out of duty to an normative ideal imposed from above. Leaders of small groups are particularly adept at manipulating the dictates of duty in order to motivate individuals to act collectively. Again, as argued above, it is important to remember that these virtues are often bounded by the limits of one's moral community. Fairness derives from the actions of significant others only; allegiance to norms encompasses only those norms of the group in question.

In short, small parochial groups can either provide selective incentives through a bounded organizational community or rely upon moral motivations that are salient in a bounded moral community. These small groups are a conducive if not a necessary setting for engendering the conditions for one or more of the collective action solutions to be realized. They therefore serve as the locus of much concerted collective action. However, there is nothing in the structure of a small group to guarantee enlightened moral action. On the contrary, these group dynamics - bounded morality, intense loyalty and adherence to parochial norms and leaders - often result in collective efforts that are far from moral.

On the other hand, principled moral thinkers who might exhibit the requisite moral sensibilities to ground their action in universal norms, are often isolated and atomistic political actors (Linn, 1987). When faced with political injustice such actors would be more adept at solitary acts of political resistance such as conscientious objection rather than sustained collective action. This follows from the collective action dynamics discussed above. In the absence of the group structure necessary to generate cooperative solutions and fire collective action principled reasoners are often long on moral indignation but short on political action.

This moral indignation, in and of itself, is not irrelevant and can be of great importance when analyzing the dynamics of collective action. Under appropriate circumstances, the actions of principled thinkers can sometimes serve to catalyze more conventional thinkers if the necessary group structure is in place. Elster (1989) has pointed out that collective action often occurs in stages relative to the expected utility of participation. At first costs are high, motivating only those that are duty bound. As more individuals participate utilitarians might be motivated to join in as the total gain in utility exceeds their cost of contribution. Finally, when a significant number of individuals are participating fairness oriented agents will contribute even though critical mass, the number of individuals necessary to achieve a collective good, may have already been reached.

Given this scenario, it might be then asked who it is that motivates the duty bound? In many cases it just might be principled thinkers if the structure of society is such that their actions or prescriptions are authoritative within a given social context. Andre Trocme, the clerical leader of Le Chambon, France might have been in such a position when the villagers decided to rescue French Jews in the Second World War. Although it is doubtful that all or even most of the villagers were motivated by Kantian fairness (Sauvage, 1989; Gross, 1990), it appears from Hallie's (1979) account that Trocme himself might have been and that he had sufficient stature and authority to influence those motivated by duty. Other variously motivated individuals joined in as the tight-knit moral community structure of the village facilitated the collective action solutions discussed earlier. Similarly, in the 1960's, the significant cohort of principled moral reasoners found among anti-war demonstrators (Haan, 1975) might have functioned in the same way, drawing upon the student community in order to precipitate action. In other words, under some circumstances principled moral thinking can be important but it is neither a necessary or sufficient condition of collective action or even of moral collective action in the political environment. It is not sufficient as principled thinkers are stranded unless they can recruit conventional participants. This necessitates a specific kind of moral community conducive to overcoming collective action problems. It is not necessary as there are a significant number of other cases (e.g. the rescue of Danish Jewry) in which what appears to be principled moral action might merely be the byproduct of self-interested behavior (Gross, 1990).

It is for these reasons that many other forms of collective action in the face of elite abuse are prone to failure. Although it is difficult to analyze inaction it can be seen that individuals preaching from the moral high ground have a tough sell unless they can authoritatively do so within well defined moral community capable of cooperation. Principled moral thinkers attempting to act without such a community cannot, in principle, effect collective action. Although inaction in the face of discrimination is certainly troubling far more insidious consequences are wrought when democratic governments unilaterally and often with full support of their constituents revoke previously granted rights enjoyed by a specific minority group. One need not look always to pre-war Germany for such failings of character: the revocation of the rights of Japanese-Americans in 1942 and, more recently the imposition of martial law in Quebec (Sorrentino and Vidmar, 1974) or the abuse of Palestinian rights in Israel afford significant examples of moral myopia in the face of legitimately sanctioned political discrimination justified by national security. In these cases one can see the clear limits of moral cognition and political action.

DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND DEMOCRATIC CHARACTER

One of the questions raised earlier asked about the extent to which normative theory is subject to behavioral constraints. In this paper two such constraints were analyzed as they pertain to democratic character. First, the cognitive limitations of moral and political reasoning that emerge from a developmental typology point to the conclusion that the associational dynamics of even highly developed conventional thinkers cannot produce the structure of moral reasoning demanded by nearly every major formulation of idealized democratic character. Second, the rational limitations of action while often surmountable by conventional thinkers with strong associational affiliations work to the detriment of sustained collective action by principled political actors.

What will normative theories of democracy and democratic education look like if they are to take cognizance of these psychological constraints? First, while cooperative virtues do emerge from associational dynamics, these traits are constrained by the limits of particular associations or interest groups. As a result, cooperation between groups is often tenuous and interest groups, by and large, are left in a competitive posture. As such, these considerations lend psycho-sociological support to theories of democratic pluralism that seek to regulate interest group competition in the pursuit of resources rather than theories which encourage universal cooperation in the form of unitary (Mansbridge, 1990) or cooperative democracy. This distinction in democratic theory can be superimposed upon the one made earlier between economic democracy on the one hand and developmental or participatory democracy on the other. In the former case the paradigm of self-interest holds and relative bargaining power and the rules of competition determine the fair distribution of scarce resources. In the latter, the paradigm is one of cooperation and altruism in which fairness depends upon appeals to equality, an appeal which intrinsically depends upon the idea of a universal moral community or family.

The problems of pluralism however, should not be underestimated. Theorists have long noted that relative bargaining power is a function of existing resource bases and that groups without sufficient resources cannot compete fairly. However, it would also be misleading to conclude that the lack of a resource base is sufficient to preclude access to scarce resources. Clearly, some groups find it difficult to compete, but many previously resource poor groups can and do successfully participate in a pluralistic and competitive environment. It therefore appears that successful action depends more upon the ability of a group to organize and mobilize resources than upon their initial endowment.

Can education capitalize on this insight? Education in general and the norm of the ideal democratic character in particular has long been driven by a cooperative and family paradigm while politics, at least in many traditions, incorporates a paradigm of self-interest and competition. In this sense we are somewhat schizophrenic in our social culture and in many ways this can be seen to dovetail well with the sharp demarcation between the political and economic spheres of activity on the one hand and the private, familial spheres on the other. One way to resolve this dichotomy might be to attempt to bring the cooperative virtues of the private and familial sphere to that of the political and the market domains (Held, 1990). Education, long considered simply the extension of familial responsibility, has been imbued with this direction.

However, one might consider a diametrically opposed approach. If the key to the acquisition of scarce resources lies in the ability of a group to act collectively and compete successfully then rather than seek to modify the political environment through educational norms based on models of familial cooperation, we might, if the competitive nature of democratic society is indeed justified, foster a better sense of political security and efficacy if educational resources are allocated to programs that encourage groups to develop the necessary means of competition rather than to those which advise them to make their political appeals based on some cooperative sense of justice. This would enable groups to compete on the basis of their ability to mobilize resources and raise their relative bargaining power, capabilities that are potentially within their range of cognition and behavior rather than make abstract appeals to beneficence which will often fail because they reflect principled thinking or universal altruism beyond conventional capabilities. Education has long attempted to foster the latter, to the ultimate detriment of less endowed minority groups.

In the broader political realm the cognitive and rational constraints analyzed above also have widespread ramifications. Emerging democracies and those established systems racked by ethnic strife are struggling to assimilate or modify existing modes of democratic government. Given the intense levels of ethnic loyalties it would not seem controversial to suggest some sort of pluralistic or consociational (Lipjart, 1977) form of government. However, can it be argued that this ought to be the normative direction of education or should these governments adopt the cooperative paradigm for educational systems with the ultimate goal of doing away with parochial appeals to resources? In other words, are these intense loyalties a temporary affliction that can be undone with large doses of democratic education?

At this juncture the answer appears to be no. The limited and essentially confined nature of cooperative motivations are a function of relatively invariant development and might then be understood to legitimize rather than refute competitive pluralism as a normative political system. Waiting for parochial interest groups (particularly ethnic minorities) to alter their moral perspective vis a vis outgroups, as is a popular progressive position in the Mideast, Northern Ireland and now Eastern Europe, obscures the fact that cooperative tendencies have severe cognitive and social limitations such that the role of democracy is best suited only to regulate competition among these groups. Education in turn must be directed toward the goal of making them better competitors. This recognizes that education cannot universally instill a character that is cognizant of the principles that underlie democratic society and that democratic states ultimately cannot provide universal political security if this is thought to depend upon an enlightened political morality characterized by principled moral deliberation and sustained political action.

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SECOND GENERAL SESSION

Marquette Center 30 11:00 a.m. - 12:30 p.m., November 11, 1989

EDUCATION AND INSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY

A Panel Presentation

Introduction

Byron F. Radebaugh, Northern Illinois University

Welcome to the Second General Session which will be a panel presentation entitled, "Education and Institutional Democracy." I am Byron F. Radebaugh, Executive Editor, Thresholds in Education, and Professor of Education, Northern Illinois University.

In February, 1989, Thresholds in Education published Vol. XV, No. 1, entitled, "Education and Institutional Democracy." Professor Arthur Brown, Wayne State University and myself served as Issue Editors. We were fortunate in obtaining articles from some of the top people in the country on this topic and the idea for this panel presentation was born. In the "Editorial" for this issue I said:

> Most of us, I suspect, have had personal experience with what we consider to be certain de-humanizing aspects of life in institutions where we work. These experiences may have left us feeling bitter, unappreciated, resentful. Some of us may have decided to withdraw from full participation in the life of the institution thereby reducing the ability of the institution to fully function. Our teaching may have become uninspiring--the quality of the products we produce shoddy--and we no longer care! Can anything be done about this? Can institutions be organized and administered in such a way that they become vital, humane, caring, worthy of our best efforts? One of our well known historians (William Manchester) once said, "A man wouldn't sell his life to you, but he will give it to you for a piece of colored ribbon."
>
> When we add to the above a consideration of the rapidity of change confronting all of us, the demands for 'reform' in many areas, the common problems that remain unsolved, and the realization that we are on the threshold of the 21st century, an understanding of how we might make our institutions more functional and humane becomes more imperative.
>
> It was with thoughts such as these in mind that one night over dinner at the Yugo Restaurant in Chicago I proposed to Arthur Brown that we plan an issue of Thresholds on the topic "Education and Institutional Democracy." Arthur has been

studying the problems and challenges of institutional democracy professionally for many years. He agreed. This issue of *Thresholds* is the fruition of this idea.

For this panel presentation we asked the following persons to present a brief summary of the major ideas in the articles they prepared for *Thresholds*, add any other points they see fit, and participate in discussion of this topic following the presentation:

Irving Bluestone is a retired Vice-president of UAW, and for many years, its negotiator with General Motors. He is now director of the program, Master of Arts in Industrial Relations, Wayne State University. His presentation is entitled, "What Education Can Learn from Industry."

Leonard Kaplan is Professor and former Division Head of Teacher Education, Wayne State University. His presentation is entitled, "Education and the Family."

Robert P. Craig has been an ethicist for the Sisters of Charity Hospitals and is now a Professor at the University of Houston. His presentation is entitled, "Democratizing Health Care Facilities."

Arthur Brown is Professor, Philosophy of Education, Wayne State University. He did much of the planning for this panel presentation, will serve as "Respondent" to the various presentations, and add some thoughts of his own.

Copies of the February, 1989 issue of *Thresholds in Education*, "Education and Institutional Democracy," will be distributed following the presentations.

I have asked Irving Bluestone to begin with his presentation, "What Education Can Learn from Industry." Professor Bluestone.

HEALTH CARE AND INSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY:
A NECESSARY RELATIONSHIP

Robert P. Craig, Ed.D., Ph.D.
College of Education
University of Houston - University Park

The intent of this reflection is to argue that institutional democracy in a health care setting is not only a sound management strategy, but it is a necessary condition for the development and implementation of the very essence and meaning of health care itself. Put more strongly, institutional democracy is a model of management relationships demanded by the primary aim of health care, that is, the healing and growth of both patients and employees. And by institutional democracy I mean management through subsidiarity or institutional decision making being made at that place in the organization in which the decision has the most impact and relevance. But, before arguments are developed to support the contention of this reflection, a few disclaimers are in order. Traditionally, health care centers have been hierarchically structured. Leadership is from the top down, that is, from the administrator to the associate administrator to the various assistant administrators to department directors to supervisors and to line employees. Although the scenario can differ in some circumstances, there may not be an associate administrator, say, the pattern of vertical leadership relationships and accountability has been standard practice in health care centers in the United States. And, through such a hierarchical management structure the stage is set which enhances an ethics of control with all the proper invasive operations, namely, accountability models, productivity and efficiency standards, short term and long term incentive objectives, among other factors.

It has been argued that there are many more managers than leaders in health care centers.[1] Certainly an environment of accountability with all the trappings of assessment through measurement encourages a strict management approach to decision making. Health care managers, then, from administrative accountability to supervisory duties, are mostly technicians who follow a prescribed manner of day-to-day work activity. This minimizes risk-taking and thwarts creativity. Such an administrative environment makes institutional democracy a difficult concept and process to implement, since implementation would necessitate the relinquishing of control.[2]

Likewise, physicians exercise a powerful degree of control over health care institutions, since physicians are the ones who service the customers, that is, the patients.[3] Most physicians are not employed by the health care center; rather they are in private practice or some other arrangement, such as a PPO or HMO. And since the physician is usually not a facility employee he/she is not responsible or accountable for the health care centers operations the same way employees are. Institutional democracy within a health care center would be mere tokanism without the participation of physicians. But to make such participation meaningful and realistic, the physician would need to give up the very power through which he/she has political and financial leverage within the health care center, that is, decisions regarding patient stays would need to be done in more collaborative manner. And given the history and development of physician autonomy and paternalism/maternalism in the United States, such a prospect is unlikely. It might even smack of creeping health care socialism, which is offensive to such large medical political lobbies as the A.M.A. Thus, without a radical change in the decision making apparatus of a health care center, institutional democracy in the full sense of the term would be next to impossible to implement.

But with the possibility of such structural, corporate culture and decision making change in mind (and there is evidence that as health care delivery systems change, due, in part, to an emphasis on patient autonomy and the creation of differing structures of health care reimbursement, health care decision making itself is becoming more participatory), let us develop arguments why participatory democracy is necessitated by the mission and meaning of health care itself. The mission of health care is healing and growth, both for patients and employees.[4] Even the process of dying can having a growth factor to the extent which the patient understands and integrates the experience of dying within the framework of his/her beliefs in the time of living which remains. Since employee growth (personal, professional and institutional) is one of the primary aims of a health care institution, a democratized work place, one in which employees' develop self-esteem, relationality and responsibility, ought to be integral to the facility corporate culture and to management/leadership style.

Likewise, health care is referred to as a ministry—but not in a religious sense.[5] "To minister" implies to reach out to employees and patients, helping them grow and develop, and treating them with respect and dignity. Since institutional democracy fosters such personal and institutional growth and development, it ought to be the modus operendi of a health care center's operations, decision making and management/leadership style.

Put differently, the basic task ahead for the health care manager is the management of values, for in situations where participation and sharing are emphasized, value priorities must be maintained.[6] The term we choose to use for this activity is institutional democracy. This is the management strategy of the future, necessitated both by the mission, philosophy, and values of a health care system/facility and by the climate ahead. Institutional democracy incorporates collegiality, subsidiarity, and accountability as necessary principles.

Many not-for-profit health care systems/facilities which value behaviors such as team spirit, caring, quality, commitment, growth, concern, and collaboration demand as much. And the health care manager who attempts this style neither gives up his/her responsibility for directing and leading nor his/her authority.

Although the basic principles operative in the theory and practice of institutional democracy, viz., collegiality, subsidiarity and accountability, cannot be expanded upon at length in an article of this size, they do need some elaboration. Collegiality deals with the quality of relationships that are intended to exist among those involved in governance and management of a health care system/facility. This means, among other things, that management values opinions from persons of all positions and status—thus, mutual trust is demonstrated.

Subsidiarity calls for vesting decision-making authority and responsibility as close as possible to the point in the organization where the impact of the decision will be felt and at the point where the people most competent to do so make the decision. This means that a decentralized approach to both governance and management is practiced, and that a broad base of responsible persons has been developed to carry out governance. Finally, accountability requires that individuals and groups be answerable for how authority has been exercised and responsibilities discharged.

Yet, a note of realism. Institutional democracy is not a process which can eliminate all the difficulties of management and it should not be judged in regard to whether it settles all organization problems. Participation is good for some things; it is not addressed to every management problem.

To implement a process of institutional democracy within a health care system/facility will take approximately 3-5 years and ought to involve all levels of organization including the corporate office, administration, management, and employees. The education and training ought to include both didactic or skill development processes and leadership assessment tools.

To conclude, in order to implement institutional democracy effectively in a health care center the involvement of leadership is absolutely essential. The future of health care itself will depend upon effective and quality relationships between management and employees. Institutional democracy is certainly consistent with the form of management/leadership practice we have been discussing. But, more importantly, institutional democracy as a strategy of corporate culture articulation within a health care center is demanded by the healing ministry of health care itself.[7]

Hand in hand with the argument that institutional democracy flows from the values/mission of health can itself, there are current social and health care trends and developments which likewise present a strong argument for institutional democracy in a health care setting. In essence, what is invalued here is personal/social value change.

Although the health care industry is in the midst of a values revolution (from an environment of abundance to one of scarcity, for many reasons we will not expand on), recent health care employees are either part of the 'Baby Boom,' those born between the end of World War II and the beginning of the 1960s, or part of the so called 'Me' generation of the 1970s. In either case, their values differ from those of our current executives and administrators. Although there has been a scarcity of material goods and services to some extent, it has not drastically affected most people's life-style. While there is a scarcity of health care resources primarily, although not exclusively, due to different delivery systems and government policy, this scarcity is not reflected in the general consumer goods and the services of the society—upon which the more recent health care employees were weaned. (We are not arguing that there is no scarcity of service/consumer goods. We are arguing that there is not a 'perceived' scarcity by the general population.)

By way of contrast, those in positions of leadership in many health care systems/facilities tend to precede the 'Baby Boom' reflect a different work ethic. In a somewhat over-simplified way, this ethic maintains that upward mobility and achievement are accomplished through the following

* self denial
* delayed gratification
* conformity
* and, hard work
* likewise, materialism
(production, efficiency,
and other forms) is valued,
and is a criterion of goodness.

It almost goes without saying that the above values are not as uniformly prized today as they were in the past. The employee entering the workforce today values self-gratification, self-expression, leisure time, autonomy, personal opportunity, and rapid advancement.

Along with a radical change in the value of work, today's health care employees are more educated. Thus, it is predicted they will be more concerned with social issues, such as human rights, resource depletion, pollution, and nuclear war. Although the reasons for such a concern may not be entirely altruistic, they do exhibit a marked concern for the quality of life. The rapid rate of social change, mobility, and social complexity will certainly change the type and degree of commitments to social relationships—there will be an increased desire to control one's destiny, which will fly in the face of the rapidity of technological change.

The single most significant response we in health care can make to this future forecast with its multiple dimensions is found in our style of leadership. The preceding insight into the attitudes and values of the merging work force impels us to discover and implement an administrative stance that will unequivocally demonstrate our awareness and desire to meet the legitimate concerns of those we direct in the work place.

The traditional understanding of management's role will not exactly be the same. Historically, the role of the manager was simply getting things done, with and through people. While it is still important to achieve objectives, the health care manager will be successful to the extent that he/she can maintain the desired outcome while engaging the work force in a sense of cooperative venture. It is clear that achievement will be closely tied to the establishment and maintenance of the worker's commitment in both thought and feeling to a shared objective.

Institutional democracy, then, is both integral to the living out of the very meaning and values inherent in health care itself. Likewise, today's individual, employment and social trends have stood traditional hierarchical management relations on its head. What worked administratively in a health care center will not work now. It is only hoped that health care leaders are both cognizant and sensitive to these two strong arguments for implementing institutional democracy within the industry of health care. Its very survival may depend on it.

NOTES

1) Kim Kehoe, "Managing Organizational Culture." Values and Ethics, No. 7 (Winter 1986), p. 4.

2) Edmund Pellegrino and David Thomasma. The Philosophical Basis of Medical Practice. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981) especially Chapter Eleven.

3) The recent change in labeling patients is interesting in itself. The initial move was from patient to client, and presently, due to the influence of the Guest Relations Movement, and other marketing strategies, the patient is often referred to in the literature as "customer."

4) Kevin O'Rourke and Dennis Brodeau, Medical Ethics: Common Ground for Understanding. (St. Louis: C.H.A., 1986), pp. 10-14.

5) Ibid, pp. 33-44.

6) Thomas Peters, Thriving on Chaos: Handbook for a Management Revolution. (New York: Alfred Knoff, 1988), especially part IV.

7) Part of this paper is adapted from an article I wrote entitled "Institutional Democracy in Health Care: A Plan," Thresholds in Education. (February 1989), pp. 21-24.

INSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY RECONSIDERED

Arthur Brown, Wayne State University

When I wrote "Institutional Democracy: Problems and Prospects" 11 years ago, I was more optimistic than I am now about the prospects and less realistic about the problems of institutional democracy. This is not to say that I have become cynical about the matter, nor have I abandoned the cause. I remain hopeful -- but less innocent. In this regard, I am reminded of what Clemenceau said: a man who is not a socialist when he is twenty doesn't have a heart; if he's still a socialist at thirty, he doesn't have a head. Double those ages, add a few years, and you've got me. Perhaps a loser on both counts. But if I am more guarded about the prospects of institutional democracy, it is not by virtue of the reasons usually offered by skeptics. I do not believe, as Oscar Wilde did, that the reason socialism could not possibly work is because it takes too many evenings. Nor do I accept Hobbes' view that man is basically selfish or Plato's that a segment of mankind is servile by nature. On such matters, my opinion is no different from what it was in 1978. It was expressed more fully five years later when Irving Bluestone and I wrote in the Foreword to Arthur Wirth's book, Productive Work -- In Industry and Schools: Becoming Persons Again:

> . . . ample empirical evidence is available to support what each of us has personally found to be the case. When workers or faculty are given the opportunity to deliberate on important institutional matters, when they are sufficiently informed, when they are convinced that the conclusions they draw will be taken seriously, and when they can voice their views without fear -- in a word when they are full participants in the decision-making process -- they will devote an extra-ordinary amount of time to the task and come up with fair and responsible proposals.

What I have lost some faith in, then, is not the capability of everyman or in the process itself, but rather in the capacity and willingness of leaders of organizations to provide those conditions which would make effective participation possible. And I have lost some confidence in our ability to rectify that situation under present cultural circumstances. I say this with great reluctance and not a little sadness -- partly because losing one's innocence is always painful, but even more so is the realization that sweet reason and collective intelligence are no match for the power of duly constituted authority in institutional governance.

You can better understand my feelings knowing that in 1978 in the introduction to "Institutional Democracy Problems and Prospects," I said that I was going to deal with this question:

> How can we make democracy as a form of political . . . pluralism compatible with democracy as an ethical system which . . . ties together separate groups and private interests?

I argued that institutional democracy could be justified on both philosophic and practical grounds. On philosophic grounds in that it allows for the full development of one's intellectual powers and moral sensibilities and in that it offers people a large measure of control in decisions which affect their lives. I argued for it on practical grounds in that it increases organizational efficiency. I made the claim that institutional democracy could do much to reduce the tensions between the public good and the private good and between freedom and equality. And, finally, I predicted that for a number of reasons, including a more highly educated populace, a heightened sensitivity to principles of justice, and the demands of the marketplace, the movement toward institutional democracy was too powerful to turn back. To some extent, I believe, that prediction was accurate. Why, then, am I more guarded, despite the fact that the world seems smitten by perestroika, Tom Peters, employee involvement, empowerment, negotiations by problem solving rather than by traditional bargaining, and the like? For one thing, since I wrote the paper, I have played a leading role in the governance of my university -- as President of the Academic Senate, among other activities. In addition, I have kept an eager eye out for what has been written or transpiring in the area of workplace democracy and have talked to a number of people involved in the process.

It seems to me that during the past decade, at least three changes have occurred within institutions which militate against a fuller realization of institutional democracy: (1) institutional culture is more competitive and less concerned about people; (2) decision-making is increasingly based on political considerations; (3) fearfulness is more widespread. All these factors are, of course, interwoven. Although I believe that these institutional changes are, to some degree, a reflection of what has happened in the larger culture, I think that institutional leaders bear a considerable share of the responsibility. Too few have an understanding of the ethical nature of the democratic concept and are willing to stand up for it. I shall say more about this later.

Despite the fact that making participatory programs work effectively is more difficult than I had earlier thought, as I said, I do remain hopeful. Others, however, have become disenchanted. Mike Parker, for example. Parker's article in Thresholds is titled, "A Dissenting Voice." An industrial electrician and co-author of Choosing Sides: Unions and the Team Concept, Parker claims that although in principle participation programs do not have to threaten workers or their unions,

> What is being widely touted as workplace democracy is a shift to a more sophisticated and paternalistic dictatorship -- not a qualitative change in the distribution of power within the corporation.
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> . . . . .
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> most programs actually result in less democracy than before.
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> . . . . .
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> . . . the process substitutes a subtle but powerful pressure on individuals to conform. . . . Minorities are either absorbed or driven out, or made to pledge allegiance.
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> . . . .
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> . . . these participation programs weaken the unions themselves. The programs seek to pit worker against worker, undermine worker unity and union ideology and fence off and coopt the unions as institutions.

And, reacting to my observation in "Institutional Democracy" that what we learn in institutional life has an impact on the larger political community, Parker noted that "If we depend on the so-called workplace democracy programs as our school of democracy, we are guaranteeing a failure."

Lest it appear that Parker is merely an idiosyncratic dissenter, consider some recent events in the auto industry. On Labor Day, 1988, Don Ephlin, at the time the UAW Vice-President for its General Motors Department, and Alfred Warren, Jr., GM's Vice-President for Labor Relations, co-authored an article in the Detroit Free Press in which they hailed the new spirit of cooperation between the union and General Motors.[1] A few quotes:

> . . . [today] we are recognizing the way in which labor and management are working together to create a new era of jointness.
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> . . . . . .
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> . . . there is definitely a new willingness to base the relationship on mutual respect and shared responsibility.
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> . . . . . .
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> We're working together successfully. . . . It means more jobs and better jobs for members of the UAW.

Yet, only a year later, on October 14, 1989, a Free Press headline read: "UAW miffed at GM tactics; plant closing cloud talks." Some quotes from the article:[2]

Harley Shaiken, University of California at San Diego: "This seems to be a drift to the old GM, where the union reads about possible plant closing in the newspapers."

UAW Vice-President, Stephen Yokich [who replaced Ephlin]: "It suggests not only disarray but flagrant insensitivity and disregard for UAW-represented GM workers who are boosting GM's quality and productivity."

Mary Ann Keller, financial analyst who specializes in the auto industry: "GM has lost a lot of credibility in negotiating with workers because job security provisions in the 1987 contract gave workers the impression their jobs would be safe if they cooperated with the company.". . . But "The promise is only as good as the company's market share, as the economic environment in which it exists. . . . "

And a few weeks later, after Chrysler unexpectedly closed the Jefferson Avenue, Detroit, plant two years ahead of schedule, "cries of betrayal and deception" were reportedly heard from union leaders, and Stan Marshall, UAW Vice-President and head of the union's Chrysler Department, was reported to have said that Chrysler "appears to be responding to Wall Street's demand for high profit margins by depriving workers of job security and income. This decision is bound to have a detrimental impact on our future relations."[3]

The setbacks I have described may be merely a blip in the long-term trend toward genuine institutional democracy. But it suggests that we be forewarned that the road is not an easy one and that it takes more than certain institutional structures and arrangements to make democracy work. They are important, of course. But also required is a certain way of looking at the world and at human relationships, a certain Habit of the Heart as well as

Habit of the Mind -- which leads me to a concluding comment excepted from my article, "Overview and Comments," in Thresholds:

> As some of our contributors point out, the participatory movement is driven largely by the prospect of economic gain or heightened efficiency, rather than by moral considerations or a commitment to democratic principles. Perhaps that should not be of any great concern to those interested in the furtherance of institutional democracy; after all, all's well that ends well. As economist Hazel White [cited by Wirth] puts it, "For the first time in history morality has become pragmatic." What is troubling about the utilitarian argument as the principal, if not exclusive, justification for institutional democracy is that democratic principles become hostage to profit or efficiency, and when profit or efficiency suffer because of, say, a recession or social changes or poor execution of the participatory process, the tendency is to reject democratic principles as applicable to social institutions. This seems to have been the case, to some extent, in higher education, as Ernst Benjamin points out. It certainly is the case with much of the reform movement in the public schools which has been characterized by attempts to make education more efficient through the use of state mandated curricula and accountability measures.
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> It seems to me, then, that the first commitment of those who espouse institutional democracy and who attempt to implement it must be to democratic principles as moral principles, as goods in themselves. If I am right, education toward that end must become a primary concern. A number of contributors to this issue of Thresholds do, in fact, make mention of the necessity for education in the participatory process. But, I am afraid, too often the education or training is addressed only to the mechanical or organizational aspects of the process. That, of course, is necessary, but it is not sufficient. More important is an education directed toward the development of commitment to the principles of democracy which undergird the process -- in a word, to the formation of character. If that is done, there would be less reason to be wary of administrative manipulation or union busting or recrimination or pressure to conform that Parker makes much of and which are discussed to a greater or lesser degree by many of our other authors.
>
> Perhaps in a culture accustomed to judging by short-term, concrete results, what I am suggesting is too much to expect. But if institutional democracy is to become pervasive in our society, and if it is to become strong enough to withstand economic, political, and social pressures and changes, required will be an education for commitment to democratic principles carried on in the classroom, in the boardroom, on the shop floor, and in the family. It means no less than a fundamental change in our culture.

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[1] Donald F. Ephlin and Afred S. Warren, J., "Labor Day heralds a new spirit of cooperation in auto industry, "Detroit Free Press, September 6, 1988, p. 7A

[2] By John Lippert and Janet Braunstein, October 14, 1989, p. 1

[3] Janet Braunstein, "Jefferson Avenue plant closure angers union, " Detroit Free Press, November 4, 1989, p. 1

MIDWEST PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY
1990 Annual Meeting

Friday, November 9

12:00-1:00 p.m. **REGISTRATION**

1:00-2:15 p.m. **FIRST GENERAL SESSION**

Welcome: Robert E. Roemer, Dean, School of Education, Loyola University of Chicago

The Contemporary Relevance of the Educational Classics

Presiding: Robert E. Roemer, Loyola University of Chicago

"Ahead to the Past: Adventures in Pragmatic Justification," Jerome A. Popp, Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville

"Phronesis and the Moral Aspects of Teaching," Jana R. Noel, University of California, Los Angeles

"Comments on Popp and Noel," Harry S. Broudy, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

2:30-3:15 p.m. **FIRST CONCURRENT SESSION**

1) Presiding: Byron F. Radebaugh, Northern Illinois University

"The Semiotics of Habit: A View of Charles Sanders Peirce's Categories in Learning," George W. Stickel, Northwestern College (Iowa)

2) Presiding: Ian M. Harris, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee

"Sociology and a Conservative Theory of Education," Peter J. Goldstone, Temple University

3:30-4:15 p.m. **SECOND CONCURRENT SESSION**

1) Presiding: Jack Kavanagh, Loyola University

"Rortyan Foundations of Education," Michael Preston, University of Cincinnati

2) Presiding: Matthew Creighton, S.J., Loyola University of Chicago

"A Century of Evolution: The Changing Role and Function of the College or University President," Richard H. Owens, Lewis University

4:30-5:15 p.m. **THIRD CONCURRENT SESSION**

1) Presiding: Charles V. Blatz, University of Toledo

"Philosophy Meets Composition: The Influence of History and Tradition in the Social Construction of Mentoring Through Written Composition," Mary Abascal-Hildebrand and Joan A. Mullin, University of Toledo

2) Presiding: David B. Annis, Ball State University
"Community, Individualism, and Epistemic Encounters," J. S. Kelly, Miami University (Ohio)

5:30-6:00 p.m. BUSINESS MEETING
Presiding: Ronald M. Swartz, Oakland University, President, Midwest Philosophy of Education Society

6:00-6:30 p.m. WINE AND CHEESE RECEPTION

7:00 p.m. PRESIDENTIAL DINNER

8:00 p.m. PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS
Presiding: Arthur Brown, Wayne State University
"Doing Dewey Again and Again," Ronald M. Swartz, Oakland University

Commentators: Lawrence J. Dennis, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale; Philip L. Smith, Ohio State University

Saturday, November 10

9:00-9:45 a.m. FOURTH CONCURRENT SESSION
1) Presiding: George Kizer, Iowa State University
"Institutional Democracy: An Ethical Demand," Robert P. Craig, University of Houston

2) Presiding: Charles Bruckerhoff, Cleveland State University
"Inherent Tensions in Teaching Philosophy of Education," Gary K. Clabaugh, LaSalle University, and Edward G. Rozycki, School District of Philadelphia

10:00-10:45 a.m. FIFTH CONCURRENT SESSION
1) Presiding: Carole Ann Ryan, Illinois College
"The Discipline of Interpretation," Thomas I. Stark, Harold Washington College, City Colleges of Chicago

2) Presiding: Ronald R. Morgan, Loyola University of Chicago
"Is Teaching a Science or an Art?," Alexander Makedon, Chicago State University

11:00 a.m.- 12:15 p.m. **SECOND GENERAL SESSION**

What Our Experience Has Shown: Teaching Philosophy of Education in the '90s

- "Classics and Beyond," David B. Owen, Iowa State University
- "'Thinking is a luxury' and Other Half-Truths: Is Education Philosophical or Philosophy Educational?," Richard C. Pipan, Oakland University
- "Teaching Qualitative Research Philosophically: An Application of Critical Hermeneutics," Mary Abascal-Hildebrand, University of Toledo

AHEAD TO THE PAST:
ADVENTURES IN PRAGMATIC JUSTIFICATION

Jerome A. Popp
Southern Illinois University

I. INTRODUCTION

Educational psychology and educational research have been dominated by empiricist epistemology. The radical behaviorism of B. F. Skinner can be seen as empiricistic thinking taken to its logical conclusion. Today, one finds that this approach to psychology has fallen into disrepute. If one examines the American Psychologist for the last twenty years one can readily see the decline in pure empiricism and the emergence of confidence in what has come to be called "cognitive science."[1]

As a part of this shift in thinking, the educational psychology of Jean Piaget has grown in stature. He is considered one of the main "cognitivists" and his views (along with research on the brain and artificial intelligence) are taken as fundamental components of "cognitive science." Piaget, however, is a developmental Kantian who looks to the notion of synthetic *a apriori* knowledge for an account of the nature of the cognitive development of the child. As B. F. Skinner can be seen as the perfector of Humean Associationism, or *tabula rasa* epistemology, Piaget can be seen as the perfector of Kantian rationalistism.

Two points are philosophically significant. (1) In my reading of the "cognitive science" literature, I find an ultimate contradiction. Many embrace Piaget's thought while still holding to a basic empiricist epistemology. (2) Pragmatists will find this shift from empiricism to rationalism far from anything they would call progress. We should be asking about the other traditional alternative to empiricism before we adopt rationalism as our working foundation for educational psychology and educational research.

II. THE RISE AND FALL OF ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY

Let us review very briefly the reasoning that lead to Radical Behaviorism. According to David Hume, ideas are lingering impressions.

> An impression first strikes upon the senses, and makes us perceive heat or cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain of some kind or other. Of this impression there is a copy taken by the mind, which remains after the impression ceases; and this we call an idea.[2]

Today things still "make impressions on" us. We are "impressed" by a particularly moving or vivid experience. Since an idea, under this view, is a lingering impression, impressions that are especially deep give rise to ideas that stay with us over great periods of time.

Our minds, however, are not always "down to business" and will often dally. We form impressions or ideas of winged horses or winged human beings. How do we know that the impressions we have are of reality, or are fictions that we have learned? Hume held that our ideas must be compared to experience or sense data. By checking the world for winged horses we come to be convinced that such thoughts are indeed fictions.

> Ideas produce the images of themselves in new ideas; but as the first ideas are supposed to be derived from impressions, it still remains true, that all our simple ideas proceed either mediately or immediately from their correspondent impressions. This then is the first principle I establish in the science of human nature....[3]

And so in Hume, we had an early statement of the principle of cognitive meaningfullness. This requirement that all knowledge claims be tracable to sensory data has, of course, devastating consequences. Cause-effect reasoning was considered by Hume to be mythological. Hume said that he saw event A and then he saw event B but he did not see any causal connection between them. Causal connections, he reasoned, belonged in the same class as winged horses. At best, we may report not causes but how events are *associated*.

This view is committed to the principle that all knowledge, ideas, mental images, concepts, and other things cognitive come from experience and are not innate or congenital--the *tabula rasa* doctrine. At birth the mind is blank and through sensory experience, we come to know how the events of the world are associated. These notions are the underlying philosophy of *associationist* psychology.

Hume even sketched the notion of stimulus generalization with his use of 'resembles' in the following statement.

> 'Tis plain, that in the course of our thinking, and in the constant revolution of our ideas, our imagination runs easily from one idea to another that *resembles* it, and that this quality alone is to the fancy a sufficient bond and association.[4]

As a paradigm for scientific psychology, this view has given direction to many years of research in the problem of defining 'learning' and the description and explanation of animal behavior.[5]

Empiricism attempted to free itself from all material assumptions, and to use only logical reasoning and observation to build an account of knowledge. Any true empiricist account of behavior had to be a radical one. Today, radical behaviorism has fewer and fewer theoretical followers. There have emerged many criticisms of this view--far to many to review here. However, the most important reason that the research community has turned attention away from radical behaviorism is that there are no new problems to solve. The paradigm is now exhausted and many scholars evidently think that until something cognitive is added, there is no room for theorizing beyond what has already been written.

III. GENETIC EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE RE-EMERGENCE OF RATIONALISM

Jean Piaget became popular in America in the 1960s when his works were translated into English and educators discovered that he was systematically studying children. I do not think the educators who applauded Paiget understood the research program in which he was engaged but he seemed to them to be discovering new ideas about child development and that was sufficient for some to attend to his thoughts.

To understand Piaget, one must go back to Kant and his criticism of Hume. Kant admitted in the famous phrase that Hume awoke him from his "dogmatic slumbers." This awakening led to Kant's writing his famous, *Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant held that sensory experience or impressions of which the empiricists wrote must be interpreted before they can become knowledge. But how do we make such interpretations? With what do we interpret our sensory experience? Kant's alternative to Hume's view was to hold that the mind brings something to sensory experience that does not originate in sensory experience. This, of course, is a rejection of the *tabula rasa* principle that undergirds empiricism.

The human mind must have some form rather than another; this form must make some difference in what we can know. In other words, the mind must have some structure and this structure will determine how sensory experiences are interpreted. As Piaget put it,

> The essential starting point here is the fact that no form of knowledge, not even perceptual knowledge, constitutes a simple copy of reality, because it always includes a process of assimilation to previous structures.[6]

Piaget is obviously rejecting Hume's ideas-are-copies view. For Piaget, the "perceptual" is interpreted by "previous structures."

> We use the term assimilation in the wide sense of integration into previous structures...which may remain unaffected or else be modified to a greater or lesser degree by this integration, but without any break in continuity with the former state--that is without being destroyed and simply by adapting themselves to the new situation.[7]

Piaget mentions the sparrow who builds a nest of pieces of straw. This "is an assimilation of the environment into a form constructed by the organism, so that there is assimilation in a general sense."[8]

> In the same way, we can say that an infant has formed the habit of making objects hung in front of it swing backward and forward (by pushing them without grasping them), and when it applies this behavior to some new object that it has not seen before, there has been assimilation of this new object or situation into the swinging schema. Thus, it can be said that the term sensorimotor assimilation is not at all artificial.[9]

This phenomenon is thought of as stimulus generalization by behaviorists.

Kant had discovered the process of cognitive "assimilation" when he criticized Hume's writings and found that ideas did not enter the mind pure and unfettered by one's current cognitive state. The mind, for Kant, always contained something prior to sensory experience, and these previous structures serve as a kind of cognitive filter that is selective in that not all sense data are interpretable. Not everything that exists in the environment can be assimilated by the organism.

Kant's prior structures, that the mind brings to experience but that do not derive from experience, are about experience. That is why they can be used in assimilation. Thus, they are synthetic. But such structures do *not* come from experience and cannot be *a posteriori* knowledge, so they must be *a priori*. Kant's famous example of *synthetic a priori* knowledge was Euclidean geometry and space. Kant thought that it was impossible to visualize the world in any other way. The mind had to use Euclidean geometry to understand space. There was no alternative. Today we know that this is just not the case.

Piaget worked in biology where Kantian *a priori*-ism was well accepted by some. For example, Konrad Lorenz thought that the imprinting phenomenon was best explained by Kantian *a priorism*. However, Piaget's inquiry led him to ask a further question. Kant was thinking of the mature scientist when he asked how is knowledge possible. And his synthetic a priori knowledge was sufficient to explain how we have scientific knowledge. But Piaget wondered how those synthetic a priori structures came to be. Clearly new born children cannot interact with the world the way Kant could. But somehow, children developed into persons who could so reason.

The process by which persons develop these mental structures was referred to by Piaget as "accommodation." Assimilative modifications of structures do not break continuity but accommodative changes occur when there are such breaks or discontinuities. By developing better structures (accommodating), one is able to assimilate differently. Piaget once commented, "Any epistemologist reading these lines will recognize the language of Kant (except that in this case the a priori is a development in itself!)..."[11] Piaget's life was devoted to this general problem. His, now famous, stages of cognitive growth culminate in "formal operations"--the last stage of mind of which Kant wrote a century before. So for Piaget, the development of knowledge is itself a response of the organism to its environment. The development of knowledge is a part of the general adaptive process carried on by all surviving species.

But what is it that promotes accommodation? Why do we progress through the distinct accommodative stages? Note that this is the central question for Piaget's theory of cognition. Piaget thought that this part of the general adaptive process was necessary for us to maintain equilibrium. The maintenance of equilibrium drives, as it were, the accommodative process. Rotman, the mathematician, observes that,

> behavior is at the mercy of every possible disequilibriating factor, since it is always dependent on an environment which has no fixed limits and is constantly fluctuating. Thus the autoregulatory function of the cognitive mechanisms produces the most highly stabilized equilibrium forms found in any living creature....[11]

Rotman considers Piaget "a through-going mechanist" and concludes as follows.

> The concept of equilibrium is for Piaget the only way to describe purposive behavior--intelligence--in organisms, without crediting them with 'intentions' or 'will' or introducing what he considers the unhelpful metaphysics of final causes, life forces and the like. So that far from invoking some agency or principle within the organism to account for its vitality, he considers the essential property of life to be self-maintaining equilibrium or self-regulation.[12]

So whereas Skinner considered the capacity to be reinforced to be the only factor prior to experience, Piaget adopted the Kantian a priori account of prior structures. Piaget realized that, as many empiricists have said critically, Kant's theory of the a priori opened the way for us to sweep many epistemological problems under the rug of mental preformationism. Piaget used the notion of equilibration to control the extent to which the a priori could be used in explaining behavior. All metaphysical priors will then have to be tied to organismic functioning.

Rotman's penetrating criticism of Piaget's theory of mechanical equilibrium casts doubt on the utility of this approach to a theory of cognition. According to Rotman, Piaget's attempt to make equilibration the explanation of accommodation, and then to explain equilibration as an endogenous, mechanical process that "collapses into an innatist or preformationist" account.[13] Being disequilibrated is, thus, not the same as having a "felt need" or seeing a problem to be solved. If one grants Rotman's criticisms as sound, then we find that Piaget has not escaped the metaphysical temptation invited by the Kantian *a priori*; that is, Piaget's account of cognition centers on the notion of equilibration, and equilibration was, after all, left unexplicated.

> The principle failure of this organism/environment model is its refusal to accept the importance of the fact that individuals are immersed in a non-natural world, in an 'environment' of ideas, meanings, intentions, history, symbols, within a matrix of social influence and cooperation. Piaget's concentration on the self as an object among objects leads him to hypostasise this environment.[14]

Note that Piaget is very compatible with the approach to the mind and to intelligence that holds that what is at the root of these notions is "cognitive functioning." Thinking becomes mental operations that cannot be observed directly but which can be described formally. To be intelligent is to be able to manipulate symbols (i.e., perform "formal operations") according to rules. Whether thinking is acting according to rules or just acting in accordance with rules is, of course, the issue. Whether computers think, and what consciousness is all about depends on such matters.

Those who enthuastically advocate the "cognitive science" approach to research on how we learn seem willing to accept the view of human development and knowing that is committed, epistemologically, to synthetic *a priori* knowledge. Researchers view the child as possessing developing synthetic *a priori* structures; however, as the researchers discuss how these children are best studied, they show a commitment to empiricist or *tabula* rasa methods. What is so obviously missing is any attention to how the mental structures constitutive of "formal" thought must give form to the methodology used to study human development. Space does not permit an exposition of examples, but any reading of the cognitive science literature already cited by philosophers will readily reveal this incongruity.

It is worth considering one final comment by Piaget.

> The second striking characteristic of intellectual accommodation is its capacity for anticipation. If adaptation in the intelligence were limited to the field of the immediate present and the reconstruction of the past, it would be found wanting....The conclusion to be drawn from the present section is that cognitive adaptation is an extension of general biological adaptation but that its proper function is to attain such adaptive forms as are unattainable on the organic level owing to their infinite power of assimilation and accommodation and to the stability of equilibrium between these two subfunctions.[15]

Accommodation is *anticipatory* and its intellectual form is *beyond the organic level*. Behaviorists will, of course, appeal to stimulus generalization as a better (i.e., more empirical) account of what Piaget meant. But this idea of anticipation leads us to wonder if Piaget is not getting very close to another kind of *a priorism*--the one that is behind talk of "reflective thinking" and "the reconstruction of experience?"

III. THE DECLINE OF EMPIRICISM IN PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Since the publication of Kuhn's, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* there has been wide concern with the problem of the rationality of scientific thought. Within the empiricist tradition, there are two current approaches to scientific rationality: (1) methodological foundationism and (2) metamethodology. Methodological foundationism was the fundamental program of logical empiricism. The attempt was to characterize a scientific method whose correctness could be established *a priori*; Carnap, Reichenbach, and Popper are doyens of this view.[16]

The metamethodologists[17] attempted to measure the problem-solving effectiveness. In this way we would have a measure of a research program's progress, and hence of its rationality. Giere argued that this approach had no *normative* force, for at its best, "the metamethodology would tell us only that we had discovered a general *description* of situations which we intuitively regard as clear cases of rational acceptance a pursuit."[18]

Giere and Hempel have suggested, following Kuhn, that if scientific inference and explanation is to be set upon a rational base, this base must be pragmatic or naturalistic and not empiricistic. Moreover, the analysis of the empiricist tradition in philosophy of science lead Giere to the "thesis that the study of science must be a science."[19]

As Giere notes, trying to use scientific methods to build a rational case for those methods is the strategy that Hume was criticizing when he argued that using induction to justify induction would not work because of circularity. Giere attempted to deal with this great problem, seeing it as less formidable than the difficulties involved in the empiricist approach.

Hume rejected the deductive justification of induction on the grounds that it led to an infinite regress. In contrast to Giere's attempt to stop the circularity objection, I want to explore the other Humean fork. What is the best strategy for defeating the infinite-regress objection?

Hempel's[20] solution to the rationality of science problem is to distinguish methodological rationalism and methodological pragmatism. The former holds that "there are certain general norms to which all sound scientific claims have to conform. These are established largely on *a priori* grounds."[21] Hempel's "methodological rationalism" is Giere's "methodological foundationism".

Both Hempel and Giere take Kuhn to be the modern founder of the pragmatist or naturalist approach to the study of scientific methodology. Hempel was concerned, however, that "even in consideration of the new perspectives provided by pragmatist studies, scientific procedures including theory choice can still be characterized by standards that do not depend essentially on purely idiosyncratic individual factors."[22] We have strong intuitions that scientific thinking is not, after all, subjective or idiosyncratic.

There are certain values and practices that are well entrenched in the experiences of scientific specialists, according to Kuhn. Hempel refers to these as "desiderata."

> Science is widely conceived as seeking to formulate an increasingly comprehensive, systematically orgainsed, world view that is explanatory and predictive. It seems to me that the desiderata may best be viewed as attempts to articulate this conception somewhat more fully and explicitly. And if the goals of pure scientific research are indicated by the desiderata, then it is obviously rational, in choosing between two competing theories, to opt for the one which staisfies the desiderata better then its competitor.[23]

Hempel then questioned whether the desiderata might, nevertheless, be idiosyncratic or subjective. He attempts to go beyond the idiosyncratic factors by what he refers to as "objectivist but 'relaxed' rational reconstruction".[24]

This point, I think, can be related to earlier pragmatic conceptions. The whole notion that a fact is a fact, and a truth is a truth, because of some wider value context is a pragmatist theme.

IV. THE PRAGMATIC A PRIORI

Seigel[25] has criticized Hempel's view on the grounds that Hempel cannot justify his desiderata or goals of science. This means-ends view of scientific rationality is unacceptable to Seigel. As Seigel sees it, the weakness in Hempel's view is that there is no way whatsoever to rationally ground assertions about the ends or goals of science. Given an end, Seigel does allow the possibility of showing the adequacy of certain means; but Seigel's rejection of Hempel's account is based on the claims that there is no way within means-ends reasoning to rationalize an end or goal.

> If scientific procesures and methodological norms are instrumentally efficacious with respect to scientific goals which are themselves not rational, then, despite their instrumental efficacy, such procedures and norms cannot themselves be judged rational. The rationality of science goes beyond considertion of instrumental efficacy. Thus Hempel's analysis of the rationality of science will not do--not because his purported goals for science are irrational, but because his view of what that rationality consists in leaves no room for consideration of the rationality of science's goals.[26]

Seigel missed the point that there are classical pragmatic arguments that can be invoked to counter such objections. Within pragmatic thought, it is indeed possible to justify ends or goals. However, the way that one must justify an end or goal is to evaluate the end or goal as a means. This, I think, is a cornerstone of pragmatist epistemology. But there is the obvious problem. As Dewey once put the matter,

> The objection always brought against the view set forth is that, according to it, valuation activities and judgments are involved in a hopless *regress ad infinitum*. If, so it is said, there is no end which is not in turn a means, foresight has no place at which it can stop, and no end-in-view can be formed except by the most arbitrary of acts....[27]

If all evaluation is instrumental, then the only way to evaluate an end is as a means. But this requires another end by which to assess the old end's value as a means to the new end, and hence the infinite regress objection.

Dewey's way of stopping the regress was by appeal to contextualism. As Dewey wrote: "Any conclusion reached by an inquiry that is taken to warrant the conclusion is 'final' *for that case*. 'Final' here has logical force."[28] I do not think that it streaches things too far to say that the force of which Dewey wrote can be seen as a type of illocutionary force.

Propositions are not in and of themselves analytic or synthetic. It is the illocutionary force that determines how we should understand the proposition, and hence, how we should go about evaluating it. Pragmatists have typically used the term 'function' in this regard. However, given the multitude of meanings and confusions that hang about that term, I think that the 'illocutionary' nomenclature is the more desirable. The main philosophic point to be made is that Kant took the *a priori* as far as was possible without going beyond the two dimensional conception of language; i.e., syntax and semantics.

The emergence of the third dimension, the illocutionary, functional, or pragmatical dimension, was bound to have significant consequences for our conception of the *a priori*.

One cannot question everything at once. To question anything, we require a logical *loco standi* from which to launch our inquiries. Methodological foundationism sought to establish a *loco standi* that would be adequate for all time, come what may as to empirical evidence and further logical inquiry. Contextualism claims only that in any given situation there will be some elements of the situation that are not in question.

As Dewey put it, "There is always something unquestioned in any problematic situation at any stage of its process...." To this statement he attached the following footnote.

> Of course, this very element may be the precarious, the ideal, and possibly fanciful of some other situation. But it is to change the historic into the absolute to conclude that therefore everything is uncertain, all at once, or as such. This gives metaphysical skepticism as distinct from the working skepticism which is an inherent factor in all refelection and scientific inquiry.[29]

So, while some elements in every situation will have to be accpeted, *a priori*, this is not to say that one may not change the context, and in that new context question these elements. However, in that new context, there will have to be some other givens--and so on it goes.

The *a priori* creates the context of inquiry and is that which is held come what may in experience. To assess this *a priori* element in inquiry, one changes the context of the inquiry. When the *a priori* is assessed, according to instrumentalists, one must consider the consequences or further ends for which the *a priori* being assessed is considered the means. It is in this sense, that logic can be experimental, i.e., that the logical can be subordinated to the experiential.

The most durable argument in the methodological foundationist literature derives from the use of Bayes Theorem in probability theory. The theorem allows one to take an initial or prior probability, a given set of data or evidence, and then produce a posterior probability. The theorem presented a formal account of how probabilities could change given evidence.

The most serious objection to the Bayesian interpretation of inductive inference concerned the selection of the prior probabilities. The initial or prior probabilities, the evidence, and the posterior probabilities formed what may be thought of as an algebriac equation. What was to stop one from examining the posterior probabilities given certain evidence, and then saying that he or she must have used the wrong prior probabilities. This objection is more than simply worrying about those who would force the result they wanted; examining the consequences of our beliefs (prior probabilities) in light of the evidence is usually taken to be open minded. But if the use of the theorem leads is to change our priors, then do we have a legitimate form of inference. If one variable in the equation is arbitrary, then the posterior probabilities are just as arbitrary.

A similiar objection might be raised against this "stop-the-regress" program of pragmatism. One could interpret Dewey as saying, like the Bayesians, that it does not matter too much where one gets one's initial *a prioris* because subsequent experience will soon overwhelm and diminish one's uncritical beginnings. C. I. Lewis seemed to be taking this view when he wrote, "The a priori has its origin in an act of mind; it has in some sense the character of fiat and is in some respects like deliberate choice."[30]

There is an important difference between the selection of prior probabilities and the "deliberate choice" of an *a priori*. The evidence used in Bayes Theorem is independent of the prior probabilities. However, the data generated subsequently to the selection of an *a priori* is dependent on that selection. Hence, the *ad hoc*ery of changing one's priors can not be used in the choice of *a priori*s.

What is the role of the *a priori* in our inquiry? We have to have some frame of reference--something to hold on to come what may in data collection--a *loco standi*. The *a priori* is necessary to observe the world; this was Kant's point to Hume. The data we gather or generate is conditioned by the *a priori*s we use to frame the inquiry. So one cannot simply change one's frame of reference to make any arbitrarily selected conclusion appear warranted. If we doctored the categories so as to change the conclusions drawable from a given set of data, we would lose the "anticipatory" quality of our pursuit.

V. VALUES IN SCIENCE

Hempel wanted to use some conception of the goals of science to decide between theories. He recognized that some commitment to value would have to drive these decisions. The context of inquiry is demarkated by valuing. To question the warrant of the valuings that have created any given context, is to change the context of inquiry. If Hempel's desiderata are questioned, then they must be questioned in some context created by other desiderata. We cannot question all desiderata at once. What would it mean to say that in this instance, we value nothing? There must have been some value in thinking it or saying it.

But what values should we adopt as our desiderata--our context-making values? These values should be judged by their consequences. What consequences do we envision for them? If we require that the values create a very wide context of inquiry, then we run the risk of adopting superficial desiderata. On the other hand, if we adopt very specific values, we run the risk of creating a very narrow context of inquiry.

Recall that Giere was concerned with naturalizing philosophy of science by confronting the "circular reasoning" objection, i.e., that one cannot use the method of science to study the method of science. At the end of his paper, he drew the following conclusion.

> The options for a naturalistic theory of science, then, are these. The first is an ambitious strategy that seeks mechanisms of scientific development that can explain not only changes in content but in aims and methods....The danger in this strategy is ending up with only vaguely defined models of science. A second, much less ambitious strategy would be to restrict attention to shorter epochs such as science in the seventeenth century....Here the danger is ending up with models of only very restricted applicability.[31]

The parallel with the value-selection problem is obvious. Giere decided to begin with the less ambitious strategy and then "try to link up the various models so as to obtain a cluster of partially overlapping models...."[32] To recast this conclusion in value terms, if we start with fairly narrow contexts of inquiry, we can expect that these contexts will invariably come to overlap, and even come into conflict. In such instances, the focus of inquiry will change to one of how to resolve the value conflicts, or inconsistencies in desiderata. The hard line that some have drawn between the descriptive and the normative (not the statistically normative) must be abandoned, as Quine[33] and P. G. Smith[34] have argued.

Once we fully understand that in order to set scientific inquiry upon a rational base we must develop a rational account of valuation, then we will be ready to move ahead (or is it back) to philosophy of education naturalized.

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Harry S. Broudy
Professor Emeritus
Educational Policy Studies
University of Illinois

Contrary to common opinion, philosophers are among the most practical of entrepreneurs. They have a long history of formulating problems that can neither be ignored nor solved, thus guaranteeing themselves more or less steady, if not always lucrative, employment. Accordingly, we are gathered here to discuss learnedly some of these perennial problems, not necessarily to solve them. In this, the first session, we have tackled, once more, the nature and origin of our beliefs concerning the nature of human knowledge. Professor Popp and Noel took us back to the Greeks and then brought us up to date on current versions of the knowledge problem.

Professor Popp led us through the arguments of, among others, Hume and Kant, Piaget and Skinner, while Professor Noel argued persuasively that the moral aspects of teaching are grounded in the phronesis of Aristotle, viz., a concept of what is good for mankind in general and for the individual facing the exigencies of choice.

If, however, as Popp casually hints, cognitive science develops into a full-blown discipline, based on the potentialities of brain research and armed with all the resources of the silicon chip, then the psychology department would be the logical purveyor of what is left of the philosophy of education. Indeed, it would open a chasm into which many items of the liberal arts college curriculum--history, perhaps, aside--would disappear.

Should this come to pass, what role would the philosophy of education play in teacher education? Once the nature of thought and knowledge is taken over by cognitive science, what need would there be for educational philosophers arguing about the nature of knowledge and its pursuit? What relevance, for example, would the two fine papers we have just heard add to what the cognitive scientists would have learned and decisively settled?

In short, if cognitive science becomes a reality, then such enterprises as philosophy of education, as well as many segments of what is now taught as the liberal arts, would become otiose, except perhaps as historical relics. If this comes to pass, what role would philosophy of education have in teacher education? What role, for example, would the two papers we have heard play in such a course, except perhaps as a historical reminder of bygone days of innocence?

Perhaps philosophy of education could claim as its territory the realm of the possible, as created and populated by the imagination, and often portrayed by works of art, i.e., the aesthetic experience as the matrix of the possible as portrayed by art.

In the Garden of Eden story the serpent tempts Eve with a promise of knowledge and even the possibility of wisdom; that human affairs could be other than they are; that human beings might transform life. This is indeed a dangerous power and runs the risk of human beings trying to translate the wildly possible into fearsome reality.

If this conjecture makes any sense at all, then philosophy of education curricula might come to stress aesthetic theory, art history and criticism, the disciplines that try to formulate principles of discerning and judging the artistic enterprise. It also means that in the school years the aesthetic and/or the aesthetic component receives far more attention than is now the case. Indeed, it raises the question as to the role and possibility of making aesthetic education a full-fledged member of the school curriculum, a problem that, as some of you are aware, has been receiving increasing attention during the last decade.

Of course, even the aesthetic experience could be organized and systematized by cognitive science, but fortunately, art is still in more than one sense a disorderly activity that persists in claims to originality and creativity. We can, I believe, rely on the freedom of the imagination, its wildness, one might say, to concoct visions of human experience that not even a cognitive science can deconstruct.

The Semiotic Logic of Habit in Learning: a View of Charles Sanders Peirce's Theories

by
George W. Stickel
Northwestern College
Orange City, IA 51041

Charles Sanders Peirce (pronounced "purse") is relatively unknown in education and little known in general throughout the United States.[1] Some know that he was John Dewey's professor of logic at Johns Hopkins or that he was the founder of pragmatism. A philosophy of education professor friend of mine shared that all he knew of Peirce was his story of the squirrel and the tree. That story, however, was a metaphysical question that William James asked about whether a person or a squirrel goes around the other as the person circles the tree to see the squirrel, which always hides on the back side of the tree.[2] Indeed, we know little about Peirce.

Some, however, are aware of Peirce's contributions as the modern father of semiotic. (Peirce preferred the singular form and also spelled the word semeiotic.) One such book which suggests Peirce's place in the scheme of the study of symbol, quickly moves to a Saussurean analysis of the impact of television upon our current generation.[3] Umberto Eco's linguistic work has been strongly influenced by Peirce, and so it might be stated that we know more about Peirce from foreign authors than from American. The tragedy in this is that some of the semiotic applications are less complete and comprehensive than could be and should be available to American scholars, particularly in education. Of particular note, here, is the limitation of Saussure's dyadic approach to signs.[4] (Peirce's approach is triadic, as will be seen.) Using the ERIC search system, one finds limited reference to Peirce and the sources have an uneven quality.[5]

Perhaps, it is Dewey's objurgation of Charles Morris's work that cautions us from treading within Peirce's garden. Dewey admonishes, "'Users' of Peirce's writings should either stick to his basic pattern or leave him alone."[6] The difficulty with Peirce is that he seems obtuse, and for many who skim his work, there appears to be little value. The questions then become, how does one maneuver through Peirce to apply his theory, and then, is it worth the pain and the possible reproach one might receive to so maneuver?

The second question first, can be answered affirmatively. As the father of pragmatism and modern semiotic study, Peirce is surely worthy of our time in philosophy of education. Moreover, Peirce was an extremely prolific author, contributing to mathematics, many fields of science, logic, and philosophy. In fact, his first article (which has not been found) was written when he was eleven years old and was in the field of chemistry (W 1:xviii).[7]

The first question of how to maneuver through Peirce will be answered through this essay's thesis, but briefly it must be understood, that first and foremost, Peirce was a mathematician. Carolyn Eisele argues that one can only properly understand Peirce in the context of his mathematics, a concept which is now known among Peircean scholars as Eisele's law.[8]

While answering the above two questions, the purpose of this essay is to provide a study of Peirce's concept of habit, in which his semiotic is central. Habit is, likewise, central to the notion of learning, in that, habit allows a student to respond in an immediate way to some task. Further, habit, in turn, is learned in some process. The role of the school system, it could be argued, is to establish habits or to provide opportunities to establish habits in the learner.

Peirce has some significant contributions to add to our current understanding of habit and has made significant contributions to William James and John Dewey on this very subject. That contribution is certainly mathematical in nature, understood within the realms of logic, and consistent with the scientific laws of the universe, in which Peirce saw an isomorphism between the human mind and the universe (CP 1.316).[9]

What then is habit, in Peirce's view? Habit can be defined from three perspectives. First, habit is belief, as Peirce came to understand the act of thought, i.e., the intellect and human interaction within an environment. Second, habit is the *Rule* in deductive logic in the form of Barbara. And third, habit is what Peirce called the ultimate logical interpretant of the sign system, with the semiotic being the essence of thought. These three points then, the act of thought, deductive logic, and the semiotic, will be examined to define habit. It will also be shown how these three points are related.

Habit as Belief: the Process

Peirce writes about thought, habit, and belief in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" (1878): "Thought . . . its sole motive, idea, and function, is to produce belief . . ." (W 3:263). On the same page he offers: ". . . belief is a rule for action . . ." Then he suggests: ". . . the whole function of thought is to produce habits of action; . . ." (W 3:265). And just as Dewey writes that the mind is a verb, so Peirce offers that ". . . thought is essentially an action." (W 3:263)[10] Belief, action, thought, and habit are inextricably related. Thought always directs itself toward the production of a belief and according to Peirce, belief is "a stadium of mental actions." (W 3:263)

Peirce writes:

> And what, then, is belief? It is the demi-cadence which closes a musical phrase in the symphony of our intellectual life. . . . it has just three properties: First, it is something that we are aware of; second, it appeases the irritation of doubt; and, third, it involves the establishment in our nature of a rule of action [deduction in Barbara, below], or, say for short, a *habit*. As it appeases the irritation of doubt, which is the motive for thinking, thought relaxes, and comes to rest for a moment when belief is reached. But, since belief is a rule for action, the application of which involves further doubt and further thought, at the same time that it is a stopping-place, it is also a new starting-place for thought. That is why I have permitted myself to call it [belief] thought at rest, although thought is essentially an action. (W 3:263)

(Emphasis is Peirce's.) The interrelationship of the terms Peirce uses defines the learning process in the same manner that is found in John Dewey or George Herbert Mead. Namely, the irritation of doubt is the problematic situation of Dewey and the impulse which creates an awareness of the maladjustment between the individual and the environment for Mead. The irritation is motive for thought, just as it is for Dewey and Mead.

Likewise, all three properties of Peirce's belief have their counterpart in the others and are at the heart of pragmatism. The awareness (Peirce's first property of belief), or consciousness, is beyond our discussion but is central to the philosophy of Dewey and Mead, as well as Peirce. The third property (the establishment of a rule of action), however, is important within this essay.

Belief, Peirce suggests as the third point, "involves the establishment in our nature of a rule of action." The establishment of a rule of action is the beginning of a habit, thus, in the process of the irritation of doubt forcing thought and yielding a new habit, one finds the growth of the individual, or emergence as Mead calls it.[11]

What is of special importance, with Peirce, and which may be less obvious with Dewey and Mead, is the conceptualization of the nature of the individual. To understand the individual, Peirce believed firmly that one must seek the mathematical interpretation.[12] Often that can be understood within the framework of logic, but it is certainly not limited to that level of understanding. At first blush, it may seem that this mathematization is an organic or biological reductionism but it cannot be comprehended from that perspective, for the individual can only be known intersubjectively. That is, whether an individual neuron or a person, each has or holds meaning only within a context of the environment and in direct relation with specific objects outside the individual.[13] The intersubjectivity is mathematically based within Peirce's theory of signs, and can be seen within the parameters of logic. For our purposes, we will rely upon the logic and save the mathematical interpretation of that logic for another time.

What can be concluded from the above discussion is that, for Peirce, habit, any habit, is a belief, on the part of the individual. Further, that belief is a rule for action. Thought, then, is the orchestration, and perhaps the competition of various beliefs or rules, which produces a new belief--that is, a habit, or an action. The reason for thought, and thus, the need for a new habit, is the initiation of an irritant, which cannot be assuaged.

Habit as *Rule*: the Logic

Peirce conceived of his logic within the frame of nature and saw a unity between thought and what transpires within nature (W 4:423). The unity can be understood semiotically, but within a logical basis. So one can examine thought and the human mind from several vantages--biologically, logically, semiotically, and mathematically. Each will bring one closer to an understanding of our being.

How are these vantages related? Through logic and mathematics. So Peirce introduces a work on **logic** with a biological view of thought, in which the first chapter is entitled, "Of Thinking as Cerebration." He writes: "Thinking is done with the brain, and the brain is a complexus of nerves; so that thinking is necessarily subject to the general laws of nervous action." (W 4:38) He continues that: "The irritation of the brain . . . appears as the uneasy sense of doubt; and the end of all thinking is the removal of doubt, just as the end of all nervous action is the removal of the source of irritation." (W 4:42)

Habit is the nervous action which consistently removes a particular irritation; it is the belief that such an action will change the doubt, the maladjustment, the problem, the irritation. Simplistically, the following might be a belief on the conscious level, when one is presented with the arithmetic problem 2 x 2 = ? (i.e., when one is irritated by a task on a third grade test). The conscious belief would then appear as, "I believe that my writing '4' will releive me of this irritant." On an unconscious level, an infant stands and releases his or her hold with a neuromuscular "belief" that the legs will keep the child upright. The irritation is driven by the stimulus toward which the child's attention is directed and which provokes the child to let go and stand firm. The end, or goal, of cerebration, or thinking, at this point is to remove all doubts of falling. This level of thinking is most difficult to articulate and certainly beyond the child's ability to describe. Nonetheless, doubt and irritation, are present with thinking and nervous action. Most of the doubt, and the belief, in the case of the toddler, are at the unconscious level, however.

Peirce again describes these notions in relation with habit in a work called "A Theory of Probable Inference." (W 4:408-ff) This work shows a mathematics of logic and describes the applications of logic. He writes, first showing a syllogism in *Barbara*:

> *Rule.* All men are mortal;
> *Case.* Enoch was a man;
> *Result.* Enoch was mortal.
>
> The cognition of a *rule* is not necessarily conscious, but is of the nature of a habit, acquired or congenital. The cognition of a *case* is of the general nature of a sensation; that is to say, it is something which comes up into consciousness. The cognition of a *result* is of the nature of a decision to act in a particular way on a given occasion. In point of fact, a syllogism in Barbara virtually takes place when we irritate the foot of a decapitated frog. The connection between the afferent and efferent nerve, whatever it may be, constitutes a nervous habit, a rule of action, which is the physiological analogue of the major premise. The disturbance of the ganglionic equilibrium, owing to the irritation, is the physiological form of that which, psychologically considered, is a sensation; and, logically considered, is the occurence of the case. The explosion through the efferent nerve is the physiological form of that which psychologically is a volition, and logically the inference of a result. (W 4:421-2) (Emphases are mine.)

To clarify the above passage, the following table will be instructive:

Table 1: Peirce's logic of physiology.

Syllogistic Form	**Physiological Form**	**Psychological Form**	**Logical Form**
Rule	Rule of action, within the interneurons	Nervous habit	Major premise
Case	Afferent neuron impulse	Sensation, feeling, present consciousness	Minor Premise
Result	Efferent neuron response	Volition	Conclusion

Peirce adds after the passage quoted above: "Although these analogies, like all very broad generalizations, may seem fanciful at first sight, yet the more the reader reflects upon them the more profoundly true I am confident they will appear." (W 4:422) He is confident because the logic rests within his understanding of the metaphysics of nature, so he continues: "We usually conceive Nature to be perpetually making deductions in Barbara. This is our natural and anthropomorphic metaphysics." (W 4:422)

Thus, Peirce's concept of habit can be understood logically because nature works within a frame of logic. That logic defines the human mind and the universe--that is his anthropomorphic metaphysics.

Habit as Ultimate Logical Interpretant: the Semiotic

It was stated above, that the mind could be examined semiotically as well as biologically or logically. To study the semiotic of the mind, a brief introduction to Peirce's theory of signs is in order.

First and foremost, Peirce's theory of signs is triadic in nature and never dyadic in essence. The reason for this is physiological, I am convinced, more than any other reason. Peirce's theory of signs arise out of his mathematical reasoning and scientific observations. Those observations, we saw from above, include an anatomical understanding, or surmising, of the nervous system and a perception of metaphysics that reflects an order within the universe. That order within the individual is more complex than the dyadic stimulus-response of behaviorism; it must include the internal processing between the stimulus and the response.

Specifically, for example, as a person sees something, something would happened inside the brain which would define that something in some way which might yield an action. Is the object in the brain? Certainly not, given any realistic metaphysics. What is within the brain? Two things are present given Peirce's semiotic, as the object is seen: first, a sign of the object; and second, an interpretant of that sign. That is, some coding exists within the individual which represents the object. The coding is certainly some neuronal firing arrangement, which equally as certain has a mathematical interpretation.[14] Further, that neuro-mathematical coding calls forth additional firings which often yield an action. This further internal and external response to the sign is the interpretant. Thus, the triadic nature of semiotic has the object, the sign, and the interpretant, as its three subjects and can be reduced no further.

Within the intersubjectivity of human thought, Peirce defines a sign as follows:

> A sign, or *representamen*, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the *interpretant* of that first sign. The sign stands for something, its *object*. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, . . .(CP 2.228)

Such a definition of sign allows for communication between individuals and also allows for internal communication within the mind of the individual.

While thought was central in Peirce's studies, because of his isomorphic conception of the universe, he could define signs and semiotic activity apart from human thought. Thus, concerning logic, Peirce defines the triadic nature of the semiotic as follows:

> Logic will here be defined as *formal semiotic*. A definition of a sign will be given which no more refers to human thought than does the definition of a line as the place which a particle occupies, part by part, during a lapse of time. Namely, a sign is something, *A*, which brings something, *B*, its *interpretant* sign determined or created by it, into the same sort of correspondence with something, *C*, its *object*, as that in which itself stands to *C*. It is from this definition, together with a definition of "formal," that I deduce mathematically the principles of logic. (Emphases are Peirce's NEM 4:20-21.)

Vincent Colapietro argues that this triadic relation is more valuable than Saussure's dyadic approach to signs. He quotes Umberto Eco who offers that Peirce's theory is ". . . more comprehensive and semiotically fruitful," and then continues from Peirce, ". . . the triadic structure of this process is not reducible to a congeries of actions between pairs ([CP] 5.484)."[15] To have a comprehenisive theory of signs, the triadic is crucial, for Peirce, but this aspect is beyond our discussions.[16] For our purposes, the value of the triadic nature will be assumed.

The sign represents the object, "not in all respects," (from above) but from some particular reference. As the observer sees the object over time, in varied experiences, the sign comes to define more specifically the interpretant and thus, the object is better known. So James Jakob Liszka can write:

> As the sign becomes more determinate its possible interpretations become less varied and the existing ones more rigid and habitual. This establishes a system of constraints . . . [and] sets the conditions or limits for any sign interpretation, i.e., any user-specific determination. . . . It establishes a pattern or habit of action in the interpreter of that sign.[17]

Likewise, Sandra B. Rosenthal argues that as the semiotic process continues within varied experiences it defines and organizes an ever more precise interpretant, or habit. She writes: "The development of the sign system is an ever evolving process, but at any moment it has an internal systematic structure unified by the organizing creativity of habit."[18] The unification of the organizing creativity is, I suspect, what Peirce (in the first section, above) calls "thought at rest." That is, when there is no irritant, and the individual is responding to his or her world in a purely habitial way, there is no conscious thought and the body is organized for habitual action. New situations, with new irritants can effect a change in the focus of the sign and thus a change in the interpretant.

The development of a precise interpretant, or what Peirce would call an ultimate logical interpretant,[19] is at the heart of learning. The ultimate logical interpretant is what Rosenthal calls a living habit, dynamic--in that it is always developing, precise--in that it provides specific responses toward the object which are habitual.[20] For example, as a child comes to see the object "2" written upon the board, the task of education is to assist in the development of the ultimate logical interpretant, which will define twoness precisely for addition, multiplication, and so forth, but which will allow for further interpretation for exponentiation, differentiation, and so on. The education of the child is to work in all areas to allow the development of the sign with a precision for how that sign is interpreted and represents the object, whether the object be musical, historical, or scientific. The ultimate logical interpretant, as a habit, is the scholastic goal.

The Categories of Habit

One additional dimension is needed to understand habits within Peirce's theory of signs and that is his system of categorization which yields a classification of all signs (CP 2.227-ff). Without delving into all classes of signs, it should be known that Peirce discusses firstnesses, secondnesses, and thirdnesses within his categorization.

A firstness is a quality, a possibility, or a resemblance, which is an iconicity. A secondness is a "brute force" or an actual existent, a fact, and is representational or what Peirce calls indexicality. A thirdness is relational, a sign of reason, a proposition which is symbolicity (CP 2.243, 247, and 250). Given firstness, secondness, and thirdness, simplistically, a habit could be: a quality--a firstness; a response--a secondness; or a conceptualization which is an argument, the proposition--which is a thirdness.

Peirce's semiotic argument is a habit that can be easily understood from the above sections of this essay. It is the result of a deduction in Barbara, given the syllogism shown. The argument is conceptual in this regard--an abstraction, in which one can see the syllogistic relationships and come to a conclusion. The conclusion, or result, is a thirdness, understood symbolically.

Peirce shared that Nature is perpetually making deductions in Barbara, not always conscious, but always from the essence of habit, which is the rule (W 4:422, 421). If thirdness is a conceptual habit, like a syllogistic conclusion, what is a secondness or firstness like, particularly if the results are always the deductions in Barbara?

An example of firstness is a feeling of redness (CP 2.254).[21] Such a feeling is a quality, a possibilty, it only has existence in past experiences which have established a habit of such a feeling. That is, feelings, and possibly all emotions, are firstnesses and are habits, surely established from experience and helped from congenital makeup, as seen above. So a habit, which is a firstness, might be the feeling of delight when you are reminded of your love.

On the other hand, when your love walks into the room, calling to mind a delight which you feel, you might also respond vocally with some amorous exclamation or physically with outstretched arms. In both cases, the response (an interpretant) is no longer only a feeling, a possibilty, but is an actual fact, a "brute force" toward another person. It is a brute force in that energy forms--sound and light (electromagnetic, hearing and seeing), or mechanical (touching)--move from oneself toward the person entering the room. These habitual responses are forms of secondnesses.

In each case of firstness, secondness, or thirdness, the habit is some rule form, some interpretant of a sign, which yields a result when given a specific case. Examining the syllogism in the second section of this paper, the rule is some habit. Given some particular situation--a case--a particular result will be effected. Suppose that given some stimulus, a rule for anger comes into play. The stimulus might be that a driver, who does not have the right-of-way at an unmarked suburban intersection, pulls out in front of a person late for a meeting. The rule might be: Given any interruption, blood pressure rises, face becomes flushed, and breathing rate increases. A feeling of umbrage pours over the individual. The feeling is a firstness. Exactly what that feeling entails, research cannot disclose, to date.

The physical responses, blood pressure, etc., are types of secondnesses; this is the brute force that Peirce discusses. These brute forces most likely have something to do with the feeling, but the interpretant is yet to be discovered. Another secondness, however, could be an immediate horn honking. Such action is a direct and habitual response, with no thought, only action. Braking would also be a secondness.[22] Each of these are some particular results of the given case and are defined by some internal rule. The rule is learned somewhere, within some experience. It is a logical interpretant of some sign, the car moving in front of the reacting driver. Over time and a variety of situations where the person is interrupted or eclipsed by another in some way, the interpretant becomes better defined and more precise. Thus, the habit becomes honed to produce the response more quickly, giving little or no chance for thought.

On the other hand, suppose that in the case of the hurried driver the other cars yields a pause on the dirver's part, to restrict action. The rule that is called to play is the rule of stopping and counting to ten when irritated. The stopping is a conceptualization of the anger which allows for thought, such as additional conceptualizations--counting, for instance. The conceptualizations are thirdnesses.

In each case, a rule called forth some result, a firstness, secondness, or thirdness, each of which are habits. The habit is thus a deduction in Barbara.

Given the above discussion and Peirce's categories of habit, what would learning look like? Much needs to be done to definitively answer that question, but the categories suggest levels and types of rules that can be called forth. Suppose that the firstness conflicts with the secondness in some way, or the secondness with the thirdness. One could even have conflicts between thirdnesses or secondnesses. Here one finds competing habits or rules of action. Because of the irritation and given that the "end of all nervous action is the removal of the source of irritation" (W 4:42), the competition of habits (nervous actions) will seek to remove the irritant. In this way old habits are reinforced and other old habits short circuited.

But, suppose that the competition of habits does not remove the irritant. Then, other habits will necessarily be called into play. Those habits, individually, might not remove the irritant, but further suppose with some level of reasoning, some consciousness, habits are put together in new ways. The new orchestration of habits might yield a solution. In which case, the result is accomplished by some new rule. The rule is weak, at this point, having solved only one problem, but it could be reinforced with repeated similar situations.

Conclusions

Dewey writes: "Habits are conditions of intellectual efficiency."[23] Using Peirce, his logic and his semiotic, one can begin to understand that efficiency. What is valuable in Peirce is his comprehensive approach to the study of the mind and the human intellect. Because of his development of the semiotic within a frame of logic, he provides a theory which can be researched linguistically as well as within the parameters of social science.[24] Because of his scientific and mathematical training he provides a system which can be researched biomathematically, if not today, at least some day when neurology has advanced to the degree of mathematical definity. A research need today, at least according to Patricia Smith Churchland, is a theory of mind/brain which is mathematical, and yet well grounded within the biological insights currently known.[25] Peirce offers potential and Churchland was aware of that potential.[26]

As can be seen above, Peirce has a conceptualization of habit, which is comprehensive and has significance for a variety of research areas. Because of its potential, it behooves educational philosophers to study this man's theories--linguistically, logically, psychologically, semiotically, mathematically, and biologically. Each area has potential for our philosophical understandings--our interpretative perspectives. According to the Council of Learned Societies in Education one of our functions in foundational studies is to provide: "The interpretative perspectives, using theories and resources developed within the humanities and the social and behavioral sciences, assist students in examining and explaining education within differing contexts."[27] Peirce can provide us with an interpretative perspective worthy of our time.

Given the above presentation of Peirce's theory of semiotic, one can have a foundational understanding of habit, which needs to be explored mathematically to define specific neuroscience research areas. Plus, Peirce's theories give the philosopher additional insights into the workings of the mind within the learning situation.

Notes

[1] It was mentioned continually at the Charles S. Peirce Sesquicentennial International Congress, September 1989, Harvard University, that scholars inside the United States knew less about Peirce than our international contemporaries.

[2] William James, *Pragmatism and the Meaning of Truth* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), 27.

[3] John Fiske and John Hartley, *Reading Television* (London: Methuen, 1980).

[4] Colapietro, *Peirce's Approach to the Self: A Semiotic Perspective on Human Subjectivity* (Albany: State University of New York, 1989), 31-33.

[5] Preliminary analysis has been done on the ERIC sources in collaboration with Janna Kappers. One work of special note is Marjorie Siegel and Robert F. Carey, *Critical Thinking: A Semiotic Perspective*, Monographs on Teaching Critical Thinking, Number 1 (Bloomington, Ind.: ERIC Clearinghouse on Reading and Communication Skills, 1989),

[6] John Dewey, "Peirce's Theory of Linguistic Signs, Thought, and Meaning," *John Dewey: The Later Works, 1925-1953* ed. Jo Ann Boydston, *Volume 15: 1942-1948* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1989), 152.

[7] It should be noted that Peirce notations are typically given as follows: CP 1.100 refers to the *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, ed. C. Hartshorne, P. Weiss, and A. Burks (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935, 1958) volume 1, paragraph 100; W 4:42 refers to *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition*, ed. Christian J. W. Kloesel, et al. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982-), volume 4, page 42; and NEM 4:32 refers to *The New Elements of Mathematics*, ed. Carolyn Eisele, (The Hague: Mouton, 1976), volume 4, page 32.

[8] Richard Tursman, *Peirce's Theory of Scientific Discovery: A System of Logic Conceived as Semiotic* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 68.

[9] See CP 1.316, 2.419, 2.713; Tursman, *Peirce's Theory*, 104-5 and 124.

[10] *John Dewey: The Later Works, 1925-1953*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, vol. 10, *Art as Experience* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987), 268.

[11] George Herbert Mead, *The Philosophy of the Present* ed. Arthur E. Murphy (La Salle, IL: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1959), 23 and 69.

[12] For Peirce's concern for the centrality of mathematics in all areas of science, there are numerous passages which define his thesis, e.g., NEM 4:17, 20 W 4:408-ff. Thought cannot be understood apart from its mathematics, according to Peirce.

[13] For an overview of Peirce's intersubjectivity, see Colapietro, *Peirce's Approach*, 27-ff; and Felicia E. Kruse "Nature and Semiosis," *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*, 26 (Spring 1990), 214, 221.

[14] George W. Stickel, "Memory, Morphology, and Mathematics," Paper presented at Charles S. Peirce Sesquicentennial International Congress, 8 September 1989, Harvard University, currently being reviewed for publication.

[15] Colapietro, *Peirce's Approach*, 31.

[16] See the following for discussion of Peirce's theory of signs as a truly general theory: Vincent M. Colapietro, *Peirce's Approach to the Self*; Eugene Freeman, *The Cateogries of Charles Peirce* (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1934); Michael Cobot Haley, *The Semeiosis of Poetic Metaphor* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988); and Richard Tursman *Peirce's Theory*; and others.

[17] James Jakob Liszka, "Peirce's Interpretant," *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 26 (Winter 1990): 46; and his *The Semiotic of Myth: a Critical Study of the Symbol* (Bloomington: The University of Indiana Press, 1989) 38.

[18] Sandra B. Rosenthal, "Peirce's Ultimate Logical Interpretant and Dynamical Object: A Pragmatic Perspective," *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 26 (Spring 1990): 203.

[19] Ibid., 198.

[20] Ibid.

[21] See also Tursman, *Peirce's Theory*, 51.

[22] Erich Harth writes that hitting the brake is a learned reflex with "unidirectional information flow and rapid execution." Because of the unidirectional nature of the information, this neural activity would be classified as a secondness, from the Peircean perspective. See Erich Harth, "Order and Chaos in Neural Systems: An Approach to the Dynamics of Higher Brain Functions," *IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics* SMC-13 (September/October, 1983): 782, for neural analysis.

[23] *John Dewey: The Middle Works, 1899-1924*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, vol. 14, *Human Nature and Conduct* (Carbondale: Sosuthern Illinois Univeristy Press, 1983), 121.

[24] See, for example, Haley, *The Semeiosis of Poetic Metaphor*; Colapietro, *Peirce's Approach*; and Liszka, *The Semiotic of Myth*.

[25] Patricia Smith Churchland, *Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind Brain* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1986), 407.

[26] Ibid, 249-251, 275, and 393.

[27] Council of Learned Societies in Education, *Standards for Academic and Professional Instruction in Foundations of Education, Educational Studies, and Educational Policy Studies*, (Ann Arbor, MI: Prakken Publications, 1986), 4-5.

Rortyan Foundations of Education

Michael Perry Preston
The University of Cincinnati

Richard Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature [1]is primarily concerned with a critique of foundationalism. The following is a very general description of foundationalism and Rorty's anti-foundationalism. I argue that shades of foundationalism may be found in research and teaching in mathematics education and I suggest that Rorty's ideas may be usefully applied in this field.

Foundationalism is the philosophical view that there are basic propositions which are so epistemically privileged as to be useful for granting or denying justification to all other empirical propositions one would wish to entertain. Triplett[2] notes that the classical version of the theory of foundationalism "maintains that these basic propositions are epistemically certain and are about what is given to a person through sensory experience" (p.115). Basic propositions are deemed successful in this project of justification when, for the subjects, they are 'accurate' internal representations of the external world. Foundationalism is considered by Radnitzky to be a pure version of justificationism. Within the scope of justificationism the central problem of epistemology can be framed in the question: "When is it rational or, so to speak consistent with one's intellectual integrity, to accept a particular position?"[3] The question suggests a justified response: "When concerned with a statement, a theory, etc., accept only those statements, theories, etc., which not only are true but whose truth has been established"[4]

Justificationism is a dominant philosophical theory of rationality. It's dominance may be due in part to the debt it owes to the conventions found in the "queen of the sciences." Pure justificationism is modelled after deductive mathematical proof wherein justified truth claims are deduced from premises that are "known to be true." Justificationism is a design for a "first philosophy:" a final arbiter of transdisciplinary disputes. Justificationism is all-pervasive, but its failure is immanent in its own program. Radnitzky points to this failure in an examination of foundationalism:

> According to foundationalism it is rational to accept all and only those statements whose truth has been established by deducing them from secure premises. This principle implies a disjunction of exactly three propositions. (i) In order to establish B_0 one deduces from it B_1, in order to establish B_1 one deduces from it B_{1+1}, and so forth; in short, an *infinite regress*. But in this way one cannot establish the sentence which was to be established. Hence the first disjunct is contrary to the principle: when the principle is

> applied to any arbitrary sentence, it turns out to be logically impossible to satisfy the principle for that sentence. (ii) During the course of justification one uses as a premiss a proposition previously introduced as being in need of justification: a *logical circle*. The second disjunct is also contrary to the principle. Hence these two consequences are ruled out for logical reasons. There remains a third possibility. (iii) The process of justification is broken off at a certain point because one considers oneself to have reached an ultimate stopping point that is epistemologically unproblematic, an Archemedian point as it were. This third disjunct is also contrary to the principle, even more patently so than the first two. From the fact that each of the disjuncts in the statement implied by the principle is inconsistent with the principle itself, it follows that the principle is inconsistent. Therefore it is useless as a regulatory principle.[5]

Foundationalism may not be completely useless as a regulatory principle. Consider the example of Woody Allen's character in the film "Annie Hall." At one point in the film Woody is reflecting on his failure to form a successful pair-bond when he says "I wouldn't join a club that would have me as a member."[6] Is Woody speaking here with the voice of a self-referential justificationist? I suggest that he may be.

Radnitzky and Rorty would probably want to join the same club. But after Radnitzky's trilemma is spelled out and foundational justification is framed as infinitely regressive, viciously circular, or assuming a "God's eye view," what more could Rorty add to an anti-foundationalist project? Perhaps Rorty may go no further than Radnitzky in pointing to the potential for foundationalisms to self destruct. However, I believe Rorty's constructive approach to defining the aims of philosophy as a form of generalized critical inquiry without permanent underpinnings speaks helpfully to a transdisciplinary audience. Rorty's voice has a timbre, which I believe is relevant to the discussion of effective problem formation and solution:

> "philosophy" is not a name for a discipline which confronts permanent issues, and unfortunately keeps misstating them, or attacking them with clumsy dialectical instruments. Rather, it is a cultural genre, a "voice in the conversation of mankind" (to use Michael Oakeshott's phrase), which centers on one topic rather than another at some given time not by dialectical necessity but as a result of various things happening elsewhere in the conversation (the New Science, the French Revolution, the modern novel) or of individual men of genius (Hegel, Marx, Frege, Freud, Wittgenstein, Heidegger) or perhaps of the resultant of such forces. Interesting philosophical change (we might say "philosophical progress," but this would be question-begging) occurs not when a new way is found to deal with an old problem but when a new set of

> problems emerges and the old ones begin to fade away (1979, p. 264).[7]

The above quote gives a general taste of Rorty's position on what philosphy might be.[8]

Rorty gives an historical analysis of philosophy as it has been conceived since Kant in an attempt to spell out the claim that philosophy as a foundational discipline is doomed.[9] Gallagher, Goldman, Hacking, Hunter, Kim, and Murphy[10] all note that Rorty is inclined to overly simplify the distinction between the foundational and the anti-foundational in philosophy. But it is perhaps important and useful to over-simplify this distinction to point out the "dangers of over-philosophication"[11] and the pitfalls in creating a "first philosophy." To stake out the distinction Rorty contrasts what he calls systematic and edifying philosophy, the former being foundational and the latter being anti-foundational. Systematic philosophers are trying to solve problems by making models of the essences of problems, and within this project the models serve as a "permanent and neutral framework"[12] for specifying and adjudicating truth claims. Therefore, the objective of systematic philosophy is "to discover permanent constraints on what can count as knowledge, the good life, a person, confirmation, *or whatever.*"[13] Edifying philosophers (the club in which Rorty claims membership) fall off of a different tree as they are primarily concerned with pointing out that the systematic philosopher kings are as naked as they were the day that they were born. The edifying philosophers respond to systematic philosophers in much the same way as systematic philosophers respond to each other. However, edifying philosophers are not out to show the systematic philosophers that their theories aren't approximating the truth, or that there is some better route to take to get to the right answer. Edifying philosophers are simply involved in getting the systematic philosophers to question their own motives for doing philosophy.

Rorty sees the development of systematic philosophy as being framed by questions such as 'How is it possible that I know how, or about, or that X?' When this question is taken seriously, a problem is formed, and when a problem is formed it isn't long before a solution is given in the form of a theory. The difficulty with this process of questioning knowledge and offering theories is that it is a result of a tradition of viewing knowledge as a composite of representations. The question for the systematic philosopher, then, is 'Which are the accurate representations, and how will we know that they are accurate?'[14] Rorty states repeatedly that claims for knowledge consisting in a subject's having representations which correspond to the real world are optional. Gallagher[15] points out that for Rorty "philosophy must give up trafficking in intellectual coinage that made epistemology possible – such notions as "truth," "essence," "the given," "necessity," "correspondence to reality," "seeing rightly" – and be content to acknowledge that its role in mankind.

. . is to resign any dream of a privileged access to objectivity not open to ordinary men" (p. 111).

How did systematic philosophy come to be involved in the task of adjudicating truth claims in light of privileged representations? Hunter tells the following story of Rorty's answer to the above question..

> Descartes invented the mind by coalescing beliefs and sensations into Cartesian thoughts or Lockean ideas with representational characteristics akin to those of retinal images and mirrors. The mind provided a handy subject matter, about which certainty was possible, for a field of inquiry, the study of representations, prior to other fields like science and theology, which were concerned with purported representeds. Locke gave birth to the idea of epistemology by confusedly thinking that a para-mechanical account of how the mind worked would be of great help in learning what we could know and how we could know it better. It would be an account (theory) of knowledge. Epistemology, thus, essentially depends on Locke's confusing explanation with justification. The former involves causal relationships between events, the latter, logical relationships between propositions. As Sellars [1963] says, in one of Rorty's favorite quotes, "In characterizing an episode or state as that of knowing, we are not giving an empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says" (141). (Rorty describes much of his book as corollaries of this quote [389].) Locke was 'led to think that an account of how one comes to have a belief should be an indication of the justification one has for it' (141) because he thought of knowledge as a relation between a person and a thing, not as a relation between a person and a proposition. This was the fault of modelling knowledge on perception. Knowing a proposition to be true is identified with being caused to be in some state as seeing a red triangle is being caused by a red triangle to have a sense impression of a red triangle. As the sense impression can be causally explained, so can knowing that a red triangle exists. Locke's program faced two other difficulties. Firstly, his 'physiology of the human understanding' is an empirical discipline, not specifically philosophical. Secondly, as such, it requires that we know about what we represent as well as about representations. The former is beyond introspection and also, given Berkeley, highly problematic. Kant solved these problems by taking objects (representeds) to be constituted by the mind in judgement, the synthesis of the manifold of sense impression via concepts-rules or modes of synthesis. Judgement was a matter of relating two radically distinct kinds of representations, concepts (formal representations) and intuitions (material representations). Categories (a-priori concepts) were the forms of empirical concepts, in effect, the forms of any possible judgement or knowledge. Thus epistemology became

> the study of necessary truths about all possible knowledge. The post-Kantian consensus about philosophy as the study of the formal (structural, logical, grammatical, conceptual) aspects of discourse was born.[16]

Rorty's story of systematic philosophy, as told by Hunter, seems to make the notion of privileged representations all the more optional. But, as Gallagher[17] points out, any argument which demonstrates the inescapable features of history only has rhetorical force in the event that it escapes the inescapable.

Rorty's anti-foundationalism, if it doesn't escape on its own, certainly facilitates the escape from a totalizing history. Consideration of the aims of edifying philosophy can lead to new points of view in all fields of human inquiry. Examples of the possibilities for edifying philosophy can be found in fields of education.[18] It seems that in research in mathematics education the goal is to map cognitive processes as they are involved in the learning of activities such as counting, adding, subtracting, integrating, differentiating, and so forth. Once mapped, these processes will be easier to understand, and it will be easier to facilitate their growth in our students. The most popular approaches to the study of mathematical activity seem to rely on some psychological theories which may be shown to be underpinned with presuppositions similar to those found in systematic philosophy.

For the sake of brevity and specificity I will here outline some of the salient features of foundationalism as it appears in a generalized cognitive psychology one might find in mathematics education. A popular example of cognitive (or computational) psychology can be found in the views defended by Fodor.[19] His central thesis is that there is an innate language of thought which forms the basis and meaning for all linguistic behavior the objects of study in cognitive psychology are the otherwise attributed distinctively computational processes found in intelligent behavior. These computational processes require a computational medium which performs the function of an internal representational milieu. The notion of the internal representational milieu is typically justified by appeal to the "fact" that cognitive activities involve an innate language of thought over which occurs the processing of information, which is acquired by an intelligent being from its environment. The environment, in Fodor's scheme, is never confronted directly, but is instead mediated by a system of internal representations. These representations stand for, or are tokens of, some independently existing structure which is given to the intelligent being in the form of information.

On the above account, the third grader learning multiplication facts would then process input in the form of examples, exercises, and other environmental sources of information in order to represent the right sort of token in performance on a test. Significance comes for the student when there is a sameness between a representing mathematical object and a mathematical object being represented. The cognitive scientist might then say that the student's success consisted in the matching of some internal structures with external counterparts. The emphasis in accounting for the source of the student's knowledge in this case is typically placed upon the mirroring capacities of the student. I believe that the flaws in foundationalism which are described by Rorty and Radnitzky apply *mutatis mutandis* to descriptions of children's mathematical activity that are framed in terms of representations deemed immanent in structural isomorphisms.

By this model of cognition, one locates the foundation of knowing in the accurate representation. But how is it decided when an accurate representation is made? Generally, this model suggests that an accurate representation is made when the student has the capacity to recognize the accurate representation. The model requires the positing of a mechanism of recognition. But then the mechanism of recognition may, on further uncovering, also require an ability to represent implying the further need for choice of accurate representations and the addition of further *ad hoc* mechanisms of recognition, and so on, *ad infinitum.* I suggest that the infinite regress required for the model to 'work' points to one possible flaw of a representational foundationalism.[20]

This approach, which maintains the notion that accuracy in cognition is the mirroring of the structure of the real world, must confront a central problem: There is no one structure of the world. There are likely as many structures as there are cognizing agents, and any approach to teaching which neglects this notion in favor of a theory of learning which has as its foundation the position that knowing is the accurate representation of the structure of the real world, will likely fail to address the needs of the students who are not inclined to give the same meaning to their experiences that the representational theory requires. I believe that Rorty's call for an edifying philosophy is relevant to the problems I have seen and described in research and teaching in mathematics education. The problems in teaching and research are based in foundationalist assumptions, which work against our appreciation of the richness and variety of descriptions of learning. An application of edifying philosophy to the conversation of mathematics education would in my opinion involve an abandoning of the quest for certainty in our building of models of the learner. The move toward edification in mathematics education would likely lead to what Rorty calls an "interesting philosophical change": a witnessing of the emergence of new sets of problems and the fading out of old ones.[21]

As I have suggested, foundationalism (as it is described by Rorty and Radnitzky) may have an unfounded importance in fields of inquiry such as mathematics education. To conclude I would like to point out three of the implications which Rorty's anti-foundationalism has for teaching. (1) It is a result of anti-foundationalist arguments that there is no right answer to any particular question. I believe that if this observation were acted on, the classroom would be a better place in which to facilitate learning. (2) It seems that a result of Rorty's critique is that it would be proper to develop foundations without granting to them any particular privileges over other foundations. This observation may be implemented in any classroom where problem solving is emphasized. (3) Given that Rorty promotes conversation or kibbitzing over and above the trading of injunctions, teachers and students might build this project into a classroom convention of negotiation as opposed to imposition. In my own personal experience as a classroom teacher I have found a higher quality of learning in my students, and a stronger democratic community, when the shared agreement is to "let a thousand flowers bloom."

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[1] Rorty, R. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979.

[2] Triplett, T. "Rorty's Critique of Foundationalism," Philosophical Studies, 52, 1987, 115-129.

[3] Radnitzky, G. "In Defense of Self-Applicable Critical Rationalism." in G. Radnitzky and W. W. Bartley (Eds.), Evolutionary Epistemology, Rationality, and the Sociology of Knowledge. La Salle, IL: Open Court. pp. 279-312.

[4] Ibid., p.282. Radnitzky cites W. W. Bartley's summary of the most popular type of justificationism in two principles: (1) A rationalist accepts any position that can be justified by appeal to the rational authority; (2) a rationalist accepts only those positions that can be justified in this way. On this account, justificationism presupposes that there is an infallible source of knowledge which is accessible to persons.

[5] Ibid., p. 284.

[6] I am told that this saying should be credited to Groucho Marx.

[7] Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 264.

[8] I see some similarity in Rorty's position and claims made in Dewey's essay "Challenge to Liberal Thought" in Philosophy of Education. Totowa, NJ: Littlefield Press, 1975. p.157ff.

[9] The central theme (as I see it) of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature is echoed in pp. 137, 152, 157, 159, 170, and 174 (among others).

[10] Gallagher, K. "Rorty on Objectivity, Truth, and Social Concensus." International Philosophical Quarterly, 24, 1984, 111-124; Goldman, A. I.. "Review of Rorty [1979]." Philosophical Review, 90, 1981, 424-429; Hacking, I. "Is the End in Sight for Epistemology?" Journal of Philosophy, 77, 1980, 579-587; Hunter, B. "Critical Notice of Rorty [1979]." Canadian Journal of Philosophy, XII, no. 3, 1982, 621-645; Kim, J. "Rorty on the Possibility of Philosophy." Journal of Philosophy, 77, 1980, 588-597; Murphy, C. "Critical discussion of Rorty [1979]." AustralasianJournal of Philosophy, 59, 1981, 338-345.

[11] For a later discussion of the dangers as they may be appearing in Philosophy of Education see the papers by Carol Nicholson, "Postmodernism, Feminism, and Education: The Need for Solidarity," Education Theory, 39, no. 3, Summer 1989, 197-205;

Rene Arcilla, "Edification, Conversation and Narrative: Rortyan Motifs for Philosophy of Education," Education Theory, 40, no. 1, Winter 1990, 35-39; and Richard Rorty, "The Dangers of Over-Philosophication—Reply to Arcilla and Nicholson" Education Theory, 40, no. 1, Winter 1990, 41-44.

[12] Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 8.

[13] Hunter, "Critical Notice of Rorty [1979]." p.622, my italics.

[14] Knowledge as depicted in representations is then a mirror of nature, and it is systematic philosophy which is the study of this mirror of nature. Currently there are a number of streamlined disciplines involved in this project: cognitive psychology, linguistics, and even mathematics education in both its research and teaching orientations.

[15] Gallagher, "Rorty on Objectivity, Truth, and Social Concensus."

[16] Hunter, "Critical Notice of Rorty [1979]," p. 624.

[17] Gallagher, "Rorty on Objectivity, Truth, and Social Concensus," p. 114.

[18] Cobb (In press) makes a convincing case for the importance of challenging a particular instantiation of systematic philosophy in math education. Shermis, S. S. and Barth, J. L. (in "Teaching for Passive Citizenship: A critique of philosophical assumptions." Theory and Research in Social Education, X, 4, 1982, 17-37) give a similar treatment to the assumptions of systematic philosophy as it tacitly appears in theories of teaching and learning in social studies classrooms.

[19] Fodor, J. The Language of Thought. Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1974.

[20] This flaw is a functional analog of Disjunction (i) of Radnitzky's trilemma.

[21] Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 264.

A CENTURY OF EVOLUTION: THE CHANGING ROLE AND FUNCTION OF THE COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY PRESIDENT

RICHARD HENRY OWENS
LEWIS UNIVERSITY

America has undergone incredible transformation in the last century. Institutions of higher learning have been both catalysts and targets of that change. Moreover, the rate and sum of change continue at an exponential pace. Although not as manifest as the progress in science and technology or the accumulation of information and data transmission, the criteria for governing institutions of higher education also have changed remarkably during a century of evolution in the role of a college or university president.

The modern American college and university emerged a century ago. Three distinct phenomena characterized American higher education a century ago: expansion of the number of small liberal arts colleges, emergence of the land grant universities, and adoption of the German-scientific model for graduate education and university organization in America. The typical and favored type of person to head a college or university then was essentially an academic leader. Invariably male, he was a respected or acclaimed member of the faculty, a **primus inter pares** with administrative and collegiate skills who also was able to represent the institution to external audiences when the need arose. Typical of those intellectual activists were Harvard's Charles William Eliot, John Hopkins' David Colt Gilman, Cornell's Andrew Dickson White, Michigan's James Angell, Columbia's Frederick Barnard, Darmouth's W.J. Tucker, Bowdoin's Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, and Princeton's Woodrow Wilson.

Half a century of progressivism, urbanization, and industrialization was followed by two decades of depression and war. By the 1930's and 1940's, economic, social, political, and international upheaval led the transition to a president as manager. Still chosen primarily from academic ranks, this type of leader was likely to be more pragmatist than pure intellectual, more administrator than academic. He (again, usually male) had much in common with his military and corporate contemporaries and was less like his historical predecessor or his own faculty. He moved more frequently between internal and external concerns, and between academic leadership and institutional management. Those traits served presidents well in meeting the challenges of the 1930's (depression), 1940's (war), early 1950's (masses of returning G.I.'s), late 1950's and early 1960's (the Sputnik inspired expansion of science and math studies/research). Even in the era of the mid-1960's to mid-1970's, the phenomenal growth of campuses to meet burgeoning rolls of college students prompted by the post WW II baby boom was less a feat of intellectual than logistical and managerial prowess for college and university presidents.

College and university presidents, however, remained principally directed inward toward their institutions. Their vision often was limited to their campus, or in the public sphere, to their state. Their predecessors often had been less attuned to the outside world because of preference or peer pressure to focus on their campuses. The growth in physical plant, facilities, number of campuses, and students after 1963 often mandated minimal attention to external relations. More fiscal, logistical, and internal management by college and university presidents was required than ever before. Although prestige was a key factor in his appointment, perhaps the brief tenure of Dwight D. Eisenhower as president of Columbia University best demonstrates this phase in the evolution of the American college/university presidency. This era was characterized by a combination of (a) vast numbers of potential and actual students; (b) a prosperous economy to foster growth and tuition payment; (c) an anachronistic "Ozzie and Harriet" view of college life that falsely perpetuated disappearing realities of college, family, career, and home; and, perhaps most importantly, (d) generous and forceful governmental stimulation to expand enrollments, campuses, facilities, and research.

Yet factors that caused the phenomenal growth of America's constellation of colleges, and usually required a management expert to serve as a university president, also contributed to many of the tragedies and failures in that phase. Many campuses and some university systems became too large, unwieldy, and bureaucratic. Many grew less responsive to changing times, less intellectually driven, less collegiate in style, culture, and governance. The needs and demands for outside financial and political support increased in proportion to changing values and diminished traditional resources. This was true at many smaller colleges that almost closed (i.e. Antioch University in Ohio and Monmouth College in Illinois), those that did succumb to the hectic rise and ultimate fall in enrollment between 1960 and 1990, and even the emerging mega-universities. (The latter are almost always public; USC and Miami University in Florida are rare private exceptions). The mega-universities became so large as to be almost unresponsive to presidential leadership, too segmented for effective collegiality, too large to be an intellectual community in the traditional sense of a "college", and driven by many diverse interests.

In the public sector, immense needs arose in the development of relationships with legislators, state coordinating bodies, and other campuses in the state university system. In smaller independent colleges, the demand for recognition, image enhancement, and external dollars beckoned presidents to venture from behind the ivy walls. Greater attention to external constituencies, public relations, fundraising, and public accountability superceded time spent on internal planning, bricks and mortar, and parochial concerns.

More than the extreme growth in sheer campus/system size and numbers of students, non-physical change truly transformed and re-shaped the American college and university. In the late 1960's and 1970's, it transformed their presidencies as well. Many presidents coped well with crisis, conflict resolution, cultural upheaval, educational reform, and societal change. However, many managerial presidents who served effectively in four decades prior to the great disruption occasioned by manifest demographic change, the civil rights movement, and anti-war protests often were unable to cope with the human crisis of the 1960's and 1970's. What occurred was nothing short of a social, economic, political, cultural, and intellectual revolution on the campuses and in the nation. For the most part, we are better for that leveling, leavening, and tempering experience. But it caused profound changes in the nature of campus governance and executive leadership.

Those challenges and crises of the 1970's led to a new environment for higher education in late twentieth century America. Already evident in some places by the mid-1970's, it became widespread in the 1980's. It will be the norm for the decade of the 1990's and the early 21st century. These new circumstances govern and will dictate the latest stage in the evolution of the American college/university presidency. For the challenge of tomorrow is not principally to assert leadership as an academic colleague. Today, faculty rarely consider any president as their **primus inter pares**, although they expect appropriate academic credentials. Nor will we widely reestablish presidents who manage internal growth, seemingly adequate fiscal resources, and ample numbers of incoming students.

The current phase in presidential evolution and new circumstances require a portion of those presidential traits typical of past stages. A college or university president usually still must possess a doctoral or terminal degree and demonstrate background and interest in academics. But his/her task clearly is no longer primarily academic in all but a few institutions. That responsibility has devolved upon faculty, deans, and academic vice presidents. Appropriately, as it was a century ago, faculty increasingly determine academic and curricular policy. That is a positive and beneficial return to past patterns. Nor is the president today generally the architect of expansion, building, and growth. On the contrary, many institutions face static or (planned or forced) declining enrollments and thus a new challenge to find enough students or contract in size (and expectations in some cases). Day to day campus management largely has passed to financial, student affairs, physical plant, and other professional managers who share academic insignia and interests but who increasingly are career administrators with neither background nor aspirations in scholarship or teaching. Today, the president is primarily the chief institutional advancement officer and its principal representative to many external constituencies with a multitude of tasks and responsibilities in fundraising, alumni, public, legislative, and media relations, enrollment management, student recruitment, corporate partnership and all aspects of external affairs. He/she must seek and ask for funds from public or private sources, represent the institution as never before, cultivate alumni, media, donors, and friends, and actively assist in the recruitment of students.

Yet it must be stated clearly and forcefully that even in these new changed circumstances the college/university president must continue to function as (a) the intellectual and academic leader of the campus, (b) the chief administrator and manager, as well as (c) the chief advancement officer of the institution.

As its leader, a president must be committed to and involved in all facets of a college's or university's life. She/he must not become immersed in the details of management of each facet. Commitment, awareness, openness, flexibility, and support are more important than detail or day to day involvement with each and every committee, memo, issue, or event, temptation to the contrary not withstanding. A college or university president must never be isolated from the essential business of the institution, as some were in the crisis era of the mid-1960's to mid-1970's to the detriment of their schools, students, and faculties. Philosophy, human dedication, and resources must be focused on the educational mission and priorities of the institution. Succinctly, this means that the efforts and spirit of a college or university president must be focused on the educational process, students, faculty, and academic programs, even as quantitative measurements of presidential responsibility and success are directed more toward institutional advancement, enrollment management, and external constituencies.

To meet these changing realities and the circumstances in which a president must lead a college or university today, a major review and reallocation of presidential time and function should by undertaken. Some suggest, as discussed in the September 12, 1990 issue of The Chronicle of Higher Education, that a review and reform of our institutions of higher learning must be undertaken. A reevaluation of the role of the president will be even more critical in that eventuality. Moreover, as Clark Kerr warns, there will be obstacles to presidents who seek to revise, reform and transform their institutions, obstacles such as "demands on university presidents, institutional inertia, and the tendency to protect the status quo" (Chronicle of

Higher Education, September 12, 1990). Yet it is the very assignment, or acceptance, of demands on that finite quantity of presidential time that may be foremost among the anachronisms that must be alleviated to maintain the pace of this century of evolution in the role and responsibilities of college and university presidents.

What follows, therefore, is a blueprint that allows some attention to all historically vital areas for qualitative presidential involvement while permitting maximum focus of quantitative effort (time), as well as qualitative achievement, on the new priorities of fundraising, external relations, enrollment management, legislative liaison, and institutional advancement. It demands quality use of time and energy, not tokenism, in addressing the myriad and important tasks and roles of the college or university president of the 21st century.

ALLOCATION OF A PRESIDENT'S TIME

	Function	Percentage of Time
1.	Trustee Relations (A)	10 Management
		5 Development
2.	Institutional Advancement (B)	20 Development
		5 Alumni Affairs
3.	External Relations (C)	5 Political/Media
		5 Community
4.	Academic Affairs & Faculty Relations	10 Faculty and Academic Affairs
		5 Teaching (D)
5.	Student Affairs and Events	10 Issues/Events
6.	Administrative Matters (E)	10 Campus, Budget, etc. and Staff (Individually)
7.	Cabinet/Staff	5 President's Cabinet
		10 With Vice Presidents
8.	Planning/Thinking/Writing	10
9.	Recreation/Exercise/ Rest Breaks (F)	5
10.	Travel to Meetings	

and Out of Town	10
Total =	125% (G)

NOTES:

A. Goal should be a personal meeting or phone contact with each trustee quarterly (more often with officers and committee chairs). In public institutions, this and the trustee development function should be divided between governing board members and appropriate legislators, legislative committees, and executive branch agencies. Time directed to key legislators and state education/government officials allows 10 to 15% for those key persons.

B. Development total in a private institution = 25% (5% with trustees plus 20% with others) in a non-campaign mode; more if involved in a major campaign. Total institutional advancement time = 50% (Development: 25%, Alumni: 5%, External Relations: 10%, Other: 10%).

C. Attention to legislative, community, and governmental affairs increases in a public institution. This 10% is supplemented by the 5% trustee development time and 5% general development time to allow 20% of president's time as needed. Public university trustee fundraising is included with development.

D. Teaching includes individual discussion and advising. Those hours may be directed to research when classes are not in session.

E. Non-trustee administrative matters include curriculum, student programs, budget, personnel, physical plant, etc.

F. Weekly or daily routine should include specific time to make phone calls, see staff, trustees, faculty, and students, plan, think, exercise, and rest.

G. If presidents wish to exert 100% effort, some may be inclined (and ill-advised) to eliminate teaching, rest, and development. Better to give 125%.

The blueprint suggests percentages rather than hours for commitment of presidential time. Hours are relative to circumstance and energy. Each president needs to determine what output of work and commitment equals 125%, regardless of how many hours are required to do the job. Presidential effort, however, should be carefully measured as a qualitative, not just quantitative, matter. Fifty quality hours per week will better serve the institution than seventy poorly spent hours. Burn-out of presidents has become more common, as average tenures for presidents have declined significantly over the last few decades. No college or university thrives with a weak or tired CEO. Each weekly calendar will not take the exact shape of the model. Crisis, major events, unforeseen demands, illness, and ad hoc external commitments will always require flexibility. But over the course of a year, the allocation of presidential time would approach these guidelines.

Trustee relations are a crucial area of concern for presidents. No other area of activity is more vital. Presidents should set a goal of a personal meeting or phone contact with each trustee quarterly, and more often with officers and committee chairs. In public institutions, this and the trustee development function should focus on governing board members and appropriate legislators, legislative committees, and executive branch agencies. In public institutions, this additional trustee time directed to legislators and state government officials allows 10 to 15 % for those key persons.

Quality effort and focus on presidential priorities should be a principal concern of presidents and their boards. One hallmark of successful presidents of the past century, regardless of time of service, has been their qualitative contributions to higher education. Interestingly, however, many successful tenures have been quite long, perhaps suggesting that pacing and quality of effort offer significant dividends in quality of service, too.

Institutional Advancement is the new and central area of emphasis for presidents in the 1990's. It includes fundraising, alumni and public relations, and student recruitment. Development effort in a private institution requires 5% with trustees plus 20% with others for a sum of 25% in a non-campaign mode. More if needed in a major campaign. Total institutional advancement time requires development: 25%, alumni: 5%, external relations: 10%, plus elements of other areas as applied to external audiences for an additional 10%. Including time spent on fundraising with trustees, external relations, and student recruitment (as distinct from student affairs and campus events), the commitment to institutional advancement adds up to a total of 50% of the 125% total presidential commitment.

This is substantial, but institutional advancement is the hallmark of the president of the 1990's, just as academics and growth management were key issues for earlier generations of higher education CEO's.

Internal management by presidents usually consumes more energy, time, and effort than necessary in most colleges and universities. The key here is selection of competent vice presidents and other senior staff, and delegation of both responsibility and authority to them for day to day management in their areas. Presidents can manage, govern, and lead effectively with 10% of time given to budget, staff and general administration supplemented by 15% of time directed to cabinet, vice presidential, and other high level campus meetings for a total of 25%, or one-fifth of total time.

Academic and student affairs also require 25%. They are a top priority, but the time required here is necessary to listen and learn as well as to lead. The president must be involved and visible, but not in the 19th century sense. Clearly the faculty's role in shared governance, and student participation in campus decisions, are vital, especially specific to academic and student affairs. Presidents should follow faculty guidance in academic policy, curriculum development, and related matters. This not only allows a president to devote just 25% of his/her time to academic and student affairs. It also allows the president to take maximum advantage of the incredibly rich pool of talent, experience, and support a faculty can offer. Faculty should be included on all major committees and task forces, and asked individually or in groups to represent the institution in various ways. The president need not and should not try to do it all. Few corporate CEO's have such quality and variety of expertise within their organization. College and university presidents do. They should pay more heed to, consult, and use faculty more frequently and effectively.

As the college/university presidency evolves over the next several decades, the quality of leadership for the college or university community remains paramount. A college or university is an integrated, dynamic, living organism. Its president is the institution's creative, coordinative nerve center of ideas and activity. The trustees represent the essential skeletal framework that supports the institution. The faculty are the soul of a college or university. The other administrators are a school's sinew and muscle. Its students are its very heart and lifeblood. The reason for a college's or university's existence is the process we call education. If the president is impaired or dysfunctional, the institution becomes ill and falters. The vitality and quality of presidential leadership therefore will be more crucial than ever before in the next century of evolution.

Richard Henry Owens

RHO/psw

COMMUNITY, INDIVIDUALISM, AND EPISTEMIC ENCOUNTERS

J. S. Kelly
Miami University

Two theses need to be explored: (1) that both the morality of our culture and moral theory are in a confused and degenerate state by virtue of widely held naturalistic assumptions and views in our scientific and technological age; and (2) that our naturalistic metaphysics is a product of a cultural bent that gives a priviliged position to materialistic values and the ways of understanding the world that serves them best and relegates humanistic values and ethical thought to a position of lesser importance. Although many fault *modern* liberal political theory for being mistakenly and irreparably individualistic, I am not of the opinion, unlike many such critics, that a return to settled traditions or the abandonment of rights' talk is the path to solution.

Rather the difficulty with *modern* liberalism arises from faulty metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions which lead to an uncritical acceptance of the modern view that all acceptable explanation must be in terms of the scientific naturalist's categories of factuality and (physical) existence. In what follows the problem facing liberalism is first set, then it is briefly suggested how this difficulty originated. Finally the logical implications of the acceptance of the categories of scientific naturalism are examined. It is concluded that these categories are too restrictive and that adherence to them entails the nasty subjectivism of modernity. On the positive side it is suggested that we need to expand the categories and recognize that our emotional and conative experiences, under critical assessment, allow access to normative reality, thus grounding moral theory.

I

It is not uncommon in American society, including academia, to hear the lament that a community of memory is lacking - being replaced by, in effect, a community of interest. According to Bellah *et al.*, "a *community* is a group of people who are socially interdependent, who participate together in discussion and decision making, and who share certain *practices*...that both define the community and are nurtured by it....It almost always has a history and so is also a *community of memory,* defined in part by its past and its memory of its past."[1] In such a community, discussion centers on, and decisions are made about the goals or ends of human activity - in short the quest for the ethically good life is a common goal. To avoid incipient relativism (or nihilism) the community must recognize the possibility of reaching (thick) moral consensus on core moral judgments - a moral language justifying moral claims as true or false must be developed. Diminishment of community, it is argued, results from the view that there is no longer a sense of morale or morality able to ground virtue or inform the "habits of the heart."[2]

Replacing the community of memory is the community of interest where self-interested individuals come together to maximize individual good; such individuals do not share a common history and do not have as a common goal the attainment of the *ethically* good life. The result is that discussion and decision making center on the means to a given end - that end is the satisfaction of individual desires. Cultural critics[3] point out that this is the present state of our culture and if, as Bellah suggests, "commitment to the common good...is necessary to assure the integrity of a community",[4] this change in the structure of community bodes ill for the present culture. As Alasdair MacIntyre has argued, "...unless there is a telos which transcends the limited goods of practices by constituting the good of a whole human life, the good of a human life conceived as a unity, it will both be the case that a certain subversive arbitrariness will invade the moral life and that we shall be unable to specify the content of certain virtues adequately."[5] Without, then, a method of discovering the good, without belief in and the possibility of rational justification of objective standards, all evaluations collapse into expressions of personal preference. Even MacIntyre's Aristotelian method of discovering the good by inquiring into the social meaning of roles will be of no avail in a society in which most roles are not attached to a single good.

A capacity for relatedness in which, although there is neither competition nor conformity, there is cooperation and caring concern that encourages creative conflict, the latter to be resolved by collaborative effort, is a capacity necessary to community.[6] And necessary for this capacity is a method for the rational justification of objective standards grounding both moral judgments and the belief in a shared objective goal upon which conflict focuses. But is such justification within our grasp? I think it is, but we must first understand the causal/historical path that has led to the present state of the culture.

Consider E. M. Adams' articulation:

> The classical Greek, Hebraic, and Christian cultures were generated by [the person] standing in the world asking primarily "What does reality require of me? How can I fulfill these requirements? How can I become what I ought to be and do what I ought to do?"

Whereas,

> The culture-generating stance of [the] Western [person] shifted between the thirteenth and the seventeenth centuries to that of [the person] standing before the world asking, "How can I get what I want? How can I impose my will upon the world? How can I manipulate, control, and exploit it for my own purposes?"[7]

In classical culture, then, there was a community of interdependent inquirers believing in and seeking a shared common good. There were, of course, materialistic needs, but these were subordinated to humanistic needs. Modern culture, however, has for the most part supplanted this sense of community with the community of interest in which materialistic needs dominate. As one illustration of how this change in community manifests itself today, consider contemporary educational assumptions.

What dominates in our culture is an objectivist mode of knowing where the paradigm of successful explanation is that of manipulation and control. (At work, as we shall see later, are the metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions of scientific naturalism.) Our educational system thus makes certain assumptions; consider four. First is the assumption that excellence is achieved only by competition among individuals. I do not argue for this here, I ask only that you reflect on the operations of the typical classroom and on requirements for tenure - collaborative learning and scholarship appear not to be highly valued. There are, of course, exceptions; but that is the point, they are exceptions. A second assumption is most readily seen in the majority of management and business classes (though it is not limited to these programs). In these classes there operates an assumption that it is a "dog eat dog" world where students need to be trained how to survive. One of my colleagues in the management program assures me this is the dominant attitude. Our classrooms also, for the most part, have adopted as a third assumption the empty bottle model of education.[8] Students are the empty bottles and teachers pour in truth, which consists of empirically verifiable propositions about phenomena. Finally, more often than not it is assumed the universe is hostile and needs to be controlled, manipulated. Such an assumption has led many in the humanities to think we can *build* communities. But if the very presuppositions which have led to the impoverishment of community are what back our belief that we can build community, we are doomed to failure.

As a result of these assumptions, the world studied is not the world lived in - the world lived in is a world of experiences, not a world of propositions. An opinion recently expressed in ***The Chronicle of Higher Education***, indicates that community is more than the collection of individuals on a college campus:

> simple observation of a typical college classroom, the mainstay of collegiate life, reveals the antithesis of community. Students file in, face the front, scribble in notebooks, file out, and go in all directions. When they do convene, they do so over lunch or a beer to discuss not "the limits to human freedom,"...but baseball scores, dates, and possibly the fact that they still haven't started their term papers. Students do not get together to discuss where do we come from and what is our destiny?[9]

The assumptions highlighted above, of course, are not lacking in attempted justifications, but as we shall see they all rest on questionable metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions. Rather than develop this illustration, however, let us look to the political order of liberal individualism which our educational system reflects. The above picture (when fully developed) is of an educational system that is a more or less value neutral institution within which individuals pursue their private goals, free for the most part from any sense of public good or the goals of community and the constraints of moral truths. The political system advanced by liberal individualism is not different.

II.

A host of cultural critics,[10] see as a crucial problem in contemporary culture the view which has as its outcome a state that is a more or less neutral framework within which individuals pursue their self-interest. Let us call this view 'modern liberal individualism'. Bellah claims that middle class America sets the dominant tone of the culture. He also concludes it is a culture in which the members have largely lost the language they need to make moral sense out of their private and public lives. The language spoken is the language of individualism in which it is not possible to satisfactorily articulate the reasons for our commitments, even our most deep seated commitments. Since, on this view, each self constitutes its own moral domain, our goals and values are ultimately no more than arbitrary preferences. Political life is a clash of irreconcilable interests and feelings. As Bellah argues, "...if selves are defined by their preferences, but those preferences are arbitrary, then each self constitutes its own moral universe, and there is finally no way to reconcile conflicting claims about what is good in itself.... In the absence of any objectifiable criteria of right and wrong, good or evil, the self and its feelings become our only moral guide."[11] Our deep-seated moral convictions are seen as non-objective and thus relative to our culture or self, or as subjective, emotional responses to reality but not themselves avenues to reality.

It is "the fundamental assumption of modernity" according to Daniel Bell, that "the social unit of society is not the group, the guild, the tribe, or the city, but the person."[12] This individual, this social atom lacks the capacity for relatedness that is necessary to community. Such alienation of individuals from each other and from the larger society makes the public good problematic. For as Bellah argues, the citizen and the public good have been engulfed in economic man and private interest. "We have committed" he argues, "what to the republican founders of our nation was the cardinal sin: we have put our own good, as individuals, as groups, as a nation, ahead of the common good."[13]

Given this Hobbesian view of the state as a contract between rational, self-interested individuals, it should come as no surprise that the role of reason is very limited. For on this view reasoning is but reckoning, a technical ability. But when reason has such a limited function, when it is, as MacIntyre writes, "calculative; it can assess truths of fact and mathematical relations but nothing more. In the realm of practice therefore it can speak only of means. About ends it must be silent."[14] Modern liberal individualism takes the ends as given; what we seek is the satisfaction of our individual interests. Before pursuing the metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions lying behind this view, let us briefly rehearse the main structure of this modern liberal individualism.

As we have just seen, the role of reason is the instrumental one of showing us what it takes to satisfy desires. Persons on this view are individuals, neutral units with nothing else in common except an ability to reason about the means to ends and never about the ends themselves. Thus disagreement about ends is not rational disagreement and is not to be settled by the rational methods of critical discourse. All that is thought needed in the modern liberal individual state are rules that will provide the minimally required social order for each to pursue his or her own objectives. At this level we run into difficulties.

Should we seek a morality of desire, then good will be interest based; the satisfaction of wants. But since desires are arbitrary, ends not capable of rational justification, a morality based upon desires is blind and will not allow for choice among competing desires. Such a morality, as Bellah illustrates, collapses into subjective choices. To have a morality of reason, however, we need to make judgments among conflicting goals. But given the subjectivity of values, reason cannot get a foothold, cannot perform this function. So a morality of reason is inert and a morality of desire is purely subjective. As with Hobbes, morality escapes us.

We are led, then, to the conclusion that there is no moral significance to community life - indeed there is no unified self and no commitment to universal ends. Under individualist psychology a person is the sum of the person's particular desires and reason is instrumental to the achievement of these desires. Likewise under individualist politics; society is the sum of individual persons and universal rules are instrumental to the achievement of particular values. Such rules will be procedural only and justice in such a state will thus be procedural, a matter of fairness of the rules under which society operates. As Bellah points out, modern liberal individualism lacks the language required for critical discussion of either (thick) distributive or substantive justice. Once the rules are structured such that all have a fair chance in society, what is to be said about the kind of society to be developed? According to modern liberal individualism, it is to be a society with *procedural* fairness. Many have tried to ameliorate these difficulties. What I shall now argue, following E. M. Adams, is that the metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions of the modern age logically lead to the above Hobbesian consequences. It shall also be suggested that such consequences can be avoided.

III

Given the above what we face is a culture dominated by, as MacIntyre puts it, emotivism - "the doctrine that all evaluative judgments and more specifically all moral judgments are *nothing but* expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in character."[15] And as MacIntyre clearly sees, "...if [emotivism] *is* true, *all* moral disagreement *is* rationally interminable."[16] But why does emotivism, if not in theory, then in practice, dominate our culture? Let us begin our answer to this important question by looking to Thomas Nagel, who claims:

> The problem is one of opposition between subjective and objective points of view. There is a tendency to seek an objective account of everything before admitting its reality. But often what appears to a more subjective point of view cannot be accounted for in this way. So either the objective conception of the world is incomplete, or the subjective involves illusions that should be rejected.[17]

If, as we have sketched, morality collapses into subjective choices, why think such choices illusions? The answer here cuts to the quick. For if our subjective choices are but our emotive responses to an objective world and are not descriptive of reality, then, as J. L. Mackie argues,[18] we are in error should we think there are objective values. The illusion involved is the belief that moral predicates, e.g., 'X is wrong', pick out objective features in the real world. But what is it to, as Nagel says, "seek an objective account of everything before admitting its reality"? We must dig deeper for the metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions at work.

What I propose is that we may bridge the subjective-objective gap by viewing the emotions (as well as our conative states) as on an epistemic par with sensory observation. The strategy in what follows is to challenge the presuppositions of scientific naturalism - although certainly not the great success of that science. Factuality and (physical) existence are the categories in terms of which, according to scientific naturalism, all successful explanations are to be carried out. In the space I have I cannot reconstruct all the arguments needed to make a case for new ontological categories. Nonetheless, since a case for an ontological category can only be made if we have the categorial capability of epistemically experiencing the ontological category, I will offer positive reasons for thinking we do have epistemic powers enabling us to experience values, and thus that the emotions play a crucial epistemic role.

What did happen between the thirteenth and the seventeenth centuries that altered our conception of the world and gave rise to the Hobbesian view? Again, Bellah, although he fails to see the deep causes of the problems generated, points in the right direction with his recognition that:

> When science seemed to have dominated the explanatory schemes of the external world, morality and religion took refuge in human subjectivity, in feeling and sentiment. Morality and religion were related to aesthetics, the realm of feeling par excellence.... theologians and moralists believed feeling had some cognitive content, some access to the external world....But with the emergence of psychology as an academic field...the purely subjective grounding of expressive individualism became complete.[19]

It is the rise of scientific naturalism that pushed morality into the purely subjective realm of emotion and feeling - witness Hobbes. And given the metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions of this naturalism, that result was inevitable. Scientific naturalism maintains that the method of modern science is the only way to know the world and that reality is delineated categorially in the way in which it is conceptualized in scientific thought. Following the logic of these presuppositions, Bertrand Russell concludes "while it is true that science cannot decide questions of value, that is because they cannot be intellectually decided at all, and lie outside the realm of truth and falsehood. Whatever knowledge is attainable, must be attained by scientific methods; and what science cannot discover, mankind cannot know."[20]

On this view there are no objective values in the world, our subjective choices cannot be evaluated as true or false and thus the normative dimension of the world is an illusion. After all, if our conceptual system operates with the categorial structure of naturalism, where the categories are Factuality and Physical Existence, then the only relevant facts in the normative domain are that we have emotional reactions to certain events in the world. Thus, if a newborn infant has a defective heart and we respond by uttering 'That is terrible, it is not the way it ought to be', there is, in effect, no cognitive content to what we say, it is neither true nor false - albeit given our form of life, such utterances may have a use. For given scientific naturalism, our only access to the facts is via sensory observation (seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching).

Yet there is a growing body of literature on the role of the emotions, especially affective, empathic responses on behalf of another.[21] Nonetheless the troubling issue of moral truth facing modernity, as opposed to the coincidental sharing of sympathies, is seldom directly addressed. Sidney Callahan writes:

> When we feel strongly and persistently that this is wrong, wrong, wrong, but we can't articulate why, we withhold assent. Our discomfort induces us to continue looking beyond the proposed arguments, to keep searching and broaden the review. Later we may be able to understand the emotional reaction and feel profoundly grateful that we were not carried away by abstractions.[22]

Following Hume, Martin Hoffman argues:

> ...if we empathize with others we should applaud or condemn acts that help or harm others; and, unless we are abnormally callous, we will feel indignant (empathic anger) when someone willfully inflicts suffering on others. Empathy may thus guide the moral judgments we make about others. Furthermore, since people may be presumed to respond empathically to similar events in similar ways, empathy may thus provide the common informational input that impartial observers need to reach a consensus on moral judgments.[23]

But when we *feel* strongly that something is wrong, say torturing healthy, unowned cats for fun, and make the judgment that such torturing ought not be done, is it enough that we reach consensus on moral judgments? Will not *mere* consensus lead to sophisticated relativism or nihilism? Are we not typically assuming we reach consensus on moral *truth*? Here is the rub, for in our culture our emotional reactions, our value experiences, are not taken to be knowledge-yielding encounters.

Our emotions, our feelings, etc., are not, according to naturalism, knowledge-yielding - they are simply our subjective responses. And within our culture naturalism is, for the most part, taken for granted. As Adams wrote in 1968:

> The culture at large has come, for the most part, to accept the belief that value judgments, especially ethical ones, are subjective and private, that there is no value knowledge, not even the possibility of any. Whenever a person makes value judgments, we tend to regard him as expressing his personal biases and prejudices. We think that they have no place in the classroom, for we believe that objective instruction is not possible in the value area.[24]

Foreshadowing the panoply of social ills Bellah catalogues, Adams tells us, "the rejection of the possibility of knowledge of objective values gives rise to apparently contradictory results."[25] (Although there may not be a contradiction here, there is a tension and the threat of inconsistency.) Some will see society and its institutions as lacking in authority and opt to "drop out" rather than compromise their freedom. As Bellah writes, "...freedom turns out to mean being left alone by others, not having other people's values, ideas, or styles of life forced upon one, being free of arbitrary authority in work, family, and political life."[26] Still others will view things differently; lacking the possibility of attaining objective value truths, they will seek to become members of the power structure that they may "control the attitudes and the value thought of the people" in order to retain certain institutions and ways of living.

Bellah concludes that to overcome our ills, we need a revival of the older biblical and republican traditions and their attendant communities. But if the attenuation of these traditions was due in large part to the change in the cultural mind occasioned by the domination of the metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions of scientific naturalism, then it is in the cultural mind that changes must take place. Obviously we cannot go into all the details of this assault on naturalistic ontology and epistemology, but I do wish to challenge the currently dominate view concerning moral realism. To that end let us consider the implications of the view that our moral beliefs are subjective in the sense that they are merely our individual responses to the world of facts.

IV

Consider the following as facts. Morgan asserts the sentence "It is raining." He can test for the truth of such a claim by checking to see if it is raining. If his observations confirm his claim, that is, if the world matches up with the claim he makes about it, his belief that it is raining stands justified as true. Next consider the fact that the local school ruffian has found a healthy, unowned cat. He ties the cat to a stake, pours gasoline over it and ignites it. The rest you can easily imagine. Sarah, having witnessed this state of affairs, screams out "Oh no - that is a wicked, horrible thing you have done Billy." What do we say about what Sarah has uttered? What do we say about the beliefs Sarah forms based on her encounter with the facts? Are her claims or beliefs true or false? In the case of Morgan, the facts backed his claim that it was raining. Do the facts back Sarah's claim? Sarah's claim is a value claim. What she says, if true, seems to entail the further claim that what has happened ought not to have happened, that Billy's burning of the cat was wrong.

Many of us tend to agree with Sarah. But there is the sophisticate who tells us that facts and values are very different kinds of things. There are no moral facts, it is contended, for all that Sarah can "observe," all that she has access to are the bare facts - namely, that there is a cat burning as the result of Billy's action. She does not "see" wrongness in reality. Rather, argues our fact-theorist, Sarah has had a subjective, emotional response to the apprehended facts. That is all that backs her belief. But her utterance is neither true nor false, for to be true it must fit the facts. But what are the facts here? There is cat burning as the result of what Billy has done. Moral utterances in general, Sarah's claim in particular, are merely subjective, emotive responses to the objective facts. Facts and values, it is concluded, are distinct, the former objective the latter subjective.

Those of us who want to claim that burning cats for kicks, let alone torturing small children for the fun of it are wrong, face a difficulty. Should we wish to maintain our belief in an objective right or wrong, then there must, in principle, be a way in which we can come to know what is right or wrong. If we can show a way in which we can gain such knowledge, then that combined with the above felt inconsistencies regarding our firmly held beliefs and what the moral sophisticate tells us, would seem to shift the burden of plausibility away from our claims and onto the claims of the relativist or subjectivist. That is, what troubles us is our lack of a moral language that is grounded in reality as opposed to being grounded in society or in subjective responses to reality. But how can we come to gain knowledge of objective moral truths?

Again, it is fair to say that what dominates our culture is an objectivist mode of knowing, where the paradigm (of successful explanation) is manipulation and control. I also believe that why it is so hard for us to generate objective justifications for normative matters is because this objectivist mode of knowing is too restrictive in that it will not allow for knowledge of all truths. Let me explain. We have already seen how this objectivist mode of knowing is manifested in our educational system and it has been suggested that it is the result of the rise of scientific naturalism. Let us investigate a bit more.

The objectivist mode of knowing finds its home in the physical sciences, which in contemporary culture have become the paradigm for secure knowledge. This view of scientific naturalism maintains that the method of modern science is the only way come to know the world, that reality is only accessible through the methods of science. On this view our only access to reality is via sensory experience which enables us to grasp the facts, e.g., that it is raining. Since this view holds that only physical items exist, it is a quick step to the denial of objective values inherent in the world. As we have seen in the case of Morgan, his claim that it is raining can be determined, in principle, to be true or false. That is because he has access to the facts through his sensory experiences. Sarah, however, is in a different position. For her claim that burning cats is wrong goes beyond the facts. Given the objectivist mode of knowing, Sarah cannot know her claim to be true since she has no access to rightness - rightness and wrongness are not features of reality, they are merely her subjective, emotional reactions to reality. Her claim is neither true nor false; her reactions themselves, of course, are real - she does indeed feel bad about the burning cat. But her claim, 'Burning cats is wrong', is neither true nor false since it is not grounded in the facts. Remember, the facts are what we have access to through sensory observation; for example, that there is a cat Billy has set on fire. That is, according to scientific naturalism, our emotions, feelings, etc., are not knowledge-yielding - they are simply our subjective responses. Thus the all too common view that when a person makes value judgments, that person is only expressing personal biases and prejudices. But here a tension surfaces, for we are deeply committed (I shall assume) to the principle that torturing small children for fun and killing helpless cats for kicks is wrong, *period*. But how can we come to *know* that that is wrong? Perhaps we have been beguiled by the objectivist mode of knowing.

Let us return to what was said earlier. Morgan's claim "It is raining," was grounded, we said, in the facts. Whereas Sarah's claim was grounded, if grounded at all, in her emotive experiences resulting from her encounter with the facts. Let us now develop an analogy between these two cases. It would seem that Sarah's value language, ('Burning cats is wrong', say) is grounded in her *value experiences*, her emotional responses to her comprehension of the facts, much like Morgan's factual language ('It is raining') is grounded in his sensory experiences. Why, then, aren't we justified in concluding that just as sensory experiences enable Morgan to come into contact with reality, so too Sarah's emotive experiences allow her to encounter reality, to gain knowledge? Let us pursue the analogy a bit. Scientific agreement is reached, when it is, by a community of inquirers critically appraising claims about reality based upon data collected via the senses (or extended senses). Of course Morgan's claim that it is raining must pass muster, for if he is standing on a street corner with ten other people who all claim that it is sunny, his claim is thereby put into doubt. Science is corrigible, claims based upon sensory observation may prove to be wrong when subjected to critical assessment. Likewise, it may be argued, agreement on value issues can be reached by a community of inquirers critically appraising claims about the value dimension of reality based upon data collected through their value experiences as well as their sensory experiences. Perhaps, then, we all agree that Billy was wrong to have burned the cat, or that torturing small children for fun is wrong, because our emotional reactions, our value experiences, in conjunction with our comprehension of the facts, enable us to come to know the truth. Why, that is, do we privilege sensory experiences as knowledge-yielding, but denigrate emotive experiences as merely subjective, non-knowledge-yielding? In both the scientific domain and the value domain we find a community of inquirers critically assessing data in order to reach consensus concerning a dimension of reality. In both domains our claims are corrigible and rational in their corroboration. Whereas the data for science are facts accessible through sensory observation, the data in the normative domain are values accessible through emotive experiences construed as, as are sensory experiences, epistemic (knowledge-yielding) encounters.

Now we can begin to understand the tension. If the commonly accepted methods for gaining knowledge lead to the view that torturing small children, burning helpless cats, and slavery are not objectively wrong, then we appear to face an uncomfortable paradox. In general the cultural mind endorses the objectivist mode of knowing, the methods of scientific naturalism, as the only way of coming to know truths; but we strongly think there are truths such methods do not ground. As I mentioned earlier, if we can plausibly propose a way in which we can gain knowledge of objective moral truths, then that, combined with the above paradox, will shift the burden of plausibility to the claims of the moral sophisticate who will now have to explain why only sensory experiences allow for access to reality, why value experiences of the sort Sarah and most of us have do not also yield knowledge. How, though, are we to reach moral consensus on moral truths if our emotive reactions differ? Consider more anecdotal evidence.

In *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, the affluent housewife finds herself opposed to laws against aiding escaping slaves - empathy for the slaves she knows funds this line of thinking. She finds, despite her apolitical background, such laws abominable and adopts a general caring principle, a premise for a moral-thinking-to-do syllogism. She, let us assume, comes to adopt the principle that all persons have an inalienable right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, from which it follows that slavery is wrong. Again, the point to be pursued is that without the affective aspect of empathy, such caring - the adoption of principles of justice which play a crucial role in moral judgment and decision making - appears not to be plausibly explicable. Should research support the claim that empathic affects become part of most people's affective and motivational structures long before moral principles are seriously considered, then we may gain some insight into what determines which principles one chooses in the first place. There are, of course, many slippery rocks here, but given Hoffman's research that people tend to respond empathically to similar events in similar ways, empathy may provide the common informational input that impartial observers need to reach a consensus on moral judgments.[27] Without such empathy individuals might develop moral principles that focus on procedural rules and on maintaining social order, but it appears unlikely that they would feel genuine connection to and caring for others. A community of individuals lacking in empathic abilities would, it seems, lack the capacity for relatedness. And distributive and substantive justice would vanish.

Still, some may question our analysis since the uncertainty and variability of our affective and conative experiences seems to weaken the claim that they can be knowledge-yielding. Although in the case of self-awareness of our wants (for ourselves) we often find chaos in our emotional and conative nature (e.g., we often want things we ought not want), things are *morally* less confused with regard to our spontaneous responses on behalf of others. Moreover, since value requirements are fact-dependent and thus context bound, it follows that, in the thickness of life, the situations in which we often find ourselves are factually very complex. Thus it is plausible to assume that many of the disagreements we have concerning our value experiences and judgments are due to disagreement about the facts, as opposed to value disagreements per se. There is much more agreement in moral matters than is typically realized. There is virtual universal agreement that slavery is wrong. But, of course, such agreement would be worthless if it were not agreement on the truth. Here, given the analogy, developed earlier, I see no particular problem for the view that value realism depends on emotive experiences seen as epistemic encounters, as does scientific realism depend on sensory experiences.

Given the above sketch, we at least see the real possibility, if not plausibility, of maintaining there are objective, universally binding, context-bound moral truths. What disagreement there is over which rules of action to accept is a matter for the critical assessment of the moral community. What stands out, however, is that purely subjective responses to one's own wants are not privileged. Moreover, it may be that certain emotive responses to the felt needs of others are universal among societies, thus reflecting an intersubjective moral perspective grounded, if this view is correct, in reality. When confronted with a tough moral decision where there is considerable disagreement, then, the community of inquirers needs intersubjective investigation of not only the facts but critical assessment of one another's experiential reactions, for these reactions are knowledge-yielding under critical assessment.

Not all agree with this picture, of course. Although I cannot address the disagreements here, let us take a very brief look at R. B. Brandt's claim that:

> ...it has been said that the belief "That's wrong," formed while observing a cat being doused with gasoline and then ignited, can only be explained by reference to the actual wrongness of the act. But, in fact, we need no such thing: the native sympathy of the judge, conjoined with his observation of an event of this kind, suffices.[28]

But of course if one lacks such sympathy and engages in such acts, it can only be said, from the naturalistic perspective, that the person and the person's actions are different, not that they are wrong. And if all were to lack such sympathy, due, say, to ingestion of some foul drug, there seems no ground for thinking the action wrong. On the view we have outlined above, the sympathy of Brandt's judge is relevant because it is the manifestation of an epistemic encounter. Given contextual, factual assumptions, the cat burning action is wrong - *period*. It is not simply believed wrong because of the subjective reactions of an array of judges whose sympathies happen to coincide. It is moral authority that grounds moral claims, just as it is epistemic authority that grounds factual claims.

If the general thesis of this paper is correct, then the lack of community due to individualism has as a deeper cause the uncritical acceptance of the metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions of scientific naturalism. The cure will involve a long process of critical, humanistic education in which the role of value experiences is recognized as knowledge-yielding under critical assessment.

Notes

1. Robert Bellah, Richard Madsen, William Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven Tipton *Habits of the Heart* (New York: Perennial Library, Harper & Row, 1986), p. 333.

2. For an excellent overview of these issues see Warren Nord, "The Humanities and the Modern Mind," in David Weissbord (ed.) *Mind, Value, and Culture: Essays in Honor of E. M. Adams* (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Co., 1989), pp. 13-54.

3. In addition to Bellah, *et al.* see E. M. Adams *Philosophy and the Modern Mind* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1975; reprinted Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1985); A. Arblaster *The Rise & Decline of Western Liberalism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984); Daniel Bell, *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (New York: Basic Books, 1978); Christopher Lasch, *The Culture of Narcissism* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1978); Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 2nd. edition (Notre Dame: The University of Notre Dame Press, 1984).

4. *Habits of the Heart*, p. 192.

5. *After Virtue*, p. 203. I do not, however, endorse MacIntyre's social conservatism.

6. See Parker Palmer, "A New View of Knowledge," address given to the American Association of Higher Education, Chicago (March 1987).

7. *Philosophy and the Modern Mind*, pp. 48-49.

8. See P. Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (New York: Seabury, 1971).

9. January 31, 1990, p. B1.

10. See note 3.

11. *Habits of the Heart*, p. 76.

12. *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism*, p. 16.

13. *Habits of the Heart*, p. 285.

14. *After Virtue*, p. 54.

15. ibid, pp. 11-12.

16. ibid

17. "Subjective and Objective," reprinted in *Mortal Questions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 196.

18. "The Subjectivity of Values," in Sayre-McCord (ed.) *Essays on Moral Realism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 95-118.

19. *Habits of the Heart*, p. 46.

20. *Religion and Science* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1935).

21. See Martin Hoffman, "The Contribution of Empathy to Justice and Moral Judgment," in Nancy Eisenberg and Janet Strayer, eds. *Empathy and Its Development* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 47-80. See also Hoffman, "Development of Prosocial Motivation: Empathy and Guilt," in N. Eisenberg, ed. *Development of Prosocial Behavior* (New York: Academic Press, 1982), pp. 281-313; "Affect and Moral Development," in D. Cicchetti, ed. *New Directions in Child Development* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1982), pp. 83-103. See also, Lawrence Blum, *Friendship, Altruism, and Morality* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), and Mary Wiseman, "Empathetic Identification," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 15, 2 (April 1978): 107-113.

22. "The Role of Emotion in Ethical Decisionmaking," *Hastings Center Report* (June/July 1988), p. 12.

23. "The Contribution of Empathy to Justice and Moral Judgment," *op. cit.*, pp. 64-65.

24. "What, If Anything, Can We Expect From Philosophy Today?", *The Personalist* 49, 1 (Winter, 1968), p. 57.

25. ibid

26. *Habits of the Heart*, p. 23.

27. See Martin Hoffman, *op. cit.*

28. "The Science of Man and Wide Reflective Equilibrium," *Ethics* 100, 2 (January 1990), p. 259.

DOING DEWEY AGAIN AND AGAIN: PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

by
Ronald Swartz
Professor of Education and Philosophy
Oakland University
Rochester, Michigan

> My first personal contact with Prof. Dewey was in an 1898 summer course in education at the University of Chicago. However, I got little from the course; I was not ready for its thinking and I was not accustomed to Dewey's method of teaching. His practice, as I later learned, was to come to the class with a problem on his mind and sit before the class thinking out loud as he sought to bring creative thinking to bear on his problem. [1]

> The surest way to corrupt a youth is to instruct him to hold in higher esteem those who think alike than those who think differently. [2]

I. Preliminary Remarks About Self-Governing Schools and Dewey's Liberal Ideals on Freedom of Discussion Remembered

During the last two years I slowly began to see that this brief essay belongs to a journey that includes visits to obscure places such as oblivion and Omaha. But before I attempt to explain the metaphorical morass that might help others understand how this paper is part of a trip to remote destinations, I would first like to say a few words about an elevator ride I had over sixteen years ago.

On a hotel elevator during the spring of 1974 when I was attending a Philosophy of Education Society meeting in Boston I had what was destined to be the first of many discussions that I have been fortunate to have with Arthur Brown. And although I do not claim that my brain works like a tape recorder, I nevertheless vaguely recall that my initial encounter with Art went something like the following:

Brown: That was a significant point you made at the session devoted to the relationship between democracy and education.

Swartz: Thanks for noticing my brief comments about the importance to distinguish between the question, "What is the role of a school in a liberal democratic society?" and "Is it reasonable for a society to create some schools that are organized as self-governing liberal democratic communities?"

Brown: Those are important problems to ponder. Perhaps we can talk some more about those questions at a future time?

Swartz: That would be great!

As the word "great" left my mouth the doors of the elevator opened before us. And as Art rushed out of that little moving room I was once again alone with my thoughts about philosophical questions related to educational issues.

My accidental meeting with Art over a decade and a half ago has left me with many fond memories primarily because it was the beginning of a friendship I have come to cherish. But when I first met Art I was most impressed by the fact that an established philosopher of education wished to have a dialogue with me about educational matters that have interested me since the time in the early 1960s when I was an anxious and disillusioned student who felt oppressed by the normal school activities which did not seem to bother most of the students and teachers who attended the public high school I was enrolled in on the North Side of Chicago. And during my secondary school days I poorly articulated questions which challenged the philosophical foundations of the education I was receiving. Specifically, as a teenager the best I could do to express my dissatisfaction with my education was to ask the question, "Why do I have to learn what is being taught to me at school?"

When I used to ask the above question to my high school teachers I was often viewed as an obnoxious, lazy, and disrespectful student, rather than a budding young philosopher of education who wished to discuss an important question such as, "Are teachers, curriculum developers, and other certified educational experts reliable social authorities who should determine what all students learn during their years in school?" This question has been a recurring concern in many of the dialogues I have had with Art in unlikely places such as cab rides to airports or walks in the park. And unlike many of my high school teachers who lacked an awareness of various educational perspectives, Art has always demonstrated a very sophisticated understanding of numerous philosophies of education; over the years my many encounters with Art have been so beneficial partly because he differed so from my high school teachers who saw no value in asking questions which might lead some people to the idea of creating a few self-governing educational programs that follow in the tradition of Bronson Alcott's Temple School, Homer Lane's Little Commonwealth, A.S. Neill's Summerhill, and Janusz Korczak's Orphans Home.

As a seventeen year old high school junior I was totally ignorant of the fact that Alcott, Lane, Neill, and Korczak had created self-governing learning environments which incorporated many of the political ideals of famous liberal philosophical thinkers. However, as a sophomore at the University of Illinois in 1965 I found out about Summerhill when I read Paul Goodman's essay "Compulsory Mis-education" for the first time. In his unorthodox and highly inadequate account of the development of educational thought in the United States during the first six decades of this century Goodman claims that by the 1960s the progressive wing of the progressive education movement no longer followed in the tradition of John Dewey and his many influencial disciples. For Goodman, the Deweyan views on education had been superseded by "the society of free choice, lively engagement, and social action of Summerhill and American Summerhill." [3] And despite his many obvious shortcomings as both an educational historian and theorist, Goodman does seem to hint at the idea that Neill developed a self-governing educational philosophy which has its intellectual roots in the works of liberal philosophical thinkers such as Socrates as he is depicted in Plato's Apology, Baruch Spinoza, John Milton, John Locke, Thomas Jefferson, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, John Dewey, Bertrand Russell, Friedrick Hayek, and Karl Popper.

The liberal tradition from Socrates to Popper and beyond encompasses far more individuals than the few I have mentioned here. Moreover, my highly abbreviated list of liberal philosophical theorists includes people who have often been unable to agree with one another about how to formulate and solve philosophical problems. Over the last two thousand five hundred years liberals have become a bit notorious for having disagreements about how to ask and answer questions related to the development of an adequate liberal perspective; those who have been a part of the liberal tradition have often taken disagreement to the point where there has been much debate about the basic problems that are most pressing or worthwhile to solve.

Liberals do not necessarily endorse any specific doctrine, but they have in various ways been a part of what Dewey has called "the cause of human liberty and the flowering of human capacities." [4] And for an outstanding statement about how a liberal was able to view diversity of thought as a virtue, rather than a vice, we need only recall that in the Library of Living Philosophers volume devoted to his academic accomplishments Dewey concluded his reply to those who had written about his work with the following:

> ...we may felicitate ourselves that we live where free discussion and free criticism are still values which are not denied us by some power reaching out for a monopoly of cultural and spiritual life. The inability of human beings in so many parts of the world to engage in free exchange of ideas should make us aware, by force of contrast, of the privilege we still enjoy and of our duty of defending and extending it. It should make us aware that free thought itself, free inquiry, is crippled and finally paralyzed by suppression of free communication. Such communication includes the right and responsibility of submitting every idea and every belief to severest criticism. It is less important that we all believe alike than that we all alike inquire freely and put at the disposal of one another such glimpses as we may obtain of the truth for which we are in search. If there is one thing more than another which my participation in the discussion composing this volume has impressed upon me, it is the extent and depth of my indebtedness to ideas which others have expressed; --- not only my teachers, students, colleagues and present fellow workers but the long succession of thinkers whose names are enrolled as the bearers of the ceaseless enterprise which is philosophy. [5]

II. On How Experience and Education Can Be Used as One Way to Enter the Wonderful World of John Dewey

Dewey wrote the above views about the "free exchange of ideas" [6] in the late 1930s when it was difficult to imagine that twentieth century totalitarian societies such as Hitler's Germany, Mussolini's Italy, and Stalin's Russia could be as barbaric as we now know they were. And over the years when modern versions of totalitarianism have surfaced around the world I have often returned to Dewey's writings for some guidance and inspiration about what to do when there is "some power reaching out for a monopoly of cultural and spiritual life." [7] Moreover, I realized long ago that my admiration for Dewey's work does not necessarily imply that I agree with what Dewey has said about important philosophical matters; my feeble attempts to submit "every idea and every belief to severest criticism" [8] have helped me understand that I disagree with a number of Dewey's views related to the development of satisfactory educational programs.

Under the influence of the works of people such as David Hume, Bertrand Russell, and Karl Popper, I have come to disagree with Dewey about the notion that educational programs should have teachers create learning situations where students are encouraged to learn and use a pragmatic inductivist view of the scientific method. Although I no longer advocate that educational programs should replace Dewey's version of the scientific method with Popper's noninductivist or falsificationist interpretation of the scientific method, I nevertheless think that Popper and a number of his former students have offered arguments which help us see that it is a mistake for schools to have teachers encourage students to learn and accept any specific view of the scientific method; my current thinking on how educational programs can best deal with the teaching and learning of the scientific method incorporates the idea that it is desirable for students and teachers to figure out for themselves how to answer a question such as, "How might experience or observation be used to aid the learning process?"

The notion of becoming a critic of Dewey's educational ideas was far from my mind when I first read Goodman's "Compulsory Mis-education" over twenty-five years ago; after being exposed to Goodman's outrageous interpretation of progressive education, I was so intrigued by what he said that I went to the library to see if I could find out more about how Dewey's educational views stressed "learning by doing, and very democratic community processes." [9] Now, of course, it is no big deal for a college sophomore to go to the library, but it must be remembered that during my days as a college student I was quite disillusioned about the formal educational process that had influenced my life since I had entered kindergarten in the early 1950s; when I was younger I associated "books with dull drudgery" [10] and I had "lost the impetus to learn" [11] partly because of the way in which learning had taken place in the schools I had attended.

Years ago when I went to a university library to find a book written by Dewey I had no way of knowing that I was about to begin an intellectual project which would keep me busy for decades. Furthermore, I was ill prepared to tackle Dewey's writings when I was an undergraduate student; to this day I well remember the feeling of being overwhelmed to the point of near paralysis when I encountered for the first time the massive amount of written material that rested on the Dewey shelf at the University of Illinois library. And for reasons which are still unclear to me I was eventually able to scan the Dewey shelf at the library. Moreover, after awhile I somehow decided to read Dewey's little book Experience and Education; this short monograph which was written in the late 1930s when Dewey was nearly eighty years old provides an excellent summary and introduction to the educational philosophy developed by Dewey since the time in 1897 when he claimed that "true education comes through the stimulation of the child's powers by the demands of the social situation in which he finds himself." [12]

When I first read *Experience and Education* I was unable to appreciate how well it dealt with a vast variety of perennial educational and philosophical problems that interested Dewey throughout the first four decades of the twentieth century. However, as an undergraduate student I was able to appreciate the clarity of the criticism that Dewey provided for traditional educational programs which were similar to the ones I had attended during the 1950s and 1960s. And in his critique of traditional schooling Dewey asked questions which clearly demonstrated to me that there was some validity to the numerous complaints I had about the formal education I had received during my elementary and secondary school days. In order to understand how Dewey used questions as a significant part of his critique of traditional educational programs we need only recall that in *Experience and Education* he noted the following:

> It is a great mistake to suppose, even tacitly, that the traditional schoolroom was not a place in which pupils had experiences. The proper line of attack is that the experiences which were had, by pupils and teachers alike, were largely of a wrong kind. How many students, for example, were rendered callous to ideas, and how many lost the impetus to learn because of the way in which learning was experienced by them?...How many came to associate books with dull drudgery, so that they were "conditioned" to all but flashy reading matter?
>
> If I ask these questions, it is not for the sake of wholesale condemnation of the old education. It is to emphasize the fact, first, that young people in traditional schools do have experiences; and secondly, that the trouble is not the absence of experiences, but their defective and wrong character - wrong and defective from the standpoint of connection with further experience...The central problem of an education based upon experience is to select the kind of present experiences that live fruitfully and creatively in subsequent experiences. [13]

III. Overview of Dewey's Educational Use of a Pragmatic Inductivist View of the Scientific Method

It is indeed difficult for me to comprehend that it has been nearly a quarter of a century since I had my initial contact with one of Dewey's books. And over the years I have slowly come to realize that *Experience and Education* does not offer a detailed "disquisition upon scientific method;" [14] in order to have a comprehensive understanding of Dewey's views on the scientific method it is necessary to take into account the elaborate arguments that he offers in works such as the following: 1) *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, 2) *Experience and Nature*, 3) *Democracy and Education*, 4) *How We Think*, 5) *The Quest for Certainty*, and 6) *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*.

Now is not the time to attempt a comprehensive account of the Deweyan views on the scientific method. But it should be noted here that Dewey's small book Experience and Education does provide a good place to begin to understand Dewey's idea that the "systematic utilization of scientific method" [15] can be seen "as the pattern and ideal of intelligent exploration and exploitation of the potentialities inherent in experience." [16] And for Dewey

> scientific method is the only authentic means at our command for getting at the significance of our everyday experiences of the world in which we live... scientific method provides a working pattern of the way in which and the conditions under which experiences are used to lead ever onward and upward. Adaptation of the method to individuals of various degrees of maturity is a problem for the educator...Neither the ideas, nor the activities, nor the observations, nor the organization are the same for a person six years old as they are for one twelve or eighteen years old, to say nothing of the adult scientist. But at every level there is an expanding development of experience if experience is educative in effect. [17]

The educational ideas that Dewey developed during the first half of this century incorporate both a negative and a positive thesis. The negative thesis entails the rejection of conventional educational programs that consider teachers and other adults to be reliable authorities who know absolute truths which students should learn. According to the conventional notions about learning it is reasonable to view the minds of students as similar to buckets that can be filled up. Of course, the "bucket theory of the mind" [18] has some holes in it. Specifically, a student's "bucket" often allows for a great deal of seepage. Thus, if students do not succumb to the adult expectations that they are passive receptacles of adult determined absolute truths, then teachers and other educational authorities are often expected to do what is necessary to make students learn the truths which adults value so. And when Dewey began writing about education at the turn of this century the normal disciplinary procedures accepted throughout most of the civilized world allowed school authorities to treat children in ways that most enlightened educators now view as extremely cruel and abusive.

In contrast to the negative thesis about conventional schooling, Dewey developed a positive thesis that incorporates the idea that students in progressive educational programs should be viewed as active learners who need to be given the opportunity to have experiences which could verify that "the organized bodies of truth that we call studies" [19] are made up of "warranted assertions." [20] And, for Dewey, the warranted assertions that students learned in school were to have the "conditional status" of "truth." [21] It is important to note here that Dewey did not consider scientific truths to be "eternal and immutable," [22] but instead he viewed scientific truths as "instruments" [23] that never lose their "hypothetic quality." [24]

Following in the tradition of Charles Sanders Peirce who was his teacher at The Johns Hopkins University during the 1880s, Dewey claimed that the goal of scientific inquiry was to acquire pragmatic truths which might at times be improved upon if people are able to create better ideas and have new kinds of experiences. Furthermore, when students attempt to decide whether or not an idea is true or false, Dewey thought that the classroom could become an experimental laboratory to make "sound inductions;" [25] for Dewey, inductive learning in the classroom would become a reality if teachers could somehow help students obtain "a fair sample or one representative" [26] experience from the class of experiences that verified that an hypothesis being tested was indeed a warranted assertion or conditional truth.

Although Dewey's educational writings consistently argue for the idea that students need to be viewed as active learners who should not be expected to passively accept adult determined absolute truths, it is nevertheless the case that Dewey thought that it was the responsibility of "the educator to determine the environment of the child, and thus by indirection to direct" [27] students to those experiences which would "secure correct conclusions;" [28] at times Dewey would refer to his pragmatic inductivist view of classroom learning as the psychologizing of ideas. That is, for Dewey, good education entailed "reinstating into experience the subject matter of the studies, or branches of learning." [29] Moreover, Dewey thought that it was "a sound educational principle that students should be introduced to scientific...facts and laws through acquaintance with everyday social applications." [30]

IV. Brief Account of Karl Popper's Critique of Inductivist Views of the Scientific Method

The pragmatic inductivist view of scientific learning that Dewey incorporated into his educational proposals is diffuclt to endorse if one accepts the arguments that Karl Popper and others have used to criticize the use of induction in science. Specifically, since publishing the German version of The Logic of Scientific Discovery in 1934 much of Popper's academic work has "opposed the notion that the empirical sciences can be characterized by the fact that they use 'inductive methods', as they are called." [31] And for Popper

> it is far from obvious, from a logical point of view, that we are justified in inferring universal statements from singular ones, no matter how numerous; for any conclusion drawn in this way may always turn out to be false: no matter how many instances of white swans we may have observed, this does not justify the conclusion that all swans are white...
>
> My own view is that the various difficulties of inductive logic here sketched are insurmountable. So also, I fear, are those inherent in the doctrine, so widely current today, that inductive inference, although not 'strictly valid', can attain some degree of 'reliability' or 'probability'. [32]

For over half a century Popper has written a great deal about how "the breakdown of the original inductivist or justificationist programme" 33 for science can be replaced with a falsificationist programme that has "discovered a way to realize the old idea of distinguishing rational science from various forms of superstition." 34 For Popper, science is a rational enterprise when the theories conjectured by scientists can in principle be falsified by observation reports. Also, Popper does not view attempts to falsify scientific theories as the ultimate goal of the scientific enterprise, but instead he thinks that it is best to view the "vague and highly metaphysical notion of "'Truth' with a capital 'T'" 35 as the unattainable goal of scientific activities; the Popperian interpretation of the scientific method as a means to falsify ideas admittedly incorporates a "heroic and romantic view of science" 36 that suggests that "all we can do is grope for truth even though it is beyond our reach." 37

Briefly stated, when we juxtapose the academic works created in this century by Dewey and Popper a dialogue emerges that has the potential to shake the foundations of Deweyan views about how science and the methods used by scientists are important for understanding educational problems. And the older I get the less I am convinced that Popper's solutions to problems related to induction and the goal of science are better than Dewey's solutions. But what Popper's work has done for me is that it has helped me see that there is a need to have some doubt about whether or not it is wise to create educational programs which encourage teachers to help students learn how to be "good" inductivists.

V. Six Educational Questions that Emerge from the Disagreement About How Induction and Truth Are Significant for Science

Popper's interpretation of the scientific method and the aim of science are not widely endorsed by contemporary historians and philosophers of science. Nevertheless, Popper's work can be used to help us see that it is desirable to at least reconsider Dewey's answers to questions such as the following:

1) Should educational programs at any level of learning attempt to have students accept some specific interpretation of the scientific method?

2) Should educational programs at any level of learning assume that there is one best goal for scientific inquiry and all other human attempts to acquire knowledge about the world in which we live?

3) How might personal experience and the experiences from past learners be used to aid the learning process?

4) Are teachers, curriculum developers, and other certified educational experts reliable social authorities who should determine what all students learn during their years in school?

5) Should a school in a liberal democratic society be viewed as a "distributing agency" for the "values and purposes" that educational authorities consider to be "cherished" by the people who live in a liberal democratic society? [38]

6) Is it reasonable for a society to create some schools that are organized as self-governing liberal democratic communities which provide all school members with the opportunity to be personally responsible for discovering the values and purposes that one should cherish?

Much of this essay can be seen as background information which helps to explain why I consider the above six problems significant for developing a modern educational perspective that goes beyond the views developed in Dewey's educational works. However, for now I do not wish to say more about why it might be desirable to challenge Deweyan solutions to a whole host of educational problems. At this time I would like to shift the discussion to issues associated with having innovative educational ideas adopted by existing institutions of learning.

VI. On How Educational Dreams are Often Blocked by the Social Circumstances Existing in Society

Recent educational theorists such as Mortimer Adler, Diane Ravitch, E.D. Hirsch, Allan Bloom, and the members of the National Commission on Excellence in Education appear to me to be a small part of a vast contemporary reactionary retreat from many of the significant humane reforms that were argued for by Dewey and the other progressive educational theorists.

In a sense it is correct to say that many of the suggested contemporary educational reforms that are often considered to be novel are nothing more than modern examples of educational programs which Dewey clearly and decisively criticized with his negative thesis about conventional schooling. Nevertheless, the reforms that have been recommended from various perspectives have usually had little or no significant impact on the way most schools are organized; it appears to be the case that existing educational programs at all levels of learning are extremely resistant to the idea of incorporating in a meaningful way almost all proposals for change and possible improvement. Thus, the gap between theory and practice is often quite huge. In order to understand how reforms are likely to remain more a dream than a reality we need only recall that after studying and advocating many Deweyan educational ideas for over half a century Sidney Hook wrote the following:

> ...today in too many of our public urban schools conflict and violence are so endemic that the police are almost as much in evidence as the teachers themselves to preserve the minimal peace and order without which no genuine education is possible.
> A grim statistic that makes commentary unnecessary is that more than 70,000 American teachers have been subjected to physical assault in their classroom or

> and near school premises during the school year.
>
> Dewey would have been the first to acknowledge that without some appreciable degree of social reconstruction and social peace any educational change can only have a cosmetic character...The philosophy, principles, and practices of progressive education have received widespread lip-alliance but they have not yet been introduced in a wholesale way in any large scale public school system with the requisite degree of community support. [39]

Hook made the above observations nearly ten years ago. And when he died at the age of eighty-seven in 1989 Hook had spent over six decades trying to rescue Dewey's educational ideas from oblivion. But, in spite of his heroic efforts during the final years of his life, Hook and those who worked with him were not able to stop the devastating decline that many of our urban schools have experienced since 1979. And from the little bit that I know about what is going on in schools similar to many of those which exist outside of this building I am embarrassed to recall that years ago I once thought that the formal education I received in the Chicago public schools was so bad primarily because I was bored to tears by much of what was included in the official school curriculum; the problems I had as a student now seem so insignificant to me as I compare them with the problems that people must deal with as they enter many urban schools which require that students and teachers spend much of their time worrying about protecting themselves from being shot to death.

Although I was bored during my days as a student, I was not denied the kind of "social peace" [40] that was necessary for me to begin to explore worthwhile problems that were far beyond the scope of the official school curriculum which seemed to me to be an incomprehensible array of information that had little value for the life I was living and wanted to live. Furthermore, as the situation in the American urban public schools has degenerated in the past few decades I have often thought that the reasonable thing for me to do is to stop criticizing Dewey's magnificent educational writings and join those who wish to bring Deweyan reforms to our schools; there is very little doubt in my mind that the world we live in would be vastly improved if more educational programs at all levels of learning were guided by the ideas consistent with those advocated by Dewey.

Whenever I offer criticism of Dewey's educational views I do it with much hesitation. Yet, the "glimpes of the truth" [41] that have emerged from my attempts to study educational problems clearly suggest that Popper's critique of inductivist views of scientific learning provides one place to begin to understand that it is desirable to reconsider the way Dewey and his followers answered a vast variety of educational problems. In addition, as I have tried to understand how it might be possible to improve upon Deweyan solutions to educational problems, I have come to see that there is much value in the self-governing educational philosophies developed by American educational theorists such as Homer Lane and Paul Goodman; in a sense much of the academic work I have done suggests that in the wake of the Popperian critique of induction the work done by Lane, Goodman, and other self-governing educational theorists can now be understood in a much more positive light than educational scholars once thought.

VII. Scattered Comments from a Journey with Visits to Oblivion and Omaha

In order for students of educational problems to reevaluate the unconventional ideas of self-governing educators it is necessary to first know that there was once a time when a few individuals suggested that it was reasonable to organize some elementary and secondary schools as self-governing liberal democratic communities. And unfortunately, educational theorists such as Lane and Goodman are usually ignored or totally forgotten by scholars who study the development of educational thought in modern societies.

For an excellent example of a contemporary educational study that ignores Lane's and Goodman's self-governing views on learning we need only to turn to Lawrence Cremin's recently published work American Education: The Metropolitan Experience 1876-1980; in this book Cremin does not even make a passing reference to Lane or Goodman in the seven hundred and seventy-five pages of his "comprehensive" overview of the last one hundred years of education in the United States. Thus, it is indeed the case that I have chosen to study the works of minor American educational reformers who are rarely taken seriously by significant scholars such as Cremin. And in thinking about the individuals who have occupied so much of my time in the last few decades I have often found some comfort in a poem called "A Minor Poet;" this extremely brief poem was written by Jorge Luis Borges and it reads as follows:

> The goal is oblivion
> I arrived early. [42]

When it comes to understanding how the depths of despair can be endured and at times overcome with humor and courage Borges far surpasses most other twentieth century writers. But what I find to be inadequate about the philosophy suggested in much of Borges' work is that it is far too fatalistic. For those of us who have been fortunate enough to read Bertrand Russell's "A Free Man's Worship" the goal of oblivion can be seen as one choice among many that are open to people who wish to struggle to be free during their years on "the petty planet on which our bodies impotently crawl." [43] And the distant image of an open society of freedom loving individuals has been a sustaining source of inspiration for me as I have tired to understand the works of self-governing educational theorists such as Lane and Goodman. Also, in my efforts to study a variety of self-governing educational philosophies I have been exposed to fascinating ideas which go far beyond what I was able to comprehend when I was a bored and anxious student sitting in one of the distant conventional classrooms of my youth.

A major mistake that is made in conventional schools is that the young are taught "to hold in higher esteem those who think alike than those who think differently;" [44] much can be gained if we help the young understand that honest and legitimate disagreements are extremely possible when individuals "bring creative thinking to bear" [45] in their efforts to solve significant problems. Furthermore, one of the great benefits that can be derived from studying self-governing educational philosophies is that people will discover that in the history of Western educational thought there have indeed been a few individuals who argued that self-governing educational programs are better than the more conventional kinds of schools which exist throughout the United States. Of course, the case in favor of self-governing schooling is far from clear-cut. And when I think about explaining to others why it might be desirable to create a few self-governing educational programs I have often been reminded of a poem that Carl Sandburg once wrote; the Sandburg poem that has been on my mind throughout writing much of this essay is called "Limited" and it reads as follows:

> I am riding on a limited
> express, one of the crack
> trains of the nation.
>
> Hurtling across the prairie
> into blue haze and dark
> air go fifteen all-steel
> coaches holding a thousand
> people.
>
> (All the coaches shall be scrap and
> rust and all the men and
> women laughing in the diners
> and sleepers shall pass to
> ashes.)
>
> I ask a man in the smoker where
> he is going and he
> answers "Omaha." 46

VII. Concluding Remarks

In some metaphorical sense it is correct to say that all of us are on some vehicle headed for the same destination. But in our travels we often decide to go to different places as our lives and the world move in ways we never totally understand. In our adventures we may at times choose to travel along with Dewey and others like him who wish to head for specific destinations where we can rest and enjoy the fruits of our labors. At other moments we may choose to join Popper and his friends on a trip toward some unattainable destination which inspires us and helps us see that all the places we visit are not the final stop in our quest for a richer life. However, the point to be noted here is that we do not have to imagine that we are on a Deweyan or a Popperian limited express. On the contrary, the vehicle in which we travel is partly our own creation; by accepting the responsibilities that go along with being self-determining individuals we can make decisions about when it is worthwhile to travel with Dewey and when it is to our advantage to take a trip with Popper. And as our travels progress we may find that in an elevator or some other unlikely place we may meet a person who can teach us things never imagined by even Dewey or Popper.

Although the works of Dewey and Popper may at times provide guidelines for helping us to get to places we wish to go, there is no need to become over committed to what has been said by either of these men. The decisions about where we should go and how we should get to our destinations can be seen as individual choices; we can use the ideas of

Dewey, Popper, and others for inspiration and guidance, but if we wish our lives to become our own, then we must learn to make our own choices about where to go and how best to achieve the goals we have chosen. And if people someday decide to create self-governing educational programs that tolerate diversity of thinking about problems which are important to individual learners, then we may finally learn how to make the educational process a significant human activity that allows students and teachers to communicate honestly with one another in the quest for truths worth knowing.

Thank you for your time this evening.[47]

The End

Footnotes for Doing Dewey Again and Again

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2. Friedrich Nietzsche, "The Dawn" in Walter Kaufmann (ed. and trans.), *The Portable Nietzsche* (New York: The Viking Press, 1964), p. 91.

3. Paul Goodman, *Compulsory Mis-education and the Community of Scholars* (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), p. 48.

4. John Dewey, *Liberalism and Social Action* (New York: Capricorn Books, 1963), p. 93.

5. John Dewey, "The Philosopher Replies" in Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), *The Philosophy of John Dewey* (New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1951), pp. 607-608.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Goodman, "Compulsory Mis-education," p. 45.

10. See footnote thirteen.

11. See footnote thirteen.

12. John Dewey, "My Pedagogic Creed" in William Robert McKenzie (ed.), John Dewey: The Early Works, 1882-1898, Vol. 5 (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1972), p. 84.

13. John Dewey, Experience and Education (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938), pp. 26-28.

14. Ibid., p. 86.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid., p. 88.

18. For an historical account of the notion that minds have often been viewed as buckets see Karl R. Popper, Objective Knowledge (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 85-88.

19. John Dewey, The Child and the Curriculum and the School and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 11.

20. John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), pp. 4-11.

21. Ibid., p. 345.

22. Ibid.

23. John Dewey, Experience and Nature (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1958), p. 154.

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26. Ibid.

27. Dewey, "The Child and the Curriculum," p. 31.

28. Dewey, How We Think, p. 173.

29. Dewey, "The Child and the Cirriculum" p. 22.

30. Dewey, Experience and Education, p. 80.

31. Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York: Harper and Row, Publisher, 1965), p. 27.

32. Ibid., pp. 27-29.

33. Karl R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations (New York: Basic Books, Publishers, 1962), pp. 228.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid., p. 231.

36. Karl R. Popper, "Replies to My Critics" in Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Karl Popper, (LaSalle, Illinois: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1974), Vol. II, p. 977.

37. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, pp. 29-30.

38. John Dewey, The Philosophy of Education (Totowa, New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams and Company, 1975), p. 37.

39. Sidney Hook, "Introduction" in John Dewey, Essays on Education and Politics 1915 (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1985), p. xxxvi.

40. Ibid.

41. See footnote five.

42. Jorge Luis Borges, The Gold of the Tigers (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1977), p. 65.

43. Bertrand Russell, Mysticism and Logic (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1957), p. 48.

44. See footnote two.

45. See footnote one.

46. Carl Sandburg, Complete Poems of Carl Sandburg (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1950), p. 20.

47. Excerpts from this paper were read at the 1990 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society. Also, while writing the many drafts of this essay I have received helpful criticisms and suggestions from the following individuals: Joseph Agassi, Richard Barron, Arthur Brown, Harold Cafone, Robert Craig, Ronald Cramer, Lawrence Dennis, Stephenie Edgerton, Gerald Freeman, Leonardas Gerulaitis, Nancy Grant, Walter Krolikowski, Michael Oliker, David Owen, Richard Pipan, Philip Smith, Robert Stern, Ivan Swartz, Marla Swartz, and Susan Swartz. I would like to thank all of the people mentioned here for their interest in my work, but I of course accept full responsibility for the ideas developed in this essay.

The Lady from Spain *

Response to Ronald Swartz
by
Lawrence J. Dennis
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale

I first read Ron's paper in a 727, stuck on the ground overlong at St. Louis' airport. As you heard, it is witty, urbane, but also, like all his work, provocative and poetic. I also had with me on the plane, in another plain brown wrapper, an article submitted to a journal for which I am an editorial reviewer. The difference was startling, and, I think, pointed up to me, a tired dissertation reader, much of what troubles education today. The writer(s) conducted an experiment, in order to find out whether certain procedures could help students become more reflective. This was done chiefly through microteaching.

Ron, as you heard, is dealing with weighty issues--with those sorts of issues that attracted most of us, certainly me, to philosophy of education. I came into the field not asking the question schoolboy Swartz asked, "Why do I have to learn what is being taught to me at school?" Rather, I came as a teacher who found himself asking, "Why do I have to teach what is being learned in school?" Thus, I was drawn into what has turned out to be a twenty-five year reflection on what it means to teach and, concomitantly, to learn. Not surprisingly then, I am skeptical when I hear that students may assume a more reflective posture toward teaching as a result of 5-6 minutes of instruction. A life-time skill concentrated into a tiny time capsule. (Teaching bytes--the educational equivalent of political sound bytes!) Why should we expect differently? George Counts told us that an educational system can rise no higher than the culture of which it is a part. This seems to me to be a case in point. There is a connection between the state of government, the state of society, and the state of the schools. I'm sure Ron would agree, and I have no doubt Art Brown would also. Five to six minutes might be now the outer limit of concentration. That means his paper was too long!

Please understand, I do not mean to denigrate the author(s) of this article--our own undergraduate teaching block is also (so I heard a few weeks ago, before our recent NCATE review) rooted (gasp!) in reflective teaching. It is, I understand, current orthodoxy. Current orthodoxy requires also that to teach something one must measure it. The author(s) did this, and no significant differences were found between the experimental and control groups; several reasons were suggested for this. It was not suggested, however, that the whole enterprise is an absurdity--an absurdity mirroring the social and political absurdities of our age.

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* There was a young lady from Spain
Who did Dewey now and again.
By "now and again,"
she was quick to explain,
Meant now--and again and AGAIN.

Last week I was in Orlando to attend the AESA annual convention--Walter was too; in fact, we met at the Epcot center in an eating hole which was not up to his customary high standards. Many of you will remember our trip to the Serbian restaurant last year--that was the real thing. At Epcot we met at the Moroccan building where the lamb was overheated, the wine French, and the instrumental accompaniment to the belly dancer on tape.

It strikes me that Epcot is the fundamental metaphor for the end of the twentieth century. Nothing is what it seems; truth is replaced by half-truth, believed because it comes dressed in a technological dream-coat. Differences are smoothed out, and the tension and ambiguities of our thoughts are massaged to euphoria. One walks the streets of Paris, or visits a London pub, or stands in the shadow of a Piazza della Signoria look-alike without going more than a few yards, but it's all fake. No dust, no poverty, no garbage, no smells, no LIFE. I also went to the futuristic exhibits at Epcot. They included Exxon's Universe of Energy, which is visited by thousands of people each week, many of them young and impressionable; I suppose many of them are old and impressionable! The viewers are told, no they are brainwashed, with all the multi-media resources of corporate America, that the oil business is essentially altruistic in its service to humankind, that the shores of Alaska remain pristine, that pollution--free energy is round the corner, that shale can provide all the oil we need, and so on. The law of entropy is finally contradicted.

Well, I'm drifting away from Ron's paper and from his time, but let me get back to it. I don't think I've ever made a secret of my admiration for Ron's work. He has style. He takes us with himself as he reveals himself. Through his conversation he helps to forge our community--a community of philosophers of education concerned about education, the schools, teaching, learning, and students. I read too many pieces that, in the name of a misguided and ultimately nonexistent objectivity, hold me at arm's length, that talk at me and not to me, that leave me cold, that lack passionate commitment. In Orlando I heard a marvelous phrase, actually from an old Mount Holyoke chemistry syllabus. Students were to learn how to make palatable a "soft and miserable bread." In educational writing we are asked to swallow much soft and miserable bread--we are even required from time to time to say that we like it, that we'd like more. So it is wonderful to come here and to be fed, not only the meal that Walter always manages to use his influence to provide us, but to share with you an intellectual repast. Ron has provided us with a post-desert--in the older days it was known as the savory--and that brings to my mind the old saying if the salt has lost its savor where with shall it be salted? Well, it hasn't lost its savor here. No soft and miserable bread, this evening.

Now, I have not dealt with the content of Ron's Paper. I knew Phil would do that. But whether Dewey's work is or is not the "sacred text," is perhaps not the point, as illuminating and helpful as discussions on this topic are. What _is_ the point, and here Dewey and Swartz (John and Ron) would agree, is that we engage in reflective thinking. This is a continuing process, not a byte, and it should help us to discriminate between the real and the phony, the authentic and the spurious, the trivial and the significant, the form and the substance. It is here that Ron again has helped me to think about important educational and life issues, as I trust he has helped you also.

Robert P. Craig, Ed.D., Ph.D.
College of Education
University of Houston - University Park

Last year at this meeting I delivered a paper on institutional democracy and health care.[1] In it I argued that institutional democracy as a management strategy was demanded for two reasons: 1) By the very mission of health care itself, namely the growth and development of patients and employees; and 2) that the nature of the workforce with its demand for participation necessitates some form of institutional democracy. In this paper I wish to go further and to argue that institutional democracy as a management strategy in education (or in any institutional setting) is an ethical demand—or imperative, if you will, in Kant's sense of categorical imperative.[2]

Likewise in last year's paper I defined institutional democracy by reference to the principle of subsiderarity, that is, decision making in a work situation should be done at the level in which the decision is impacted.[3] This would mean, among other things, that employees would hold themselves responsible and accountable for the decision since they made it. Or, in current jargon, that they would "own" the decision. I would like to initiate my discussion by broadening the definition of institutional democracy—or at least broadening the areas of its impact.

To my mind there are four broad areas in a work setting which institutional democracy impacts. First, employees in an educational setting, to be specific (and not merely teachers), may participate in setting goals. They may also participate in making decisions, that is, choosing from alternative courses of action. Thirdly, they may participate in solving problems. This is a somewhat more complicated process which includes the definition of issues and the generation of alternative courses of action as well as choice among the alternatives. And finally, participation may involve making changes within the organizational design of the school, or what is referred to as organizational development activities.[4] Obviously the above areas are not mutually exclusive. For instance, participation in an organizational development activity would necessitate problem solving, decision making and goal setting. The reason the four areas are separated is for heuristic purposes, that is, to better understand what institutional democracy may encompass.

In my opinion there are three ways to argue for the "appropriateness" of institutional democracy as a managerial strategy. One would be to gather evidence that institutional democracy results in improvements in performance and productivity—as well as improvements in the functioning of a particular organization. Such evidence, although not absolutely conclusive, has been elaborated on elsewhere.[5] Another method would be to argue that institutional democracy as a management strategy satisfies basic work needs, such as the need for security, challenge and creativity. It is certainly the case that when such work needs are not met individuals feel alienated, used and insecure.[6] Although the above two arguments would comprise a more systematic and comprehensive analysis of the ethical demand for institutional democracy, I wish to follow a different approach.

Much has been written recently regarding business ethics, managerial ethics and the ethical responsibility of business. This is sometimes referred to as organizational ethics.[7] One way to compress the literature is to notice that two divergent views regarding organizational ethics are argued. The first may be termed a "essentialist" view. In such a view management is responsible only for its direct actions and not for any consequences of those actions—such as the failure of defective equipment. Obviously this view pre-supposes that management is not responsible nor accountable for any aspects or elements of social justice, such as equal employment opportunity, or such community efforts as improving the local physical environment.

The second position, which may be termed the "ethical responsibility" viewpoint, is concerned with at least two areas of managerial ethical and ethical responsibility.[8] The first, and usually the area of primary involvement, extends to such direct activities as ethical and socialvalue integration in production, marketing, hiring, disciplining, termination, and so on. The second area of ethical/ethical responsibility extends the scope of managerial responsibility to issues which include such activities as safety concerns, environmental pollution, the impact of work on the growth of employees and a vast array of fairness and equity issues.

Many educational leaders would probably have a difficult time accepting either the essentialist view, with its lack of concern for human development and the value/ethical demands of the work place, and the ethical responsibility view, with its liberal extension of management responsibility to practically every value/ethical concern dictated by popular ethical conscience. It is desirable, then, to elaborate a view which mediates both the essentialist and ethical responsibility standpoints, that goes well beyond essentialism but does not extend as far as the ethical responsibility paradigm.[9] This "integrative" view argues that management should be held responsible for reasonably predictable consequences of its actions. Put differently, one is obliged both to prevent harm and to rectify the negative consequences of one's actions, when those consequences were (or could be) reasonably predictable. Without rigidly defining "reasonably predictable," it will be found that this is a reasonable ethical requirement for the practice of educational leadership.

The argument up to this point, then, is that when properly applied, designed, and implemented (concepts which will be developed shortly), institutional democracy will result in performance and productivity improvements. Not even those whose biases lead them to argue against institutional democracy's effectiveness seem willing to assert that institutional democracy is any less effective than alternative nonparticipative approaches.[10] Thus, at the worst, there is no "cost" to the school (or district) that elects to implement institutional democracy.

Although not argued in any detail, I have noted that institutional democracy, when properly implemented, will satisfy basic work needs. At the very least, failure to satisfy them is harmful to employees, both psychologically and physically. This logically follows from the concept of "work needs." It is therefore inescapable that institutional democracy is an ethical imperative, if one accepts the minimalist ethical position just articulated, namely, do no active harm to other people. The logical conclusion, then, is that one can satisfy this ethical imperative best—and perhaps only—through the appropriate application of institutional democracy.

The ethical base that is defined here is, indeed, basic. It has little to do with sophisticated concepts of "ethical justice", deontology or teleology. It is less subject to ideological argument, therefore. It seems difficult to argue against the individual's basic right not to be knowingly harmed by other persons' actions. A further conclusion, then, is that it is ethically unjustifiable to manage nonparticipatively, unless one maintains the essentialist position and asserts that in a civilized society individuals do not have a basic right to remain unharmed by the actions of others. Let me, then, briefly consider some of the implications for educational leadership if one were to accept institutional democracy as an ethical imperative.

Let me first consider what an individual administrator can do without any special organizational support to implement institutional democracy. Such an administrator might give subordinates more control and responsibility over their work. Note that control is tied to the concept of "responsibility." For instance, school administrators can set goals with teachers (and not merely accept goals from a state board of education). Such a process will almost certainly improve performance as well as develop participation. Educational administrators can offer teachers, among others, decision alternatives on work matters (instead of simply giving predetermined directives), can ask teachers how work-related problems might be dealt with (instead of simply providing solutions), and can solicit teachers' ideas for making changes (instead of insisting on the status quo). By using the four basic types of participation previously mentioned, educational administrators can provide teachers, among others, with increased control over their own work behavior, thus satisfying a basic work need. Even if no changes are possible, giving teachers more autonomy, say—and the responsibility for controlling their own work—is almost always possible. At the very least such a process would lessen the rift often felt (and expressed) between administrators and teachers.

To meet other basic needs, the educational administrator interested in implementing institutional democracy might make assistant administrators', department chairs' and teachers' job assignments more complete, more like a "whole job," so they can get a sense of completion and achievement from their work and judge how well they are doing. Setting goals is an indirect way to provide feedback on task accomplishment, but it can be a useful approach. Feedback is critical because one can only improve if one knows how well one is doing.[11]

Participating in solving school and instructional problems or in a formal change project (implementing effective schools' criteria, for instance) more directly fulfills the need for task completion through the use of institutional democracy. Even if formal programs are not feasible, educational administrators, etc. can surely ask teachers and staff for their ideas on problem solutions or needed changes. This is more likely to have a positive impact if their ideas are used.

The most direct way to provide opportunity for task completion and the resulting sense of accomplishment, I think, is to make modifications in the school or job assignments to create more naturally complete tasks.[12] While it may seem unrealistic at first glance, it is surprising how much impact even very small changes in this direction can have.[13] It has been found, for example, that even assembly-line jobs can be changed a little by having workers perform a few more operations so that the work is more like a complete task.[14]

Finally, the assistant administrator or department chair can, in many cases, form work groups or teams and apply some of the (or all) four types of participation previously enumerated in team or group settings.[15] Group members are then able to develop new skills, to schedule and control their own work, to see a whole task, and to feel responsible as a team for the effective accomplishment of their task. Although it is far better to design the work itself as a group task, when this is impossible it may still be possible to use groups on an occasional basis, as for instance, a task force team to deal with a special decision or problem issue.

If only a few school administrators, etc., take the actions just outlined, they may not make an impressive contribution to overall school organizational effectiveness, but this will result in clear, albeit small scale, improvements in performance and productivity, as well as in healthier school employees whose basic rights are being effectively recognized and acknowledged by ethical school leaders.

From a more fully organizational developmental perspective, schools can be encouraged to develop clear and public statements of organizational values. This could be the first step in organizational change toward a more effective pattern of institutional democracy. The schools mission/philosophy statement can create an institutional democracy "mind set," because it is the first step in the cycle of defining goals, developing strategic plans, implementing those plans, evaluating the results, and then revising philosophy, goals, plans, or implementation actions on the basis of those results.

The main point is that the cycle is started and guided by the school's values—its philosophy or "mind set." Thus by making value implementation conscious and overt, the school can gain a degree of control over the values students, administration, teachers and staff live by, and can, to some extent, choose those values that promote increased organizational effectiveness—in part through institutional democracy. The key here is that values cannot be imposed on a school. They must come from all those interacting within the school environment. Otherwise there is little "ownership." That is, key values may differ from one school to another, but in all cases the values ought to be clearly recognized and used as a basis for action. It is of special interest that one of the small set of superordinate values that are commonly found in excellent organizations is a belief in the importance of people—the members of the organization—as individuals. One can only speculate on how schools would be different places if such a value were implemented.

CONCLUSION

I have briefly sketched an argument that institutional democracy is not merely effective in terms of performance, productivity, and other measures of organizational effectiveness within a school setting; but also that institutional democracy is a moral and ethical imperative. The case for institutional democracy has been made through a combination of argumentation and strong propositions, and it is recognized that the model of institutional democracy presented in this paper is not fully proven, indeed if it can be in principle, and that there are differing interpretations of the effects and effectiveness of institutional democracy.

The position argued for in this paper is clearly and openly value based. Yet it has also been argued, although not in great detail (which will be the subject of a future paper), that institutional democracy is indeed effective, in terms of performance and productivity, when properly implemented. While we do not know everything there is to know about the organization and management of schools (and hopefully never will, lest such issues become rigid with little room for variance and alternatives), we do understand reasonably well why institutional democracy is effective, and sometimes ineffective. And I have argued about how to develop an ethical institutional democratic approach in a school setting so that it succeeds in improving productivity and in meeting human work needs as well.

We know how to use institutional democracy effectively; and we know its limits reasonably well. Whether one would apply ethical institutional democracy in management principles and practices in public schools depends primarily on whether one chooses to design and construct work settings in which institutional democracy, and people, will flourish. In the near future it may become impossible for people to pretend that the decision to use or not use institutional democracy is based on anything other than their values—and the values of the school as it relates to the local community. To put the conclusion as strongly as possible, for those of use who adhere to the basic value precepts of western civilization, the choice is clear.[17]

Institutional democracy in a school setting is not, of course, practical in every situation or circumstance. What is more, not every teacher or staff member may wish to participate. Some people seem to prefer responsibility which requires doing the minimum, that is, doing only what they are told and no more. Obviously a commitment to intitutional democracy means much more than this. Yet, such individuals who do not desire to participate, as long as they do nothing to undermine the institutional democratic precess and abide by the decisions made, cannot be forced to participate. To do so would contradict the theory of institutional deomcracy. But perhaps some individuals not wishing to participate may merely be adapting as best they can to the only type of top-down work situation they have experienced in the past--a point made lucidly by Douglas McGregor some 30 years ago.[16]

We know, at this point, how to use institutional democracy effectively; and we know its problems and limitations reasonably well. Since the decision to develop an institutionally deomcratic management environment is value laden, this decision must be based on the recognition that individuals (as well as schools) develop human skills, virutes, dispositions and traits when sucha system is managed effectively. It is this ethical commitment which forms the basis of such a decision.[17]

Notes

1) Robert P. Craig, "Democratizing Health Care Facilities." Chicago, Midwest Philosophy of Education Society, November, 1989.

2) See, for instance, Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, in Kant's Political Writing, Ed. Hans Reiss. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

3) Craig, "Democratizing Health Care Facilities," p. 3.

4) Perhaps the oldest and one of the most respected reviews of such participative concepts is Aaron Lowin, "Participative Decision Making," in Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, (February 1968).

5) See, for example, B. M. Straw and L. L. Cummings, Eds., Research on Organizational Behavior. (New York: JAI Press, 1979).

6) Karl Marx is perhaps the originator of such a view.

7) For various theories on organizational ethics, refer to, Tom Beauchamp and Norman Bowie, Eds., Ethical Theory and Business. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1983).

8) For an analysis of the relationship between management models and ethical responsibility, see, Marshall Sashkin, A Manager's Guide to Participative Management. (New York: American Management Associations, 1982). I am especially indebted to Sashkin's work in the development of this paper.

9) Ibid., Chapter three.

10) This is noted by Rosabeth Moss Kanter in "Dilemmas of Managing Participation," Organizational Dynamics, (Summer 1982).

11) I am indebted to Dr. Kim Kehoe, Director of Executive Development, Rice University, for an elaboration of this point. Kim Kehoe, "Managing Effectively," unpublished manuscript.

12) Tom Peters develops this idea in Thriving on Chaos: Handbook For a Management Revolution. (New York: Alfred A. Knofp, 1988), Chapter Four.

13) The "Hawthorn Effect" is a famous elaboration of this.

14) Peter Drucker refers to this in Managing in Turbulent Times. (New York: Harper & Row, 1980).

15) Peters, Thriving on Chaos, Chapter Four.

16) Douglas McGregor's Leadership and Motivation is a classic in this area.

17) I would like to thank Professor Arthur Brown of Wayne State University for many enlightening discussions on Institutional Democracy. I am sure he will find many of his ideas in this paper.

TEACHING PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION: THE INHERENT TENSIONS

by Edward G. Rozycki

Introduction

The idea for this paper came from a conversation with a colleague who was preparing a conference panel presentation on improving pedagogy in philosophy of education. Conceding its intrinsic merits, I wondered whether his concern with pedagogy had any strategic dimensions. Was his underlying concern, perhaps, to promote philosophy of education to the infidel? Would attempting pedagogical innovation be worth the trouble if only for only our self-edification? Was there no expectation of higher student evaluations, or, perhaps, extra-disciplinary respect? Had he no compulsion to reconquer lost Deweyan domains of influence; no secret lust, even, to wrest control of schools of education from the minions of Scientism?

Levity aside, let's consider how improving pedagogy in philosophy of education might have broader consequences. If what underlies such efforts are strategic disciplinary goals, certain important questions have to be addressed. By strategic disciplinary goals I mean any of the following:

a. enhancing outsiders' perceptions of the discipline of philosophy of education as a study worthy of their substantial effort.

b. regenerating the esteem that many believe the discipline to have enjoyed in the earlier part of the century.

c. by virtue of a and b, strengthening the academic positions of philosophers of education in their competition for university resources.

What I will address in this paper is the extent to which individual efforts can be reasonably seen to bear on these strategic issues. How could improved pedagogy in philosophy of education affect the status of philosophers of education?

The institutional contexts in which philosophy of education is practiced are an environment of conflict, a situation where reasonable yet competing goals tend to undermine any straightforward procession to strategic disciplinary goals. For example, student expectations as well as departmental or school "mission", however vaguely it may be conceived, can have important effects upon the conduct of the philosophical enterprise.

Late in the exposition I will present as an example a pedagogical technique for developing relevant philosophically analytic skills that surmounts the political difficulties commonly encountered in those contexts in which philosophy of education is practiced.

Examining Some Tensions

A colleague - let us refer to him as Boethius - was hired to teach philosophy of education part-time to fill in for someone taking a sabbatical from (let us call it) Bigschool U.. The new adjunct was cautioned that the Bigschool U was "conservative" yet urged to "help the students understand how their beliefs and values would affect their efforts as practicing teachers." Boethius was amazed at the size of the department he was working in: it was two to three times as big as most he knew of. Most of the faculty was tenured. Yet the department had been generally professionally quiescent. How did it manage to capture the student body it needed for mere economic survival?

He soon got an idea. Within a week, after having explained to his class how the common practice of "teaching to the middle" rested on the same rationale as medical triage, he was summoned by his department head to a conference. His department head cautioned him that despite Boethius' decades of experience in the public schools, he didn't want him to advocate approaches to education that "we" -- who, exactly, left unclear -- believed to be discriminatory against certain members of society.

Wondering if this was a manifestation of the "conservative" nature of Bigschool U and how that jibed with the framed picture of Che Guevara on the department head's desk, Boethius suppressed his feelings of indignation and calmly explained that he had been advocating nothing, but had been misunderstood. He thought he had taken pains to indicate that the introduction of the concept of triage was for the purposes of analysis: teaching to the middle is justified in the same manner as triage: it is an attempt to ration scarce resources. If it is objectionable then the general rationale underlying both teaching to the middle and triage has to be examined.

The department head suggested that recognizing the politically charged atmosphere of Bigschool U was a consideration in avoiding alienating sizable numbers of their education majors. Boethius left with little to console himself with but a sense that it would probably be his last semester teaching at Bigschool U.

This anecdote indicates certain tensions that anyone who teaches philosophy of education must negotiate. There is a risk to be run no matter whether one answers yes or no to the following questions:

1. To the extent they are incompatible, is philosophy aimed at the comfort or the edification of prospective educators?

(A critical perspective is often not welcome by hopeful teacher aspirants who believe themselves in need of little more preparation than a "correct" attitude.)

2. Ought one to bring to the surface the disciplinary hostilities that are inculcated under the banner of "educational science"?

(It is not uncommon to find professors in putatively scientific educational disciplines taking pains to make invidious comparisons with philosophy and using texts that importune the reader with insistent claims about the scientific status of their discipline.[1])

3. Does one press to develop collegiality or discipleship in one's students?

(In a culture permeated with technological hyperbole, philosophy is insufficiently formalized to intimidate students into conceding authority to the instructor. Students do not recognize that non-technical thinking can be done more or less adroitly, that is it not merely a matter of "feeling." Also, a university overly sensitive to economic and political pressures undercuts traditional supports for initiation into the discipline, e.g. threats of failure or of dismissal from major programs, even enforcement of traditional civilities.)

Examining Consensus

Though lip-service is given to "action-orientation" in many schools of education, philosophers are often more welcome as missionaries of the contemplative life than as critics of practice. Perhaps, the missionary role assures both their dismissal by students as irrelevant and their eventual disciplinary demise as competitors for university resources.

Some philosophers of education anesthetize themselves to such apprehensions by proposing a stronger alliance with departments of philosophy in Liberal Arts. This confusion of a long and honorable tradition of inquiry with the particular institutional accidents which support some of its practitioners - as Richard Rorty might put it, "to confuse philosophy with Philosophy" - is both political and moral folly. Their location in a school of education gives philosophers of education a mission that insulates them from the kind of pointlessness of which Rorty accuses traditional academic philosophy. This mission, however, need not be merely the promulgation of comforting (or even, discomforting) ideology, but the exercise of their unique perspective in voicing useful approaches to the more intelligent practice of education.

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What I present you with here is, of course, less of an argument and more of a homily. My concern is not merely with defining ends and noting the tensions generated by the means I choose to pursue them. There is a third dimension, often overlooked by philosophers, which may substantially affect the direction of our common enterprise: that is, the nature of the consensus we arrive at in pursuit of the undertaking.

We may agree on an issue or proposal in a variety of ways. Our consensus may be broad or narrow depending on the number (large or small, respectively) of people agreeing with us. Even more important, our consensus may be deep or shallow depending on the number of commitments we understand to follow from our initial agreement. Argument, the employment of logic, conceptual analysis, many of our philosophical techniques can be understood as means for deepening our consensus. Logic, for example, enhances the efficiency of our consensus by enabling us to generate a maximum of "theorems" from a minimum of "axioms." Our consensus on the axioms is transformed into consensus on the theorems, if we are also agreed on the logic of generation.

Remaining in this metaphor, I submit that the task of the philosopher of education is to maximize consensus in the most efficient manner on "theorems" of educational practice. Consensus may be maximized by extending its breadth or its depth or both. The breadth of consensus may be extended by arguing how commitments to certain practices (theorems) require commitments to certain theories (axioms) or modes of thinking (logics). Here efficiency requires finding the minimal number of such axioms needed to "generate" the practice. Finding such a minimal set will likely maximize the political support for the practice since a minimal set of commitments is less likely to gainsay other commitments held by those whose backing we seek. (Such a procedure may also be used to argue against a practice by showing it to "be in contradiction to" other, widely accepted higher order principles.)

We may also maximize consensus by increasing its depth. That is, we may, in a similar but somewhat converse manner to that described above, begin with a consensus on general "axioms" and work down to the practical level. Lest this seem merely like philosophical child's play, I would admonish the reader that the connections between educational policy and implementation are widely recognized as problematic. No small reason for this is that questions of consensus are generally ignored. Philosophers of education occupy a unique position in that their institutional context justifies their addressing such concerns (as, for example, location in a Liberal Arts department would not). Secondly, there is no other discipline in schools of education with the tools and traditions that would support such inquiry. (Sociology of education might be a competitor were its concerns with the nature of inquiry more self-conscious.)

Contemplation vs. Action

Philosophers of education are uniquely situated to *address* problems in education in a manner that promotes their practical treatment.. This is not to say that philosophers of education need be able to solve such problems. It is rare, in practice, that argument, however well-constructed, unambiguously indicates a course of action. Decision almost invariably involves risk. We might well avoid certain actions were we able to foretell all of their consequences. This is no reason for philosophers to retreat from the practical concerns. Rather, we should expect that a large element of our reasoning will contain information of a specific, historically situated kind. The consequences of actions taken without "complete" theoretical justification have to be noted. Such history is important and necessary for good decision making but will never -- one might suspect -- preclude the possibility of risky future action.

We ought not to expect that intelligent practice will be replaced by algorithms concocted by contemplative philosopher kings. On the other hand, given the institutional circumstances of education today, those who hope to develop reasonable,.humane educational practice cannot dispense with philosophers of education.

The Basic Triad of Tensions

Let's return for the moment to a metaphor I will call "the basic triad of tensions". Ends compete with means and both of these compete with consensus. As individuals in a recalcitrant world we must often adjust our ends to the means by which we attempt to achieve them. As members of a social group, particularly as we are dependent on others for their assistance, we may have to make further adjustments to our ends and means by taking into account others' willingness to go along.

Figure one gives a geometric representation of the basic triad as as set of vectors.

figure 1

The Basic Triad of Tensions



Depending upon how we expand or delimit the interpretation of ends and means, this triad could as easily be interpreted as a tension between any of the following:

a. ends -means- consensus; or

b. authority - efficiency- consensus; or

c. criteria -technique- consensus; or

d. morality- technology- politics.

If we recall the anecdote given earlier about Bigschool U, we can easily see the tensions involved (although they are more complex than the simple triad illustrated above. We will generate a controlled complexity below.)

ENDS: help the students understand how their beliefs and values would affect their efforts as practicing teachers. There was, for example, a conflict here between what Boethius as opposed to his students believed it was necessary to know about the school.

MEANS: indicate that teaching to the middle is justified in the same manner as triage: it is an attempt to ration scarce resources. This immediate means to Boethius' ends was frustrated by some of his students' rejection of it as "cynical."

CONSENSUS (of department head and students): to discuss is to advocate. Advocacy of triage is wrong. Students need not (will not?) take courses advocating "wrong" ideas.

The result was that Boethius, who continued to pursue his goal with the same means despite lack of general consensus, was not invited back the next year despite the availability of classes. A sufficient number of students (about 20%) complained that after taking the course they were considering not entering teaching. The prospect now seem considerably less comfortable than their other professors had depicted it. (It occurred to Boethius that his department head feared that a reduction of 20% in student enrollments might affect the fiscal health of the department.)

Contemplative Infinity with Practicability

Clearly, these tensions are not merely the constructs of my example. The ends-means tension has been recognized since antiquity. And consensus issues are the primary ones that undermine the philosophy of education not only with respect to its relations to other disciplines within schools of education, but also within the discipline itself. Consensus issues abound in education.[2] For example, I have polled students and classroom teachers over several years to identify what knowledge they think is primary for teachers. The same item is chosen as the first of ten options[3] again and again: knowledge of "efficient teaching." Of far less importance to them is knowledge of cultural difference or the effects of organization on behavior. Nor are many particular interested in examining what "efficient" might mean.

I will attempt now to tie two strands of argument together: the basic tensions with considerations of how contemplation serves action. I will extend the metaphor of a triad of tensions by building into it that bugbear of philosophical argumentation: an infinite regress. The infinite regress allows for the possibility of peculiarly philosophical inquiry but does not get in the way of practical decision.

Allow a parallel example. The computation of pi is an infinite process which lends itself to a variety of mathematical investigation. This does not hamper its use as a calculational constant. If we consider philosophy to be a kind of general "criteriology", then we can easily see the infinite regress in the offing. If our purpose is to specify the set of criteria, c, by which qualities are truly predicated of objects, then we pursue theoretical completeness by specifying criteria c' in terms of which predicates of c are truly predicated, etc. But rather than take the impossibility of completing the enterprise as an argument against its undertaking, we invoke a pragmatic maxim such as: do as much analysis as in useful in the circumstances. (Perhaps a second maxim is needed also: don't feel guilty that you cannot practically pursue infinite outcomes. If this seems like dereliction of one's Platonic duty, it probably is.)

What I am suggesting is that the role of the philosopher of education is to investigate that "interface" where theory and practice come together. Contemplative infinity is required to make the inquiry peculiarly philosophical -- restrictions which delimit it will tend to define a special science. However, focus on practical results, to use a Wittgensteinian metaphor, provides the friction which keeps our theoretical wheels from spinning pointlessly.

I will construct our new model that will have, hopefully, a philosophically interesting quality of "contemplative infinity." What I am looking to do is to generate a recursion. To do so I will generalize the terms in our basic triad, ENDS-MEANS-CONSENSUS to CRITERIA-TECHNIQUE-CONSENSUS. The generalization is plausible because ends are judged to have been met in terms of certain criteria and means may likewise be subsumed under technique. We can then understand that to investigate CRITERIA or TECHNIQUE or CONSENSUS individually generates new questions about new tensions among a subsidiary CRITERIA-TECHNIQUE-CONSENSUS triad.

To illustrate: let us consider how we might go about determining what philosophy of education is about. What we are looking for are criteria - call them C_1 - for determining what is and what is not a disciplinary concern for philosophers of education. But in focussing here on C_1 we encounter the basic triad albeit restricted in scope. We find we have to deal with a subproblem of consensus on criteria - here C_2 - and technique by which to identify items of C_1.

This regression is contemplatively infinite. What is interesting is to examine how we in fact break the regress for practical purposes, just as we might investigate how we round off pi for the purposes of some calculation. (Would such an investigation be philosophy? That we might be tempted to raise this question indicates another consensus problem.)

The Conflictual Fractal

We need a somewhat more complex model for a map of philosophical inquiry besides the calculation of the number pi. I will use a geometric metaphor borrowed from Benoit Mandelbrot, the fractal.[4] The particular example given in diagram 2 is called a "Koch's island" and it is generated by taking an equilateral triangle and pasting to each side another equilateral triangle whose sides are 1/3 the length of the original.side.

This aggregation of additional area done is such a way as to build up the figure so that a common periphery is maintained be carried on indefinitely. In the limit -- as mathematicians are wont to say of their contemplative infinities -- the Koch's island has an infinite boundary with a finite area approximately measuring .693.

figure 2


Fractalization:Contemplative Infinity
Example: Generating a Koch's Island
Step 0
Initiator
Generator
Step 1
perimeter = 3
area = .433
Step 2
perimeter = 4
area = .577
Step 3
perimeter = 5.33
area = .641
Limits: perimeter = ∞
area = .693

What makes this an interesting metaphor for the relationship between theoretical and practical inquiry is that it catches our sense of diminishing returns as reflection faces the need to take action. The amount of additional area captured in each step of the progression towards the infinitely complex Koch's Island diminishes exponentially. Yet computational effort is not reduced.

In order to visualize the relationships among the three tensions I present in diagram 3 a "conflictual fractal."

diagram 3

Conflictual Fractals


Each subpart of a fractal reproduces the configuration of the whole.
CONSENSUS
CRITERIA
TECHNIQUE

This fractal image supports our intuition that certain questions are more, others, less central to our concerns as practitioners of philosophy of education. (See diagram 4)

diagram 4

Locating Some Problems


CONSENSUS
What is the Point of the Discipline?
Discipleship to Collegiality
"Real" Philosophy?
CRITERIA
TECHNIQUE

We can understand how consensus on the point of philosophy of education as a discipline in a school of education is a much more critical question than the infra-disciplinary query as to what extent philosophy of education is "real" philosophy. Certainly just as critical is the concern for developing collegial status in those who begin by just being our students. What I will propose in this last section of the paper is that our attempts to ensure the continuance of the discipline by the nurturance of students (disciples) into colleagues suffers from a severe tension between criteria and technique (or norms and pedagogical approach, to use another interpretation.)

I will illustrate this tension by examining the problem in getting students to think dispassionately and carefully about the contrast between punishment, cruelty and the infliction of pain. Students, not uniquely, tend to equate criticism with animadversion rather than with examination with an eye to evaluation. They come to their philosophy of education courses having already been inculcated with beliefs such as:

a. Punishment is cruelty;

b. Prohibiting corporal punishment prevents cruelty;

c. Inflicting pain is punishment.

d. If punishment is retributive, it is immoral.

With careful analysis, each of these statements can be strongly argued to be false or misleading.[5] But how does one present such argument without its being dismissed as special pleading, or -- even more frustrating -- conceded as "mere opinion"?

Now, we might succeed in having our students reject a through d above by using strongly indoctrinatory techniques. But this is at best to create disciples. Also, because such an approach is exactly what most students expect both the value of the discipline and the trustworthiness of the instructor suffer in their eyes. Another approach is needed: one that captures what trained philosophers might agree one but which elicits the commitment of the novice.

Coaching Critical Philosophy

The trick to achieving consensus through critical analysis is to be a coach, a mid-wife, not a dictionary or some other kind of absolute authority. You must allow for the possibility that the most novice may correct you. This has several benefits. First, the technique gains credibility; there will be consensus on the results. Second, easily as important, you will discover interesting, sometimes important, things about the linguistic communities you are dealing with.

You may begin by despairing that anything can be done with the ideologically-charged slogans your students emit with such thoughtless ease. However, you will end up not only having convinced them to amend their discourse, but to become more observant in the process: observant in that peculiar way we recognize as philosophically sensitive.

Or, it may turn out that certain kinds of dissensus define boundaries among speech communities with the practitioners from each community, yourself included, becoming aware of the discursive costs and benefits of their commitments.

How to Do It

The basic technique is this:

a. Working with a group of students, present them with a set of carefully constructed contrastive cases relevant to the distinctions at issue. (A set of examples will be provided below.)
b. Have them examine the cases for similarities and differences.
c. Prior to discussion, have them vote *by show of hand* how to categorize each case with respect to a given category: yes, no or maybe. Keep a tally of these choices. (See the form given below.)
d. Direct individual students to explain to the others why he or she differs on a specific case. (Don't ask for explanation for why they agree!)

e. Act as a moderator, pointing out how and maybe why they might differ, or where they may differ not, say, on criteria but only degree, and the like. Let the students do the criticism! Nonetheless be prepared to introduce other considerations as you see necessary.

f. Do case profiles and adjust the case-profile chart (also given below) so that there is consensus on points of agreement, disagreement and uncertainty. (Recast the profiles in definitional form if it is useful.) Very often all will agree on the reasons for the consensus - or lack of it.

In a minute we will look at a set of contrastive cases. However, some immediate comments on the procedure are in order:

1. Let whatever antagonism is generated to be done so by group members among group members. There will not likely be any deference to rank as there might if you were to comment on their choices. Nor will there be any logically irrelevant concessions made.
2. A small group (4-10) works best both in order to assure everyone a chance to explain and in order to make individual ideological commitments vulnerable to group pressure.
3. Examine conceptual contrasts that bear on cogent issues of practice! Any current slogan will suggest something. Some exciting ones are "punishment-cruelty-infliction of pain", or"race-ethnicity-class". Save more technical distinctions until your class understands the process, e.g. "reward-reinforcer".
4. For practical reasons, use triads of concepts, unless there is an abundance of skill and time available. We will see that this is a consideration in constructing the case examples.
5. Pursue good pedagogy and good philosophy will *eventually* follow. Your attempting to impose "correctness" is self-defeating.

Figure 1 on the next page illustrates a set of cases for examining the distinctions among "punishment-cruelty-infliction of pain" These distinctions are crucial to practice in our public institutions because there is substantial sloganeering to the effect that

a. punishment is morally undesirable because necessarily cruel;

b. sports where pain may be inflicted is morally wrong;

c. prohibiting corporal punishment abolishes cruelty.

These slogans not only exaggerate to the point of confusion but they tend to do a disservice to the concerns that underlie them.

figure 1
Clarifying Concepts: A Case Study Approach:
Punishment, Cruelty, Infliction of Pain

CASE EXAMPLE	punish-ment?	cruelty?	infliction of pain?
1. 5 year-old Arnold falls into a hole after pinching his sister and running out into the backyard.	yes / no / ? / /	yes / no / ? / /	yes / no / ? / /
2. Mrs. Smith vigorously slaps her 5-year old son, Arnold, 3 times on the buttocks because he pinched his little sister after having been warned not to do it.	/ /	/ /	/ /
3. Mrs. Smith vigorously slaps her 5-year old son, Arnold, 70 times on the buttocks because he pinched his little sister after having been warned not to do it.	/ /	/ /	/ /
4. Mrs. Smith vigorously slaps her 5-year old son, Arnold, three times on the buttocks because she enjoys doing it.	/ /	/ /	/ /
5. Mrs. Smith gives her 5-year old son, Arnold, a cookie after he pinches his little sister.	/ /	/ /	/ /
6. 6-year old neighbor Jeffrey vigorously slaps 5-year old , Arnold, three times on the buttocks because he pinched his little sister after having been warned not to do it.	/ /	/ /	/ /
7. Mrs. Smith says to her 5-year old son, Arnold, "I wish you would die, you bad, bad little boy! I hate you!" because he pinched his little sister after having been warned not to do it.	/ /	/ /	/ /
8. Mrs. Smith vigorously slaps her 5-year old son, Arnold, three times on the buttocks because he pinched his little sister three years ago after having been warned not to do it.	/ /	/ /	/ /
9. Mrs. Smith sends her 5-year old son, Arnold, to his room because he pinched his little sister after having been warned not to do it.	/ /	/ /	/ /
10. Arnold vigorously slaps his mother three times because he is angry at her.	/ /	/ /	/ /

Constructing Worksheets

The worksheet of case examples is constructed from your own hypothesis as to how certain concepts compare and contrast. Your analysis is based on your speech community and the literature you draw on in making the contrasts and comparisons. The group you work with may not make the same conceptual cuts. You may attempt to get them to understand how the distinctions you find useful could be useful to them. Or, as a consequence of this activity, you might abandon a distinction as pointless. Or you and your students might discover an even more interesting way of looking at them.

Constructing a set of case examples for contrast and comparison is a matter of logic and a little narrative ingenuity. You take all the logical combinations of variables and construct a narrative for each combination. So two concepts give you four combinations, e.g. TT, TF,FT,FF; three give you eight and so on in powers of 2. A triad of conceptual contrasts is most convenient. Note that in figure 1 there are 10 narratives: two are redundant.

So for the group, "punishment-cruelty-infliction of pain" we construct narratives that exemplify the following:

a.something that is punishment, cruelty and infliction of pain simultaneously;
b. something that is punishment and cruelty but not infliction of pain;
c. something that is punishment but not cruelty yet infliction of pain

Thus we continue for all logical possibilities. Once you have constructed all your narratives, mix them up on your presentation sheet.

Case Profiles: the chart

A case profile chart (see figure 2) merely lists both the concepts into which the cases are typed and the criteria identified as relevant by the group against the cases considered. Each typed case can then be correlated with criteria it satisfies. The items given in figure 2 are from an actual class sample.

figure 2:CASE PROFILE CHART
(partial chart for "punishment" etc.)

**TYPE\CASE #	1	2	3	4	5	etc
Punishment	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	...
Cruelty	No	Yes/No	Yes	Yes	No	...
Infliction	No/Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	...
*****CRITERIA	*****	*****	*****	*****	*****	*****
Agency	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	...
Recompense	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	...
Authority	No	Yes	Yes	Yes/No	NA	...
etc.	...	...	...	...	...	...

It is important not to make this profiling too analytic a process. Note that each case is typed first and then constitutive criteria are considered. This is because most people can say what a thing is even when they are unable to articulate why. It is possible that a review of the criteria in the profile chart may necessitate a retyping of the cases. This is to be expected.

Having experimented with this approach for several years, I recommend it to you for several reasons. The first is that students like it: they feel they are involved in discovery (they are, indeed), rather than merely bowing to authority. Another reason is that the level of discussion becomes amazingly sophisticated after a short period of time, particularly if you take pains to mark the distinctions they discover with the traditional vocabulary as it pertains.

Beneath the veneer of conflicting slogans lies an often amazing consensus on criteria and/or authority.. Once the group agrees that a distinction is useful you may want to point out how certain slogans obscure it and generate inconsistencies in parlance or practice;In those rare cases where dissensus persists and is stable, you and your class will have discovered a real boundary among linguistic communities. Exploring its dimensions and the form of life that supports it is a particular challenge.

The Tensions Addressed

The case-example method described above addresses the tension between criteria (authority, norms, ends) and technique (efficiency, means). The objection to it I have encountered is a consensual one. It goes something like this, "Granted that this process helps some students developed skills useful to philosophers, but, is this really philosophy? Isn't it rather some kind of linguistic anthropology? After all, a good deal of what the case method approach turns up are empirical facts about actual speech communities, not meta-linguistic generalities of the kind we have traditionally recognized as the focus of philosophy. At best, you are creating a scientific technique. But, again, is that really philosophy?"

I am inclined to dismiss this objection as subtle animadversion. Or perhaps, to be kinder, one might say that at best is demonstrates an unexamined adherence to a doctrine which equates -- to use Rorty's distinction again -- philosophy with Philosophy. It confuses the critical tradition of inquiry with its present academic institutionalizations. But such confusion does not merely make philosophy of education a subordinate discipline. It warrants its demise.

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[1] See for example Audrey Haber and Richard P. Runyon **Fundamentals of Psychology** Fourth Edition (New York: Random House, 1986) esp.pages 5 -15 beginning with a depiction of how science beginning with Bacon "threw off the shackles of philosophical speculation" (p.5)

2 One indication of the ubiquity of consensus issues in philosophy of education is indicated by the very extent to which this paper is not a straightforward deductive presentation; but rather, a complex rhetorical mixture.

[3] The last survey I conducted with 100 undergraduate education majors. The results were similar to those of preceding years. In descending order of priority the students thought the following to be most important for a teacher to know about: Improving Teaching Efficiency, Punishment and Control, Rewards and Reinforcers, Evaluation, Rationales for Intervention, Learning Styles, Educational Problems, Pluralism and Culture, Educational Reform, Systemics and Organization.

[4] See presentations of Mandelbrot's theory in James Gleick, **Chaos: Making a New Science** (New York:Viking, 1987) or in John Briggs & David F. Peat **Turbulent Mirror: An Illustrated Guide to Chaos Theory and the Science of Wholeness** (New York: Harper & Row, 1989)

[5] See Edward G. Rozycki, "Pain and Anguish: the need for corporal punishment" **Philosophy of Education 1978**, pp.380—392

IS TEACHING A SCIENCE OR AN ART?

Alexander Makedon
Assistant Professor
Department of Curriculum and Instruction
Chicago State University
Chicago, Illinois 60628

I. INTRODUCTION

Is teaching a science or an art, or both? If both, to what extent is it either, and why should it be even if it *can* be? In the paper we shall attempt to throw light on these questions by, first, discussing the meaning of the terms "art" and "science," including the difficulties involved in such discussion. Knowing more about the meaning of the terms "art" and "science" may help us to better understand what it means to teach as if teaching were either an art or a science. And second, we throw more light on the *second* question by building those analytical tools, such as, TAA and TAS (explained below), that will help us to understand not only whether teaching is an art or science, but if it is both, then exactly in what amount or degree is it either, or at least can be.

In the paper, we refer to that type of teaching which assumes that teaching is a science as "teaching-as-a-science," or TAS for short; and that type which assumes that teaching is an art, as "teaching-as-a-an-art," or TAA for short. TAS and TAA are not themselves specific teaching methods, but two different "methods" for finding teaching methods. Metaphysically speaking, they are "meta-methods" of teaching, rather than specific teaching techniques. Although they are not fully developed educational philosophies, they are based on certain underlying philosophical assumptions[1]. For example, undergirding TAA may be a variety of different philosophical views regarding the nature or purpose of art, and therefore also of TAA. In any event, TAA and TAS are not independently existing ideas in the Platonic sense, but instead "makeshift" constructs designed for the purpose of helping us to understand the differences between the two types of teaching[2]. Finally, it may be noted that as meta-methods of teaching, TAA and TAS require that we see even formal schooling from a distance. Theirs is the educational landscape that extends well beyond the classroom, since the classroom itself is no more than just another teaching method.

Although closely related, the attitude that a teacher adopts toward himself as the *teaching agent* is not identical to that which he adopts toward his students as *learners*. By TAA and TAS we mean the attitude that a teacher adopts toward his teaching, than toward his students as learners, or of his students toward their learning. A teacher's attitude or practice toward his teaching is also different from the attitude or practice that students may adopt toward their teacher. As a result, it is not inconceivable that a teacher use a scientific curriculum under TAA, or an artistic curriculum under TAS. For example, a teacher may hold the view, as did John Dewey, that students should learn through the scientific method, but consider his own teaching more his creatively designed art, than his empirically pretested science[3]. For example, he may consider a scientific curriculum "aesthetically appealing." Alternatively, a teacher may require that his students engage in artistic activities precisely because it may have been shown in a scientific experiment, hypothetically conceived here for illustration purposes, that students learn more or better by engaging in such activities. In other words, a teacher may reject science in the curriculum because of his commitment to science in his teaching. Again, what is important here for our purposes is not how students learn, including their curriculum or teaching methods, since they may learn artistically or scientifically under either TAA or TAS, but whether how they learn is the result of their teacher's either artistic or scientific attitude.

II. METHOD IN THE PAPER

Our paper is built from the ground up, as opposed to assuming the truth or validity of any one theory or definition of art or science, and building it deductively from the top down. The closest we come to examining existing theories is in our hypothetical analysis of what teaching might be like were art or science defined according to this or that pre-existing theory of art or science.

III. THE TERMS "ART" AND "SCIENCE" IN LANGUAGE

Are art and science different? Are there certain characteristics, ideas, or activities associated with either one which, taken together, may show art to be either like or unlike science? If the two, art and science, are not different, then it makes no sense that we should be asking whether teaching is a science or an art: art and science are the same, and therefore so are TAS and TAA. As such, it wouldn't really matter whether teaching is practiced as either an art or a science, since the two types of teaching practice would be the same, but that teaching as an art or a science should be practiced at all (as opposed, for example, to teaching being practiced as neither art nor science).

If art is not different from science, then it makes no sense that we should have two different terms in our language to describe essentially the same thing. Unless we have been wrong all along in having these terms, or at least in how we have been using them, art and science are different, and, therefore, so are teaching as an art and teaching as a science. On the other hand, we should also note that historically man has changed the meanings of terms in his language several times, which also explains how languages have evolved over time to better reflect man's understanding of the world[4]. This means that popular linguistic usage or understanding of the meaning of different terms may not be the best or only means of finding out what different terms mean, or, in our case, of finding out whether "art" and "science" are truly different. In any event, we submit that unless all science is art, or all art science, a point to which we shall return again in the paper, there must be certain underlying principles or practices in science which we can't reject without at the same time becoming unscientific, and the same may be said regarding art. If that is so, then the same may be said about TAA and TAS as was said about their corresponding artistic and scientific "contents." In the paper we shall attempt to discover those underlying artistic or scientific principles in teaching that make TAA and TAS at least possible, and possibly desirable.

IV. ARE TAA OR TAS DESIRABLE?

Since what teaching should be is not the same as what it can be, we may find that at least some of the things that teaching can be, be they either art or science, are undesirable. This issue of "desirability" opens a whole new pandora's box of underlying reasons for choosing this rather than that, for example, a specific mission statement, or, more broadly, an existential view of teaching, rather than, say, a Marxist view. In the paper we neither defend any specific view of teaching, nor the underlying ethical theory that may give such view its larger meaning, but instead examine teaching hypothetically. By "hypothetically" here we mean that we assume a certain view of teaching, and then ask what might be the significance of such view for TAA or TAS.

Suffice it to give here an example of the relevance of ethics to our view of TAS and TAA. Thus on the basis of a situational view of desirability, that is, on the basis of the view that what is desirable is what is considered by the society at that time and place to be desirable, there are certain types of teaching which a society may consider undesirable even if it could be shown that they are at least possible. For example, in a culture that does not value science, as the Middle Ages in Europe did not, no matter how scientific teaching may be shown to be, or perhaps because of it, such teaching will remain undesirable[5]. But even if the majority of the people in a society, or their representative institutions consider certain things, say science, to be undesirable, that doesn't mean that everyone in that society does, as there may be certain individuals whose view of what is desirable is diametrically opposed to social views at large. As representatives of alternative ideas, such individuals may be seen as a threat by those whose ideas and character structure have been shaped by an altogether different view of the world[6]. Finally, we may disagree not only with how other people or the society as a whole come to evaluate the desirability of this or that (for example, of TAS or TAA), but also, and more fundamentally, with their underlying "definition of definition," that is, their meta-definitional metaphysics (or, as we refer to in the paper, their "definitiology").

We begin our paper by defining the terms "teaching," "art," and "science," and the constructs TAS and TAA, below.

V. DEFINITION OF TEACHING

Trying to define teaching may be no less difficult than trying to define anything. We decided to lay open some of the problems associated with definitions by examining in some detail our preliminary thinking process in defining teaching here, as we believe that similar problems arise in defining the terms art and science, and, by extension, TAA and TAS.

Since teaching signifies a method of conveying information, its precise definition may depend as much on which larger theory of teaching one is willing to adopt, as on what are the ultimate educational goals which teaching is designed to serve. Since there are numerous theories of teaching, or at least potential theories that may be extrapolated from larger systems of thought in the various social and humanistic disciplines, there are at least as many different definitions of what teaching is, or at least of what teaching should be[7]. For example, in the field of philosophy of education alone, definitions of teaching may vary from the existentialist view of teaching as an enabling exercise, to the Platonist view of teaching as recollection, to the Deweyan view of teaching as facilitating[8]. If one is unaware of all these theories, or of ways of extrapolating different definitions of teaching from them, he may identify teaching with only that type of teaching which he has himself seen or experienced in school; or, if dissatisfied with such teaching, with what teaching he has imagined is most appropriate for the fulfillment of certain educational goals[9].

On the other hand, if one were to re-phrase the question to mean not what teaching ought to be, but more precisely what teaching "really" is, then since teaching is not a thing that can be touched, and therefore shown to be this or that in a certain tangible or "real" form, the next best thing might be either to question whether there is such a thing as "real" teaching, or to take a survey to see what others think teaching really is. But again, simply because the majority of the people in a certain society or situation, or its representative legal or political institutions think that teaching is such and so, doesn't necessarily mean that teaching really is that, since it might have meant something else to the same society in the past, or to other societies elsewhere. It follows that what definition of teaching we adopt, we could neither justify on the basis of wider social practices or beliefs, as we may be assuming precisely that which we wish to define; nor on the basis of larger philosophical systems, as we must also show what reason we have for adopting them, and so on, ad infinitum.

If teaching is possible to define ex cathedra, it might be possible that we baptise it with a meaning that we can commonly agree on; or, if that is impossible due to certain obvious communication obstacles among the different users of the term "teaching," to define teaching a priori, assuming that such definition is clearly qualified as such by its author, or intended at best as a personal dictionary term of his own choosing[10]. It is in this last sense that we decided to define teaching to mean the conveyance of skills or information at the elementary and secondary grade levels. We have intentionally left our definition rather simple and open-ended, as we believe that circumscribing it further will neither add to its power to organize our thoughts, nor leave room for the possible logical re-adjustments that our inquiry into the nature of TAA and TAS may later require.

VI. DEFINITIONS OF ART AND SCIENCE

Since both art and science are human activities, they share at least in the fact that they are man-made and controlled, as opposed to being controlled by, say, nature, chance, God, or other living organisms. Consequently, if there are any differences between the two, and by extension between TAA and TAS, they can't be because of what man does as man, since they are more alike in that respect than unlike, but because of how man perceives the qualities of his scientific and artistic activities, including their methods, goals, and related scientific and artistic attitudes, to differ. In other words, if art and science are different, they may be more different in degree, than they are different in kind. This may explain why it is often difficult to distinguish between art and science in human activities, including teaching, as such activities are usually perceived as including a little bit of both[11]. Of course whether this is the case, and if so, whether we are justified in calling something either "art" or "science" if it is neither by itself alone, depends, as mentioned earlier in the paper, or our chosen definitiology.

For our purposes here, suffice it to mention that where science represents man's attempt to understand the world, and therefore is not much different in that respect than other attempts by man to understand, art may be seen as man's *attempt to help the world to understand*[12]. In his attempt to understand the world, man developed methods of empirical observation of existing facts, with all the disbeliefs or "doubts" for unobservable "facts" that such methods entail. In the process of trying to understand the world, man also developed what is now known as the "scientific method," or what amounts to several rather similar scientific "dialects." This doesn't necessarily mean that he has allowed his method to cloud his understanding, but that this is how he thinks he can understand the world to the best of his ability at this time in his history. Furthermore, if as a result of the technological revolution scientists are more intent today on finding what works, in what is also known as "applied science," that doesn't necessarily make science any more the handmaiden of technological control, or the cause of technological problems, than architecture is the cause of poorly built buildings, or, for that matter, philosophy of bad theorizing. Consequently, it seems unfair that we should blame science for the problems that technology may have brought about, as it is not science itself that caused us all these problems, but how we used it[13].

Finally, it may be pointed out that unlike those who blame science for what is essentially man's failure to use it "better," there are also those, including the philosophers of the enlightenment, who saw science as liberating mankind from superstition, or from the political unfreedoms that such alleged superstition allowed the dominant institutions during the Middle Ages to exercise[14]. Thus quite differently from those who see science as taking away man's freedom, *they* saw it as an opportunity for man to exercise it by relying on his own senses, including his common sense. This is, incidentally, also John Dewey's argument for the scientific method in education, as he saw it as an opportunity for our students to use it to solve problems, and thus also to build the kind of character or "habit" that is necessary for the survival of democratic institutions[15].

Ironically in this regard, Dewey did not consider teaching itself a science, but a combination of art and science, and if forced to make a choice between the two, more like an art than a science[16]. As he put it, "If there were an opposition between science and art, I should be compelled to side with those that assert that education is an art."[17] While he advocated the scientific method for our students, hoping that eventually they internalize it, he did not think that teachers themselves should practice it in deciding how to teach. Putting the issue of whether teaching is a science or not temporarily aside, we may note here regarding Dewey that students may be getting contradictory messages from teachers who don't practice what they preach, and therefore in effect come to view even the scientific method with cynicism.

By contrast to science, which may be seen as man's attempt to understand what is outside, in the world around him, and thus to bring what is outside "in," art may be seen as his attempt to bring what is inside, "out." This may explain why art is usually seen as a "creative activity," as it allows the artist to re-create outside himself that which he feels inside, in his heart, or thinks about or imagines in his mind. While art may be seen as an opportunity to express one's inner feelings or ideas for everyone to see on canvas, read in a story, or hear in a musical composition, science may be seen as a method that man has developed to help him "assimilate" in his mind the world outside. This may explain why artists often portray something that exists as they would like it to be, as did a Rembrandt, or, more clearly, a Salvador Dali, while scientists make an effort to portray it "objectively" as-is. It may also explain why artists often read into nature certain images that may not be there, while scientists could not possibly confuse a tree that looks like a person for the person without also distorting, thus in effect "destroying," scientific objectivity. Finally, I refer to the creation of artifacts as the "objectification" of personal feeling, since the artifact gives personal feeling a form which everyone can objectively see. Alternatively, I refer to scientific understanding as the "subjectification" of reality, since through the techniques of observation that the scientist employs the world "enters" inside his understanding.

Although the "reality" which the artist portrays may be more "real" than scientific reality, as it must be at least to the artist, it is nevertheless more subjective than science. This doesn't mean that the scientist has no imagination or will of his own, as he is as human as the artist, and therefore no less liable to re-interpreting, or even "mis-interpreting" the world. What it means is that where the artist is given free rein to reinterpret the world, the scientist makes an effort to describe it objectively. This may be seen from the work of artists who must work as scientists. For example, artists who are hired by scientists for designing scientific illustrations, for example, the illustrations in a medical encyclopedia, are not allowed the freedom to recreate reality as artists, that is, as it can help them express a new vision or feeling, but must recreate it as scientists, that is, as true to what is commonly observable as possible.

If there is art in science, it is re-directed to serve science, and therefore becomes in effect "scientific." The same may be said about the role of science in art: it is re-directed to serve art, and therefore in effect becomes "artistic." For example, an artist may use the latest scientific findings to better express his new vision of the world, as do, for example, filmmakers. If, as Dewey claimed, there is no opposition between art and science, it doesn't mean that the two are logically identical or "coextensive." Consequently, there is no reason why TAA and TAS should be, or that they are so hopelessly opposed that there can be no science under TAA, or no art under TAS. In fact, as we have seen in some earlier examples, it is not inconceivable that a teacher adopt scientific activities for his students under TAA, or artistic activities under TAS.

Finally, another way to compare art with science may be to examine how artists and scientists use symbols. Thus although both use symbols to represent things or ideas, artists use them to represent their inner feelings, as a painter might by using a certain line or color to express his anger; while scientists use them to help them represent the world without feeling, "objectively" as one might say, as a chemist might by assigning certain widely agreed upon symbols to certain observable phenomena[18].

VII. TAA AND TAS COMPARED

It follows from our discussion of art and science, above, that under TAA teaching in no less an artifact created primarily by the teacher-as-artist than any other so-called "work of art." Consequently, teachers are free to rearrange what they know or possess to express objectively their inner feelings or ideas about teaching. Thus a teacher-artist may use his classroom for his canvas, his teaching methods for his brush, and his learning materials, even his students, for his paint. Finally, it may be pointed out that since under TAA teachers are not scientists, they are not bound by "empirical evidence" that certain of their techniques may be learning ineffective for their students. Aside from the issue of how learning effective a teacher's art may be for his students, it also risks becoming his self-centered use of other people's energy and time. For example, a teacher under TAA may so require his students to follow his art, that some of his students who would rather not learn under their teacher's "artistic" method may consider his teaching oppressive or even intellectually "suffocating."

While science aims at expressing reality subjectively, through the artistic creativity of the artist, science aims at expressing reality objectively, through the empirical investigations of the scientist. TAA is not any less expressive of reality than TAS, except the reality of TAA is the teacher's own, while the reality expressed by TAS is based, at least in part, on the students' observable behavior. Some examples of the scientific study of such "behavior" may include James Coleman's sociological study of the effect of social class on academic achievement, Jean Piaget's "psychological" study of cognitive development in children, and Philippe Aries' historical study of the behavior of adolescents in several western societies[19]. Implied in TAS is the idea that there is nothing that a teacher-as-artist does effectively that another teacher could not study objectively, or in turn apply in his teaching. By contrast, even the most learning-effective teacher may be seen under TAA as a "bad" artist, and therefore as a bad teacher. This means that while TAA may have immortal value as art, it is no more valuable as art in the fulfillment of learning goals, than a painting of a clear blue sky is in reversing the Greenhouse effect in the earth's atmosphere.

Although admittedly artists may reveal "truths" about human nature that can be revealed in no other way, or by no others, they may also feel the need to self-centeredly "use" others to better express their feelings. They may become so concerned with themselves, as they must be as artists, that they risk denying others their own "art," or, to paraphrase Jean Paul Sartre, their becoming artists-for-themselves[20]. This may be particularly true in situations where others may be forced by the circumstances to "depend" on the artist for guidance or leadership, as is clearly the case with students who have no choice but depend on their teacher for guidance[21]. This doesn't mean that all teachers who teach as if teaching were an art, or "teacher-artists," are insensitive to their students' own artistic needs, as there may be those whose teaching is so creative as to inspire students to new levels of unprecedented achievement. What it means is that the nature or "structure" of art-work itself is such as to lend itself easier to self-absorption, and therefore to possible lack of empathy for others[22].

On the other hand, if teaching were to become a science, what inclination a teacher may have to express his inner feelings or ideas, or to creatively represent through his teaching example a new way of teaching, he must channel it within the boundaries established by the scientific method. A teacher with a new idea or image of how students learn can't propose it as a "fact" unless he has at least tested the "truth" of his assumptions empirically, or knows for a fact that someone else did. If he is bound by certain "rules of evidence," a teacher under TAS is not also discouraged from being creative or original. For example, he can't even begin to test ideas without at least some ideas to test. Consequently, he can be creative in the ideas that he proposes to test, for example, in formulating hypotheses for further testing, although not also in how selectively he can exclude certain facts that "disprove" his ideas.

Alternatively, if a scientist has new or original ideas, they must not only be tested empirically, but, unlike the view that an artist may have of the world, must be at least testable[23]. Thus while an artist can paint unicorns running in a field, or write a whole story full of imaginary characters, a scientist can't even say whether they exist, let alone describe what they do. Consequently, underlying TAS is the idea that however imaginative or creative educational theories may be, and there is no reason why they can't be, they must not only be tested, but also be fully testable.

If science lends itself easier to empirical observation of the world outside, it doesn't necessarily mean that no scientist risks ever replacing the world outside with ideas of his own[24]. If a scientist is less liable to doing so than an artist, that is, to replacing observable phenomena with ideas of his own, his is as "human" an interpretation as the artist's, and therefore as influenced by human thoughts and emotions as any human interpretation potentially can be. For example, a scientist may become so engrossed in his work, as to rarely see it objectively from a distance, or to examine critically its underlying scientific paradigm[25]. As a result, his attachment to science may become as strong a feeling for science, as the artist's presumably is for his art[26]. In fact, as a result of his scientific education, work in science, and emotional attachment to science, he may become unable to examine science critically, and thus end up using science to express his feelings, in this case, his feelings about science, rather than to understand the world "objectively" as-is. Seen from that angle, a scientist may be no different from the artist for whom his personal feelings or ideas are the starting point for his work. As a result of doing science without thinking critically about it, scientists risk practicing science as if it were a mechanical "technique," rather than a critical "praxis."[27]

We conclude from our discussion so far that whether a scientist can show logically that the scientific method is "superior" to another method of inquiry, the fact remains that practicing it uncritically is not the same as knowing why you practice it. What makes an "uncritical" scientist even more "biased" in this case than the artist is the fact that, unlike the artist who is at least aware of the subjective nature of his art, the scientist who practices science uncritically simply assumes that science is not "subjective." His "science" may become as powerful an emotion in his subconscious, as anything else which man does "blindly" as a result of "passion."[28] The irony here is that it may be impossible to show logically the superiority of the scientific method, or, more broadly, of "science," even if one were to examine it critically from a distance. It is to a brief examination of the logic of science that we turn to, next.

VIII. THE LOGIC OF SCIENCE

If a scientist attempts to "prove" the validity of the scientific method, he may find that it is an almost impossible task. Thus in his attempt to "test" experientially the "truth" of certain theories, he may be may be assuming the "truth" of an untested one through the means he employs to test it--namely, the theory that the scientific method itself is valid, or at least more valid than another method of inquiry[29]. If he attempts to test the "truth" or "validity" of the scientific method, then we can test it by using either the scientific method, or by some other means. If he uses the scientific method to test the validity of... the scientific method, then he would be assuming precisely that which he set out to prove, thus falling into a circular argument that proves nothing. If he uses another method, say, the "aesthetic method," then even if he can thus show that science is "true" or "valid," to be really true or valid he must also show that the method he used to test science (in our example, the "aesthetic method") is also valid[30]. Now if he uses still another method to test the validity of the aesthetic method, say the method of poetic intuition, then he must show that that method is also valid, which may lead him to choose another method to test the validity of the method of poetic intuition, and so on ad infinitum. There is no end to how many methods he must prove to be valid in order to show that the scientific method is valid, and therefore impossible to show that the scientific method is, indeed, valid.

Finally, even if it were possible for him to show through another, non-scientific method that science is valid, the fact that he did so through another method assumes that the other method is also valid. Such procedure is based on the assumption that the scientific method is not the only method that is valid. We conclude that faced with a choice between two equally "valid" methods, a scientific and a non-scientific one, there is no reason why anyone, including the individual teacher, should choose only the scientific method to test the validity of a learning theory. If he does, it may be because of what he perceives he can accomplish by using it, than because of anything inherently logically superior or "valid" in the scientific method itself.

IX. THE ROLE OF RULES

Rules make science, including the rule that nothing is "in fact" the case unless it is empirically verifiable; while in art, rules may become the subject of creative re-design by the artist[31]. It follows that under TAA, teachers are not only allowed more freedom to express their feelings than they are under TAS, but also more freedom to create their own rules of representation of feelings and ideas. For example, a teacher with particularly strong feelings regarding the creationism versus evolution controversy may re-arrange his teaching method and curriculum around his personal beliefs, or even make it a requirement that his students be able to identify his views in a test to pass in his class. By contrast, teachers under TAS can't arbitrarily replace scientific rules with rules of their own without possibly destroying precisely that which they are presumably advocating, namely, science itself.

On the other hand, it is not inconceivable that scientists change the rules of scientific inquiry to improve science. As means for the achievement of scientific goals, scientific rules of inquiry are no more necessary than are all means as means, in general. To put it bluntly, they are what scientists think at the time can better serve scientific goals. If they change their rules of observation or experimentation, that doesn't necessarily mean that scientists have changed science itself, since their goals remain the same, but only what means they perceive will better serve their ultimate scientific goals. Thus while keeping constant their goal to describe (predict, understand) the world as-is, scientists may find ways which in their view will better help them achieve their goal[32]. Consequently, it is not inconceivable that if teachers under TAS change its rules, they are not arbitrarily replacing its rules with rules of their own, but simply trying to better achieve its overarching "scientific" goals.

If the rules in art are less clearly defined than rules in science, it doesn't mean that all art is great whatever its rules, or all activities that follow the scientific rules of inquiry are therefore good science. For example, I consider my drawings poor even if I follow certain pre-established rules regarding distance and perspective, while my friend creates better art even without following any. On the other hand, however unimaginative or outdated my experiments may be, they are at least scientific if I followed certain scientific rules, and therefore seen from a scientific perspective possibly "better" than unscientific experiments. Of course I may examine so trivial an educational issue in my research, that however well "controlled" or designed my experiment may be, it may be less interesting than an artistic approach even to teachers who would rather teach under the paradigm of TAS. We conclude that the difference between art and science, and by extension, between TAA and TAS, is not the presence or absence of rules, but, respectively, how are such rules employed, respectively, to express inner feelings or ideas, or to "accurately" describe the world as-is.

X. THE POLITICS OF TAA AND TAS

We examine the politics of TAS more extensively in another paper[33]. Suffice it to mention here that as educational paradigms for teaching practice, TAA and TAS are critical, respectively, of all un-artistic and un-scientific educational agendas. Thus to the extent that established educational agendas are unscientific or unartistic, whether now or in the future, to that extent TAS and TAA are "anti-establishment." Teaching under either TAA or TAS means that given a conflict between, say, Teaching-as-a-Moral-Exercise (TME), or Teaching-as-Tradition (TRA), on the one hand, and either TAS or TAA, on the other, a teacher chooses to sacrifice the former to the latter even if it means teaching under conditions that are neither "practical" nor politically "advantageous."

Given our society's emphasis on learning results, and the perceived ability of educational researchers to study objectively effective ways of improving such results, it is no wonder that TAS should be recognized by funding agencies as more important in the fulfillment of learning goals than TAA[34]. Of course if scientific proposals stand a better chance of being funded than artistic ones, that doesn't necessarily mean that this is so because schools themselves practice teaching as if it were a science, since, in fact, they may not[35], but simply that funding agencies prefer scientific over non-scientific proposals.

Finally, it may be noted that if researchers must conform to certain rules of scientific inquiry under TAS, or teachers have an ethical obligation to consider in good faith the results of educational research, it doesn't necessarily mean that they must conform politically to the educational status quo to survive. In fact, a teacher or researcher under TAS may introduce evidence or "facts" that discredit the dominant educational paradigm, and therefore become "subversive." This may explain why it is so difficult to conduct educational research outside the parameters established by the public school system, or why research done outside such system may be seen by teachers or school administrators as being "inapplicable."[36]

XI. CONCLUSION

Is teaching an art or a science? We could argue that teaching is, quite simply, both art and science, as are all human activities, and leave it at that. We are not satisfied with such easy solution, since it tells us nothing about how much of each teaching is, and exactly how the two are combined in teaching practice. Whether teaching is an art or science depends on which definition of teaching we adopt, or what we think the goals of teaching should be. If, for the sake of argument, we mean by teaching the attempt to help our students learn, then teaching may be seen as the art of applying learning research. Ironically, in spite our use of the term "art" here, trying to help students learn based on how we have observed them in fact learn makes teaching more a science than an art, and therefore more the "art" of induction from facts, as in science, than the "science" of deduction from feelings, as in art. If, on the other hand, we mean by teaching simply the act of conveying information with no particular emphasis on how well students learn, then teaching lends itself easier to a teacher expressing his feelings even spite his learning effectiveness, and therefore to TAA.

The fact that man has art means that even under the paradigm of TAS he must acknowledge his art: a scientific observation of man requires that he acknowledge his artistic creativity. Alternatively, even arti-facts are in-fact "facts," and therefore require that the artist has at least some knowledge of the world to create them. In his effort to communicate with others, the artist is "forced" to learn enough about the "world" to be able to recreate "objectively" his personal dream or vision. This means that if a teacher is teaching as if he were an artist, then he may still have to learn enough about his students, for example, their patterns of learning, thinking, or feeling, or about his colleagues or school system, to be able to recreate objectively in his classroom his personal vision of teaching.

If a teacher-as-artist is not satisfied with simply how he can recreate objectively in his teaching his own view of teaching, but also wants his students to learn, then he may have to use his art to serve his students, rather than his students to serve his art. It is in this sense that "effective" teaching is both a science and an art, since it can be artistic enough to allow teacher-initiated creativity to intervene, if not require it at least in the formulation of learning hypotheses, but not so artistic as to sacrifice learning by students to his inner subjectivity.

In this paper we tried not so much to offer a prescription of how one should teach, but by distinguishing between art and science to lay open some of the underlying assumptions in both TAA and TAS. Whether one decides to teach as one or the other may depend as much on his overall educational or teaching goals, as on his definition of teaching.

ENDNOTES

[1] For a discussion of systems building in philosophy of education see G. Max Wingo, *Philosophies of Education: An Introduction*, 2nd edition (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1974).

[2] Plato, *The Phaedo*, *Theaetetus*, *The Republic*, in *The Dialogues of Plato*, tr. Benjamin Jowett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953).

[3] On John Dewey's view of the scientific method, see Dewey, *The Sources of a Science of Education* (New York: Liveright: 1929); *How We Think* (Boston: D. C. Heath, 1933); *The Quest for Certainty* (New York: Minton, Balch, 1929); *Intelligence in the Modern World*, ed. Joseph Ratner (New York: The Modern Library, 1939); *Democracy and Education* (New York: The Free Press, 1966); *The Child and the Curriculum* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1902).

[4] See Susanne Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1942); Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, tr. Ralph Manheim (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1953-57).

[5] On religion and society in the Middle Ages, see Geoffrey Barraclough, ed., *Eastern and Western Europe in the Middle Ages* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1970); Thomas F. X. Noble, and John J. Contreni, ed., *Religion, Culture and Society in the Middle Ages* (Kalamazoo, Mich.: Medieval Institute Publications, Western Michigan University, 1987).

[6] The relation of culture to personality has been a favorite topic of writers since classical times. See, for example, Plato, *The Republic*, in *The Dialogues*; Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, tr. James Strachey (New York: Norton, 1961); Wilhelm Reich, *The Mass Psychology of Fascism*, tr. V. R. Carfagno (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1970); Herbert Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966); Albert Memmi, *Dominated Man* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969).

[7] For example, in the field of psychology alone different views on teaching may be inferred from psychoanalytic, humanistic, behavioristic, or existentialistic theories. See Calvin S. Hall and Gardner Lindzey, *Theories of Personality* (New York: John Wiley, 1978). Likewise with different schools of thought, or their representative thinkers in the fields of anthropology, sociology, history, or philosophy.

[8] On the existentialist view of teaching, see the relevant chapter in Wingo, *Philosophies of Education*; George F. Kneller, *Existentialism and Education* (New York: Wiley, 1958); and Van Cleve Morris, Existentialism in Education (New York: Harper and Row, 1966). On Dewey's views on teaching, see Dewey, *School and Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943); *Democracy and Education*; *Child and the Curriculum* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956); *My Pedagogic Creed* (Chicago: Flanagan, 1910); *Experience and Education* (New York:

who have been critical of schooling as a whole. See, for example, Ivan Illich, Deschooling Society (New York: Harper and Row, 1970).

[22] Several works have been published in recent decades on the effect of "structure" on behavior and personality development. See Jean Piaget, Structuralism, tr. and ed. C. Maschler (New York: Basic Books, 1970).

[23] On the "testability" of theories or ideas in science, see Rudolf Carnap, "Testability and Meaning," Philosophy of Science, vol. 3 (1936), 419-471, and vol. 4 (1937), 1-40; and Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science.

[24] On the role of "theory" or "paradigm" in science, see Michael Scriven, "Definitions, Explanations and Theories," in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. II, Herbert Feigl, Michael Scriven, and Grover Maxwell, eds. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), pp. 99-195; Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions; and Norwood R. Hanson, Observation and Explanation (New York: Harper & Row, 1971).

[25] Recognizing the danger of such "biased" interpretation of reality, Edmund Husserl suggested that a scientist put his personal beliefs in "brackets" during his observation of phenomena. See Husserl, Phenomenology and the Foundations of the Sciences, tr. T. E. Klein and W. E. Pohl (Boston: M. Nijhoff Publishers, 1980).

[26] The effect of scientific education on scientists is graphically portrayed in Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.

[27] I am referring here to Paulo Freire's distinction between mechanical action that requires no critical thinking on the actor's part, or "technique," and one which assumes a critical or "thoughtful" view of reality, or "praxis." See Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, tr. M. B. Ramos (New York: Continuum, 1985).

[28] There are several social-psychoanalytic interpretations of how certain experiences may be eventually "internalized," which in turn may cause the person to act "irrationally." See, for example, Sigmund Freud's classic description of internalization in The Ego and the Id, tr. Strachey (New York: Norton, 1960); See also Freud, Totem and Taboo, tr. James Strachey (New York: Norton, 1950); and The Future of an Illusion, tr. W.D. Robson-Scott (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1957).

[29] On the logic of scientific inquiry, in general, see, among other works, Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery; Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, "The Logic of Explanation," in Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck, eds., Readings in the Philosophy of Science (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953), pp. 319-352.

[30] We use the "aesthetic method" only for illustration purposes here. We shall define this method of inquiry as a method that assumes that something is "true" if it is "beautiful."

Arts (Philadelphia, Pa.: Temple University Press, 1978); Ernst Cassirer, Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1953-57); Suzanne Langer, Philosophy in a New Key (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1942); Monroe C. Beardsley and Herbert M. Schneller, eds., Aesthetic Inquiry: Essays on Art Criticism and the Philosophy of Art (Belmont, Ca.: Dickenson, 1967); Robert Goldwater and Marco Treves, eds., Artists on Art, from the XIV to the XX Century (New York: Harper and Row: 1945); John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York: Minton, Balch, 1934); Albert Hofstadter and Richard Kuhns, eds., Philosophies of Art and Beauty (New York: Modern Library, 1964); Robin G. Collingwood, The Principles of Art (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1938); John Hospers, ed., Artistic Expression (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1971); R. Layton, The Anthropology of Art (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981); Evelyn Payne Hatcher, Art as Culture: An Introduction to the Anthropology of Art (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1985); Charlotte M. Otten, ed., Anthropology and Art (Garden City, N.Y.: Natural History Press, 1971).

[13] This is in response to several arguments made regarding the dangers of technological control, or the elimination of humanistic studies in education. This view was most clearly expressed during the 1990 conference of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society in Chicago by Professor Harry S. Broudy in his "Comments on Popp and Noel." Annual Conference of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society, Chicago, Illinois, Nov. 9, 1990 (see inside Proceedings).

[14] Ralph M. Blake, Curt J. Ducasse, and Edward H. Madden, Theories of Scientific Method: THe Renaissance through the Nineteenth Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1960).

[15] John Dewey, Democracy and Education.

[16] Dewey, Sources of a Science of Education.

[17] Dewey, Sources, "Education as an Art," p. 13.

[18] On symbolism in art, see Ernst Cassirer, Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, tr. Ralph Manheim (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1955-1957); and Suzanne K. Langer, Feeling and Form (New York: Scribner's, 1953).

[19] James Coleman, et. al., Equality of Educational Opportunity (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966); Jean Piaget, The Origins of Intelligence in Children (New York: International University Press, 1952); Philippe Aries, Centuries of Childhood (New York: Knopf, 1962).

[20] Jean Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, tr. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956).

[21] On the teacher-student relation, see Willard Waller, The Sociology of Teaching (New York: Wiley, 1932); Robert Dreeben, On What Is Learned in School (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1968). Several writers have written critically about several aspects of schooling, including a group of educational historians known as the "revisionists." See, for example, Colin Greer, The Great School Legend: A Revisionist Interpretation of American Public Education (New York: Basic Books, 1972); Walter Feinberg, Reason and Rhetoric (New York: Wiley, 1975); and Michael Katz, Class, Bureaucracy and Schools: The Illusion of Educational Change in America (New York: Praeger, 1975). Finally, there is a group of writers

Collier Books, 1969); Interest and Effort in Education (Boston: H. Mifflin, 1913). On Plato's view see The Meno, The Symposium, The Republic, The Laws, and the Phaedo, in The Dialogues.

[9] There are probably as many views of teaching as there are public or representative "education groups." See, for example, the views expressed during the school reform movement in Chicago in 1988 and 1989 by the various popular reform groups, such as, Citizens Schools Committee, The Concerned Parents' Network, Taxpayers for Responsible Urban Education (T.R.U.E.), Reconstruct Education with Students, Parents, Educators and Community Together (R.E.S.P.E.C.T.), and others.

[10] On the use of "personal dictionaries" in scientific terminology see, among others, N. R. Campbell, What is Science? (New York: Dover, 1952).

[11] On the mixed artistic-scientific view of teaching see Dewey, Sources of a Science of Education; Nathaniel L. Gage, Hard Gains in the Soft Sciences: The Case of Pedagogy (Bloomington, Ind.: Phi Delta Kappa Center on Evaluation, Development and Research, 1985); The Scientific Basis of the Art of Teaching (New York: Teachers College Press, 1978).

[12] These "definitions" of art and science are derived from the author's reading of works in the history of art and science, his personal encounters with works of art and science, and his own re-interpretation of these theories. The works written in the philosophy of science and the philosophy of art are too numerous to include here. Instead, only a few "classics" and introductory works are mentioned. In the area of the **philosophy of science**, see Plato, Phaedo, in Jowett, Dialogues; Aristotle, Analytica Posteriora, in J. A. Smith and W. D. Ross, eds., Works, 12 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1910-1952), vol. I; Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method, tr. Paul Oscamp (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1965); Issac Newton, Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, tr. A. Motte (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1955); Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1961); Richard B. Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation: A Study of the Function of Theory, Probability and Law in Science (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1953); Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck, eds., Current Issues in the Philosophy of Science (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1961); Norwood R. Hanson, Patterns of Discovery (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1965); Thomas S. Kuhn, The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977); Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); Carl G. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science (New York: Free Press, 1965); Stephen Toulmin, The Philosophy of Science: An Introduction (London: Hutchinson, 1953); Paul K. Feyerabend, and Grover Maxwell, eds. Mind, Matter, and Method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honour of Herbert Feigl (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1966); John Ziman, An Introduction to Science Studies: The Philosophical and Social Aspects of Science and Technology (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1984); Harry S. Broudy, Robert H. Ennis, and L. I. Krimerman, eds., Philosophy of Educational Research (New York: John Wiley, 1973). There seems to be much less agreement on **what is art**, than on what is science in the philosophical literature. In any event, given the variety of often conflicting philosophical theories, the reader may non-philosophical literature, for example, historical, autobiographical, sociological, psychological, or anthropological works on art, at least as helpful. See Joseph Margolis, Philosophy Looks at the

[31] On the role of rules in science, see, among others, C. F. Presley, "Laws and Theories in the Physical Sciences," in Arthur C. Danto and Sidney Morgenbesser, eds., *Philosophy of Science* (New York: Meridian Books, 1960), pp. 205-215.

[32] Unlike Kuhn, who assumed in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* that science has undergone several "revolutions," we submit that it has simply improved its methods of observation. A "revolution" implies a radical change in goals, which never really happened in science. We sumbit that even based on the examples that Kuhn mentioned in his book, what changed were not the goals of science, in the sense of science as the attempt to understand the world, but its intervening "means." Consequently, such changes may better be seen not as "revolutions," but simply as "improvements." This is not to deny the tremendous contribution which Kuhn made to the philosophy of science, if for no other reason because of the discussion that it caused, but simply to distinguish between "essential" and "instrumental" changes, and therefore between scientific *revolutions*, and simply scientitifc *improvements*.

[33] A. Makedon, "The Politics of Teaching as a Science." Paper presented in November of 1989 at the Annual Convention of the American Educational Sudies Association (AESA), Chicago, Illinois, in November of 1989. A chapter by that title is also included in a book on "Teaching as a Science" that is presently being prepared by the author.

[34] This is shown from the number of scientific proposals being funded for research, and the criteria for funding established by funding agencies. For a discussion of the politics of funding for research, see Robert Glaser, ed., *Research and Development and School Change* (Hillsdale, NJ: Halsted Press/J. Wiley, 1978); and Walter R. Borg and Meredith D. Gall, *Educational Research* (New York: Logman, 1989).

[35] As Jack L. Nelson and James P. Shaver put it regarding the relation of empirical research to the teaching of social studies, "... there is a great void. Practice seems virtually undisturbed by research. .. educational and social policy is apparently uninformed by research and remains bound to moralism and prior practice." In William B. Stanley, et. al., *Review of Research in Social Studies Education, 1976-1983* (Boulder, Colo.: ERIC Clearinghouse for Social Studies/Social Science Education: Social Science Education Consortium; Washington, D.C.: National Council for the Social Studies, 1985), p. 420. See also Makedon, "Politics of Teaching as a Science."

[36] According to Ralph W. Tyler, practitioners pay no attention to research that is not "consistent" with the reality that they perceive. Tyler, "How Schools Utilize Educational Research and Development," in Glaser, ed., *Research and Development and School Change*, p. 97.

Classics and Beyond

David B. Owen
Iowa State University

This paper is one of three in a General Session devoted to "What Our Experience Has Shown Us: Teaching Philosophy of Education in the '90s." The purpose of the session is to raise questions that are all too rarely discussed at professional meetings like this, namely, questions pertaining to the practice of teaching theoretic courses in education, especially philosophy of education. The lack of discussion of these matters is, I believe, quite serious; in fact, I am coming to believe that it has been a factor, and possibly a major one, contributing to the decline in the importance of "foundations" courses in professional preparation in education at all levels. I want to suggest something of why I have reluctantly begun to think in this fashion.

Let me begin by backing up a step or two and presenting you with a concrete example of educational policy in the making. In my state, a recent report by the Iowa Business-Education Roundtable Task Force, led by David W. Hornbeck, has received much coverage in the press and is apparently a major source of ideas for the state's Governor and Department of Education as they plan major state-wide reforms. This report reflects what became the "conventional wisdom" in the 1980s, wrapped in the standard specious appeals to "excellence," "competitiveness," and "efficiency." What's especially interesting to me is that the set of philosophic assumptions underlying the recommendations are unusually clear in the report's sections on its "3 Assumptions" and "8 Guiding Principles," though I don't find either truly to be assumptions or principles. Going beneath the stated basis of the ideas, one sees that the report's view of humans is a mechanistic one. In reworking competency based instruction and Benjamin Bloom's Mastery Learning, the authors hold that all children are as like as trains running down the same tracks; the only difference is in how fast they move between stations. No question exists about qualitative differences among them, just as no question exists about the goal of the journey or about the means to get there. The public is told something I think you will be surprised to learn, that everything of importance in educational practice is already known: "What works is a matter of knowledge, not opinion." Thus, in good technicist fashion, the only issue for debate is the most efficient way to achieve our educational purpose, which is characterized by mastery of "a clearly defined, measurable core of learning.

In such a mechanical universe, issues of means and ends are not subject to debate; the only issue to be discussed--and this is a technical discussion, notice, not a public, political debate--is efficiency. It is from this perspective that the report makes its analysis. It argues that the failure of Iowa's school system currently is that it "emphasizes process, not results"; consequently, the system needs to be reconstructed solely on the basis of the latter. Laying aside Dewey's cogent attack on the process-product dichotomy so obviously present here, what is frightening is the Task Force's consequent recommendation that Iowa employ a state-wide "test" for all students which will not only define every few years or so who advances to the next level but also identify schools which are "unsuccessful" and, therefore, after being given a period in which "to improve," "should be penalized" [italics added] by a reduction of state funds. In short, the report encourages reducing an educational system (and here I am thinking of Iowa as it reflects the whole U.S. approach) that, however deeply troubled currently, has produced arguably the richest diversity of innovative and democratic schools in history to what is basically a mass-produced ideal: "one size fits all." And with a Calvinist twist, too: be chosen or be punished. We're back to the elect and the damned, and in a pluralistic democracy, too!

There are, of course, almost limitless practical reasons for attacking such a report, including issues of the socio-economic character of a school's community, per-pupil financing levels, "measurement" of knowledge, and so on. I have brought it up, however, to call attention to its theoretic underpinnings, namely, its materialist reductionism, an educational philosophy which it proposes to impose by legislation on the entire state. In the presentation of this set of ideas to the people of Iowa, what is most striking to me is three things. First, there is a near total absence of educators, especially those with some theoretic sophistication, from the panel making these educational recommendations. Second, educators in the state seem not really to grasp the seriousness of the ideas represented in the report and have mustered little response to it despite the obvious interest of the Department of Education and the Governor. Third, I find it uniquely ironic that during a period when the historically centralized governmental agencies of the U.S.S.R. and its client states are moving dramatically toward more democratic solutions to social problems, Iowa, a farming state with an long record of individualism, should want to centralize and standardize its entire educational system, thereby eliminating its pluralistic, democratic character.

Now, where does philosophy of education fit into all this? Well, in the direct sense, today it doesn't. What we may have forgotten, however, is that this was not always the case. From the Civil War up through at least World War II, national commissions on education, whether set up by the President, by other governmental agencies or by private foundations, frequently had major "foundations" types, including philosophers of education, on them, providing advice and criticism. Since the War, however, participation in national investigations of education by educational philosophers and historians has almost totally disappeared. One need think only of the Nation at Risk, Holmes Group and Carnegie reports of the 1980s. That's at the national level.

At the other extreme, the local level, I suspect that my experience at Iowa State may not be wholly different than that at many contemporary institutions. Philosophy of education (history of education, too, for that matter) is required in no graduate program in education and hasn't been for decades. (Though an undergraduate requirement of a "Social Foundations" course does exist in the teacher-preparation program, neither the text used or the way the course is taught presents any serious consideration of philosophic or historical issues--but that's a topic for another time.) I know that this is not a peculiarity of Iowa State because when I talk to students who have attended graduate programs at other public and private universities in Iowa and other states, a number, I would guess a majority, cannot remember ever having had a course in philosophy of education, graduate or undergraduate. Most disturbing, possibly, is that colleagues in other areas of education respond, when philosophic issues are brought up, that this is not their area of expertise, that they don't really know anything about it, and that anyway, it's more important to be about our business and not get caught up in all that abstract debate. Again, as the previous paragraph suggested, this has not always been the case.

So philosophy of education is virtually invisible at the level of national policy debate and close to invisible in the experience of many professors of education and their students. Why? Well, a number of reasons external to the field exist, of course, ones having to do with such things as socioeconomic forces, the American streak of anti-intellectualism, political struggles, professional turf protection in public schools and in colleges and universities, plus a host of others. However, I think some reasons are internal to our field itself. Two causes of the decline of philosophy of education, ones I will not deal with here, have to do both with the type of philosophy that has dominated since the Second World War and with the increasing "professionalization" of the field. A third cause, however, I do want to discuss here, namely, the teaching of philosophy of education.

It is striking to me that at meetings such as this one, professional philosophers of education rarely discuss teaching their discipline. Going back through the Proceedings of the annual meetings of the Philosophy of Education Society, I find only a handful of papers in the last decade directly devoted to teaching philosophy of education. In the Midwest PES, I'm told it was last discussed in a panel in 1986, but prior to that Milwaukee meeting it is unclear to me when it was last brought up. I think it is critically important to think about and discuss with one another not only what philosophy of education is but also how one presents the discipline to others, especially "outsiders," those who do not plan to become philosophers of education. Many of the students who have passed through our classes have gone on to be leaders at some level in educational circles, and others have gone on to become professors of education and our present colleagues. Judging by frequently expressed attitudes of colleagues in other education fields, we have not in the past been able to help them see the central importance of what we do for all educational endeavors. Philosophy of education, at least potentially, is not just one more technical specialty jockeying for academic power in a Hobbesian war of all against all.

This panel has been put together, therefore, as an attempt to begin to suggest something of the wide diversity of approaches to teaching philosophy of education that exists today and to stimulate reflective discussion of the issues involved in how we present our discipline to others. In addition, I would like to take this opportunity to propose to the Society that we establish some kind of forum at each of our annual meetings where the issues of teaching philosophy of education can be discussed and some of the different approaches even demonstrated in an abbreviated form. Hopefully we will have time later during the discussion of this panel's presentations to debate this proposal.

Such, then, was the impetus behind putting this panel together. Since my two colleagues are going to focus their remarks directly on aspects of how they teach philosophy of education, I will just sketch quickly some of the approaches I have made to this problem, each of which leaves me more or less dissatisfied with its effectiveness.

Let me describe the typical graduate class I work with. It is a 3-credit-hour, semester-long course entitled "Philosophy of Education." None of the students is a major in philosophy of education, so this is entirely a "service" course. Students take it usually because either philosophy, a "social foundations," or a psychology course is required in their masters or doctoral program. They are all experienced teachers, ranging from preschool/kindergarten through junior college level. They tend to be either upgrading their certificate through a masters program or working on a doctorate in Educational Administration, Research and Evaluation, or Curriculum and Instructional Technology. Sometimes they can remember taking a "foundations"-type course in their undergraduate teacher-preparation program. Only infrequently do they remember ever having had a philosophy or a philosophy of education course.

One approach I have made was suggested to me by the first paragraph of Dewey's Experience and Education. "Mankind likes to think in terms of extreme opposites. It is given to formulating its beliefs in terms of Either-Ors, between which it recognizes no intermediate possibilities. . . . The history of educational theory is marked by opposition between the idea that education is development from with and that it is formation from without; that it is based upon natural endowments and that education is a process of overcoming natural inclination and substituting in its place habits acquired under external pressure." As Dewey makes clear in Democracy and Education, this opposition is fundamentally that between Rousseau and Plato. So my course structure was clear: begin with the Republic, then turn to Emile, and conclude with Democracy and Education. Classes read the whole of each book and discussed them each week, with little formal lecturing on my part. My main purpose was to get students to recognize the importance of thinking connectedly and comprehensively about the problems that education raises. I wanted them to begin to recognize that education is not just the technical skill they've been led to believe it is but also the most important perspective one can take on civilized life. The course's success in my eyes was Deweyan in character: either students "took to" this approach like the proverbial ducks (I have yet to find any student who remembers ever having read any of these works previously) or this was just a chore to get through. Dewey's observation on humankind's tendency prevailed.

What to do? Two ideas occurred to me. The first arouse out of student complaints that these books were "too abstract" or "didn't reflect reality." Since "What do I do Monday morning?" seems to be the level at which most of their educational preparation has functioned, I decided to become "concrete." Having written a dissertation on Emile, I had great sympathy with such an approach to theoretic problems. Consequently, I decided to present individual schools that had been organized on philosophic principles. Maybe that would be "practical" enough. But which schools? Here my work on Richard McKeon came to mind. McKeon argues for four enduring approaches to intellectual issues, in rough terms, the atomist, formalist, skeptical, and problematic approaches. Moreover, he argues that "any question pushed far enough is philosophic in character." So I had four approaches to work with, a rationale for beginning with the concrete, and the structure for the course. I tried to choose a school to represent each of the four approaches. First came Skinner's Walden Two for the atomistic view of education. (I know, this is not a real school, but it seems as if it is to the students; furthermore, if pressed, I bring out Kathleen Kinkade's A Walden Two Experiment as a working example.) Next was Bruno Bettelheim's Children of the Dream about the Israeli Kibbutzim--often supplemented with Charlotte Perkins Gilman's Herland, a wonderful (and also seemingly concrete) feminist utopian novel--to present the formalist educational perspective. Then I've used either Carl Rogers' Freedom To Learn in the '80s or A. S. Neill's Summerhill, both taking a more skeptical, relativistic approach. Finally, the last reading was Katherine Camp Mayhew and Anna Camp Edwards, The Dewey School, the detailed recollections of two sisters who taught with Dewey in Chicago. I have come always to present Dewey last in a course; I find his ideas the most difficult for students to grasp.

I've had some modest success with this approach, and less students complain about abstraction and irrelevance. I am, however, troubled by the marginality of several issues that I try to work into discussions but lack the time in the context of this course to deal with. First is the whole host of feminist issues. A substantial majority of my students are women and they tend to find little attention paid to gender issues in other courses. I'm troubled that I haven't provided more in this area. Second, I have a similar unease about racial issues. Third, the 1980s provided a most striking reorganization of public priorities, leading to unique and growing class divisions, all increasingly reflected in our educational system in America. Last, as I talk with practicing teachers, I'm becoming increasingly uneasy about the power of television. Television (and I recognize I've come late to this awareness) is arguably the most powerful educator in America today. It has apparently become the environment within which we all function, mediating both our direct "experience" of the world as well as, more obviously, the way we are presented with what's important in that world by other humans. I sense that as a philosopher of education I need to think about media much more carefully and stimulate the students in my classes to do so, too.

In short, I wish I could conclude by telling you that mine is a success story. I can't. I wish I could at least tell you what the "moral" is. But, again, I can't. My class gives me just one chance to talk with individuals who have virtually no philosophic background and little intention of formally pursuing further the intellectual issues raised in class. I find myself torn between two purposes. One is to indicate that there is something I would call an intellectual world, a world in which matters of knowledge, action, and emotion have a discernible, if debatable, relation to each other. I would like to encourage students to recognize that when they are told to think about learning, for instance, as being merely information-processing based on a metaphor of the mind as a computer, they are also being told to conceive of knowledge as having a certain character and of human relationships, social and political, as having a certain quality, that, in short, learning theory has consequences far beyond the field of cognitive psychology. Yet another purpose I find myself drawn to is to consider some of the critical "issues" currently so important in general discussions and practices of education today, for instance, the four I mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

So, as I think about the next time I will teach philosophy of education, which purpose will act as my guide as I prepare the course? I don't really know today. I find it important, however, to share my experience with those of you who teach even in situations only loosely related to mine because I believe your responses will help me see my way more clearly. Perhaps my experience will provide some stimulus for your reflections, too. And, most important, it opens the possibility of our both seeing more by conversing together than any one of us can see alone. As Socrates says in the Protagoras [348d], referring to Ulysses' night investigation of the Trojan camp in the Illiad, "When two go together, one sees before the other." And that is a central source of intellectual community.